Judgment :- 1. The first petitioner is the corporate manager of the CMC Educational Society, Kolazhy, Trichur which runs 4 private colleges affiliated to the Calicut University. Petitioners 2 to 6 are the lecturers appointed by the first petitioner. They were appointed as lecturers as per Exts. P1 to P5. Exts. P6 to P10 are the representations made by petitioners 2 to 6 to the Registrar of the University of Calicut, to approve their appointments in respect of which the first petitioner had already made a request to the University. As respondent No.1 the Registrar of the University did not communicate the approval sought, the petitioners have approached this Court in OP. No. 10560 of 1985 for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the first respondent to approve the appointments of petitioners 2 to 6 and to pay the salary to them. The second respondent is the State Government and the third respondent is the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education. The 4th respondent has been added at her instance. The learned Single judge before whom the original petition came up for consideration felt that the relevant decision of this Court reported in 1980 KLT 666 between Mother Anasthasia and University Appellate Tribunal requires reconsideration. It is for that reason that the learned Single Judge has referred this case to the Division Bench. 2. The approval was sought by the first petitioner as per S.57(9) of the Calicut University Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') which provides that every appointment under S.57 shall be reported to the University for approval. S.57 deals with the appointment of teachers in private colleges. Though there is no express provision in the Act casting an obligation on the University to accord approval, it is implicit in the language of sub-section (9) of S.57 that the University is under a duty to render a decision in regard to the approval sought under S.57(9) of the Act and communicate the same to the management seeking such approval. The first petitioner having sought approval in respect of the appointment of petitioners 2 to 6 it was the first respondent's duty to communicate his decision on the request made to the University, that being the legal duty of the first respondent. The first petitioner having sought approval in respect of the appointment of petitioners 2 to 6 it was the first respondent's duty to communicate his decision on the request made to the University, that being the legal duty of the first respondent. As the said legal duty has not been discharged by the University, the petitioners are entitled to seek a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the University to take a decision on the question of granting approval to the appointment of petitioners 2 to 6 as requested by the first petitioner and to communicate the same expeditiously. 3. But then, it was submitted that the view taken by this court in 1980 KLT 666 requires reconsideration The question that was considered in the said case was in regard to the interpretation of sub-section (6) of S.57 which reads: "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (4) a teacher discharged from a private college on or after the 14th day of March 1974 due to abolition of a course of study in that college or for any other reason except disciplinary action against him shall be given preference in the matter of future appointments in the private college or, as the case may be, any of the private colleges under the management of the educational agency within the University area." It has been ruled in 1980 KLT 666 that a person who goes out of the service on the expiry of the period for which he or she was appointed cannot claim protection of S.57(6) of the Act because in such cases there is no discharge from service for any reason. It has been held that when a person is appointed in a leave vacancy and his appointment gets terminated automatically on the said vacancy ceasing it cannot be said that the person was discharged from service in order to claim the benefit of sub-section (6) of S.57. An attempt was made to persuade us to reconsider the said decision in WA No. 697 of 1982 After exhaustively examining the decision we have held that the law laid down in 1980 KLT 666 is sound and therefore the said decision does not require reconsideration. An attempt was made to persuade us to reconsider the said decision in WA No. 697 of 1982 After exhaustively examining the decision we have held that the law laid down in 1980 KLT 666 is sound and therefore the said decision does not require reconsideration. This is what has been held in the said decision: "Sub-section (6) of S.57 makes it clear that the said clause applies only when the teacher by positive action taken by the management of the private college is discharged from service. It is therefore obvious that the said clause will not apply to the case where the appointment is made in a leave vacancy, in which case the appointment gets terminated automatically without the management being required to make any positive order of discharge. We have, therefore, no hesitation in taking the view that the aforesaid decision of this court does not require any re-consideration." The said decision has been in force for the last 7 years and the provisions of the Calicut University Act have not been amended even though observations in this behalf were made in Para.13 of the said decision. That indicates that the law laid down in the said decision was accepted reflecting the intention of the University and therefore no attempt was made during the last 7 years to amend the provisions of S.57(6) of the Act. It is one of the essential attributes of law that the law should be certain. The law in this case has been laid down in the year 1980 by a Division Bench of this Court and has been consistently followed. It is not proper to disturb the said decision at this length of time. 3. Sri. Sudhakara Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the University, however contended that having regard to the promulgation of statute 23(2) of Chap.2 of the University Statutes the law laid down in 1980 KLT 666 does not govern cases arising after Statute 23(2) of Chap.2 has come into force. 3. Sri. Sudhakara Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the University, however contended that having regard to the promulgation of statute 23(2) of Chap.2 of the University Statutes the law laid down in 1980 KLT 666 does not govern cases arising after Statute 23(2) of Chap.2 has come into force. Statute 23(2) relied upon by the learned counsel reads as follows: "23(2) A teacher duly appointed on probation for a specified period if thrown out of service for reasons other than disciplinary action shall be given preference in the matter of future appointments in the private college or, as the case may be of any of the private colleges under the management of the Educational Agency within the University area." It was submitted that even if the right or privilege conferred by S.57(6) is not available to teachers appointed in leave vacancies after the Statute 23(2) of Chap.2 has come into force, such teachers can claim and preferential right to appointment. Though Statute 23(2) speaks of persons thrown out of service for reasons other than disciplinary action, it has to be read along with the provisions of S.57(6) of the Act which deals with the same topic of thrown out teachers. If it is harmoniously read, it follows that Statute 23(2) deals with the same categories of persons for whom benefit has been conferred