GULAB GUPTA J. ( 1 ) APPLICANT Ashok Kumar having been convicted for offence under section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by judgment dated 6-7- 83 passed by Shri A. K. Mishra, judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sausar in Cr1. C. No. 1190 of 82 and sentenced to six months RI together with fine of Rs. 1,000/- which conviction and sentence remain confirmed by judgment dated 18. 10. 83 passed by Addi. Sessions Judge, Chhindwara in Cr. A. No. 77/83, has approached this Court invoking its revisional jurisdiction under sections 397/40 1 of the Cr. P. C. ( 2 ) PROSECUTION case against the applicant is that on 9. 4. 81, he sold adulterated sago to the Food Inspector A. S. Shakya (P. W. 1), which on analysis by the Public Analyst was found to be not conforming to the prescribed standard. It was alleged that the said sago was purchased on payment of price vide Ex. P-2 in- the presence of witnesses and a Panchnama (Ex. P. 4) prepared. One of the samples was sent to the Public Analyst, Jabalpur for analysis Report of the Public Analyst dated 22. 4. 81 (Ex. P-7) indicated that it had O. 85% of ash and O. 2% insoluble in dilute hydrochloric acid as against O. 4% and 0. 1% respectively. After receipt of the report, a copy of the same was sent to the applicant on 22. 6. 81 vide Ex. P-S, acknowledgment of which is Ex. P-6. Thereafter, the applicant was put on trial as aforesaid. The defence of the applicant before the trial Court appears to be that no sample was purchased from his shop and that Exhibits P-I and P-2 do not bear his signatures. Curiously enough, be admitted having received the report of the Public Analyst and information that he was entitled to challenging the report under section 13 (2) of the Act. He also surprisingly admitted having signed Panchnama (Ex. P-4 ). The learned trial Judge, on consideration or oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the sample was adulterated. It was further held that it was purchased from the applicantts shop. That is how, the applicant was found guilty and sentenced. He also surprisingly admitted having signed Panchnama (Ex. P-4 ). The learned trial Judge, on consideration or oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the sample was adulterated. It was further held that it was purchased from the applicantts shop. That is how, the applicant was found guilty and sentenced. While sentencing the applicant, the trial Jude felt that it was not a case where any leniency moulds be shown and, therefore, awarded the sentence as aforesaid. Before the lower appellate Court, it was submitted that the learned Magistrate, who tried the offence was not entitled to try it under section 16-A of the Act. It was also submitted that even under the Distribution memo issued by the D. J. the ibid Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the case. The Court, no doubt, found that the learned trial judge was not authorised to try the case under section 16-A of the Act and yet relying on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Food Inspector, Mandsaur Nagar Palika v. Fakhru1 held that the trial was not vitiated. As regards absence of jurisdiction based on distribution memo, the learned Judge found that it was curable defect in view of section 465 Cr. P. C. ( 3 ) THE submission of the learned counsel for the applicant is that since the applicant was not the manufacturer for the adulterated sago and had disclosed the name of the firm from which it was purchased, he could not have been prosecuted and punished because of lection 19 (2) of the Act. It is further submitted that the learned lower appellate Court has not properly appreciated the submission regarding want of jurisdiction in the learned Trial Judge. It was not a case where there was no Magistrate available in the District to try such a case, though no such Magistrate was available at Sausar. Under the circumstances, Sausar Magistrate could not have usurped jurisdiction and dealt with this case. It was also submitted that the Food Inspector was not authored to launch the prosecution, as required under section 20 (l) of the Act and, therefore, the proceedings were vitiated. At the end, it is submitted that if this Court finds no justification for the aforesaid submission, it should consider those matters for purposes of sentence. Applicant claims that he has done nothing for which he is being punished. At the end, it is submitted that if this Court finds no justification for the aforesaid submission, it should consider those matters for purposes of sentence. Applicant claims that he has done nothing for which he is being punished. According to him, be sold sago in the same condition in which be purchased it and, therefore, a jail sentence is not deserved. It is now well-settled that the Act is a social measure intended to curb trading in human health in wider public Interest. It should, therefore, be the anxiety of this Court to secure the purpose and give effect to the provisions of the Act. This has been very succinctly and forcefully stated by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v Devendra Kumar2. According to the Supreme Court, Courts should not be too eager to quash on slander grounds the prosecutions for offences alleged to have been committed. Added to it is the fact that it is the revisional jurisdiction which has been invoked by the applicant. Main purpose of this Jurisdiction is to correct errors and ensure justice. In so doing, the revisional Court does not act as an appellate Court. This is, however not to lay that this Court would not look into the fact of the case, if they be necessary for ensuring justice. Keeping those legal limitations in mind the submissions or the learned counsel for the applicant may be examined. ( 4 ) PANCHNAMA (Ex. P. 4) clearly indicate that the applicant had shown a bill dated 13. 