JUDGMENT This writ petition is directed against the office order dated 15th January, 1982/21st January, 1982 issued by the Director of Primary Education, West Bengal. The relevant portion of the said order, as contained in Annexure 'D' to the writ petition, reads thus :– "In the interest of public service the following Principles/ Lecturers/Craft Teachers/Hindi Teachers of Government Junior Basic Training Institutes are hereby transferred to the post noted against each in the same service with the same scale of pay with immediate effect : – Sl. No. Name of the Name of the Institute Name of the Institute Remarks: candidate : serving at present : where transferred to : 1. Shri Krishna Balurghat Govt. Radhanagore Govt. Jr. Vice Sri K.L. Kanto Roy. Junior Basic Trg. Basic Training Sahoo transfe- Institute, West Institute, Howrah. Rred. Dinajpur. 2. Principal, Balurght/Taranagapur Govt. Jr. B. T. Institute for information and necessary action. The incumbent concerned should be released immediately under intimation to this office. As regards the case of Principal further communication will follow." 2. The facts of the case may be stated as follows :– The petitioner belongs to Scheduled Caste which is the weaker section of the community. The Government Junior Basic Training Institute (For short the said Institute hereafter) imparts training to the primary teachers and is a residential institute. By an order dated 6/9 August, 1978 the Director of Public Instructions, West Bengal, appointed the petitioner as a Principal of the said Institute Junior Basic Training Institute, P. O. Kamarpara, in the District or West Dinajpur in the scale of Rs. 376-15-415-610-20-650 (Efficient bar after 8th and 16th stage) with a special pay of Rs. 50/- per month plus allowances as admissible under the rules. Consequent upon the issue of the said letter of appointment the petitioner joined the said institute as a Principal. In the said letter of appointment it was specifically mentioned that the then Lecturer-In-Charge would go down to his substantive post of Lecturer and hand over charge of the Principal to the petitioner. Respondent No.4 at the material time was acting as a Lecturer-in-Charge of the said Institute. The Respondent No. 4 duly handed over charges of the Principal to the petitioner. Respondent No.4 at the material time was acting as a Lecturer-in-Charge of the said Institute. The Respondent No. 4 duly handed over charges of the Principal to the petitioner. After his taking over the charge, the Respondent No.4 took up an attitude of non-co-operation with the petitioner and started to find fault with the petitioner, and also started fomenting the students and others against the Principal, i. e,. the petitioner. Since 2nd January, 1979, the petitioner has been discharging the duties and functions as a Principal and effected considerable improvement in the affairs of the Institute. 3. The relevant policy of the Government is that the Principal of the Government Junior Basic Training Institute will not be transferred before the expire of five years from the date of joining the said post. In the instant case, the petitioner alleged that five years' period at the material time did not, expire. But the District Inspector of Schools (Primary Education) West Dinajpur issued the Office order impugned in this writ petition. It has been mentioned in Annexure 'D' as regards the case of the Principal that further communication will follow. As regards further communication, no order was served on the petitioner till the time when the writ application was moved. The petitioner had predicaments prevailing in his family and made a representation to the Respondent No.1 on 2nd February, 1982. It was submitted that the wife of the petitioner at the relevant time was suffering from certain ailments and pursuant to the advice of the Doctor she should not be removed because of her physical weakness. Other ground, inter alia, was that the son of the petitioner was admitted in Class VI in a School at Balurghat. Under the circumstances, a prayer was made that the case of the petitioner be considered and to keep the order of transfer in abeyance for one year only. 4. Before embarking upon that upon determination of the issues involved in the writ application. It is appropriate for the Court to record that no Affidavit-in-opposition to the writ application. It is appropriate for the Court to record that no Affidavit-in-opposition to the writ application has been filed during all these years. This Court directed on the 12th March, 1987 that "let this case come for hearing 10 days hence. In the meantime all Affidavits are to be filed if not already filed". It is appropriate for the Court to record that no Affidavit-in-opposition to the writ application has been filed during all these years. This Court directed on the 12th March, 1987 that "let this case come for hearing 10 days hence. In the meantime all Affidavits are to be filed if not already filed". The case is taken up for hearing to-day when the learned Advocate appearing for the State was not present. This Court waited for more than 15 minutes so that the learned Advocate for the State would be in a position to oppose the writ application. It is most unfortunate that now-a-days in most of the matters learned Advocates engaged by the State to represent its case are not available at the time when the matter is taken up for hearing. This Court has and had accorded ample opportunities to the learned Advocate Counsel appearing for the State so as to enable him to present the case on behalf of the State. On the 4th March, 1987 when this application was directed to be released from my list on the ground