RAMA JOIS, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition presented by the owner of a touring cinema, the following questions of law arise for consideration: whether a touring cinema licence, which was existing on the date of the commencement of the Karnataka cinemas (Regulation) (Amendment) rules, 1967 ('the Amendment Rules' for short) and which, by virtue of sub- rule (6) of Rule 105 of the Amendment rules is deemed to continue for a period of one year, if an application was made under sub-rule (l) of Rule 105 of the Amendment Rules for conversion of touring cinema into Semi- permanent cinema within a period of three months from the date of commence ment of the Amendment rules, does not cease if such application is rejected earlier? ( 2 ) WHETHER the Licensing authority was right in holding that the touring cinema licence granted to the petitioner, prior to the commencement of the Amendment Rules which was deemed to have been continued by virtue of sub-rule (6) of Rule 105 of the Amendment Rules, came to an end at the end of three months from the date of the commen cement of the amendment Rules even though he had made an application within the prescribed period, on the ground that the application of the petitioner was defective ? 2. The petition is posted for preliminary hearing. It is taken up for final hearing by consent of all learned Counsel appearing for the parties. ( 3 ) THE facts of the case, in brief, are as follow: The petitioner had secured a No Objection Certificate and constructed a touring cinema building on a land bearing Sy. No. 309/2 at Tarakanambi village, Gundlupet taluk. The land belongs to respondent-2. Thereafter he had also secured a licence for running a touring cinema in the said structure. The said licence was being renewed from time to time. There had been large number of Writ Petitions before this Court, questioning validity of some of the rules which governed the grant of No Objection certificate and licence to the touring cinemas. This Court upheld the validity of those rules and there after the matter was taken up in appeal before the Supreme court. There had been large number of Writ Petitions before this Court, questioning validity of some of the rules which governed the grant of No Objection certificate and licence to the touring cinemas. This Court upheld the validity of those rules and there after the matter was taken up in appeal before the Supreme court. When the matter was pending before the Supreme Court the touring cinema licence granted to the petitioner had been renewed upto 31st July, 1987 or till the date of the disposal of the appeal by the Supreme court, whichever was earlier. Before the supreme Court it was represented on behalf of the State that there was a proposal to make several amendments to the Karnataka cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1971, and it was also submitted that even the draft rules had been framed. The Supreme Court in karnataka TOURING TALKIES v state OF KARNATAKA (Nos. 13177 to 13195 of 1984) made the following order:"in view of the speech of the Chief minister of Karnataka on the floor of the house on July 19,1985,= and in view of the draft rules which are DOW awaiting to be finalised, the petitioner want permission to withdraw, the Writ Petitions, appeals, and Special Leave Petitions with liberty to pursue such future remedy as may be permissible if it becomes necessary. Status quo will continue in all these petitions and appeals. In Civil Appeal No. 4703-4906 of 1985 the State is the appellant and for the same reason the appellant desires to withdraw the appeals. It is understood that the judgment under appeal is not to be treated as precedent. The questions are left open. The Writ Petitions, appeals, and special Leave Petitions are disposed of accordingly". There is no dispute that, in view of the last sentence of the first paragraph of the order of the Supreme Court, touring cinema licence granted to the petitioner was to continue for a period of three months from the date of the order of the Supreme Court. Accordingly the petitioner was continuing to run the touring cinema till and on 25th february, 1987, on which date the Amend ment Rules were promulgated. According to the Amendment Rules separate provision had been made for grant of touring cinema licence which was limited for a period of only three months in respect of a given site. Accordingly the petitioner was continuing to run the touring cinema till and on 25th february, 1987, on which date the Amend ment Rules were promulgated. According to the Amendment Rules separate provision had been made for grant of touring cinema licence which was limited for a period of only three months in respect of a given site. We are not concerned with the said provision in this petition. The Amendment Rules also made a provision for converting of touring cinemas into Semi- Permanent cinemas. A semi-permanent cinema could be located only in a permanent building, though, in several respects specification are not the same as required for establishing a permanent cinema. Rule 105 of the amendment rules provides for making an application for conversion of a touring cinema into a semipermanent cinema and for grant of licence for such permanent cinema. Rule 105 of the amendment rules reads:"conversion OF TOURING cinemas INTO SEMIPERMANENT cinemas,-- (1) Any person who is