ORDER Dr. R. R. Misra, J. - The petitioner ran his unit of crushing sugarcane for the crushing season 1981-82 on non-option basis. The Khandsari Inspector, opposite party No. 2, passed two assessment orders each dated 28-1-82 for the months of November and December, 81 and the third assessment order dated 25-3-82 for the month of January; 1982, copies of which have been filed as Annexures Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the writ petition. 2. The Deputy Sugar Commissioner, opposite party No. 3, however, in the exercise of his power under Section 3-B of the LJ.P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act passed an order dated 19-3-84 and revised the aforesaid -three assessment orders and accordingly raised an extra demand under the said impugned order dated 19-3-84, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure No. 4 to the writ petition. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The first contention raised by Sri Giridhar Malaviya appearing on behalf of the petitioner is that under the law it was not open for the Deputy Sugar Commissioner to exercise the power of revision in regard to the assessment orders for the months of November and December, 1981 inasmuch as he had no jurisdiction to do so. In paragraph 3 of the writ petition a specific plea has been raised that the respondent No. 3 could not revise the said assessment orders for the months of November and December, 1981 after more than six months. In reply in paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit it has been stated that the show cause notice was issued to revise the assessment orders for the months of November and December, 1981 as well as January 1982 on 31-8-82. 4. Having regard to the above admitted facts it has to be examined as to whether the aforesaid contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has substance or not. Section 3-B of the U.P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) lays down as under : "3-B. Revision. 4. Having regard to the above admitted facts it has to be examined as to whether the aforesaid contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has substance or not. Section 3-B of the U.P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) lays down as under : "3-B. Revision. - The Cane Commissioner, in the case of a factory, and the Sugar Commissioner or any other officer, not below the rank of Assistant Sugar Commissioner, authorised by the Sugar Commissioner in this behalf, in the case of a unit, may, in order to satisfy himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by an assessing authority under this Act, call for and examine either on his own motion or on the application of the assessee or the State Government, to be made within six months of the date of the order, the record of any proceedings of assessment and pass such orders as he may think fit;" 5. From a perusal of the aforesaid section, it is clear that in the case of a unit the revising authority can pass an order within six months from the date of the assessment order. In the present case if a show cause notice had been given on 31-8-82 for revising the assessment orders each dated 28-1-82 for the months of November and December, 1981, obviously, it was not open to the revising authority to do so under the law, and the said orders, in my opinion, could not be revised by hire. The said contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, therefore has got force. Accordingly, it is held that under the impugned order dated 19-3-84, the Deputy Sugar Commissioner could not revise the assessment orders each dated 28-1-82 for the months of November and December, 81 in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him under Section 3-B of the Act. 6. The next contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is in regard to the revision made by the Deputy Sugar Commissioner for the demand raised for the month of January, 82. The contention raised in this regard has got two limbs. Firstly, it is submitted that under the impugned order absolutely no reason has been assigned as to why the Deputy Sugar Commissioner proposed to interfere in revision. The contention raised in this regard has got two limbs. Firstly, it is submitted that under the impugned order absolutely no reason has been assigned as to why the Deputy Sugar Commissioner proposed to interfere in revision. After perusing the record of the case and the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite parties, I find that this contention has got force. In my opinion no material has been pointed out by the revising authority as to why he has exercised his powers under Section 3-B of the said Act. 7. The second limb of the submission made with regard to the second contention is that at any rate since the unit ran on non-option basis, the question of number of days of closure was irrelevant consideration. I find that this submission has also got force. In the case of non-option, in view of the 2nd proviso to Section 3 of the aforesaid Act, the tax is payable on the quantity of the sugarcane actually purchased. Under the U.P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Rules, 1961, in Form No. 1' the petitioner is obliged to maintain the record of the quantity of sugarcane purchased and file returns with regard to the same and the purchase tax due etc. in form No. 2' and ultimately form No. 6 and 7 Para prescribed under Rule 12 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Rules, 1961 which lays down in detail the various details in regard to the quantity of sugarcane purchased by a unit holder. In this case, in my opinion, it was on the part of the revising authority to have examined and determined the amount of sugarcane actually purchased by the petitioner in accordance with the aforesaid provisions of the U.P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Rules and the forms stated above. This having admittedly not been done, the impugned order passed by the, appellate authority suffers from a manifest error of law and is liable to be set aside, 8. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. This having admittedly not been done, the impugned order passed by the, appellate authority suffers from a manifest error of law and is liable to be set aside, 8. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The impugned order passed by the revising authority is quashed and it is held that the revising authority, opposite party No. 3, could not revise the assessment orders for the months of November and December, 1981 and that the revision made by him in the assessment order for the month of January, 1982 is quashed with directions to re-determine the same in accordance with law.