indicated in the order dated 4th March, 1987, the learned Advocate for the State was not present. On the 12th March, 1987 the learned Advocate for the State was not present. To-day also the learned Advocate for the State is not present. The Court is thus placed in a very awakward position by reason of the persistent non-appearance of the learned Advocate for the State in this case. The State cannot in my view claim to be priviledged litigant. It will be improper for the Court to go on adjourning the matter each and every occasions when the matter is called on the ground of the absence of he learned Advocate for the State. The learned Advocate of the State took it for granted the Court would go on adjourning the matter on account of the absence of the learned Advocate of the State. When the matter was called on neither any prayer was made for adjournment of the matter nor was the next case ready. In the background of the facts-situation this Court thus is compelled to proceed with the matter without waiting any further for the learned Advocate of the State. 5. Mr. Asok De, the learned Advocate appearing in support of the application seriously challenged the order of transfer on various grounds. 6. Mr. In the background of the facts-situation this Court thus is compelled to proceed with the matter without waiting any further for the learned Advocate of the State. 5. Mr. Asok De, the learned Advocate appearing in support of the application seriously challenged the order of transfer on various grounds. 6. Mr. De submitted that the orders of transfer were passed with the object of accommodating the Respondent No.4 at the particular station for undisclosed reasons. He contended the orders were not in the interest of public service nor were they meant for securing and promoting administrative purpose. The orders of transfer according Mr. De were issued for collateral purpose and Mr. De while seriously assailing the orders of transfer by way of punishment and for inflicting punishment without drawing up any disciplinary proceeding. Mr. De also claimed and contended the orders of transfer apart from being infected with mala fide and/or extraneous consideration was passed on the basis of suspicion that the petitioner "has been indulging in the alleged Uttar Khanda Movement". It was also urged by Mr. De that the orders of transfer were secured at the instance of Respondent No.4. There did not exist any administrative necessity nor any interest of public service and same cannot be sustained. 7. For a variety of reasons namely the orders of transfer were passed in the gurb of ostensible public interest or in the interest of public service Mr. De ellaborately placed the various paragraphs of the writ petition that the orders of transfer as contained in Annexure 'D' specifically mentioned further communication will follow to the principal of the said Institute and without following the further communication to the Principal and Respondent No.4 could not give a notice in February 19, 1982 declaring himself to be a Principal which would be evident from Annexure 'F' to this application. Annexure 'F' as well as the first paragraph of Annexure 'B' would show that the Respondent No.4 was a Principal of the said Institute and the fact that the Respondent No. 4 was really aspirant for the post of Principal remains admitted. The serious point according to Mr. De was illegal and unwarranted exercise of power by respondent for the purpose of accommodating Respondent No.4. 8. The contention of Mr. The serious point according to Mr. De was illegal and unwarranted exercise of power by respondent for the purpose of accommodating Respondent No.4. 8. The contention of Mr. De that the orders of transfer were passed with the object of accommodating Respondent No.4 at the particular station for undisclosed reasons requires the court to examine the circumstances preceding to and attendant upon the orders of transfer. In absence of any affidavit-in-opposition to the main writ petition the allegation or the statement made in writ petition remains unchallenged. When the challenge is thrown, the concerned authorities are required to produce the record of the case or to file affidavit-in-opposition, but that was not been done. 9. Reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Barium Chemical Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC Page 295. In the aforesaid judgment the Supreme Court laid down proposition that when formation of the opinion of the authorities is challenged as being not bona fide one it is for the authority to produce relevant records justifying that the formation of the opinion was bona fide. In the instance case when the petitioner made specific grievance to the effect as indicated above it was fit and proper that the concerned authorities ought to have produced the records of the case of to rebut the contention of the petitioner by filing appropriate answer to the complain lodged by the petitioner by way of writ petition. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Barium Chemical Ltd. (Supra), the court cannot but hold that it was no occasion to see the materials. This court is competent to examine as to whether the public interest or administrative reasons existed or not. The action of the respondent is challengeable on the ground of non-application of mind or on the ground that it was formed on collateral ground and was beyond the scope of the executive instruction laying down guideline regarding transfer or transfer passed in exercise of power under the relevant rules or administrative instruction, supplementary rules cannot be challenged on the ground of propriety but it is liable to be set aside in case or in given situation whether power is exercised mala fide or for purpose extraneous to the public interest or administrative reason or purpose. The orders impugned as claimed and contended by Mr. The orders impugned as claimed and contended by Mr. De are beyond the ambit of the public interest or passed on the grounds not germane to the scope of those rules and the policy laying down guidelines. In my view the respondents, not having dealt with foundational grievances of the petitioner as stated above inescapable conclusion is that the challenge of the petitioner goes uncontroverted or unchallenged. 