NAVIN CHANDRA SHARMA, J.—This order will decide Civil Revisions Nos. 486 of 1985 and 352 of 1983 by this common order because in both of them common question of law and fact are involved. 2. In both these revisions, the petitioners are persons who obstructed the delivery of possession which the Sales Ameen wanted to enforce in execution of a warrant for delivery of possession issued by the trial court under O. XXI r. 35 C.P.C. on applications for execution filed by non - petitioners in both the cases. Ratanchand non-petitioner in S.B. Civil Revision No. 485 of 1985 in execution of his decree against the judgment-debtor got a warrant of possession issued from the Munsif, Bikaner in execution case No. 68 of 1979 of that Court. This warrant of possession was returned by the Sales Ameen to the executing court with a report that the petitioners Chhotulal and Smt. Sadra, who are said to be brother and mother respectively of the judgment-debtor, obstructed the delivery of possession. Thereupon Ratanchand decree-holder filed an application under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. on November 7, 1981. Notice of that application was issued to the obstructors. The obstructors filed a reply in which they pleaded that the application of Ratanchand decree - holder under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. was barred by limitation. Some other objections were also raised. The Munsif Bikaner after hearing the arguments came to the conclusion that the petition of Ratanchand under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. in execution case No. 26 of 1979 was barred by limitation and accordingly dismissed the same on May 22, 1982. The decree-holder did not file any appeal against this judgment of Munsif Bikaner dismissing his application under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. However, the decree-holder got fresh warrant of possession issued for possession of the disputed property in Execution case No. 68 of 1979. On this warrant of possession, the Sales Ameen made a report on September 3, 1982 that the petitioners again obstructed the taking of possession and refused to deliver possession of the disputed property. The non-petitioner decree-holders alleged that the petitioners were in possession of the property on behalf of judgment-debtor Shankarlal Bhanwarlal and they prayed that the petitioners be dispossessed from the disputed property. The non-petitioner decree-holders alleged that the petitioners were in possession of the property on behalf of judgment-debtor Shankarlal Bhanwarlal and they prayed that the petitioners be dispossessed from the disputed property. In reply to this second application under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C, the petitioners referred to the dismissal of the previous application under O. 21 r. 97 C.P.C. by the Munsif, Bikaner on May 22, 1982 on the ground that the same was barred by limitation and that judgment of the Munsif had become final. The Munsif came to the conclusion that the second application under O. 21 r. 97 C.P.C. would not be entertained as the first application under the said Order had been dismissed on May 22, 1982, as a result of the amended r. 103 of O. 21 because the previous judgment dated May 22, 1982 had the force of a decree. Aggrieved by this decree of the Munsif Bikaner dated January 31, 1983, Ratanchand decree-holder filed an appeal before the District Judge, Bikaner who by his order dated November 2, 1985 allowed the appeal of the decree-holder and set aside the judgment of Munsif Bikaner dated January 31, 1983. It is against this that the obstructionists Chhotulal and Smt. Sadra have filed the revision petition No. 485 of 1985. 3. Facts giving rise to revision No. 352 of 1983 are that Bhanwarlal had obtained a decree against Ramkishan and he filed execution No. 33 of 1979 for execution of that decree for ejectment of the premises in respect of which the decree was passed. In that execution a warrant of possession was issued, but Satyanarain petitioner obstructed the delivery of the possession, Thereupon Bhanwarlal non-petitioner No. 1 filed an application under Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C. which was dismissed, on January 12, 1982. The decree-holder sought a fresh warrant of possession and when the Sales Ameen went to execute that warrant, the petitioner again obstructed the delivery of the possession whereupon the decree - holder filed a second application under o. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. which was registered as civil miscellaneous petition No. 2 of 1981 by the Munsif. In that second application, the petitioner raised an objection that the dismissal of the previous application filed by the decree-holder operated as resjudicata and the second application under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. was not maintainable. In that second application, the petitioner raised an objection that the dismissal of the previous application filed by the decree-holder operated as resjudicata and the second application under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. was not maintainable. The Munsif, Bikaner upheld the objection of the petitioner and dismissed the application of Bhanwarlal under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. on the above ground. Bhanwarlal decree-holder filed an appeal which was registered as appeal No. 31 of 1982 in the court of the Civil Judge, Bikaner. As in Ratanchands case the Civil Judge disagreed with the views of the Munsif Bikaner and held that the second application under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. was maintainable. He, therefore, by his order dated May 19, 1983 allowed the appeal of Bhanwarlal decree-holder, set aside the judgment of the Munsif Bikaner and remanded the case to the Munsif to decide the subsequent application under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. on its merits. It is against this order of the Civil Judge Bikaner that the obstructionist Satyanarain has filed civil revision No. 352 of 1983. