G. T. NANAVATI, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER No. 1 is the Tax Recovery Officer; and petitioner No. 2 is the Union of India represented by the Commissioner of Income-tax Gujarat. They are challenging in this revision application the order dated 27-6-1983 passed below Exh. 20 in Execution Application No. 732 of 1979 by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court Ahmedabad. Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 who are judgment-creditors and trustees of Hargovandas Laxmichand Charity Trust filed Civil Suit No. 3497 of 1976 in the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad against opponents Nos. 4 to 7 (judgment-debtors) for recovering Rs. 6 55 817 Ps. together with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum and costs by selling the properties given under equitable mortgage by the judgment debtors to the judgment-creditors in the year 1911. The said suit was decreed on 20-8-1978. According to the final decree the decretal amount has to be paid by the judgment-debtors by half yearly instalment of Rs. 75000. 00. It is further provided in the decree that in case of default of payment of any two instalments the judgment-creditors are entitled to execute the decree at once. With respect to the realisation of rent and mesne profits of the properties in question from 1-1-1979 one of the trustees has been appointed as a Court receiver without remuneration and he is directed to recover rent; and after paying taxes and other expenses to appropriate the net amount towards the instalments payable by the judgment-debtors. It is further provided in the decree that the amount which the Court receiver may receive will be considered as having been received towards instalments. The judgmentdebtors committed default in payment of two instalments; and therefore the judgment-creditors have filed Execution Application No. 732 of 1979 for executing the decree by selling the suit properties and other properties of the judgment-debtors. ( 2 ) OPPONENT No. 8 who is one of the tenants in the suit property was paying rent to the Income-tax authorities towards income-tax and wealth-tax liability of the judgment-debtors. He was doing so in view of the notice given and prohibitor order issued by the Income-tax authorities. On 14-10-1980 he received a notice from the Receiver calling upon him to pay rent to him. The second notice to that effect was received by him on 1-6-1981. He therefore on 21-7-1981 gave application Exh. He was doing so in view of the notice given and prohibitor order issued by the Income-tax authorities. On 14-10-1980 he received a notice from the Receiver calling upon him to pay rent to him. The second notice to that effect was received by him on 1-6-1981. He therefore on 21-7-1981 gave application Exh. 21 and took out a Chamber Summons Exh. 20 for obtaining a direction from the Court as to whom rent should be paid by him. The learned Judge by his order dated 27-6-1983 held that the effect of the order of the Court contained in the final decree amounts to creating a charge in favour of the mortgagees i. e. judgment-creditors. In that view of the matter the learned Judge negatived the claim of the applicant who also appeared in those proceedings and claimed priority on the basis that crown debt has a priority over other debts. ( 3 ) THE question which falls for consideration is whether the view taken by the learned Judge is correct in law. What is urged by Mr. Bhatt the learned Advocate for the petitioners is that the judgment-creditors in this case are merely decree-holders and the decree which they have obtained is on the basis of an equitable mortgage created in their favour. Therefore mere passing of a decree in such a case cannot amount to creating a charge over the rent and/or other income of the mortgaged property. He further submitted that merely because a receiver has been appointed by the Court to collect rent it cannot be said that for that reasons a charge has been created over the rent and other income of the mortgaged property. He also submitted that in absence of any charge the judgment-creditors must be regarded as ordinary creditors and not as secured creditors and as against the dues of the State right to receive money under the decree must give way. ( 4 ) IT is no doubt true that the Common Law Doctrine on priority of Crown debts applies in this Country as that was a law in force in the territory of India; and by virtue of Art. 372 (1) of the Constitution of India it continues to be in force. ( 4 ) IT is no doubt true that the Common Law Doctrine on priority of Crown debts applies in this Country as that was a law in force in the territory of India; and by virtue of Art. 372 (1) of the Constitution of India it continues to be in force. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Collector Aurangabad v. Central Bank AIR 1967 SC 1831 this must be taken as a settled law As pointed out by Chagla C. J. in Bank of India v. John Bowman AIR 1955 Bom. 305 the priority given to the Crown was got on the basis of its debt being a judgment debt or a debt arising out of statute but the principle was that if the debts were of equal degree and the Crown and the subject were equal the Crowns right would prevail over that of the subject. It is not well settled that the Government of India is entitled to claim priority for arrears of Income-tax due to it from a citizen over the amounts due from him to unsecured creditors. Therefore dues of the State will have priority over the creditors of equal degree to payment out of the assets of debtor which are distributed by a receiver or an administrator. This rule of priority in favour of the Crown for the realisation of its dues can only prevail and be enforceable as between unsecured creditors of equal degree and it has no application where there is any lien charge or mortgage. The priority of the State can rank as against a secured creditor so as to deprive him of his security or to effect or injure his rights as such secured creditor. Even though this doctrine of Priority of Crown Debts is the outcome of the maxim salus populi suprema lex (regard for the public welfare is the highest law) it applies only where the debts are of equal degree and the State and a citizen stand on the same footing. ( 5 ) IN this case while passing the final decree the Court has directed the receiver to collect rent and other income of the suit properties; and after paying tax as and other expenses the Court has directed him to appropriate the same towards the instalments payable by the judgment-debtors under the decree. ( 5 ) IN this case while passing the final decree the Court has directed the receiver to collect rent and other income of the suit properties; and after paying tax as and other expenses the Court has directed him to appropriate the same towards the instalments payable by the judgment-debtors under the decree. The amount which the receiver receives are to be considered as having been received towards instalments. The trial Court could have made the decree executable immediately but looking to the facts and circumstances of the case it has though it fit to provide for this mode of execution of the decree. The judgment creditors could have realised the amount due under the decree by getting the decree executed immediately; but they have now to wait till the decree is executed in the manner provided by the Court. It is in this context that we have to appreciate the effect of the direction given by the Court with respect to rent and other income to be received by the receiver and appropriation of the balance amount. The balance has to be utilised for payment of instalments. The Court has not left any other course open to the receiver. The receiver has to make appropriation only in one manner and that is towards payment of instalments. The Court has not thought it fit to retain any control about disbursements to be made out of the amount of rent and mesne profits to be realised by the receiver. Thus the amount which the receiver receives under the decree are required to be utilised for only one purpose viz. Payment of instalments. For all these reasons it can be said that a charge has been created over rent and mesne profits to be realised from the mortgaged property in favour of the judgment-creditors; and the judgment creditors cannot be said to be creditors of equal degree and the State dues cannot have priority over the right of the judgment-creditors. ( 6 ) IN the result this revision application fails and is dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Interim relief stands vacated. Revision Application dismissed. .