10. The next contention of Mr. De that the orders of transfer apart from being infected with mala fide and extraneous considerations were passed on the basis of uncommunicated ground the petitioner "has been indulging in the alleged Uttar Khanda Movement" also requires active consideration of this Court. During the last five years when the writ petition has been kept pending respondent never though it fit that when challenge is made in the writ petition the same is to be dealt with by filing an affidavit-in-opposition. The respondents slept over the matter and do not wake up from slumber for the purpose dealing with the challenge by filing an affidavit-in-opposition. The court cannot remain asilance spectator by allowing the respondent undue advantage. In view of the conduct of the respondent, the court is thus compelled to draw an adverse inference that the respondents have had no answer to the basic grievances of the petitioner. Reference made by Mr. De to the decision of the Madras High Court in (2) C. Ramanathan v. Acting General Manager, Jute Corporation of India, SLR 1980(1), Page 309 Mr. De strongly stressed reliance on paragraphs 6 and 11 of the said decision which read thus : "6. It would of course be necessary to go through the facts in this case, to a certain extent in detail. But it would be convenient to preface our judgment with certain general observations. Courts are chary to interfere with an order of transfer made for administrative reasons. An innocuous order of transfer which not only on the face of it appears to be one made in order to further, the administrative interest of an organisation, but which even on a deeper scrutiny does not pose any irregular or mala fide exercise of power by the concerned authority is generally upheld by Civil Courts, as courts cannot substitute their own opinion and interfere with ordinary orders of transfer of employees of established organisations. But, if in a given case, an order of transfer appears to be a deliberate attempt to by pass all disciplinary machinery and offend the well known principle of audi alteram partem if ex-facie it is clear that the order of transfer was not made for administrative reasons, but was made to achieve a collateral purpose, then it is open to the court to crack the shell of innocuousness which wraps the order of transfer and by biercing such a veil, find out the real purpose behind the order of transfer. No doubt, a normal order of transfer can, under no circumstances, be misunderstood as punitive measure. But, in the circumstances surrounding such an order leads to a reasonable inference by a well instructed mind, that such an order was made in the colourable exercise of power and intended to achieve a sinister purpose and based on irrelevant consideration, then the arm of the court can be extended so as to decipher the intendment of the order and set it aside on the ground that it is one made with a design and motive of circumventing disciplinary action and particularly when a civil servant is involved, to avoid the straingent but mandatory procedure prescribed in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. 11. There are two other notable circumstances in this case which also prompt us to come to the same conclusion as above that the challenged order is not an order of transfer simplicitor. The guidelines fixed for transfer have not been followed and why there has been deviation thereto there is no explanation at all." 11. Respondent No. 4 is very influencial member of the known political party ; no affidavit-in-opposition has been filed on behalf of Respondent No. 4. It is repeatedly harped on by Mr. De that the orders of transfer were made for the purpose of accommodating Respondent No. 4. It is now well settled by a long line of decisions that even the executive or administrative order can be challenged on the ground of its ultra vires action or mala fide exercise of power contrary to the guidelines and principles laid down by the authorities. Reference may be made to the decision in (3) Ramanek Chowdhury v. State of Bihar, 1975(2) SLR 67 which is materially and helpfully called hereinafter. Reference may be made to the decision in (3) Ramanek Chowdhury v. State of Bihar, 1975(2) SLR 67 which is materially and helpfully called hereinafter. In well known case in (4) Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation reported 1948(1) K B 223. The question was in the aforesaid decision whether the authority acted unreasonably in the exercise of discretion and the court was entitled to investigate the action of the authority. 