A. K. CHATTERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE 16 revisional applications, 8 of them made by one K. P. Sundarson and the remaining 8 made by one I. J. Chools heard together seek to quash 8 criminal prosecutions started by a Provident Fund Inspector in the court of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. Calcutta against the aforesaid 2 petitioners and another under sections 14 (A) read with 14-A (1) and 144aa of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 for failure to pay provident fund contribution and family pension fund contribution, in both employees and employer's share as well as administrative charges for 8 different periods. The petitioners were said to be the Chief Executive and a Director respectively of Bertams Scott (1) Limited which according to the petitioners has a factory at Titagarh within 24. Parganas district. ( 2 ) SEVERAL grounds common to all the revisional applications were urged in support of the Rules. In the first place it has been pointed out that the offence was alleged to have been committed by the aforesaid company and relying upon the provisions of section 14a, it has been argued that prosecution of a Director or a Chief Executive was incompetent in the absence of the prosecution of the company itself. There is nothing in section 14-A of the aforesaid Act to support such a contention and, therefore, I am clearly of the opinion that the prosecutions cannot be said to be incompetent as no complaint has been lodged against the company. This contention therefore fa i Is. ( 3 ) IT has been next contended that the petitioners were not in charge of or responsible to the company for conduct of its business and therefore, they could not be held to be vicariously responsible for offence, if any committed by the company. It has been stated in paragraph 3 of the complaint that the petitioners at all material time were the persons in. charge of the establishment and were responsible to it for the conduct of its business while paragraph 2 of the complaint states that the Bertams Scott (I) Ltd. was the establishment in question. It has been stated in paragraph 3 of the complaint that the petitioners at all material time were the persons in. charge of the establishment and were responsible to it for the conduct of its business while paragraph 2 of the complaint states that the Bertams Scott (I) Ltd. was the establishment in question. Therefore, these two paragraphs read together no doubt suggest that petitioners were the persons in charge of and were responsible to the company for the conduct of its business and so, if the company was the offender then the complaint cannot be said to be lacking in material particulars to make out a case of vicarious liability against the petitioners. However, the complaint itself seems to be confusing and indeed it is not clear whether the alleged offence has been committed by the company. Under section 14 (1a) of the Act it is the employer making default in complying with certain provisions of the Act and the scheme framed there under, who is punishable with the sentence prescribed therein. It may also be noted that section 6 of the Act and paragraph 30 of the Scheme cast responsibility upon the employer to do certain acts and the complaints alleged non-performance of such duty. Clearly therefore, the alleged offender is the employer which has been defined in section 2 (e) of the Act to mean in relation to an establishment which is a factory the owner or occupier of the factory including the agent of such owner or occupier and when a person has been named as a manager of the factory under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Factories Act, 1948, the person so named. Now in the instant case the complaints have been lodged against the petitioners under section 14 (1a) read with section 14-A (1) suggesting thereby that the petitioners are sought to be made vicariously responsible for the offence committed by the company which must, therefore, be the employer. In paragraph 4 of the complaint, however, it has been stated that it is the petitioners who are the employers. Thus, the allegation that the petitioners are responsible by reason of the provision of section 14-A (1) is inconsistent with the statement in paragraph 4 that the accused persons were the employers. In paragraph 4 of the complaint, however, it has been stated that it is the petitioners who are the employers. Thus, the allegation that the petitioners are responsible by reason of the provision of section 14-A (1) is inconsistent with the statement in paragraph 4 that the accused persons were the employers. Again the statement in paragraph 2 that the company was an establishment cannot be reconciled with the case that the offence has been committed by the company because if really the company was the establishment, the offender would be the employer namely the owner or occupier of the factory and not the company itself. Thus on such an inconsistent complaint the learned Magistrate was not right in taking cognizance nor the petitioners can be asked to answer a charge under the sections alleged of the aforesaid Act. ( 4 ) THE learned Advocate for the petitioners has then contended that the learned Magistrate had no territorial jurisdiction to try the cases. It was urged that the employees in respect of whom contributions were not deposited were engaged in a factory at Titagarh in 24 parganas district while