ent. JUDGMENT - H.W. DHABE, J.:---This is a letter patent appeal arising out of the proceedings under the provisions of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (for short, ''The Tenancy Act''). Briefly the facts are that the field survey No. 98 admeasuring 20.00 acres of village Donak belongs Bk. to the appellant. The respondent was admittedly the tenant of the suit field. It appears that the lease of the suit field was since the time of his father and was created in 1958. The appellant gave a notice dated 10-1-73 to the respondent for resumption of the suit field for personal cultivation. A second notice dated 26-12-74 for resumption of land for personal cultivation was served by her regd. Post upon the respondent. The appellant thereafter filed an application under section 36(2) read with a section 38 of the Tenancy Act claiming possession of the suit filed. The said application was filed on 29-1-75. The respondent resisted the said application by filing the written statement, According to him, he did not receive the first notice dated 10-9-73 and as regards the second notice dated 26-12-74, his case was that it was not a notice of six months as required by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and was, therefore, invalid. 2. The Additional Tahsildar by his order dated 9-12-77 allowed the application of the appellant for resumption of the suit filed for personal cultivation thus rejecting the objections raised by the respondent. In appeal preferred by the respondent, the learned Sub-Divisional Officer (for short S.D.O) by order dated 13-11-78, set aside the order of the learned Additional Tahsildar thus upholding the objections raised on behalf of the respondent to the notice given by the appellant. The appellant preferred a revision before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (for short M.R.T) and the learned M.R.T. by its order dated 23-7-80 allowed the revision setting aside the order of the learned S.D.O. and thus resorting the order passed by the learned Additional Tahsildar. The respondent challenged the order of the learned M.R.T. by preferring a writ petition in this Court. The learned Single Judge of this Court by his judgment rendered on 24-8-84 set aside the order of the learned M.R.T. and maintained the order passed by the learned S.D.O. Being aggrieved, the appellant-landlord has preferred the instant I.P.A. in this Court. 3. The respondent challenged the order of the learned M.R.T. by preferring a writ petition in this Court. The learned Single Judge of this Court by his judgment rendered on 24-8-84 set aside the order of the learned M.R.T. and maintained the order passed by the learned S.D.O. Being aggrieved, the appellant-landlord has preferred the instant I.P.A. in this Court. 3. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellant landlord did not canvass before us the correctness or otherwise of the finding of the learned Single Judge relating to the non-service of the first notice dated 10-9-73. He has, however, strenuously urged before us the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the notice under section 38(2) of the Tenancy Act should be of 6 months duration as required by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is erroneous and is liable to be set aside. It may be seen that the second notice dated 26-12-74 was served by registered Post upon the respondent tenant and the application thereafter under section 36(2) read with section 38 of the Tenancy Act was filed on 29-1-75. The notice dated 26-12-74 served upon the respondent-tenant was thus clearly not of 6 months duration. The learned Counsel for the respondent-tenant apart from the controverting the above contention raised on behalf of the appellant, has urged that there is no right to the widow-landlord to give any notice under section 38(2)(B) of the Tenancy Act, which right is conferred thereunder upon her successor in title only. 4. As regards the first contention urged on behalf of the respondent landlord that the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable to the notice to be given under section 38(2) of the Tenancy Act, reliance is placed by the learned Counsel of the appellant-landlord upon a decision of this Court in the case of (Zabda v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal)1, 1964 Maharashtra Law Journal 559. He has further urged that the tenancy of the respondent-tenant is statutory tenancy and, therefore, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Sardari Lal Vishwa Nath v. Pritam Singh)2, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1518, section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable to such a statutory tenancy. He has further urged that the tenancy of the respondent-tenant is statutory tenancy and, therefore, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Sardari Lal Vishwa Nath v. Pritam Singh)2, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1518, section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable to such a statutory tenancy. The learned Counsel for the respondent-tenant has, however, urged that section 5 of the Tenancy Act makes the provisions of Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act applicable to the tenancies and the leases to which the Tenancy Act applies except in so far as the said provisions are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Tenancy Act. In support of the above submissions, the learned Counsel for the respondent-tenant has relied upon the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court (Joshi J, as he then was) in the case of (Rajmal v. Uttam)3, 1980 Maharashtra Law Journal 112, who has followed the decisions in the case of (Ratan v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal)4, 1972 Maharashtra Law Journal (Note) 70 of another learned Single Judge of this Court i.e. Chandurkar, J, as he then was, who has in turn relied upon his own previous decision in the case of (Telsingh v. Shameunnisa)5, 1971 Maharashtra Law Journal (Note) 28. He has also in support of his submission relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Manekji v. Maneksha)6, 1975 Bombay Law Reporter 609. 