having touring cinema licence under these rules before the date of the commen cement of the Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) Amendment Rules, 1978 (hereinafter in this rule referred to as the amendment Rules) and desire to convert such touring cinema into semipermanent cinema, may from the date of the commencement of the Amendment Rules, applied in Form AA for conversion of existing No Objection Certificate into No objection Certificate for Semi-Permanent cinema. (2) The licensing authority, on receipt of application under sub- rule (l) if satisfied, after inspection or such enquiry as it may consider necessary that the licensed touring cinema building conforms to the requirements of provisions relating to construction of semi-permanent cinema building may exempt such licensees from the requirement of the grant of the said no Objection Certificate. (3) If the licensing authority, on inspection of the touring cinema, is satisfied that the touring cinema building requires any modification in relation to the structure of the building or otherwise, it may grant No Objection Certification to the applicant in Form 'd' specifying that the applicant shall conform to the provi sions relating to the semi-permanent cinema building within three years from the date of issue of such No Objection certificate. (4) If the licensing authority is satisfied that no such No Objection Certificate is required in respect of conversion of a touring cinema into a semi-permanent cinema, it may grant licence to the applicant for semi-permanent cinema. (4) If the licensing authority is satisfied that no such No Objection Certificate is required in respect of conversion of a touring cinema into a semi-permanent cinema, it may grant licence to the applicant for semi-permanent cinema. " (5) The provisions of rule 111g shall not apply to the No Objection Certificate granted under this rule. (6) The licence granted for a touring cinema under these rules before the date of the commencement of the amendment rules be deemed to have been continued for a period of one year from the date of the commencement of the amendment rules. Provided that such licence shall not be deemed to have been so continued after the expiry of the period specified under sub- rule (l), if the licensee does not apply for No Objection Certificate within the said period: provided further that if the licensing authority is satisfied that sufficient progress regarding conversion of existing touring cinema into semi-permanent has been made, and the licensee has also applied for the No Objection Certificate under sub-rule (l), it may extent the licence for a further period of not exceeding one year at a time but the total period including the period so extended shall not exceed three years from the date of the commencement of the amendment rules. "sub-rule (l) of the above rule enables a person, who was desirous of converting a touring cinema into a semi-permanent cinema, to apply within three months from the date of the commencement of the amendment rules, in Form-AA. There is no dispute that the petitioner did apply before the District magistrate, Mysore, seeking permission for conversion of his touring cinema into semipermanent cinema on 8-5-1987. There is also no dispute that the petitioner was continuing to run the touring cinema, in view of sub-rule (6) of Rule 105. On 19-5-1987 the district Magistrate sent a communication to the petitioner calling upon him to stop the exhibition of flims with effect from 25 th may, 1987. The said communication reads: aggrieved by the said communication the petitioner has presented this petition. ( 4 ) THE plea of the petitioner is as follows: in view of sub- rule (6) of Rule 105 the petitioner was entitled to continue his touring cinema shows for a period of one year as the petitioner had made application within three months as provided in sub-rule (1) of rule 105. ( 4 ) THE plea of the petitioner is as follows: in view of sub- rule (6) of Rule 105 the petitioner was entitled to continue his touring cinema shows for a period of one year as the petitioner had made application within three months as provided in sub-rule (1) of rule 105. The proviso to sub-rule (6) gets attracted to the case only if the petitioner had not made an application within three months as provided for in sub-rule (1) and, therefore, the said condition was not applicable as he had made such an application. Even if the position in law was that the licence continued by virtue of sub-rule (6) of rule 105 must come to an end and if the application made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 105 were to be rejected, the petitioner's licence had not come to an end because the district Magistrate had not passed orders rejecting the application of the petitioner. Therefore, the direction given by the District magistrate in the impugned communication that the petitioner should stop shows with effect from 25th May, 1987, was contrary to law. ( 5 ) THE plea of the respondents is as follows: According to sub- rule (1) of Rule 105 the petitioner was required to make an application in the prescribed form (Form-AA ). According to the said form the applicant was required to produce the document about the lawful occupation of the applicant, of the land in question. Further, if the land concerned was an agricultural land the appellant was also required