JUDGMENT 1. - In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner Smt. Ambika Devi has challenged the legality and correctness of the order of the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan (for short 'the Tribunal') dated February 18, 1986. 2. The averments in the writ petition are that the petitioner was serving as a Teacher at Gadra City in Tharparkar, District Sindh in erstwhile Province of Sindh. Because of partition she had to migrate to India and being a displaced person was registered as a refugee. She got the job of a Teacher in Jai Hind Sindhi Middle School, Gopalji-ka-Rasta, Jaipur, where she served from November 1,1951 to August 15, 1953. Thereafter vide order dated August 13, 1953 passed by the Deputy Inspector of School, she was appointed as a Teacher in the Government School, Barmer. On being relieved on August 15, 1953 from the Jai Hindi Sindhi Middle School, she went to Barmer and was directed to produce the medical certificate which she obtained on 16th, 17th being Sunday she joined on August 18, 1953. 3. Vide letter dated July 13, 1973 the District Education Officer informed her that she will stand retired from service on December 31, 1983. The petitioner made representations for being allowed to continue in service up to the age of 58 years as her case was covered by the Finance Department Circular dated February 22, 1971. Vide letter dated February 6, 1984, she was informed that it is only when Government aided institutions from prior to 1952 are taken under the control of the Government that the benefit of extension of period with regard to retirement is available. That as the School in which the petitioner was teaching was not so taken over by the Government she was not entitled to benefit of continuing in service up to the age of 58 years. 4. Against the orders No. Shivira/Estt/F.3/13749(17)83/14 dated 3-1-1984 (Ex. 7) and No. Shivira/Estt/F.3/13749(17)/83/25 dated 6-2-1984 (Ex. 8) by which the petitioner's claim for extension of service period from 55 to 58 years was turned down as unacceptable, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by the order dated February 18, 1986 (Annexure 1) dismissed the appeal on two grounds. Firstly, that it was barred by time and secondly, the case of the petitioner was not covered by the relevant Circular. 5. The Tribunal by the order dated February 18, 1986 (Annexure 1) dismissed the appeal on two grounds. Firstly, that it was barred by time and secondly, the case of the petitioner was not covered by the relevant Circular. 5. Feeling dissatisfied with the findings of the Tribunal, the petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court by filing the present petition. 6. Notices were issued to the respondents at the admission stage. Mr. L.S. Udawat, Additional Government Advocate appeared on behalf of the respondents. At the request of the learned Counsel for the parties, the petition was heard for final disposal at the admission stage. 7. So far as the question of limitation is concerned, suffice it to say that though the Tribunal had gone into the question of limitation it had heard the appeal on merits and decided it accordingly and, therefore, the question of limitation does not survive as such. Apart from it, the learned Counsel for the respondents has not raised the question of limitation here so as to require any finding on it. 8. Mr. M. Mridul, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the object for extension being granted was to rehabilitate displaced persons. That in the circumstances in which they were placed, it was considered proper to allow them to remain in service beyond the normal age of retirement so that the hardship they had to face while migrating to India might be redressed. 9. It has been argued that in the erstwhile Sindh Province, the age of superannuation was 60 years and if the circumstances compelling the Teachers serving at Sind Province would not have taken place they would have continued in service up to the age of 60 years. 10. According to Mr. Mridul, it was in those circumstances, that the Circular was issued by the Finance Department. It has been stressed that the case of the petitioner is fully covered by Clauses (a) and (b) of Clause 1 of the Circular because she had joined in aided institution before 1952 and subsequently came in Government Service as required by Sub-clause (b) of Clause 1 and was entitled to the benefit under the Circular. 11. Mr. It has been stressed that the case of the petitioner is fully covered by Clauses (a) and (b) of Clause 1 of the Circular because she had joined in aided institution before 1952 and subsequently came in Government Service as required by Sub-clause (b) of Clause 1 and was entitled to the benefit under the Circular. 11. Mr. L.S Udawat, learned Additional Government Advocate justifying the finding of the Tribunal submitted that so far as Sub-clause (a) of clause 1 is concerned it related to a person joining Government Service in Rajasthan or Ajmer before 1952 and the petitioner having joined Government Service in Rajasthan for the first time vide order dated August 13, 1953, the benefit of extension of service could not be given to her. Regarding Sub-clause (b) of clause 1, the argument advanced by Mr. Udawat is that the petitioner had of course joined service in the aided institution prior to 1952 but it is not because of the institutions being taken over by the Government that she had became the Government Servant rather she had been given appointment independent of it and as such the benefit of extension of service has been rightly denied to her. 12. The relevant portion of the Circular reads as under: 19C(1) 56 Power to sanction extension of service upto age 58 years of a displayed school or College teacher from Pakistan who Director, Primary & Secondary Education Rajasthan Full powers in respect of teaching staff other than officers of Rajasthan Education Service (Gen. Branch) (a) Joined service in Rajasthan Ajmer before 1952; or