9. 1980 indicating purchase of sago from Shyamsundar Oil and Kirana Merchants and a copy of the bill was also produced. The Food Inspector however did not accept this bill of any consequence because be found no marking, of any type on the bag in which the sago had been stored. Section 19 (2) of the Act provided for an exception to general rule that a vendor of adulterated article is liable under this act. According to this provision, a vendor shall not- be deemed to have committed any offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated article of food if he proves that he purchased the article from a duly licenced manufacturer, dealer or distributor, in cases where a licence was prescribed for sale thereof. According to this provision, a vendor shall not- be deemed to have committed any offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated article of food if he proves that he purchased the article from a duly licenced manufacturer, dealer or distributor, in cases where a licence was prescribed for sale thereof. In those cases where the licence was not required, he gets this benefit on proving that he purchased it with a written warranty in the prescribed form. He has further to prove that the article of food while in his possession was properly stored and that he sold it in the same states he purchased it. This provision was added into the Act in 1964 with a view to protect and safeguard the interests of innocent vendors and has, therefore to be taken seriously. The provision does not require the vendor to prove that the bag in which an adulterated food article II stored has also the marking of the manufacturer, dealer or, distributor. It is therefore apparent that the Food Inspector unjustifiably refused to consider this aspect on an unjustifiable and irrelevant ground. Whether the bag in which the sago was stored by the applicant carried any marking or not was wholly irrelevant. Unfortunately, for the applicant however, he did not take this plea before the trial Court and, therefore the matter was not investigated. He even did not cross-examine the Food Inspector on this point. Indeed, it would appear that he accepted the decision of the, Food, Inspector as correct and did not canvass it either in the trial Court or lower appellate Court. Since he did not false this plea before the trial Court, there is nothing on record to indicate that the sago found adulterated was the same purchased by the applicant from Shyamsunder Oil and Kirana Mills. There is also no evidence to show that it was purchased either from the licenced dealer or under an warranty or that it was stored in the same condition as purchased. Under the circumstances this Court even if inclined to consider the submission is not able to do anything in favour of the applicant. There is also no evidence to show that it was purchased either from the licenced dealer or under an warranty or that it was stored in the same condition as purchased. Under the circumstances this Court even if inclined to consider the submission is not able to do anything in favour of the applicant. It will be too much to expect of this Court to set-aside the conviction and sentence on a point being raised for the, first time inspite of it, this matter may be taken into consideration for deciding the proper sentence to be imposed on the applicant. ( 5 ) AS regards jurisdiction of the trial Court, it is apparent from the impugned-order of the lower appellate Court that the learned trial Judge was not authorised under section 16-A of the Act,. It is equally clear that under the distribution memo for the year 1980-81 all cases under the Act, arising in the district were to be heard by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chhindwara and not by the judicial Magistrate. It is however, not clear whether the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chhindwara had also been notified - under section 16-A of the Court. It will, however be reasonable to hold that but for such authorisation the District Judge, Chhindwara would not have allotted these cases to him. Clearly therefore it is a case where the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chhindwara was the Court competent to take cognizance of the offence and not the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sausar. Section 460 (e) Cr. P. C. provides that if a Magistrate not empowered by law takes cognizance of an offence under clause (a) or clause 960 of sub-section (1) of section 190 erroneously in good faith, proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered. It may therefore appear that if the learned trial Magistrate even without being empowered by law took cognizance the same would not be an irregularity vitiating the proceedings does it mean that such aMagistrate can also try the offender and punish him? Section 461 (2) of the Code provides that it any Magistrate not being empowered by law in this behalf trial an offender him proceedings shall be void. This would