Judgment S. K. Jha, J. 1. This case involves a matter of first impression. The defendant of Title Suit No.1 of 1983 of the court of 2nd Munsif, Buxar, is the petitioner here. This revision petition is direcetd against the order dated 30th April, 1985 by which the learned Munsif has directed that the suit for eviction from lease hold building filed on composite grounds be bifurcated into two parts, or rather into two suits for all practical purpose. 2. On 23-12-82 a composite suit was filed by the plaintiff-opposite party for eviction of the petitioner on the ground of personal necessity and default in the payment of rent. So far as the question of eviction on the ground of personal necessity is concerned, a special summary procedure has been prescribed in the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (Bihar act No.4 of 1983) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in which certain special features have been engrafted in the statute book with some obvious purpose. But so far as a composite suit is concerned, namely, a suit on the ground of personal necessity as covered by Sec.11 (1) (c) of the Act and other provisions of Sec.11 (1) of the Act, the trial is to be guided by the proceedings in the usual manner and there is no short cut for it in the statute book. To continue the narration of facts on 6-1-1983-the defendant-petitioner filed his written statement regarding default in the payment of rent as well as personal necessity. Long thereafter on 12-3-1985 the plaintiff-opposite party filed an application for bifurcation of the two subject matters one with regard to personal necessity and the other with regard to default in the payment of rent. By the impugned order the court below has done so. 3. Mr. Sukumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that this is absolutely an illegal order as the suit cannot be bifurcated at any time after the written statement has been filed by the defendant in an eviction suit under the Act. In my opinion, there is much force in this contention. Sec.14 of the Act, as already stated above, provide for special procedure for disposal of cases for eviction on the ground of bonafide reasonable requirement. In my opinion, there is much force in this contention. Sec.14 of the Act, as already stated above, provide for special procedure for disposal of cases for eviction on the ground of bonafide reasonable requirement. Subsection (2) thereof enjoins that :- "the Court shall issue summons in the prescribed form in every suit referred in sub-section (1) without delay. " sub-section 3 (i) of Sec.14 of the Act contemplates that :- "the Court shall, in addition to, and simultaneously with, the issue of summons for service on the tenant or tenants, also direct the summons to be served by registered post with acknowledgment due, addressed to the tenant or his agent empowered to accept the service at the place where the tenant or his agent actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain and may, if the circumstances of the case so require, also direct the publication of the summons in the Official Gazette or newspapers circulating in the locality in which the tenant is last known to have resided or carried on business or personally worked for again. " Thereafter sub-section (4) of Sec.14 provides that:- "the tenant on whom summons is duly served (whether by ordinary mail or by registered post) shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless the files an affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to make such contest and obtains leave from the Court as hereinafter provided ; and in default of the appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave the statement made by the landlord in the suit for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid". Sub-section (5) of Sec.14 categorically states that :- "the Court shall give to the tenant leave to contest the suit if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction. On the grounds specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Sec.11". It may be incidentally be mentioned that Sec.11 (l) (e) of the Act deals with termination of the tenancy by efflux of time (i. e. contractual period ). On the grounds specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Sec.11". It may be incidentally be mentioned that Sec.11 (l) (e) of the Act deals with termination of the tenancy by efflux of time (i. e. contractual period ). Subsection (6) of Sec.14 states that :- "when leave is granted to the tenant to contest the suit, the latter may, within fifteen days from the date of the order, pray after filing the requisite Court-fee, required for a written statement that the affidavit may be treated as the written statement or if he chooses to file a separate written statement he may do so within fifteen days of the grant of leave to contest the suit and if he does not file the written statement within the period he shall not be allowed to do so. Later (he Court shall thereafter commence the hearing of the suit as early as practicable" . Sub-section (7) of Sec.14 which is a non-obtante clause speaks that : -"notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or any other law, the Court while hearing a suit under this section shall follow the practice and procedure of a court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. " we are not concerned in this case with regard to the provisions of sub-sections (8) and (9) of Sec.14 of the Act. 4 Having regard to these provisions one may ask a question as to whether when the written statement has already been filed and long thereafter a petition for bifurcation of such suit as the instant one is filed, the allowing of the same will tantamount to relegating the plaintiff or plaintiffs to its/their original position as if the suit on the ground specified in Sec.14 had now been filed because in such a case (i) notice through post is a must; (ii) publication in the official gazette and newspaper is a must in appropriate cases ; (iii) making an application to the court on affidavit seeking to contest the suit is a must and only (iv) when the court accords such sanction a written statement has to be filed by the tenant. 5. 5. The present suit having been filed as far back as in the year 1982 and the defendant having filed his written statement on 6-4-83, it does not lie in tbe mouth of the plaintiff opposite party to bifurcate the two causes of action one which is solely confined within the four corners of Sec.14 and the other to which the general law is applicable. Taking any contrary view of the matter will be making a ridicule of the legislature. Therefore 1 am constrained to hold that the learned Munsif has erred in law and has exceeded his jurisdiction in passing the impugned order bifurcating the two causes of action in the same suit tanta-mounting to making them into two suits out of one after the lapse of the period during which all the formalities which were to be performed under different provisions of Sec.14 have long since passed their limits. 6. In the result, this application is allowed and the order passed by the learned Munsif is set aside. However, in the circumstances of the case I shall make no order as to casts. Since this is a suit for eviction, inter alia, on the ground of personal necessity the trial court shall proceed to try the suit as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law. Revision allowed.