JUDGMENT - M.S. DESHPANDE, J.:---This writ petition in directed against the order, dated 17th September, 1984, passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Amravati, fixed the application before him for evidence of parties, without deciding the petitioner's preliminary objections that respondent No. 1's application could not be heard unless the application, which had been dismissed for default, was restored. 2. The petitioner is a partnership firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act and had entered into an agreement on 22nd October, 1982, for selling three survey numbers, admeasuring 11 acres and 13 gunthas situated at Rahatgaon, to the respondent No. 1 for Rs. 1,81,200/-. Respondent No. 1 filed an application before respondent No. 2, the Sub Divisional Officer, under section 89 of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the BTAL Act') for permission to purchase the land. The petitioner filed a written statement resisting the application. On 6-4-1984, respondent No. 1's application was dismissed by respondent No. 2 for default of his appearance and, so, respondent No. 1 filed an application for restoration of that application on 11-5-1984, of which notice was issued to the petitioner. When the case came up on 13-6-1984 respondent No. 2 allowed an application for amendment presented by respondent No. 1, without deciding the application for restoration. On one of the adjourned dates, i.e. on 27-7-1984, respondent No. 2 made an order dismissing the case for default, and presumably the order had effect of dismissing the application for restoration. On the same day, the earlier order was scored out and the petitioner was granted time to file his say. On 1-9-1984, the application for amendment was allowed and the case was fixed for evidence of parties. On 17-9-1984, the petitioner raised a preliminary objection, urging that the unless the application under section 89 of the BTAL Act, which had been dismissed, was restored, evidence of parties on merits could not be recorded, but the case came to be fixed for evidence of parties for 17-9-1984. This action of the respondent No. 2 is being challenged by the petitioner. 3. The submission of Ms. This action of the respondent No. 2 is being challenged by the petitioner. 3. The submission of Ms. Bhamburkar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that the application for amendment and the original application under section 89 of the BTAL Act could not have been allowed by respondent No. 2, unless the application for restoration was allowed, and the dismissal for default was set aside. 4. On the other hand, Shri Palshikar, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1, urged that the proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Officer were purely of an administrative character and were neither Judicial nor quasi judicial proceedings and there was no question of the authority exercising powers which were characteristic of judicial Tribunals, and the authority had no power to dismiss the application before it for default or to restore it, and sine the order of dismissal was itself without jurisdiction, the authority was competent to proceed with the original application. It was further contended that the petitioner was not entitled to be heard by the Collector, because neither section 89 of the BTAL Act, nor the provisions of rules 45 and 45-A of the Rules framed under it, require the Collector to issue a notice to the petitioner and hear him before passing the impugned order, and the present petition would not, therefore, be maintainable. 5. Section 89 of the BTAL Act, which appears in Chapter-VIII relating to restrictions on transfers of agricultural lands and acquisition of holdings and lands, so far as in material, runs as follows :--- "89. 5. Section 89 of the BTAL Act, which appears in Chapter-VIII relating to restrictions on transfers of agricultural lands and acquisition of holdings and lands, so far as in material, runs as follows :--- "89. (1) Save as provided in this Act,--- (a) no sale (including sales in execution of a decree of a Civil or for recovery of arrears of land revenue or for sums recoverable as arrears of land revenue), gift, exchange or lease of any land or interest therein, or (b) no mortgage of any land or interest therein, in which the possession of the mortgaged property is delivered to the mortgagee, shall be valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist or who being an agriculturist will, after such sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage, hold land as tenure-holder or tenant or partly as tenure-holder and party as tenant exceeding two thirds of the ceiling area determined under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, or who is not an agricultural labourer : Provided that the Collector or an officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf may grant permission for such sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage, in such circumstances and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed." The other provisions of section 89 are not material. It is important to notice that no procedure is prescribed, nor any notice is to be issued to a party to the contract, on the basis of which the transfer is likely to be made. 6. Rule 45 of the Rules framed under the BTAL Act provides for circumstances in which permission for sale, etc. of land under section 89 may be granted; and Rule 45-A lays down the conditions subject to which permission for sale of land under section 89 may be granted. It may be only mentioned that none of these rules requires a notice to be issued to the other party to the agreement, on the basis of which the transfer is likely to take place, and he is not given any right to be heard in the proceedings which are initiated under section 89 of the BTAL Act. 7. It may be only mentioned that none of these rules requires a notice to be issued to the other party to the agreement, on the basis of which the transfer is likely to take place, and he is not given any right to be heard in the proceedings which are initiated under section 89 of the BTAL Act. 7. The only person, whose right is likely to be affected by virtue of the provisions of section 89, which invalidates the transfer in contravention thereof, is the purchaser or the vendee, and naturally he is the person who has to satisfy the Collector before permission can be granted to him that he has the eligibility as is prescribed under Rules 45 and 45-A. 8. Ms. Bhamburkar relied on (Haji Zakeria Suleman v. The Collector, Yeotmal)1, 1962 Nagpur Law Journal 180, where a Division Bench of this Court, while considering the provisions of the C.P. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 took the view that the Rent Controller has power to dismiss for default an application of a landlord under Clause 13(3) of the Rent Control Order and to restore the application to file if he is satisfied that the good cause exists for such restoration and referred to the rule in matter of this kind which is to be found at Page 105 Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, which is as follows :--- "If a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done, but omits to mention in terms some detail which is of great importance (if not actually essential) to the proper and effectual performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation, the Courts are at liberty to infer that the statute by implication empowers that detail to be carried out." In this context, this Court observed that there is no inherent power in the Rent Controller or in the Appellate Authority to dismiss the application for default or to restore it. Inherent power can only be implied in the civil courts having general jurisdiction, but where special authorities are constituted under a special statute and for special object, it is not possible to imply inherent powers in them, and we must turn to the statute itself to find a power either in its express terms or by necessary implication. Inherent power can only be implied in the civil courts having general jurisdiction, but where special authorities are constituted under a special statute and for special object, it is not possible to imply inherent powers in them, and we must turn to the statute itself to find a power either in its express terms or by necessary implication. This Court took the view that in the discharge of his functions under sub-clause (3) of Clause 13 of the Rent Control Orders, the Rent Controller, no doubt, acts in a quasi judicial manner; he normally hears both the parties, gets their statements, records evidence and hears arguments of Counsel, and in order to facilitate and further the beneficient purposes of the enactment, even though no such power can be found in the express provision of the statute, a power to dismiss in default and to set aside the dismissal must be held to exist by necessary implication. 9. Reliance was also placed on (Diwalibai v. Jaikumar)2, 1969 Maharashtra Law Journal 421 and (Tulshiram Kashiram Tijare v. Sushma w/o Keshao Raich)3, 1982 Maharashtra Law Journal 199, but they were also the cases arising under Clause 13(3) of the Rent Control Order, and it was held that the power to dismiss in default or to proceed ex parte implies equally a duty to restore an application dismissed for default or to set aside the ex parte order if the defaulting party satisfies the authority that there was good cause for non-appearance, and this right and this duty is a sine qua non of judicial procedure. 10. At one stage Ms. Bhamburkar urged that the procedure prescribed under the Mamlatdar courts Act would apply to the proceedings under section 89 of the BTAL Act, but as the preamble of that Act shows, it is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the powers and procedures and Mamlatdar's Court. It was conceded that the procedure prescribed by that Act would not apply in proceedings under section 89 of the BTAL Act which have to be taken before the Collector. 11. It was conceded that the procedure prescribed by that Act would not apply in proceedings under section 89 of the BTAL Act which have to be taken before the Collector. 11. From the objects of the BTAL Act, it is clear that besides regulating the relations of landlords and tenants of agricultural lands and sites, it was felt expedient in the interests of the general public to regulate and impose restrictions on the transfer of agricultural lands and of dwelling houses and lands appurtenant thereto and sites used for allied pursuits belonging to or occupied by agriculturists agricultural labourers, etc., and to provide for the assumption of the management of agricultural lands in certain circumstances. It was in order to achieve this object that restrictions were placed on transfers as are to be found in Chapter-VIII. In (Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas)4, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 222, it was held that even when the executive authority has to from an opinion about an objective matter as a preliminary step to the exercise of a certain power conferred on it, the determination of the objective fact and the exercise of the power based thereon are alike matters of an administrative character and are not amenable to the writ of certiorari. When the law under which the authority is making a decision itself requires a judicial approach, decision will be quasi-judicial. Prescribed forms of procedure are not necessary to make an inquiry judicial provided in coming to the decision to well-recognised principles of approach are required to be followed. Therefore, wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority a writ of certiorari may issue. Two conditions are essential, inter alia, to constitute a quasi judicial decision---(1) the decision must be an objective one and (2) there must be over and above this duty to act judicially. In the present case, though section 89 and Rules 45 and 45-A lay down the conditions and circumstances in which the Collector may function while granting permission, there is no duty to act judicially, and considerations, which would be relevant while ascertaining whether the procedure followed was consistent with acting judicially, will not regulate the administrative action, provided the objective tests are satisfied. 12. 12. Turning to the facts of the present case and applying the above principles, what was done by the Sub-Divisional Officer was to allow the application for amendment which only amended the name of respondent No. 1. It was open to the Sub-Division Officer exercising the power under section 89, while the matter was still before him until the application was decided on merits, to consider whether the circumstances existed and the conditions for granting the permission sought were fulfilled. It was not obligatory upon him to hear the petitioner in this respect. The ultimate act of respondent No. 2 may expose itself to a challenge, in the event of the conditions not being fulfilled and the requirements are not satisfied before granting or refusing the permission sought to respondent No. 1. However, the procedure followed by the collector, as long as the investigation is not complete, will not be open to challenge, because the action, which the Collector has to take under section 89, would be purely administrative action to which none but the respondent No. 1 could be a party, as the petitioner would not have the right to be heard in those proceedings. This is not to say that the Collector may not hear the petitioner, if he is so inclined, before deciding the application finally, but no right in the matter would be conferred on the petitioner enabling him to participate in the proceedings before the Collector under that proviso. It was, therefore, open to the Sub-Divisional Officer to direct evidence to be led for the purposes of satisfying himself as to whether permission should be granted to the respondent No. 1 under the proviso to section 89 of the BTAL Act. 13. In this view of the matter, I see no merit in this petition. The rule is discharged with costs. Rule discharged. -----