Administrative Department Full powers in respect of officers of Rajasthan Education Service (General Branch) and (Collegiate Branch) holding post on teaching side. (b) initially joined service in aided institution before 1952 but came into Government Service thereafter as a result of Govt. taking over such institution and attains the age of officer of the Rajasthan Education Service (General Branch) or (Collegiate Branch) while holding a post on the teaching side. 13. Mr. Mridul, learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to the case of Manmohan Singh Jaitla v. Commissioner, Union Territory, Chandigarh and Ors. AIR 1985 Supreme Court 364 to substantiate his arguments that the Government aided Schools are under the control and supervision of the Government Authorities and as such a person serving in such institutions is entitled to statutory protection.14. Mr. Mridul, learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to the case of Manmohan Singh Jaitla v. Commissioner, Union Territory, Chandigarh and Ors. AIR 1985 Supreme Court 364 to substantiate his arguments that the Government aided Schools are under the control and supervision of the Government Authorities and as such a person serving in such institutions is entitled to statutory protection.14. In the above referred case, the aided school was receiving 95% of expenses by way of grant from the public exchequer and the employees of the school were held to have the statutory protection under the Punjab Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act (19 of 1969) as extended to Union Territory of Chandigarh. The petition in that case was filed by the Head Master of the Aided School whose services of seven years in that Aided School were ignored and his service was dispensed with only because he was appointed by the out going Managing Committee. The High Court rejected the writ jurisdiction in limine observing that the School cannot be said to be 'other authority' under Article 12 of the Constitution and was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.15. On appeal by Special Leave, it was held that the appointment of the Head Marter by the Director of Public Institution would certainly be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The order terminating the services of the Head Master was quashed and set aside.16. The Aided School in a way comes under the control and supervision of the Government as it becomes the concern of the Government that the aid granted to the School is utilised in regular and proper way. However, simply for that reason, it cannot be interpreted that a person serving in a private school would in all case be entitled to be treated as Government Servant. The finding of the Tribunal that Sub-clause AIR 1985 Supreme Court 364 of clause 1 of the Circular cannot be interpreted in the way that a person joining in service in Rajasthan or Ajmer before 1952 even in private institutions were entitled to extension of period of service simply because the institution is aided, has substance.17. Mr. Mridul has mainly argued for bringing the case of the petitioner under Sub-clause(b) of Clause 1 of the Circular. Mr. Mridul has mainly argued for bringing the case of the petitioner under Sub-clause(b) of Clause 1 of the Circular. The contention raised is that the words 'as a result of Government taking over such institution' brings disparity between the person placed in similar circumstances.18. It has been urged that if a Teacher coming to the Government Service by virtue of the aided institution being taken over by the Government is entitled to the benefit under the Circular, why should a person serving in the aided institution thereafter being appointed as a Government Servant should not be treated in the same way.19. In order to appreciate the argument the object of the Circular will bear importance.20. As noted above, the purpose was to give relief to the Teachers serving in Pakistan and compelled to migrate to India. When they migrated to India some of them fortunately got Government Service while others not so fortunate had to take job in private institutions. In order to give relief to those persons who could not get Government job before 1952 but could get the job in the aided schools, the relevant Circular was issued so that their period of service may be extended to the age of 58 years from 55 years. In such cases power was given to the Director Primary and Secondary Education, Rajasthan and the Administrative Department to sanction extension of service upto the age of 58 years to the displaced School and College Teacher in case his case comes within the ambit of either of the categories of Sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Clause of the Circular.21. The interpretation of the Tribunal of Sub-clause(b) of Clause 1 of the Circular as it stands cannot be technically said to be wrong because it clearly mentions that the benefit is to be given to a person who had initially joined service in aided institution before 1952 but has come to the Government Service as a result of that aided institution being taken over by the Government. Admittedly, in the present case, the aided institution in which the petitioner had served since 1951 had not been taken over by the Government and her appointment to the Service was independent of it.22. Admittedly, in the present case, the aided institution in which the petitioner had served since 1951 had not been taken over by the Government and her appointment to the Service was independent of it.22. Now the pertinent question arising for determination is that whether the Teachers situated in similar circumstances i.e. initially serving in aided institution and thereafter coming in the cadre of Government employees would be treated differently simply because the manner of their coming to Government Service is different i.e. in one case they become Government Servants as a result of the aided institution being taken over by the Government and in another