the complaints were lodged in court of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. It has been pointed out that the allegation in the complaints only related to non-payment of provident fund and family pension fund contribution in both employeest and employer's share as well as administrative changes and there was no allegation that the petitioners did not submit the statutory return. It has been held by a Division Bench of this court In D. K. Bhattacharjee, Provident Fund Inspector v. Chandidas Chitra Mandir and others1, that the provident fund contribution and administrative charges are to be paid locally and not to the Officer of the Provident Fund Commissioner at. Calcutta. Their Lordships after considering the relevant provisions had further observed that payment was to be made with Reserve Bank of India or the State Bank of India of the station where the factory was situated. In the instant case the learned advocate for the opposite party was fair enough to admit that the factory was situated at Titagarh in 24-parganas district and. therefore, offence if any, was committed not at any place within the jurisdiction of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta but at Titagarh in 24-parganas. In the instant case the learned advocate for the opposite party was fair enough to admit that the factory was situated at Titagarh in 24-parganas district and. therefore, offence if any, was committed not at any place within the jurisdiction of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta but at Titagarh in 24-parganas. In these circumstances the position seems to be clear that the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate had no territorial jurisdiction to try the cases and as such he should not have taken cognizance on the complaints. ( 5 ) ANOTHER ground urged on behalf of the petitioners in support of the Rules was that several charges have been clubbed together in each complaint with the result that it is vitiated for misjoinder of charges. It has been argued that default in making contribution constituted a distinct offence in respect of each employee and each kind of contribution and separate cases 8hould have been filed for default of each description for each employee. If this contention is upheld then hundreds of cases would have to be filed which would not be conductive to the interest of either the complainant or the accused persons and indeed it would cause enormous hardship and prejudice to the latter. However, the law relating to joinder of charges is well settled and it can be summarized by stating that when series of acts are so connected together as to form the same transaction, all the offences may be tried together. The question whether the acts are so connected has to be decided considering the proximity of time and place, continuity of action and unity of purpose and design. It has been so held by a chain of authorities of which reference may be made to the case of Becharam Mukherji v. Emperor and another2. The view taken by this Division Bench is consistent with the view taken by another Division Bench in an earlier case in Ram Chandra Rango Sawkar and others v. Emperor3. It has been so held by a chain of authorities of which reference may be made to the case of Becharam Mukherji v. Emperor and another2. The view taken by this Division Bench is consistent with the view taken by another Division Bench in an earlier case in Ram Chandra Rango Sawkar and others v. Emperor3. If this test is applied in the instant case it will at once follow that the alleged defaults by reason of proximity of time and place as well as by reason of unity of purpose and design are so connected as to form part of the same transaction and, therefore, a single complaint in respect of non-payment of provident fund and family pension fund contribution in both employees and the employer's share for a particular period is quite sustainable. Therefore, the complaint under consideration cannot be said to be bad for mis-joinder of charges. ( 6 ) THE learned advocate for the petitioners has alto stated that the complaint was not shown to have been empowered to file the complaint as required by section 14-AC of the employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act. Now, it has been stated in the complaints that the complainant was an Inspector appointed under section 13 of the Act and further that the sanction for prosecution has been granted by the Regional Provident Funds Commissioner, which was enclosed with the complaint. In the circumstances there is no substance in the contention that cognizance has been taken in contravention of the provisions of section 14-AC of the Act or that the complainant had no authority to file the complaint. ( 7 ) FOR reasons stated above, I am disposed to the view that an opportunity should be given to the complainant to file fresh and proper complaints in the court of a competent Magistrate as the allegations relate to contravention of provisions of a statute designed to secure welfare of the em ployees. ( 8 ) THE proceedings in question are therefore, quashed but the complaint may file fresh and proper complaints on the same facts in the court of a competent Magistrate within one month from this date and if such complaints are filed, the learned Magistrate shall dispose of the proceedings with utmost expedition. ( 9 ) THE Rules are thus, disposed of. Records be sent down at once. Petition allowed. .