5. Before considering the cases relied upon on behalf of the rival parties, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scheme of section 38 of the Tenancy Act in its proper prespective. It may be seen that by virtue of section 9 of the Tenancy Act, no tenancy of any land can be terminated solely on the ground that it has expired by either of time. Section 19 of the Tenancy Act provides for termination of tenancy upon the grounds enumerated in Clause 1 of its sub-section (1) by notice of 3 months prescribed under Clause 11 of the said sub-section. Section 38 also provides for termination of tenancy but on the ground of personal cultivation. 6. Section 19 of the Tenancy Act provides for termination of tenancy upon the grounds enumerated in Clause 1 of its sub-section (1) by notice of 3 months prescribed under Clause 11 of the said sub-section. Section 38 also provides for termination of tenancy but on the ground of personal cultivation. 6. Examining closely section 38, it may be seen that sub-section (1) of section 38 provides that a landlord after giving notice in writing at any time on or before 15th day of February, 1961 and by making an application for possession under section 36 on or before the 31st day of March, 1961 can terminate the tenancy of the land held by a tenant. It is thus clear from section 38(1) that for terminating the tenancy not only a notice by the date mentioned therein but an application for possession under section 36 before the date mentioned therein is also necessary. It us further clear from section 38(1) read with section 46 of the Tenancy Act that the right to terminate the tenancy for personal cultivation can be exercised by the landlord before the tenant becomes a statutory owned on 1-4-61. Then comes sub-section (2) of section 38 which makes a provision in relation to a landlord who is either a minor or widow or a person subject to any physical or mental disability. It is clear from sub-section 2 of section 38 that a landlord of any of the above categories can avail of the right to give notice for personal cultivation under section 38(1) of the Tenancy Act, However, if no such right is exercised by him under section 38(1) of the Tenancy Act by giving notice before 15-1-61 and making an application for possession under section 36 before 31-3-61, such a right can be exercised within the time prescribed under section 38(2) by the minor landlord after he becomes major, by the person under the physical or mental disability, after such disability ceases as provided under Clause (A) of sub-section (2) of section 38, and by the successor-in-title of the widow landlord after the widow's interest has ceased to exist as provided under Clause (B) of the aforesaid sub-section. It is however, not necessary to construe at this stage section 38(2). Suffice it to say that section 38(2) also requires a notice to be given and an application to be made for termination of tenancy. 7. It is however, not necessary to construe at this stage section 38(2). Suffice it to say that section 38(2) also requires a notice to be given and an application to be made for termination of tenancy. 7. It is further clear from reading section 38(2) that although an outer limit for taking action under the said sub-section is provided, no provision is made for the duration of the notice as such to be given there under. It is because of the absence in section 38(2) of the provision about the duration of the notice that section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is pressed into service by the learned Counsel for the respondent since according to him it stands incorporated in section 38 (2) by virtue of the provisions of section 5 of the Tenancy Act. On the other hand, the submission on behalf of the appellant landlord is that the tenancy does not stand terminated by merely giving notice under sub-sections (1) or (2) of sections 38 of the Tenancy Act unlike in the case of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, by giving of which the tenancy stands terminated. According to the learned Counsel for the appellant be scheme of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 38 shows that it is inconsistent with the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore, the provision regarding duration of notice thereunder cannot be made applicable to the same. 8. The learned Single Judge whose judgement is impugned before us has for his view principally relied upon the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Rajmal v. Uttam, 1980 Maharashtra Law Journal 112 cited supra. A perusal of the said judgment would show that it has in turn for its view solely relied upon the judgment of another learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Ratna v. M.R.T. 1972 Maharashtra Law Journal (Note) 70 cited supra. In para 3 of his judgment, the learned Single Judge in Rajmal's case has held that in view of section 5 of the Tenancy Act, the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property, would be applicable and, therefore, notice under section 38(2) should be of six months duration. In para 3 of his judgment, the learned Single Judge in Rajmal's case has held that in view of section 5 of the Tenancy Act, the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property, would be applicable and, therefore, notice under section 38(2) should be of six months duration. The judgment of the Division Bench in Zadbai's case, 1964 Maharashtra Law Journal 559 cited supra, which was relied upon by the learned Counsel for the tenant in the said case was distinguished by the learned Single Judge in Rajmal's case by relying upon the same distinction which is made by the learned Single Judge in Ratna's case cited supra. 9. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to the ratio of the judgment of this Court in Zadba's case cited supra. It is first necessary to notice that the judgment in Zadba's case is a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench in Zadba's case has held that the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act apply in the absence of any local law as provided therein. It has further held that section 30(1) of the Tenancy Act is a local law within the meaning of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and, therefore, section 106 would not be applicable to the termination of tenancy under section 39(1) of the Tenancy Act. It has also found that section 39(1) of the tenancy Act does not provide for any period of notice and that all it requires is a notice in writing. 