to furnish Certificates of conversion of the land for non-agricultural purpose. In the application presented by the petitioner he had left these columns (Columns 8 and 10) blank obviously because he could not satisfy those two requirements for the reason that the lease in favour of the petitioner had already come to an end, and, further, as far as Certificate of Conversion of the land for non-agricultural purpose was concerned, it was only respondent-2, owner of the land in question, who could make application for grant of such Certificate and he had not made any such application and he was not willing to make any such application. It was in these circumstances the District magistrate had issued the impugned communication. It was in these circumstances the District magistrate had issued the impugned communication. The said communication taut amounts to the rejection of the application (Form-AA) of the petitioner in view of the inability on the part of the petitioner to comply with the aforesaid two requirements. If the communication issued by the District magistrate was understood as an order rejecting the application of the petitioner, he had no right to continue the shows even from 19-5-1987 itself. ( 6 ) WITH reference to the first question, it is true that sub-rule (6) of Rule 105 provides that the licence granted for touring cinema under the rules before the date of the commencement of the amended rules, is deemed to have been continued for a period of one year from the date of the commencement of the amendment rules. If the application for conversion of the touring cinema licence into semi-permanent cinema is made under sub- rule (l) of Rule 105. Sub-rules (2), (3) and (4) provides for passing of an order with reference to the No Objection Certificate. There is no specific provision in Rule 105 as to what would happen if the application presented in form-AA under sub-rule (l) of Rule 105 is rejected. The rule, in my opinion, cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read along with the provisions of Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) Act; 1964 ('the Act' for short ). Section 5 of the Act requires that any person who intends to give exhibition by means of a cinematograph in a place should make an application before the licensing authority in the prescribed manner. The said Section reads:"5. LICENCE FOR EXHIBITION OF cinematograph FILMS. (l) Any person who intends to give exhibition by means of a cinematograph in a place shall make an application in writing to the licensing authority for a licence thereof together with such particulars as may be prescribed. (2) The licensing authority may, thereupon, after consulting such authority or officer as may be prescribed and subject to the provisions of this Act, and the rules thereunder, grant the licence to such person and on such terms and conditions and subject to such restrictions as it may determine. " (3) Where the licensing authority refuses to grant the licence, it shall do so by an order communicated to the applicant giving the reasons for such refusal". " (3) Where the licensing authority refuses to grant the licence, it shall do so by an order communicated to the applicant giving the reasons for such refusal". When an application under sub-section (1) of Section 5 is made, under sub-section (2), the licensing authority has the power to grant the licence, if all the terms and conditions are complied with. Sub-section (3)empowers the licensing authority to refuse to grant the licence, but requires the authority to record its reasons for refusal and communicate the same to the applicant. The application made in Form-AA under sub-rule (1) of Rule 105 of the Amendment Rules is required to be considered by the licensing authority under section 5 of the Act. Therefore, an application made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 105 has to be and is liable to be rejected if the requirements of the provisions of the Act or the Amended Rules are not complied with. From this it follows a person, whose application under Rule 105 (1) for grant of licence for Semi-Permanent Cinema is rejected, cannot continue to run the touring cinema or semi-Permanent cinema even after such rejection. Therefore, the real intention of the rule making authority is that the licence granted to a touring cinema, before the commencement of the Amendment Rules, has to continue for a period of one year so that the person concerned may apply under sub- rule (l) of Rule 105 and secure permission for converting the existing touring cinema into Semi-Permanent cinema. If that application is rejected for valid reasons shortly after the application is made, it cannot still be said that as the concerned person had made an application under sub-rule (1) of rule 105 and as he had a touring cinema licence on the date of the commencement of again, the same reiterated in M/s. GIRI the Amendment Rules, he can continue the touring cinema for one year. ( 7 ) IT is a well-known rule of construction that when the statutory provision is silent, in respect of any particular matter, the real meaning of the statute should be ascertained having due regard to the intention of the rule making authority. This principle has been explained by the Supreme Court in STATE of KARNATAKA AND OTHERS v m/s. HANSA CORPORATION (A. I. R. 1981 s. C. 463 ). This principle has been explained by the Supreme Court in STATE of KARNATAKA AND OTHERS v m/s. HANSA CORPORATION (A. I. R. 1981 s. C. 463 ). The relevant portion of the judgment reads (at page-469):"whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within the human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may, arise, and, even, if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of parliament have - often been unfairly criticised. A Judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. 