indicate that trying an offender different than taking cognizance of a case. Section 461 (2) of the Code provides that it any Magistrate not being empowered by law in this behalf trial an offender him proceedings shall be void. This would indicate that trying an offender different than taking cognizance of a case. It may be that a Magistrate is not competent, to take cognizance of a case and yet sates cognizance and sends he same for trial to the competent Court. In such a case section 460 will come into play and proceedings would not be vitiated. But, the position would be different where a Magistrate not empowered by law not only states cognizance but also tries the offender and passes a sentence on trial held by him. In such a case section 461 of the Code would apply and the trial would be void. This appears to be the view of this Court in Sonelal v. State of M. P. 3where in It has been held that section 537 of the old Code can cure defects in the trial only when the trial held by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent, however, is that in view of the Division Bench decision. In Fakhrus case (supra) it is not possible 80 hold that the learned trial Magistrate was without jurisdiction in the matter. It is, therefore submitted that provisions of section 461 Cr. P. C. of the Code would not come into play and proceedings should not be vitiated. Section 20 (2) of the Act provides that no Court inferior to that of a Judicial Magistrate, First Class, shall try any offence under this Act. Section 16-A provides that no withstanding anything contained in the Code of Cr. Procedure all offences under section 16 (1) of the Act shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate First Class specially empowered In this behalf by the State Government. A combined reading of the two provisions indicates that it has now been made compulsory that all offences under section 16 (1) of the Act shall be tried in a summary way. The Magistrate trying the offence in summary manner has, however, been authorised, by the second proviso to this section, to order regular trial, if found necessary. It therefore, appears that summary trial is the rule and the regular trial, an exception. The Magistrate trying the offence in summary manner has, however, been authorised, by the second proviso to this section, to order regular trial, if found necessary. It therefore, appears that summary trial is the rule and the regular trial, an exception. The purpose appears to be to achieve speedy disposal of these cases. Fakhruts case does not appear to be laying down any different law. From the short note of the case available for perusal, it appears that it dealt with a situation where no. Court has been specially empowered and the offender could not have been tried if section 16-A of the Act would it be considered in the light of section 26 (b) Cr. P. C. The reasoning of Fakhruts case would, however, not govern the present case as the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chhindwara was admittedly competent to try this case. The law does not provide that every Judicial Magistrate of First Class must be empowered to try such a case. Such an Inter preparation would Indeed negative and render Infructuous the provisions of section 16-A. Such an Interpretation would also defeat the object and purpose for which the new provision was added. Under the circumstances, even the Supreme Court decision in Devendra Kumars case (supra) emphasizes the necessity of giving effect to his provision, in this view of the matter, this Court is not able to read the decision. In Fakhruts case as generally entitling every Judicial Magistrate of first Class to try these cases even if they have not been authorised. In the opinion of this Court, the facts of this case being different and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chhindwara having been authorised to try such cases, there is no scope for application of the ratio in Fakhrus case. It must consequently be held that the learned trial Judge, who held the trial, acted without jurisdiction. The trial was therefore, vitiated. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the impugned conviction and sentence are illegal. ( 6 ) THOUGH, it is not necessary to deal with the matter any further, this Court would have, even if the trial was not without jurisdiction, modified the sentence. This was not a case where the applicant had himself adulterated the logo. The analysis of the saga was done in dry condition indicating that adulteration was at the end of the manufacturer. This was not a case where the applicant had himself adulterated the logo. The analysis of the saga was done in dry condition indicating that adulteration was at the end of the manufacturer. Since the purpose of the law is not to punish an Innocent vendor. Jail sentence would have fully proved undeserved. The applicant living in a small village running a small Kirana shop could not justifiably be called upon to suffer the Jail sentenced for the misdeeds of someone else. The Court would have, therefore, imposed the fine of Rs. 1,000/- only, as this would have satisfied the conscience of law. ( 7 ) THE revision succeeds and is allowed. The impugned conviction and sentence are set-aside, as it is held to be illegal and without jurisdiction. The bail band, if any furnished by the applicant would stand cancelled. Fine if paid, shall be refunded to him. .