10. A perusal of the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Ratan's case cited supra would show that according to the learned Single Judge in the said case Zadba's case was distinguishable on the ground that the period of notice is expressly provided in section 39 in a case which is governed by that section. With respect, in our view, the above observation of the learned Single Judge are just contrary to what the Division Bench has observed in para 4 in Zadba's case. It is clearly observed by Division Bench in Zadba's case that the relevant local law in section 39(1) does not provide for any period of notice. With respect, in our view, the above observation of the learned Single Judge are just contrary to what the Division Bench has observed in para 4 in Zadba's case. It is clearly observed by Division Bench in Zadba's case that the relevant local law in section 39(1) does not provide for any period of notice. It was not therefore, upon the learned Single Judge to distinguish Zadba's case by making observations contrary to what was stated by the Division Bench in Zadba's case. Apart from that, even a perusal of section 39(1) would show that the above observations of the learned Single Judge are not borne out by the said sub-section 39(1) provides for an outer limit i.e. the last date before which a notice in writing for termination of tenancy must be given and an application for possession under section 36(2) of the Tenancy Act must be made but it does not provide for any period or any duration of the notice required to be given there under. The learned Single Judge in Rajmal's case has merely followed the ratio of the aforesaid decision in Ratan's case. The said judgment, therefore, also suffers from the same vice by which the judgment in Ratan's case suffers. 11. The ratio of the decision of the Division Bench in Zadba's case cited supra, in our view, really clinches the issue in regard to the construction of section 38(2) also. When the Division Bench in Zadba's case has observed that section 39(1) is a local law within the meaning of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act what it meant was that section 39(1) enacted a local law contrary to the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It would thus be clear that according to the Division Bench in Zadba's case, the provisions of section 39(1) were inconsistent with the provisions of section 106(1) of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Single Judge in the above case, therefore, should have followed the ratio in Zadba's case. The same reasoning which is applicable in regard to section 39(1) would also be applicable in regard to sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 38 of the Tenancy Act. 12. The learned Single Judge in the above case, therefore, should have followed the ratio in Zadba's case. The same reasoning which is applicable in regard to section 39(1) would also be applicable in regard to sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 38 of the Tenancy Act. 12. It may be seen that the scheme of section 38 shows that the tenancy of the tenant does not stand terminated by merely giving a notice under section 38(1) or section 38(2) unlike section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, under which the tenancy stands terminated on the expiry of the duration of the notice of termination of tenancy. The scheme of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 38 shows that for terminating the tenancy of a tenant not only a notice but an application for possession under section 36(2) has to be made within the limit provided there under. Moreover, the right to terminate the tenancy is subject to the requirements or conditions laid down in other sub-sections of section 38, which necessarily postulate an enquiry to be made before the landlord is allowed to terminate the tenancy and obtain possession of the land. In such an enquiry it is possible that the Competent Tenancy Authority may not allow the landlord to terminate the tenancy and resume the whole or part of the land. The termination of tenancy is thus not effective till an order of resumption of land is passed by the Competent Tenancy Authority. The scheme of section 38 is thus incompatible with or is inconsistent with the scheme of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, which can not, therefore, be made applicable to the notice under section 38(1) or section 38(2) of the Tenancy Act. The above view about the scheme of section 38 of the Tenancy Act is supported by the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of (Harikisan v. Krishnaji)7, 1976 Mh.L. J. 527. (Para 17) 13. The scheme of section 38 would, therefore, fortify the contention that the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 38 of the Tenancy Act are inconsistent with the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, whereunder the tenancy comes to an end merely on expiry of the period for which the notice has to be given thereunder. The above view is also supported by a direct Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of (Harkubai v. Shankar Daulat)8, 1980 Mh.L.J. 671, in which it is held that the provisions about the termination of the tenancy for personal cultivation under the provisions of section 31(1) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, which are identical with the provisions of section 38(1) of the Tenancy Act are inconsistent with the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Division Bench in the above case has approved and followed the decision in Zadba's case cited supra. In view of the above Division Bench judgment, which fortifies the view taken by us it has to be held that a notice to be given under section 38(1) or section 38(2) of the Tenancy Act as regards its duration is not governed by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 14. The learned Counsel for the respondent-tenant has, however, strongly relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manek v. Manekshaji, 1975 Bombay Law Reporter 609. It may be seen that the question involved in the said case was