'it would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appear the judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word - so as to give 'force and life' to the intention of the legislature". Again, the same principle has been reiterated in M/s. GIRDHARILAL and SONS v BALBIR NATH MATHUR AND OTHERS (A. I. . 1986 S. C. , 1499.) at page-1502, which reads:"it may be worthwhile to restate and explain at this stage certain well known principles of interpretation of statutes:words are but mere vehicles of thoughts. They are meant to express or convey one's thoughts. Generally a person's words and thoughts are coincidental. No problem arises then, but, not infrequently, they are not. It is common experience with most men, that occasionally there are no adequate words to express some of their thoughts. Words which very nearly express the thoughts may be found but not words which will express precisely. There is then a great fumbling of words. No problem arises then, but, not infrequently, they are not. It is common experience with most men, that occasionally there are no adequate words to express some of their thoughts. Words which very nearly express the thoughts may be found but not words which will express precisely. There is then a great fumbling of words. Long winded explanations, and, in conversation, even gestures are resorted to. Ambiguous words and words which unwittingly convey more than one meaning are used. Where different interpretations are likely to be put on words and a question arises what an individual meant when he used certain words, he may be asked to explain himself and he may do so and say that he meant one thing and not the other. But if it is the legislature that has expressed itself by making the laws and the difficulties arise in interpreting what the legislature has said, a legislature cannot be asked to sit to resolve those difficulties. The legislatures, unlike the individuals, cannot come forward to explain themselves as often as difficulties of interpretation arise. So the task of interpreting the laws by finding out what the legislature meant is allotted to the Courts. Now, If one person puts into words the thoughts of another (as drafts man puts into words the thoughts of the legislature) and a third person (the Court) is to find out what they meant, more difficulties are bound to crop up. The draftsman may not have caught the spirit of the legislation at all; the words used by him may not adequately convey what is meant to be conveyed; the words may be ambiguous; they may be words capable of being differently understood by different persons. How are the Courts to set about the task of resolving difficulties of the interpretation of the laws? The foremost task of a Court, as we conceive it, in the interpretation of the Statutes, is to find out the intention of the legislature. Of course, where words are clear and unambiguous no question of construction may arise. Such words ordinarily speak for themselves. Since the words must have spoken as clearly to legislators as to judges, it may be safely presumed that the legislature intended what the words plainly say. Of course, where words are clear and unambiguous no question of construction may arise. Such words ordinarily speak for themselves. Since the words must have spoken as clearly to legislators as to judges, it may be safely presumed that the legislature intended what the words plainly say. This is the real basis of the so called golden rule of construction that where the words of statute are plain and unambiguous effect must be given to them. A Court should give effect to plain words, not because there is any charm or magic in the plainness of such words but because the plain words may be expected to convey plainly the intention of the legislature to others as well as Judges. Intention of the legislature and not the words is paramount. Even where the words of statutes appear to be prima facie clear and unambiguous it may some times be possible that the plain meaning of the words does not convey and may even the defeat the intention of the legislature; in such cases there is no reason why the true intention of the legislature, if it can be determined, clearly be other means, should not be given effect. Words are meant to serve and not to govern and we are not to add the tyranny of words to the other tyrannies of the words". The combined effect of the provisions of the act and the Amendment Rules would show that the existence of a licence is a condition precedent for conducting cinematograph exhibition in a touring cinema or semi permanent cinema and an application for such a licence can be rejected by the authority having the power to grant licence under Section 5 of the Act, if the rejection is called for, having regards to the provisions of the Act and the rules, recording the reasons for the rejection. From this it follows that if the