by sub-section (6) of S.57 of the Act. If it is not so harmoniously construed, Statute 23(2) shall be rendered void as being inconsistent with the express provisions contained in sub-section (6) of S.57 of the Act. There is another more important reason for coming to the same conclusion. The Senate has been conferred the power of making statutes by S.19(2) of the Act read with S.34, 35 and 52 of the Act S.34 provides that subject to the provisions of the Act, the statutes may provide for all or any of the matters specified therein. Thus it follows that the statutes have to be made consistent with the provisions of the Act as otherwise the repugnant statute could be rendered ultra vires. S.34 enumerates matters in respect of which statutes can be made by the Senate. None of the clauses (a) to 0) empowers the Senate to make any statutes regulating recruitment to private colleges. Thus it follows that the statutes have to be made consistent with the provisions of the Act as otherwise the repugnant statute could be rendered ultra vires. S.34 enumerates matters in respect of which statutes can be made by the Senate. None of the clauses (a) to 0) empowers the Senate to make any statutes regulating recruitment to private colleges. Clause (k) of S.34 however adverts to all other matters which by the Act are to be, or may be, prescribed by statutes. Sri Sudhakara Prasad has not relied upon any other provisions of the Act which expressly empowers the Senate to make a statute regulating recruitment to private colleges. S.60 of the Act speaks of statutes being made regulating conditions of service of teachers of private colleges. Sub-section (1) of S.60 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law, or in any contract or other document, the conditions of service of teachers of private colleges, whether appointed before or after the commencement of this Act, including conditions relating to pay, pension, provident fund, gratuity, insurance and age of retirement, shall be such as may be prescribed by the statute Sub-section (I) of S.60 in terms deals with different topics in respect of which statutes can be made. The power that is conferred by S.60 is not to make statutes regulating recruitment but only regulating conditions of service. Matters which fall within the realm of recruitment are different from matters which fall within the realm of conditions of service. That is why Art.309 of the Constitution provides for provisions being made to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State. That S.60 deals only with the conditions of service is of significance. In other words, it speaks only of conditions of service which stage arises from the date of appointment and not from the stage of recruitment and appointment. That S.60 deals only with the conditions of service is of significance. In other words, it speaks only of conditions of service which stage arises from the date of appointment and not from the stage of recruitment and appointment. Sri Sudhakara Prasad, learned counsel for the University, however relied upon S.5(13) of the Act which reads: "with the previous sanction of the Government, to regulate the emoluments and pattern and to prescribe the duties and conditions of service of teachers and non-teaching staff in private colleges;" In the first instance it is necessary to note that this clause is in S.5 of the Act which deals with the powers of the University and not with the powers of the Senate in regard to making of statutes, which is only one of the authorities of the University. Besides it only speaks of regulating the emoluments, pattern, duties and conditions of service of teachers and non-teaching staff in the private colleges and does not deal with the topic of recruitment. Hence clause (xiii) of S.5 cannot come to the aid of the first respondent. We are therefore inclined to take the view that Statute 23(2) of Chap.2 has to be harmoniously construed with S.57(6) of the Act so to give full meaning and effect to the provisions of sub-section (6) of S.57. In other words. Statute 23(2) of Chap.2 takes colour from S.57(6) of the Act. Hence the same should be understood as conveying that preference in the matter of appointment is not available by the operation of Statute 23(2) of Chap.2 to those teachers who are appointed on leave vacancies, as such persons cannot be regarded as persons who can be regarded discharged from service on the leave vacancy ceasing. 4. As the position in law is clear and as the law laid down in 1980 KLT 666 has been consistently followed by this court, we see no good reason why the first respondent-University has chosen not to follow the said decision and to render its decision on the representation of the first petitioner in the matter of according approval to the appointment of petitioners 2 to 6. As the first respondent has not communicated his decision so far a writ in the nature of mandamus has to be issued. 5. Sri. As the first respondent has not communicated his decision so far a writ in the nature of mandamus has to be issued. 5. Sri. Sudhakara Prasad, learned counsel for the University, submitted that there are other aspects when the University has to take into account to ensure that the other provisions of the Act in the statute have been duly followed in the matter of appointment to justify approval being given for the appointment of petitioners 2 to 6. We make it clear that it is open to them to examine all aspects and take an appropriate decision in the matter. 6. Unfortunately petitioners 2 to 6, though they have been rendering service as teachers from 1984, the institution in question being governed by direct payment scheme, not having received the salary for the work done, the learned Single Judge during the pendency of the original petition made an order on 20-11-1986 after bearing all the parties directing the State Government to pay the salary due to the petitioners till 30-11-1986 within a period not exceeding one month. Sri. M. I Joseph, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that order has been obeyed and the salary till 30-11-1986 has been drawn and disbursed to the respective teachers, petitioners 2 to 6. As the University has to take a decision on the approval sought by the first petitioner in respect of the appointment of petitioners 2 to 6. it is not right to expect petitioners 2 to 6 render service without payment for the work that they are actually doing. Therefore justice demand that we should issue an appropriate direction to the second respondent, the State Government to draw and disburse the salary to petitioners 2 to 6 for the period from 1-12-1986 till the decision is rendered by the first respondent in regard to the approval of the appointment of petitioners 2 to 6. The first respondent-University is directed to render its decision on the approval of appointment of petitioners 2 to 6 as expeditiously as possible. The original petition is accordingly disposed of. No costs. The first respondent-University is directed to render its decision on the approval of appointment of petitioners 2 to 6 as expeditiously as possible. The original petition is accordingly disposed of. No costs. As in our opinion no substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court arises for consideration in this case and particularly having regard to the fact that we have rendered a decision applying settled law which has been in force for the last 7 years, leave to appeal to Supreme Court prayed for is refused. Leave Refused. Let photostat copy of the order be furnished to parties on usual terms.