under section 38-B of the Bombay Tenancy Act under which the tenancies created by the unlic trust were exempted from the applications of the provisions of sections 31 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, which is analogous to section 38 of the Tenancy Act. Since the provision of section 31 of the Bombay Tenancy Act were not attracted in the above case in view of section 38-B of the said Act, it was not necessary for the Division Bench to consider in the said case, the question whether section 31 of the Bombay Tenancy Act (analogous to section 38 of the Tenancy Act) was in consistent with the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was therefore, possible in the case of the public trust to apply the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The said case is thus clearly distinguishable and it has been so distinguished by the Division Bench of this Court in Harkubai's case (cited supra) also. The above decision is, therefore, of no assistance to the respondent in the instant case. The said case is thus clearly distinguishable and it has been so distinguished by the Division Bench of this Court in Harkubai's case (cited supra) also. The above decision is, therefore, of no assistance to the respondent in the instant case. It is thus clear that the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the notice under section 38(2) should be of six months duration is erroneous and is liable to be reversed. 15. It is, however, next urged that the widow landlord has no right to give any notice under section 38(2) of the Tenancy Act. The submission is that if a widow or a minor or a person having physical or mental disability wants to give notice for personal cultivation she or he may do it before the dates mentioned in section 38(1) of the Tenancy Act. However, after the said date mentioned in section 38(1) i.e. 31-3-61 is over, according to the learned Counsel for the respondent, notice can be given in the case of widow-landlord by the successor-in-title only within one year from the date on which the widow's interest in the land ceases to exist, as provided in Clause (B) of sub-section (2) of section 38. As regards the landlord who is minor, the submission is that in his case notice can be given by him only after he attains majority and the time limit is one year from the date of attaining majority. In the case of a person subject to any physical or mental disability, according to the respondent, such a person can give notice only after such physical or mental disability ceases and that too within one year from the date such physical or mental disability ceases. 16. In appreciating the above contention urged on behalf of the respondent/tenant it is necessary to notice that there are two Division Bench judgments of this Court taking a view that for the landlords, who are in the category of a minor, widow or a person subject to any physical or mental disability the outer limit for giving notice and for making an application for resumption of land on the ground of personal cultivation as prescribed in section 38(1) of the Tenancy Act (analogous to section 31(1) of the Bombay Tenancy Act) stands extended by the time limit given in section 38(2) of the said Act (corresponding section 31(3) of the Bombay Tenancy Act). The first decision is under the Bombay Tenancy Act in the case of (Nagarbai v. Gahininath)9, 1964 Mh.L.J. (Note) 57 and the second decision is under the Tenancy Act in the case of (Ratanlal v. Rukmabai)10, 1976 Mh.L.J. 492. We need examine only the later decision which is under the Tenancy Act itself. 17. In Ratanlal's case cited supra, the Division Bench of this Court held that all the sub-section of the section 38 of the Tenancy Act have to be read together, as they are interdependent. The Division Bench, therefore, held in the said case that sub-section (2) of section 38 cannot be read in isolation but must be read with the other provisions of this section and if so read according to the Division Bench, for the exercise of the right to give notice and make an application for possession in the case of the landlords of the categories given in sub-section (2) conferred by sub-section (1), sub-section (2) provides an extended period for giving notice and filing an application for possession. It is thus clear from the above judgement that the view taken is that when the tenancy is subsisting in the case of landlords of the categories in section 38(2) because the tenants of their lands cannot become statutory owners on the relevant date under section 46 or section 49-A of the Tenancy Act, there is no reason why they should not have a right to terminate the tenancy for personal cultivation, during the subsistence of the Tenancy. According to the Division Bench, such landlords may not till the dates mentioned under section 38(1) require the tenanted lands for their personal cultivation in which case according to it there is no reason why they should be precluded for terminating the tenancy for personal cultivation thereafter they choose to do so on or before the extended period under section 38(2) of the Tenancy Act. 18. The above judgement of the Division Benches of this Court are binding upon us. Even otherwise, although the literal construction placed upon sub-section (2) of section 38 on behalf of the respondent-tenant is attractive on deeper consideration looking to the benevolent object of section 38(2) which is enacted to protect the interest of the special categories of the landlord described therein, we cannot persuade ourself to accept the said construction of section 38(2) of the Tenancy Act. 19. 19. Since we have held that the provisions of section 106 are inconsistent with the provision of section 38(2) of the Tenancy Act, it is not necessary for us to consider the contention raised on behalf of the appellant whether the tenancy in the instant case is a statutory tenancy and whether for terminating such a statutory tenancy a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary or not. 20. In the result, the instant Letters Patent Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgement of the learned Single Judge is set aside and that of the learned M.R.T. is restored. However, there will be no order as to costs in this appeal. Appeal allowed. ----