application made in Form-AA under sub-rule (1) of Rule 105 is rejected, the deemed continuance of the licence under sub-rule (6) of rule 105 must come to an end. From this it follows that if the application made in Form-AA under sub-rule (1) of Rule 105 is rejected, the deemed continuance of the licence under sub-rule (6) of rule 105 must come to an end. In other words, the clear meaning of sub-rule (6) is, that the licence granted to a touring cinema, which is in existence before the date of the commencement of the Amendment Rules, should be deemed to have continued for a period of one year from the date of the commencement of the Amendment Rules if the concerned person had made an application within a period of three months from the date of the commencement of the Amendment Rules or upto the date on which the application made under sub-rule (l) of Rule 105, is rejected. A contrary view would lead to absurd results, in that, even if the application made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 105 was rejected, say within a period of one month from the date on which the application was made, even then the person concerned would be entitled to continue the touring cinema for a period of one year. Certainly this could not have been the intention of the rule making authority. Therefore it is reasonable to construe the provision as enabling the licensee to continue the touring cinema for a period of one year from the date of the commencement of the Amendment Rules, if he had made an application within three months from the date of the commencement of the amendment Rules for conversion of a touring cinema licence into semi-permanent cinema or till the date of the rejection of the application, whichever is earlier. Therefore, for these reasons, I answer the first question as follow: a touring cinema licence which was existing on the date of the commencement of the Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) (Amendment) Rules, 1987 and which by virtue of sub-rule (6) of Rule 105 of the amendment Rules, which is deemed to continue for a period of one year, ceases to continue with effect from the date on which the application made under sub-rule (l) of Rule 105 of the amendment Rules for conversion of a touring cinema into a semi-permanent cinema, is rejected, even earlier to one year. ( 8 ) THE second question for consideration is whether the impugned communication dated 19-5-1987 (Annexure-D) could be regarded as an order rejecting the application of the petitioner dated 8-5-1987? ( 9 ) AS stated earlier the Amendment rules came into force on 25- 2-1987. Immediately prior to the said date the petitioner had a licence to run a touring cinema. He had made an application under Rule 105 (l)on 8-5-1987. Therefore, under sub- rule (6) of Rule 105 his licence was deemed to have been continued. In view of Rule 105 read with Section 5 of the Act it was obligatory on the part of the District Magis trate to consider the application of the petitioner and to take a decision as to whether it should be granted or rejected, a reading of the impugned communication would show that the District Magistrate had taken the view that the application made by the petitioner was no application at all in the eye of law and, therefore, it should be regarded that the petitioner did not make an application at all within the period permitted under sub-rule (l) of Rule 105. Consequently, he held that the petitioner should stop shows with effect from 25-5-1987, ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents pointed out that the two reasons assigned by the District Magistrate for issuing the impugned communication were: (1) that the petitioner had not produced any documentary evidence to show that he was in lawful possession of the land in question; and (2) that he had not produced any document regarding the permission for conversion of agricultural land into non-agricultural land. They invited my attention to the relevant portion of the application, From-AA, i. e. , columns 8 and 10 which read: "8. If the land/site is not owned by the applicant (i) Name and address of the owner (ii) Is document to prove the lawful occupation of the applicant enclosed? 9. xx xx xx xx ( 11 ) ARE the following attached to the application? 1. Katha extract 2. Certificate to the effect of clearence of land revenue/ Municipal tax. "3. Certification of the conversion of the land for non- agricultural purposes if it is revenue land. 4. Treasury challan for payment of fees for 'no Objection Certificate' under rule 105 fees under rule 29. 5. Drawings required under clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 25 (3 ). Certificate to the effect of clearence of land revenue/ Municipal tax. "3. Certification of the conversion of the land for non- agricultural purposes if it is revenue land. 4. Treasury challan for payment of fees for 'no Objection Certificate' under rule 105 fees under rule 29. 