12. Lord Greene M. R. said that when an executive discretion is entrusted to a local authority it can be challenged in the Courts in a limited class of case, for instance, when the exercise of the discretion is not real in the sense that matters which the authority ought to have regard to have not been given regard or where matters which would not be germane to the matter in question had been taken in to consideration. In the case of (5) Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council and Others, (1956 Appeal Cases 736) there was a compulsory purchase order of lands which was under challenge on amongst other grounds as an abuse of the exercise of the power and bad faith. Lord Reid in his speach said at pages 761-762 :– "......It seems to me that there were four grounds on which the courts could give relief. First, informality of procedure ; where, for example, some essential step in procedure had been omitted. Secondly, ultra vires in the sense that what was authorised by the order went beyond what was authorised by the Act under which it was made. Thirdly, misuse of power in bona fide. And, fourthly, misuse of power in mala fide. In the last two classes the order is ultra vires in the sense that what it authorizes to be done is within the scope of the Act under which it is made, and every essential step in procedure may have been taken ; what is challenged is something which lies behind the making of the order. I separate these two classes for this reason. There have been few cases where actual bad faith has even been alleged, but in the numerous cases where misuse of power has been alleged Judges have been careful to point out that no question of bad faith was involved and that bad faith stands in a class by itself. I separate these two classes for this reason. There have been few cases where actual bad faith has even been alleged, but in the numerous cases where misuse of power has been alleged Judges have been careful to point out that no question of bad faith was involved and that bad faith stands in a class by itself. Misuse of power covers a wide variety of cases, and I am received from considering at length what amounts to misuse of power in bona fide because I agree with the analysis made by Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation............" His Lordship then quoted the following extracts from Lord Greene's judgment in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation (Supra) :– "The exercise of such a discretion must "be a real exercise of the discretion. If, in the statute conferring the discretion, there is to be found expressly or by implication matters which the authority exercising the discretion ought to have referred to, then in exercising the discretion it must have regard to those matters. Conversely, if the nature of the subject-matter and the general interpretation of the Act make it clear that certain matters would not be germane to the matter in question, the authority must disregard these irrelevant collateral matters............a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'.........It is true to say that, if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonably that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere. That, I think, is quite right : but to prove a case of that kind would require something overwhelming......The court is enqitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing whether they have taken into account matters which they ought not to take into account, or, conversely, have refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which they ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may still be possible to say that, although the local authority have kept within the four corners of the matters which they ought to consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In such a case, again I think the court can interfere. The power of the court to interfere in each case is not an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority, but as a judicial authority which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether the local authority have contravened the law by acting in excess of the powers which Parliament has confined in them." His Lordship further said :– "None of those cases need involve mala fides. A local authority may have had regard to quite irrelevant considerations or may have acted quite unreasonably but yet be entirely innocent of dishonesty or malice.........I am of opinion that cases involving mala fides are in a special position in that mere general words will not deprive the court of jurisdiction to deal with them........... " Lord Radcliffe in his speech in the same case said at page 767-768 :– "............It is an abuse of power to exercise it for a purpose different from that for which it is entrusted to the holder, not the less because he may be acting ostensibly for the authorized purpose. Probably most of the recognized grounds of invalidity could be brought under this head : the introduction of illegitimate considerations, the rejection of legitimate considerations the rejection of legitimate ones, manifest unreasonableness, arbitrary or capricious conduct, the motive of personal advantage or the gritification of personal ill-will............" Lord Somervell of Harro said at page 770 :– "Ultra vires and mala fides are, prima fade, matters for the courts. If the jurisdiction of the courts is to be ousted it must be done by plain words. "Mala fides is a phrase often used in relation to the exercise of statutory powers. It has never been precisely defined as its effects have happily remained mainly in the region of hypothetical cases. It covers fraud or corruption.............. If the jurisdiction of the courts is to be ousted it must be done by plain words. "Mala fides is a phrase often used in relation to the exercise of statutory powers. It has never been precisely defined as its effects have happily remained mainly in the region of hypothetical cases. It covers fraud or corruption.............. " His Lordship then quoted the following passages from Lord Justice Warrington in the case of (6) Short v. Poole Corporation, (1926)1 Chancery