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties appearing in both these revisions on behalf of the decree - holders non-petitioners in both the revisions, it was urged that the matter stands concluded by a single Bench decision of this Court in Narain Vs. Smt. Kalabai (1) wherein it was held by his Lordships S.S. Byas J. that in case of successive obstructions, it is the day of the succeeding obstruction which would alone be taken into consideration and not the date and day of the earlier obstruction. It was held that law does not compel a decree-holder to complain against the resistance or obstruction as soon as it is made. He can ignore the resistance or obstruction and may in his wisdom apply for a fresh warrant of possession. It is of course open to him to move the court under O.XXI r. 97 C.P.C. and the choice lies with him. He can ignore the resistance or obstruction and may in his wisdom apply for a fresh warrant of possession. It is of course open to him to move the court under O.XXI r. 97 C.P.C. and the choice lies with him. If he obtained a fresh right of possession and is again obstructed by the same person, he can move an application under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C, for the removal of such obstruction caused on the second or successive occasion and his application would not be held to be barred by time if it is filed within 30 days of the second or successive resistance which is complained of. Suffice it to state that decision in Narains case (supra) related to a period when the Code of Civil Procedure was not amended by the amending Act No. 104 of 1976 as is apparent from the narration of facts mentioned in para 2 of the reported judgement. In Narains case the Munsif had issued the warrant for the delivery of possession and a bailiff went on the spot for delivery of possession on February 10, 1974. The first resistance was on February 10, 1974. For the second time, the bailiff went on the spot on July 12, 1975 and there was resistance. It was on August 11, 1975 that the decree-holder complained of the second obstruction, It would thus appear that all the events in Narains case took place before the provisions contained in rr. 97 and 103 of O. XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure were in an unamended state. The decision in Narains case would not, therefore, help us in deciding a case in which the successive obstructions have taken place after the above provisions had been amended by the Amending Act No. 104 of 1976 and therefore, decision in Narains case does not conclude the matter. In Narains case, there was no dismissal of an earlier application under Order 21 rule 97 C.P.C. as well. 5. In Narains case, there was no dismissal of an earlier application under Order 21 rule 97 C.P.C. as well. 5. It may be stated that after carefully considering the recommendations made by the Law Commission in its 27th, 14th, 54th and 55th reports, the Central Government decided to amend the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 keeping in view, among others, the following basic considerations, namely:- (i) that a litigant should get fair trial in accordance with the accepted principles of natural justice; (ii) that every effort should be made to expedite the disposal of civil suits and proceedings so that justice may not be delayed; (iii) that the procedure should not be complicated and should to the utmost extend possible ensure fair deal to the poor sections of the community who do not have the means to engage a pleader to defend their case. One of the important changes made as a result of amendment made in the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment Act No. 104 of 1976) was to make the doctrine of resjudicata more effective. Under the existing provisions, the principles behind the doctrine of resjudicata was that issue heard and decided between the parties to a suit should not be allowed to be agitated by the parties or any persons claiming through them in subsequent litigation. The condition precedent for applying the bar of resjudicata against the trial of any suit or issue was, however, that the previous court must have been competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which the issue, was subsequently raised. The existence of this condition to a certain extent detracted from the finality of judgments of courts of limited jurisdiction and that have rise to multiplicity of proceedings. To remove this multiplicity of proceeding, various changes were made in the Code by the Amending Act of 1976 and the doctrine of resjudicata was extended to independent proceedings and also to execution proceedings. So far as the change were made in relation to the matter in consideration before me, it may be observed that prior to the amendment made in the year 1976, the holder of a decree for possession, in case an obstruction was made in delivery of possession by third parties, has three remedies. He could proceed under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. He could apply again in execution of the decree under rr. He could proceed under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. He could apply again in execution of the decree under rr. 35 and 36 of O. XXI or he could institute a regular suit for possession. However, the amendment made in 1976 have brought about a substantial and material change in the provisions, o. XXI r. 97 (2) provides that where an application is made in sub-r. (1) of the said Rule, the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained. Rules 98 to 103 of O. XXI were also substituted. The Amended r. 98 provides that upon the determination of the questions referred to in r. 101, the court shall in accordance with such determination and subject to the provisions of sub-r. (2)-(a) make an order allowing the application and directing that the application be put into possession of the property or dismissing the application or (b) pass such other order as in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit. Rule 101 of Order XXI suffered substantial changes. The amended r. 101 provides like amended sub-rule (2) or r. 58 of O. XXI that all questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceedings on application under