5. Drawings required under clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 25 (3 ). " they also showed from the original records that the petitioner had left the said columns blank. As held by this Court in KANTHAM- ma v A. SUDARSHAN AND ANOTHER (3) as far as the lawful possession of the land in question in respect of which a cinematograph licence sought for, it was obligatory for the applicant to produce documentary evidence only in order to satisfy the District Magistrate that the applicant concerned was in lawful possession of the land. In the instant case, the respondents pointed out that the petitioner had left the columns 8 and 10 blank and had not been able to produce documentary evidence obviously because he had no such documentary evidence. ( 12 ) AS far as the conversion of agricultural land for non- agricultural purpose is concerned, the application is required to be made by the owner (respondent-2) of the land and, therefore, unless respondent-2 applies for conversion of the agricultural land for non-agricultural purpose and secures permission of the Deputy Commissioner and thereafter gives consent to the petitioner to construct a semi-permanent cinema on the land in question the petitioner will not be in a position to comply with the said condition. In view of these two infirmities in the application the learned counsel for respondents submitted that the impugned communication should be considered as an order rejecting the application of the petitioner. ( 13 ) IT is true that the defects pointed out by the District Magistrate in the impugned communication are such that unless the petitioner complies with those conditions the licence or permission could not be granted and it might be difficult for the petitioner to comply with the said conditions. Whatever that may be, the petitioner had made the application under sub-rule (l) of rule 105 on 8-5-87, i. e. , within three months from the date of the commencement of the amendment rules. Whatever that may be, the petitioner had made the application under sub-rule (l) of rule 105 on 8-5-87, i. e. , within three months from the date of the commencement of the amendment rules. It WIS open to the District magistrate to consider the said application and make an order sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act recording reasons for rejection. But, in the impugned communication, the district Magistrate had not passed any order on the application presented by the applicant-petitioner on 8-5-1987. The effect of the impugned communication is that as the petitioner has not furnished two important informations required in columns (8) and (10) of Form-AA, the application of the petitioner was no application at all and, therefore, on the ground that the petitioner bad not made may application under sub-rule (1) of Rule 105 he must stop exhibition of films with effect from 25- 5-1987. ( 14 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the District Magistrate could not proceed on the basis that the petitioner had not made any application at all. On the application made by the petitioner on 8-5-1987 it was still open to the petitioner to satisfy the two conditions. If the petitioner was unable to satisfy the District Magistrate, he was at liberty to pass the order in accordance with law, but he was not right in saying that the application made by the petitioner was no application at all. ( 15 ) IN the circumstances, it appears to me that, though in the impugned communication, the District Magistrate had pointed out two defects in the application presented by the petitioner, the impugned communication could not be regarded as an order made by the District Magistrate under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act. In this behalf it is pertinent to point out that under Section 10 of the Act, a person, whose application for grant of licence is rejected, is entitled to file an appeal before the prescribed authority i. e. , The Divisional Commissioner. The impugned communication was not and could not be regarded as an order made on the application filed by the petitioner on 8-5-1987. The impugned communication was not and could not be regarded as an order made on the application filed by the petitioner on 8-5-1987. Further, from the answer to the first question, it is clear that licence, which the petitioner held on the date of the commencement of the Amendment Rules should be deemed to have been continued for a period of one year from the date of the commencement of the amendment rules or atleast till the date of rejection of the application, if it were to be rejected. From this it follows that the petitioner could not have been asked to stop the shows with effect from 25-5-1987 without there being any order of the District magistrate rejecting the application of the petitioner. ( 16 ) IN the result, I make the following: "1. The Writ Petition is partly allowed. 2. A direction shall issue to the District magistrate (respondent-1) to consider the application of the petitioner dated 8-5-1987 under Rule 105 of the amendment rules read with Section 5 of the Act and pass orders as required under the provisions of Section 5 of the Act. 3. The District Magistrate is also directed to allow the petitioner to continue to run his touring cinema as provided under sub-rule (6) of Rule 105 of the amendment rules until and unless the application of the petitioner dated 8- 5-1987 is rejected. The District Magistrate is further directed to pass appropriate orders regarding the continuance or otherwise of the touring cinema by the petitioner in the light of the order made by him on the application of the petitioner dated 8-5-87 and in the light of this order. Sri. P. R. Ramesh, H. C. G. P. , is permitted to file his memo of appearence in two weeks. Writ Petition partly allowed. --- *** --- .