case, institution remains as such but they are appointed in the Government Service and after resigning from the aided institution they join the Government job.23. If the purpose of the Circular is to give help to the displaced persons migrated to India and serving in Rajasthan but not being absorbed in Government Service at a particular time, then distinction cannot be drawn between the two categories mentioned above. This type of classification between the persons similarly placed would amount to hostile discrimination and unreasonable differentiation between the persons placed in similar circumstances.24. In this regard guidance is to be sought from the principle enunciated in the case of D.S. Nokara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 Supreme Court 130 . Their Lordships were dealing with the question of justification of classification in revised formula between pensioners on the basis of date of retirement. The Ministry of Finance Memorandum and Ministry of Defence Memorandum were under consideration before the Court. Their Lordships were pleased to observe as under: "The fundamental principle is that Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation which classification must satisfy the twin tests of classification being founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group and that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question." 25. Dealing with the doctrine of classification it was further observed as under: "The doctrine of classification was evolved to sustain a legislation or State action designed to help weaker sections of the society or some such segments of the society in need of succor. Dealing with the doctrine of classification it was further observed as under: "The doctrine of classification was evolved to sustain a legislation or State action designed to help weaker sections of the society or some such segments of the society in need of succor. Legislative and executive action may accordingly be sustained if it satisfies the twin tests of reasonable classification and the rational principle correlated to the object sought to be achieved. The State, therefore, would have to affirmatively satisfy the Court that the twin tests have been satisfied. It can only be satisfied if the State establishes not only the rational principle on which classification is founded but correlates it to the objects sought to be achieved." 26. Considering the case on hand in the light of the above referred principles enunciated by the Apex Court of the Country, the classification of two groups of persons cannot be said to be reasonable. The classification for giving the benefit under the Circular does not satisfy the twin tests laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court.27. A person coming to the category of Government servant either by direct appointment or as a result of the aided institution, he had been serving in, being taken over by the Government falls in the same category of displaced person. Both type of employees hold identical posts i.e. initially in the aided institution and then in the Government service. Simply because the mode of coming in the Government Service after serving in the aided institution is different one cannot be denied the benefit of the Circular while it is available to the other. The object of the Circular is to help the displaced employees of the Pakistan and special treatment cannot be given to one for the reasons mentioned above.28. In view of the above discussion, there cannot be any justification for giving the petitioner a different treatment from the rest situated in almost identical situation by inserting the words 'as a result of taking over the institution' appearing in Sub-clause (b) of Clause 1 of the Circular. The classification in the light of these arguments cannot be said to be justifiable. The classification in the light of these arguments cannot be said to be justifiable. The different treatment cuts at the root of the very object sought to be achieved by issuing the Circular i.e. giving relief to the displaced persons who initially could not get Government job and had to take jobs with other institutions. If the Government chooses to take over one institution, and declines to take over the other, the employees of the former cannot be put up in better position than the employees of the latter in case they are independently appointed by the Government in the same category in which the employee of the former institution are placed in after taking over the institution.29. For the reasons mentioned above, the words 'as a result of taking over such institution occurring in Sub-clause (b) of Clause 1 of the Circular dated February 22, 1971 are held to be invalid and are quashed.30. In view of this finding, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit under the Circular dated February 22,1971 for extension of service up to the age of 58 years.31. The petitioner was retired on December 31, 1983. If the extension of service up to the age of 58 years would have been sanctioned to her the date of retirement would have been December 31, 1986. Mr. Udawat submitted that extension of service requires previous sanction and as the petitioner had already attained the age of 58 years there is no question of sanction being accorded now and she cannot be given any relief by the court.32. The representation of the petitioner was rejected not because of any defect or short coming in her disentitling her to the benefit but on the ground that her case was not covered by the Circular. Now that it has been held that she is entitled to the benefit under the Circular, sanction would be deemed to have been accorded for extension of service.33. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated February 18, 1986 (Annexure-1) passed by the Tribunal is set aside. The petitioner would be deemed to be in service up to December 31,1986 and would be entitled to all consequential reliefs accordingly. Costs are made easy.Writ allowed. *******