Division 66 :– "My view then is that the only case in which the court can interfere with an act of a public, body which is, on the face of it, regular and within its powers, is when it is proved to be in fact ultra vires, and that the ferences in the judgments in the several cases cited in argument to bad faith, corruption, alien and irrelevant motives, collateral and indirect objects, and so forth, are merely intended when properly understood as examples of matters which, if proved to exist, might establish the ultra vires character of the act in question." Then his Lordship said :– "This way of describing the effect of bad faith should not be used to blur the distinction between an ultra vires, act done bona fide and an act on the face of it regular but which will be held to be null and void if mala fide is discovered and brought before the court. The Division in law is clear and deep. No party would be allowed to raise fraud under an allegation of ultra vires simpliciter........... " 13. In the aforesaid case of Short v. Poole Corporation, Polak M. R. laid down at page 85 :– "…….Where an authority is constituted under statute to carry out statutory powers with which it is entrusted there are cases which show that if an attempt is made to exercise those powers corruptly–as under the influence of bribery, or mala fide for some improper purpose, such an attempt must fall. It is null and void." 14. Then again His Lordship said at page 88 :– "Where a discretion is given to the local authority, it is for that authority to exercise it, provided that its action is not ultra vires, nor its powers exercised corruptly or mala fide. It is null and void." 14. Then again His Lordship said at page 88 :– "Where a discretion is given to the local authority, it is for that authority to exercise it, provided that its action is not ultra vires, nor its powers exercised corruptly or mala fide. Where the exercise of the discretion is challenged, it is for the plaintiff to prove that there is a duty in the courts to interfere, upon the grounds already stated.........The authority may appear to be right or may appear to be wrong in the course they have adopted, according as that course may be subjected to criticism from one point of view of another. Upon such discussion and criticism it is not for the courts to pronounce. So long as the discretion has been exercised and the limits of discretion are not passed, the decision rests with the local authority." 15. In the case of (7) Earl Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Estates Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Town and Country Planning and Another, 1951(2) King's Bench 2846 the question was whether a compulsory purchase of land made by the Central Land Board under an Act of Parliament was for the purpose alleged. In this connection Lord Denning said :– ".........In the ordinary way of course, the courts do not have regard to the purpose or 'motive' or 'reason' of an act but only to its intrinsie validity.........But sometimes the validity of an act does depend on the purpose with which it is done–as in the case of a conspiracy and in such a case, when there is more, than one purpose, the law always has regard to the dominant purpose. If the dominant purpose of those concerned is unlawful, then the act done is invalid, and it is not to be cured by saying that they had some other purpose in mind which was lawful...........'' So also the validity of Government action often depends on the purpose with which it is done. There, too, the same principle applies........The department cannot escape from this result by saying that its motive is immaterial. Just as its real purpose is crucial, so also is its true motive, because they are one and the samething......... '' 15. Our Supreme Court itself has adopted the views expressed in these English decisions in a number of cases. There, too, the same principle applies........The department cannot escape from this result by saying that its motive is immaterial. Just as its real purpose is crucial, so also is its true motive, because they are one and the samething......... '' 15. Our Supreme Court itself has adopted the views expressed in these English decisions in a number of cases. In the case of (8) Sardar Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 Ayyangar, J. Speaking for the majority said as follows:– 'Pausing here, we might summarise the position by stating that the Court is not an appellate forum where the correctness of an order of Government could, be canvassed and, indeed, it has not jurisdiction to substitute its own view as to the necessity or desirability of initiating disciplinary proceedings, for the entirely of the power, jurisdiction and discretion in that regard is vested by law in the Government. They only question which could be considered by the Court is whether the authority vested with the power has paid attention to or taken into account circumstances, events or matters wholly extraneous to the purpose for which the power was vested, or whether the proceedings have been initiated mala fide for satisfying a private or personal grude of the authority against the officer. If the act is in excess of the power granted or is an abuse or misuse of power, the matter is capable of interference and rectification by the Court. In such an event the fact that the authority concerned denies the charge of mala fides, or asserts the absence of oblique motives or of its having taken into consideration improper or irrelevant matter does not preclude the Court from enquiring into the truth of the allegations made against the authority and affording appropriate reliefs to the party aggrieved by such illegality or abuse of power in the event of the allegations being made out. 16. The question of transfer have been brought to my notice. The first of them is the case of (9) Dr. (Sm.) Pushpika Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal and Others, 1972 SLR 910. The petitioner was a Government servant who had been transferred with the object of accommodating another person at a particular station for undisclosed reasons. 