SYED YUSUFF v. CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BANGALORE
1987-06-05
M.P.CHANDRAKANTARAJ
body1987
DigiLaw.ai
CHANDRAKANTHARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is a registered Class I contractor of the Karnataka Government public Works Department. In response to the invitation to tender dated 19th february 1987 he quoted for items 1, 8 and 10. The tender notification is filed at Annexure-A to the writ petition. One of the conditions imposed by the invitation to tender was that the earnest money deposit should be accompanied by a demand Draft for the relevant amount or challan for having credited the said amount into the Corporation Treasury, drawn infavourofthe Executive Engineer. Petitioner's tender though lowest was rejected for all items on the ground that there was no fulfilment of condition No. 1, substance of which is extracted above. He had produced what is described as a banker's cheque. Therefore, the present petition seeking the relief by way of writ of mandamus directing the first-respondent corporation. City of Bangalore, to accept his tender for items 1, 8 and 10 in place of the tender made by the 3rd respondent venugopal on the ground that the petitioner's tender is lowest while that of the 3rd respondent is not. It is further asserted that on enquiry it has been learnt that his tender was rejected solely on the ground that his tender for the items in question was not accompanied by the necessary demand drafts. ( 2 ) CONTENTION in this Court is that demand Draft and Banker's cheque which he submitted are one and the same as certified by the Bank filed at Annexure-C to the Petition. That certificate is dated 21st May 1987 whereas the tender was much earlier. Even the scrutiny and rejection also was earlier than the certificate. Technically it may be true that the Demand draft payable to the Executive engineer or a Banker's cheque payable to the Executive Engineer of the corporation, may ensure the payment of the money. 'but if the conditions stipulated a particular mode of payment (in this case two modes) it is not open to the tenderer to adopt a third mode of his choice and then contend that the authorities are wrong in rejecting his tender, though there is no evidence prima facie that his tender has been rejected fo. r that reason only.
'but if the conditions stipulated a particular mode of payment (in this case two modes) it is not open to the tenderer to adopt a third mode of his choice and then contend that the authorities are wrong in rejecting his tender, though there is no evidence prima facie that his tender has been rejected fo. r that reason only. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel however drew my attention to the decision of the Supreme court in Manjit Kaur v The State of punjab and others (AIR 1987 S. C. 1070 ). In Manjit Kaur's case a handicapped person applied for the post of social studies mistress and she was denied the job on the sole ground that her certificate disclosed that she was "orthopaedically handicapped but otherwise fit for employment". It did not state that she was "disabled/handicapped but otherwise fit for employment. " The Supreme Court in that case held that it was not a case that the candidate was not a handicapped person but only that she did not possess the certificate in the form prescribed. In other words, the fact that the petitioner was handicapped was never in dispute either before the selection authorities or before the Supreme Court. It was in that circumstance they have given liberal interpretation to favour the handicapped person apparently on the doctrine of substantial compliance. That ought not to assist the petitioner in the present case because he has got to blame himself for not seeking demand draft from the Bank. It is no use for the bank to certify that there is no difference between the two and it cannot be assumed that the Executive Engineer was aware of the intricate names that Negotiable instruments may have or the forms they may assume. If it was within the knowledge and ability of the petitioner to produce a demand draft he should have done so. If he did not, he cannot blame the first respondent Corporation. ( 4 ) THERE is no merit, in this petition particularly when the ground for rejecting tender for items 1, 8 and 10 are not clear to the Court. Petition dismissed. Writ Petition dismissed at the stage of preliminary hearing itself. --- *** --- .