ORDER K.L. Shrivastava, J.- . l. This revision petition is directed against the order dated 29-6-1985 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhabua in Criminal Case No. O/85 whereby he has held that the cognizance of the offences u/Ss. 167, 177, 196 and 500 IPC could not be taken without the previous sanction of the Government as provided under Section 197 (1) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short 'the Code'). 2. Circumstances giving rise to the revision petition are these. The petitioner was working as Deputy Collector in Jhabua District between 24-8-67 and 25-9-69. In 1972 some defalcations were detected in the Nazarat of the Collectorate, Jhabua. It was found that this was due to irregularities. Several Deputy Collectors had remained in charge of Nazarat during the period. They were noticed. After inquiry the Collector Jhabua reported the matter to the Government which issued notice to the petitioner to show cause. In part I of the notice five charges were mentioned. The petitioner submitted his explanation. Thereupon, the Government proceeded against hi m only in respect of charges 2 and 5. Later holding that they were proved, the matter was referred to the Public Service Commission which did not concur with the recommendation for the penalty of censure to the applicant. The papers were ultimately submitted to the Government which accordingly censured the applicant. 3. The contention of the petitioner is that as he had filed a civil suit against the Government and had prosecuted the non-applicants they acted mala fide and reported falsely against him to the Public Service Commission. In relation to the charge no.2 they wrongly stated that the applicant had indirectly admitted that he had not conducted the monthly verification of the cash in certain months. In fact the petitioner in his explanation had touched only those months in which he was in charge and it was wrongly assumed in respect of the other months that he had no explanation to submit. It is urged that the charge in fact was regarding absence of the daily verification and the finding is regarding monthly verification. 4. Regarding charge no. 5 it is stated that in his explanation the petitioner had denied the same which was regarding maintaining single cash-book of Government and non-Government money whereas two different cash-book ought to have been maintained. It is urged that the charge in fact was regarding absence of the daily verification and the finding is regarding monthly verification. 4. Regarding charge no. 5 it is stated that in his explanation the petitioner had denied the same which was regarding maintaining single cash-book of Government and non-Government money whereas two different cash-book ought to have been maintained. In the report submitted to the Public Service commission the non-applicants, however, had stated that this charge was admitted by the petitioner. The complaint was filed on 4-2-85. 5. The contention of the petitioner's learned counsel relying on the decision in Durgaprasad Raika v. Dr. Devilal Cr. Revision No. 1413/80 (JBP); decided on 29-10-72. is that giving false report during the course of duty does not attract the applicability of Section 197 of the Code. He contends that at any rate as the matter stands, on record there is no case for applicability of Section 197 of the Code which on material brought on record during the course of the trial might be attracted. 6. The contention of the learned counsel for the non-applicants is that once it is found that the facts complained of are relating to the performance of official duty then notwithstanding the fact that there was dereliction of duty or negligence or failure to follow the proper procedure applicability of Section 197 of the Code is clearly attracted. 7. It is further contended that in respect of offences under Sections 177 and 196 the bar under Section 195 regarding filing of complaint by the petitioner is also attracted. 8. The point for consideration is whether the impugned order deserves to be interfered with. 9. The relevant provision in section 197 (1) (b) reads thus :- (197) (1) when any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction- (a) ................ (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State. 10. (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State. 10. The contention of the petitioner's learned counsel is that the provision is not intended to confer blanket immunity to a Government Servant in respect of offences committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty and the non-applicants who have proceeded in utter disregard of truth and the prescribed procedure cannot seek shelter under it. 11. The contention of the learned counsel for the non-applicants is that it is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. In support of his submission he mainly placed reliance on the decisions in Ramayya v. State of Bombay 1955 SC 287 and State of M.P. v. Keshar rao and another 1975 JLJ SN 59. 12. On the point of sanction, the decisions in Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor AIR 1939 FC 43, B.P. Shrivastava v. M.P. Mishra AIR 1970 SC 1661 , Baijnath's case AIR 1966 SC 220 , Kailash Chandra's case 1986 JLJ 499 and R.K. Chari's case 1967 MPLJ 56 may be usefully perused. 