r. 97 or their representatives and relating to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the court dealing with the application and not by a suit and for this purpose, the •court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. In the amended r. 101 of O. XXI of the Code, the expression "all questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property)" and the (expression "and not by a separate suit" are very pertinent. In the amended r. 101 of O. XXI of the Code, the expression "all questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property)" and the (expression "and not by a separate suit" are very pertinent. In my view, the expression all questions" includes within its ambit a plea raised by an alleged obstructionist that the application under O. 21 r. 97 C.P.C. is barred by limitation, when such an application, is held by the court to be barred by limitation, its adjudication is of a questions involved and arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under O. 21 r. 97 C.P.C. The decree-holder having taken recourse against an obstructionist by moving an application under r. 97 of O. 21 has to get it adjudicated under r. 101 of O. 21 and he cannot then file a separate suit, for determination of any question which he has himself chosen to raise by moving an application under O. 21 r. 97. Then it is pertinent to note that by r. 103 which has also been substituted for the old rule, it has been expressly and unambiguously provided that where any application has been adjudicated upon under r. 98, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subjected to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. Since the adjudication under r. 98 was given the force of a decree, it also became necessary to insert same new rules in order XXI which are. 104 to 106. Rule 104 was inserted to protect a pending suit on the date of commencement of proceedings under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C Rules 105 and 106 were meant to introduce provisions for dismissing the application under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. in default and passing exparte orders for restoring the application and for setting aside exparte orders. They were necessary because a prior to the amendment, the remedy in such events was by a suit which was taken away by the express provisions contained in r. 101 of O. XXI. 6. As already observed by me that even dismissal of an application under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. is adjudication of an application under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. on account of the provisions contained in rr. 6. As already observed by me that even dismissal of an application under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. is adjudication of an application under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. on account of the provisions contained in rr. 98 and 101 of O. XXI, the decision in an earlier application will operate as resjudicata and will bar the entertaining of a subsequent application under O. XXI, r. 97 C.P.C. by the concerned court. 7. I may also deal with some more decision referred to by learned counsel appearing for the decree-holders in both these revisions. The first decision relied upon by them apart from the single Bench decision in Narains case referred to above, is in the case of Parmeshwaran Vs. Kumara Pillai (2). Regarding this decision, suffice it to state that his Lordship of the Kerala High Court even did not touch the amended provisions of the Code of Civil procedure and, therefore, this decision cannot be said to be an authority about the provisions as contained after their amendment by Amending Act No. 104 of 1976. The decision in Ganpat Singh Vs. Kaliash Shankar (3) is not at all an authority for interpreting the provisions of O. XXI r. 97 to O. XXI r. 103 of the Code. As to the decision in Ganga Ram vs. Devi Singh (4). I wonder, why it has been relied upon. At best this decision is an authority for the proposition that for the decree-holder, the provision of O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. is only a permissible provision and not a mandatory or imperative provision. It may be that a decree holder while faced with an obstruction may instead of applying under O. XXI r. 97 C P.C., take recourse to the remedy of filing a suit for declaration and possession. But having taken recourse to the remedy provided under O. XXI r. 97 C.P.C. and having failed in that, he cannot turn round and urge that he is not bound by the adverse decision. 8. Before concluding I may state that the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dattatray Vs. Mangal (5) supports the view which I have taken and I entirely agree with the answer given by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the reference made by the single Judge to them. 9. 8. Before concluding I may state that the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dattatray Vs. Mangal (5) supports the view which I have taken and I entirely agree with the answer given by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the reference made by the single Judge to them. 9. The result, therefore, is that the order of the Civil Judge, Bikaner, dated November 2, 1985 in appeal No. 72 of 1984 of this court out of which Revision No. 485 of 1985 has arisen and the view taken by the Civil Judge; Bikaner in his order dated May 19. 1983 in appeal No. 31 of 1982 of his Court out of which Civil Revision No. 352 of 1983 has arisen, are erroneous and the view taken by the munsiff, Bikaner in both these matters is correct. 10. I, therefore, allow Civil Revisions No. 485 of 1985 and 352 of 1983 and set aside the order of the Civil Judge, Bikaner, dated November 2, 1985 impugned in Civil Revision No. 485 of 1985 and the order of the Civil Judge, Bikaner dated May 19, 1983 impugned in Civil Revision No. 352 of 1983 and restore the order of the Munsiff Bikaner dated Jan. 31, 1983 and Feb. 20, 1982 passed respectively in the aforesaid two matters. In the circumstances of the case, I, therefore, leave the parties in both these revisions to bear their own costs.