This revision is directed against the order dated 10.12.84 of-the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate e, North Tripura, Kailashahar, in case No. GR. 21 of 1984 by which the learned trial court accepted the contention of the learned counsel for the accused that in view “ of the provisions contained in sub-section (5) of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for short, 'Cr. P. C.' the trial could not proceed as the accused persons were arrested more than six months prior to the submission of the charge-sheet by police. 2. Briefly stated, on 10.1,84 the vehicle bearing Registration No. TRG-233 was driven in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against a woman causing grievous hurt. The police after investi­gation submitted charge-sheet under relevant sections of the I.P.C. and the Motor Vehicle} Act against two accused/opposite parties. In view of the order passed by the learned trial court, State has filed the present petition. 3. Mr. Deb, learned Public Prosecutor has fairly submitted all the relevant decisions of different High Courts regarding interpretation of Section 167 (5) Cr. P. C. and further submits that as the said Section is not mandatory the order of the learned trial court is liable to be set aside. 4. There is no dispute that the (charge-sheet against the accused opposite parties was submitted six months after the arrest of the accused persons^) There is also no dispute that no petition was filed on behalf of the investigating agency within a period of six months from the date of the arrest of the accused persons for allowing the continuance of investigation beyond the above period^) So only ^ point for consideration is whether for non-fulfilment of the requirement of sub-section (5) of Section 167 Cr. P. C, the; impugned order is liable to be set aside. 5. In Ali Hossaia vs. State of West Bengal, 83 CWN, 559 Calcutta High Court held that in view of the provision of Section 167 (5) Cr.P.C. the charge-sheet submitted after six months of arrest was without jurisdiction and the proceeding is liable to be quashed. In Ram Kumar Keshori vs. The State, 1981 Cr. L, J., 1288, in Ram Bikash Jadav vs. State of West Bengal, 1983, Cr. L. J., 39 and in Pappa Rao vs. State, 1985 Cr. In Ram Kumar Keshori vs. The State, 1981 Cr. L, J., 1288, in Ram Bikash Jadav vs. State of West Bengal, 1983, Cr. L. J., 39 and in Pappa Rao vs. State, 1985 Cr. L. J., 546 the same High Court reiterated the above view and held that continuance of an investi­gation beyond the period of six months is illegal and the Magistrate is not competent to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the charge sheet as a result of such investigation. The Rajasthan High Court also expressed the same view in Babulal vs. State of Rajasthan, 1982 Cr. L. J. 1001. The High Court was of the view that the provisions of Section 167 (5) is mandatory in character and it is the duty enjoined upon the Magistrate to see that no investigation is continued in a summons case beyond six months from the date of the arrest of the accused without his permission. 6. The Madras High Court in Jaganathan & Others vs. The State, 1983 Cr. L. J., 1748 was also of the view that in view of the provisions of Section 167 (5) the investigation conducted beyond the period of six months without the permission of the Magistrate is illegal and the failure of court to stop investigation cannot be deemed to be an implied permission to continue investigation. The Court was, however, of the view that once a case is taken cognizance of by a competent court, the proceeding of the case has commenced and the mere antecedent illegality or irregularity in the investigation on the basis of which the final report has been filed, will not invalidate or vitiate the proceedings unless it is shown that prejudice has been caused to the accused or any miscarriage of justice has resulted thereby and hence the illegal investigation conducted beyond the prescribed period of six months, without the order of the Magistrate would not vitiate the taking cognizance of the offence and the subsequent proceedings, 7. The Delhi High Court in The State vs. Jai Bhagwan, 1985 Cr. L. J. 932 was of the view that where the Magistrate straightway acquits the accused because the investigation had continued beyond six months, the order of acquittal is illegal. The Delhi High Court in The State vs. Jai Bhagwan, 1985 Cr. L. J. 932 was of the view that where the Magistrate straightway acquits the accused because the investigation had continued beyond six months, the order of acquittal is illegal. The Court held that the said sub-section (5) of Section 167 cannot be read to mean that no permission could be sought from the Magistrate once a period of six months has expired and that before passing an order stopping further investigation the Magistrate must give an opportunity to the police to satisfy him that there are any special reasons for continuing the investigation beyond a period of six months. The Court rejected the contention that the Magistrate is powerless to grant permission after lapse of six months. The Court, however, in paragraph 7 of the report expressed that "we. would expect the Magistrate to pass appropriate orders if investigation is still continuing beyond six months from the date of the arrest of the accused ; we would also expect the prosecution to move the Magistrate to silk appropriate directions if it considers continuation of investigation beyond a period of six months to be necessary in the interest of justice". In paragraph 11 of the report the Court also observed as follows :- "The only result in that case is that the Magistrate will only took into the material which had been collected within a period of six months and will ignore the other material and then decide whether to take cognizance or not". Thus it appears to me that even the Delhi High Court accepted the position that investigation in such a case has to be completed within a period of six months. At this state it is appropriate to reproduce Section 167 (5) and (6) Cr. P. C. "Section 167............ (5) If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the^ investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interests of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary. (6) Where any order stopping further investigation into an offence has been made under sub-section (5), the Sessions Judge may, if he is satisfied, on an application made to him or otherwise, that further investigation into the offence ought to be made, vacate the order made under sub-section (5) and direct further investigation to be made into the offence subject to such directions with regard to bail and other matters as he may specify". 9). The fate of the present petition will depend on the interpre­tation of sub-section (5) of Section 167 Cr.P.C. It is the recognised principle of interpretation that a statute or for that matter a section has to be interpreted according to its plain words and without doing violence to the language used by the legislature and where the words used are capable of one construction only, it would not be open to the 'Courts to any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such-hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act (see Ram Krishan vs. State of Delhi. A.I.R. 1956 SC 476, Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Management. A.I.R. 1973 SC 1227). On. plain reading of sub-section (5) only one interpretation is possible, that is, in a case triable under sum­mons procedure if the investigation is not concluded within a period of ( six months from the date of the arrest of the accused, the Magistrate shall make an order for stopping the investigation?) However, if the investigating officer can satisfy the Court that for special reason and in I the interest of justice continuance of investigation beyond six months is necessary, Magistrate can make order that investigation may continue 10). Minor offences are tried according to summons procedure The intention of the legislature is clear that in such type of cases the investigating machinery should be vigilant and should complete the investigation as early as possible and definitely within a period of six months as the legislatures do not want that the Sword of the Damocles should be kept hanging over the head of the person accused of such offence indefinitely. The language of the section is clear, unambiguous and emphetical. The language of the section is clear, unambiguous and emphetical. For proceeding with the investigation beyond six months in such cases the investigating officer should not only make an application to the Court, but must satisfy the Court that there are special reasons that the investigation should continue beyond the said period and for the ends of justice. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, even the Magistrate cannot pass an order allowing continuance of such investigation.(This provision has been incorporated in the new Code of Criminal Procedure by the legislature in the interest of speedy investigation?) 11). The legislature also could visualise that in the interest of justice continuance of investigation beyond six months may be necessary and accordingly Sessions Judge has also been empowered to direct further investigation in the event of refusal by a Magistrate. Looking at sub­sections (5) and (6) of Section 167, I am of the opinion that these two sub-sections are self-contained. 12. In my opinion the mandate of the legislature in respect of sub­section (5) of Section 167 Cr.P.C. is dear and in cases triable under summons procedure the investigating agency must complete the investigation within a period of six months from the date of arrest of the accused failing which the Magistrate is legally bound to stop further investigation. If the investigating agency wants to proceed beyond the period of six months, it must make an application before the Court within the aforesaid period and the Court may allow, after applying its judicial mind, continuance of investigation beyond the above period provided the Court is satisfied that there are special reasons and that for ends of justice such continuance of investigation necessary. Any other interpretation, in my opinion, will make the provision nugatory and it will go contrary to the intention of the legislature. I am also of the view that in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case the requirement of sub-section (5) of Section 167 must be fulfilled, before the Magistrate can take cognizance. I hope and trust that both the trial courts and the investigating agency will scrupulously follow the mandate of the legislature as laid down in the above provisions of law. 13. I hope and trust that both the trial courts and the investigating agency will scrupulously follow the mandate of the legislature as laid down in the above provisions of law. 13. In view of the above opinion, I respectfully accept the law laic down by the Calcutta and Rajasthan High Courts, but disagree with the views expressed by the Madras and Delhi High Courts, as in my opinion, the question of miscarriage of justice may not arise as the entire proceeding will be illegal in view of the violation of the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 167 Cr.P.C. 14. Coming back to case in hand, it is an admitted fact that the charge sheet was submitted after six months of the arrest of the accused persons. There is nothing on record to show that any prayer was made by the investigating agency for extending the period of investigation. The prosecution also did not take recourse to sub­section (5) of Section 167 Cr.P.C. In view of the above circumstances and what has been stated above regarding interpretation of sub-section (5) of Section 167 Cr.P.C. I am of the opinion that the order dated 10.12.84 was legally and validly passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and it need not be interfered with, 15. In the result, the present petition is dismissed and the rule is discharged. Sd/- Judge