13. In the decision in Amrik Singh's case AIR 1955 SC 309 , it has been observed as under : "It is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197 (1) Cr. 13. In the decision in Amrik Singh's case AIR 1955 SC 309 , it has been observed as under : "It is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197 (1) Cr. P. C. and not even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties, but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary; and that would be so irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of his duties, because that would really be a matter of defence on the merits which would have to be investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the grant of sanction which must precede the institution of the prosecution." In this decision it has further been pointed out that even when the charge is one of misappropriation by a Public servant whether sanction is required under section 197 (1) will depend upon the facts of each case. If the acts complained of are so integrally connected with duties attaching to the office as to be inseparable from them, then sanction would be necessary; but if there was no necessary connection between them and the performance of these duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required. 14. The aforesaid decision in Amrik Singh's case was doubted in Baijnath v. State of M. P. (supra) and was relied on in the decision in B.P. Shrivastava's case (supra). 15. In the decision in Matajog Dubey v. H.C. Bhari AIR 1956 SC 44 , it has been pointed out that there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty, the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable claim, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. In the decision in Baijnath's case (supra) the S.C. has explained that it is the quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned, the protection contemplated by section 197 of the Code will be attracted. 16. In the decision in Ramayya's case (supra) is has been pointed out that if the provision is construed to narrowly it can never be applied, for of course, it is not part of an official's duty to commit an offence and never can be. The decision relates to an offence under section 409 IPC and it was held that sanction was necessary, and it has further been pointed out that the Courts have to concentrate on the word 'offence' in the sanction and offence seldom consists of a single act. It is usually composed of several elements and as a rule a whole series of acts must be proved before it can be established. The offence under section 409 of the IPC requires dishonest disposal. The decision points out that there could in that case be no disposal lawful or otherwise save by an act done or purporting to be done in an official capacity and if the disposal was innocent, it was an official act, if dishonest, it was the dishonest doing of an official act; but in either event the act was official because the accused could not dispose of the goods save by doing of an official act, namely, officially permitting their disposal. 17. From the decision in Baijnath's case (supra) the following excerpt from the majority view of the point of sanction may also be profitably extracted ; "What is important is the quality of the act and the protection contemplated by S. 197 of the Criminal P.C. will be attracted where the act falls within the scope and range of his official duties. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. It is not connected with the official duty, there can be no protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable." Paragraph 17 of the decision is also apposite. It is not connected with the official duty, there can be no protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable." Paragraph 17 of the decision is also apposite. It reads thus :- "Applying the principle to the present case, we are of opinion that sanction of the State Government was not necessary for the prosecution of Gupta under S. 409 of the Indian Penal Code because the Act of criminal misappropriation was not committed by the appellant while he was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties and that offence has no direct connection with the duties of the appellant as public servant and the official status of the appellant only furnished the appellant with an occasion or an opportunity of committing the offence". The decision in R.K. Chari's case (supra) is also pertinent. 18. From the decision in B.P. Shrivastava's case (supra) the following pertinent observations are apposite :- "The principle embodied in this section seems to be well understood, the difficulty normally lies in its application to the facts of a given case. The question whether a particular act is done by a public servant in the discharge of the official duty is substantially one of the fact to be determined on the circumstances of each case. In the present case the alleged offence consists of the use of defamatory and abusive words and of getting the complainant forcibly turned out of the operation theatre by the cook. There is nothing on the record to show that this was a part of the official duty of the appellant as Civil Surgeon or that it was so directly connected with the performance of his official duty that without so acting he could not have properly discharged it." 19. In B.P. Shrivastava's case it has further been observed that as suggested by the S.C. in Prabhakar's case AIR 1969 SC 686 it would be open to the appellant to