16. The question of transfer have been brought to my notice. The first of them is the case of (9) Dr. (Sm.) Pushpika Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal and Others, 1972 SLR 910. The petitioner was a Government servant who had been transferred with the object of accommodating another person at a particular station for undisclosed reasons. A learned single Judge held that the order was not for public interest or for administrative purposes and therefore, for collateral purposes and mala fide. Reliance was placed by Salil Kumar Dutt, Judge on the observation made in the case of (10) Mihir Kumar Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 75 CWN 831 where the learned Chief Justice said that "and executive decision or action or an administrative decision is liable to be struck down if it is used mala fide or for collateral purpose". The learned Judge held :– "I am of the opinion that this is a fit case where the order of transfer should be interfered with even though no civil or evil consequence would follow from such an order." 17. In another case decided by Salil Kumar Dutt in (11) N. N. Singh and Others v. General Manager, Chittaranjan Locomotive Works and Others, 1973 SLR 1153 a Railway employee has been transferred. The learned Judge said :– "At the same time it may be obvious or apparent on the facts evident admitted or established, that the orders of the authorities, though otherwise legal and valid have not been issued for the professed purposes as in this case in Public or administrative interest or in the exigencies of service but they are only passed for other purposes in the garb of ostensible purposes. The Court of law in such cases has thought it fit and competent for itself to prove in and scrutinise such orders to see if they have been passed for other purposes under colourable exercise of powers or if such orders are accordingly mala fide. The administrative orders, not otherwise justiciable, thus come under Court's scruting if there are allegations of mala fides or colourable exercise of powers behind such orders, even though they are free from violation, of any constitutional or statutory provisions. Such orders again are lable to be interfered with if the allegations noted above are established or evident on materials on record in absence of any rebutable evidence." 18. Such orders again are lable to be interfered with if the allegations noted above are established or evident on materials on record in absence of any rebutable evidence." 18. Sometimes right to transfer an employee is a lethel weapon in the hands of the employer. Sometimes it is more dangerous than other modes of punishment. In the service matters relating to transfer the Court finds that the transfer though issued in a very innocuous language to get rid of an inconvenient employee. When the court is alerted, the court has necessarily to lift the veil of deceptive innocuousness and see what exactly actricted or warranted the transfer. The respondents have not filed any affidavit nor produced records of the case. Why it was necessary for the respondents to pass order of transfer before the expiry of five years ? To the query, bogey of public interest and/or public service would be of no assistance to the respondents, herein. In this context reference usefully and materially be made to the observation of the Supreme Court in (12) E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others which reads as under :– "Art 16 embodies the fundamental guarantee that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Though enacted as a distinct and independent fundamental right because of its great importance as a principle ensuring equality of opportunity in public employment which is so vital to the building up of the new classless vital to the building up of the new classless enalitarian society envisaged in the Constitution. Art. 16 is only an instance of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Art. 14. In other words, Art. 14 is the genus while Art. 16 is a species, Art. 16 gives effect to the doctrine of equality in all matters relating to public employment. The basic principle which therefore, informs both Arts.14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle ? It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose, J., 'way of life' and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose, J., 'way of life' and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be 'cribbed, cabined and confined' within traditional and 'doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies, one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is there violative of Art. 14, and if it effect any matter relating to public employment, it is also violalive of Art. 16, Arts. 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant consideration because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible considerations. It would amount to mala fide exercise of power and that is hit by Arts. 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of power and arbitrariness and different lethel radiations emanating from the same vice, in fact the latter comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by Arts. 14 and 16.'' 19. It is true that a provision for transfer is meant for placing rigorous check upon creation of vested interest, nepotism and corruption. No civil servant could say that he could not transferred without consent. However like any other executive or administrative action, the power of transfer is required to be exercised in good faith and in terms of rules and guidelines governing the transfer of employee. The Government is required to adhere strictly to the standard or policy laid down by the Government. However like any other executive or administrative action, the power of transfer is required to be exercised in good faith and in terms of rules and guidelines governing the transfer of employee. The Government is required to adhere strictly to the standard or policy laid down by the Government. When such guidelines are laid down, Government cannot deviate and depert from the said guideline without any rational justification. If any departure or deviation is made in breach of the guideline without rational justification that could amount to breach of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It is well settled that the Court should not normally interfere with the orders of transfer which are issued on the exigency of the service and in discharge of administrative or executive power. However if the power issued is not in good faith or in mala fide exercise of power the court would not hesitate to interfere, since mala fide exercise of power is not considered to be legal exercise of power. Once a policy is laid down by the Government it must apply equally to every employee. To transfer without sufficient reason before expiration or normal period of five years, is open for judicial scrutiny. If there is rational justification in support of the transfer it cannot but be held as mala fide. Now turning back to the facts of the case it is proper to bear in mind that the assertion made in paragraph 19 of the writ petition which refers to the alleged involvement of the petitioner in Uttar Khanda Movement case remains unchallenged. There is no affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of Respondent No.4 against whom serious allegation levelled in the writ petition. The orders of transfer were issued at the instance of Respondent No. 4. This assertion of the petitioners remains unrebutted. The court is not unmindful that sometimes unscheduled transfer disrupts the education of the children and leads to various others inconvenience and problem resulted in hardship and demoralization. During the imperialist regime, the general policy was to restrict the period of posting for definite period. Taking into consideration good efficiency and smooth administration the Government rightly decided to modulate general policy in relation to the transfer. Such policy is conducive to the streamlined administration. During the imperialist regime, the general policy was to restrict the period of posting for definite period. Taking into consideration good efficiency and smooth administration the Government rightly decided to modulate general policy in relation to the transfer. Such policy is conducive to the streamlined administration. Accommodation on the ground of personal difficulty for short span of one year or so can be well appreciated but an employee on flimsy ground cannot avoid normal transfer. The writ petition furnished cogent grounds for interference with the order of transfer more particularly on the ground as indicated above. The facts of the case warrant the Government not to depert from general policy and issue order of transfer in contravention of guidelines. The petitioner rightly raised the grievances that the Government acted unfairly and in unusually manner in issuing the order of transfer by making a clear departure from the guidelines contained in the policy. 20. In my opinion, for its streamline administration the head of the administration should personally look into the grievances of every person like petitioner herein and put a serious check on the abuse of power otherwise right-minded people might say that the administration has been suffering from chronic infection of administrative lethargy. It will be appropriate for the court to record a note of caution for the administration that immediate steps should be taken for streamlining good administration. I am not obligious of the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of (13) Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka and Others 1986(4) SCC page 131. After consideration of the submission of Mr. Asok De, the learned Advocate for the petitioner as indicated in details hereinbefore I cannot but persuade myself with the contention of Mr. De that order of transfer were not passed in bona fide exercise of power, but same was passed for accommodating Respondent No.4 herein and the said orders of transfer not having been passed in adherence to the policy of the Government cannot but quashed as being illegal, irrational and improper. In view of the foregoing reasons I allow the writ application. I further direct the respondent to pay the petitioner all the service benefit to which he would be entitled had he not been served with the order of transfer. In view of the foregoing reasons I allow the writ application. I further direct the respondent to pay the petitioner all the service benefit to which he would be entitled had he not been served with the order of transfer. In view of expiry of five years in terms of policy the respondent will allow the petitioner to join the place of posting wherefrom he was sought to be transferred and thereafter, issue an appropriate order of transfer by posting him elsewhere in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.