place material on the record during the course of the trial for showing what his duty as Civil Surgeon was and also that the impugned acts were interrelated with his official duty so as to attract the protection afforded by section 197 Cr. P. C. 20. P. C. 20. The difficulty in the application of the principle under the relevant provision which has been alluded to in B.P. Shrivastava's case (supra) may admit of easy solution on a perusal of paragraph 10 of the decision in Kailash Chandra's case (supra). The paragraph runs thus :- In the decision in Albert W. H.' s case (supra) the earlier decision of the Privy Council in 1948 P.C. 128 has been referred to and the following excerpt from the portion of that judgment extracted in paragraph 20 is apposite :-. "A public servant can only be said to act or purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty. Thus, a Judge neither acts nor purports to act as a Judge in receiving a bribe, though the judgment which he delivers may be such an act; nor does a Government Medical Officer act or purport to act as a public servant in picking the pocket of a patient whom he is examining, though the examination itself may be such an act. The test may well be whether the public servant if challenged can reasonably claim that what he does in virtue of his office. A public servant charged with an offence under section 120 B read with section 161, Penal Code cannot justify his act of receiving bribe as an act done by him by virtue of the office that he held." 21. In Basa Shambhu's case AIR 1983 SC 64 , this is what has been observed in paragraph 4 :- "It was contended before us as was done before the High Court that the D.O. letter sent by the appellant to the District Judge was in discharge or his duties because the District Judge had called for the remarks and hence whatsoever had been written by the appellant was done while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty and as such the ingredient of S. 197 Cr. P C. was satisfied. It is not possible to accept this contention for in our view there is no reasonable nexus between the act complained of and the discharge of duty by the appellant. P C. was satisfied. It is not possible to accept this contention for in our view there is no reasonable nexus between the act complained of and the discharge of duty by the appellant. Calling the respondent as 'Rowdy', a big gambler, and a mischievous element, cannot even remotely be said to be connected with the discharge of official duty which was to offer his remarks regarding the allegations made in the transfer petition". "There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty, the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty." "Applying this test to the facts of the present case it is impossible to come to the conclusion that the act complained of has any connection with the discharge of official duty by the appellant". In this very decision with reference to one in Pukhraj's case AIR 1973 SC 2591 , it was pointed out that kicking the complainant and abusing him by the respondent No 2 his superior in the postal department could not be said to have done in the course of the performance of duty. 22. In the light of the foregoing discussion, in the instant case, on facts it is clear that the act complained of can reasonably be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office held by each of the non applicants and this claim cannot outright be characterised as pretended or fanciful. There is a reasonable nexus between the act and the performance of duties. It is not that the act is wholly unconnected with the duties and the official status merely furnished an occasion for the act. As pointed out in Amrik Singh's case (supra) whether the act was a proper discharge of duties relates to the stage of defence and cannot arise at the stage of grant of sanction which precedes the institution of the prosecution. 23. As a result of the foregoing discussion, it is quite clear to this Court that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the applicability of section 197 (1) (b) of the Code is attracted. 23. As a result of the foregoing discussion, it is quite clear to this Court that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the applicability of section 197 (1) (b) of the Code is attracted. It is for the State Government to decide keeping in view the object and the purpose behind the provision, whether or not sanction for prosecution of the non-applicants should be granted. 24. It has also to be remembered that as pointed out in the decision in State of Orissa v. Nakula Sahu AIR 1979 SC 663 , despite the words of wide amplitude employed in section 401 of the Code, the Court, in exercise of its discretionary revisional jurisdiction, steps in to interfere only to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice and I find that no case for interference in exercise of this jurisdiction has been made out. In the decision in State of Rajasthan v. Gurcharandas Chadha AIR 1979 SC 1895 , the second order in revision passed by the High Court though wrong and even without jurisdiction was not interfered with as it was in consonance with a later Supreme Court decision and was calculated to promote the ends of justice. 25. In the ultimate analysis, I find that this revision petition being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. It is, consequently dismissed.