JUDGMENT Sengottuvelan, J. 1. The interesting questions of law that arise for decision in the second appeal are as follows: 1. Whether the subsequent bequest conditional on the happening of a specified uncertain event takes effect only if such event happens during the life-time of the testator? 2. Whether a bequest made to a person who was not in existence at the time of the testator's death, subject to a prior bequest contained in the will, is void unless it comprises the whole of the remaining interest of the testator in the thing bequeathed? 2. The facts of the case are briefly as follows: The properties described in the first schedule to the plaint belonged originally to one Sivakami Ammal, the paternal grandmother of the appellant. Sivakami Ammal died on 4.1.1968 leaving behind her two grandsons Sivakamisundaram Pillai the appellant, and Maruthanayagam the father of the respondent, through his son Navaneethakrishnan. Originally she executed a registered will dated 9.12.1960 whereby she bequeathed the plaint schedule properties for the charities making both the grandsons Sivakamisundaram Pillai the appellant herein, as well as Maruthanayagam as trustees. Not being satisfied with the conduct of the younger brother Maruthanayagam she cancelled the said will and executed another will dated 19.8.1965, which is marked as Ex.A1 in this case. According to the will she dedicated the properties to certain charities and constituted the appellant as a trustee to be in possession of the properties without the right of alienation and with an obligation to carry out the charities and to enjoy the remaining income after performing the charities. There is also a further provision that in case Maruthanayagam adopted a normal life and got married and begot a male issue, such male issue shall be the joint trustee and both the appellant and the male issue of Maruthanayagam shall perform the charities jointly and enjoy the plaint schedule properties alike. Marudhanayagam married one Bhagavatiammal and through her the minor respondent was born on 24-12-1974. The next friend of minor respondent Bhagavathiammal filed the suit O.S No 7 of 1977 on the file of the First Additional Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli, for a declaration that as guardian of the minor respondent she is entitled to joint possession of the suit properties bequeathed for the conduct of the charities. The next friend of minor respondent Bhagavathiammal filed the suit O.S No 7 of 1977 on the file of the First Additional Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli, for a declaration that as guardian of the minor respondent she is entitled to joint possession of the suit properties bequeathed for the conduct of the charities. The appellant herein contended that Sivakamiammal bequeathed the plaint mentioned properties to the appellant exclusively, providing that he should enjoy all the properties without any power of alienation and after him his sole issue should inherit the suit items and perform the charities and he has been given the exclusive right in the remaining proceeds after performing the charities and the subsequent bequest that in the event of Marudanayagam getting married and a male chile born to him, such male issue is entitled to joint right of enjoyment is void since the specified uncertain even of Marudanayagam getting married and giving birth to a male child happened long after the death of the testatrix. Hence the alleged bequest of joint management of the properties and the trusteeship in favour of the respondent did not and could not take effect. Even otherwise the bequest in favour of the respondent is void inasmuch as it was a bequest to an unborn person and the same does not comprise the whole of the remaining interest of the testatrix in the properties bequeathed since the respondent is not given any right in the surplus of the income. The respondent is therefore not entitled to any relief. 3. The trial Court negatived the contention of the appellant that the respondent having been born subsequent to the death of Sivakamiammal when the succession opened, the gift in favour of the respondent which was only contingent is void on the ground that under Section 20 of the Transfer of Property Act if an interest is created for the benefit of a person not then living, he acquires if no contrary intention appears from the terms of the transfer, a vested interest. Relying on Section 20 of the Transfer of Property Act the trial court held that the bequest to a person who was not born at the time of disposition is perfectly valid. Relying on Section 20 of the Transfer of Property Act the trial court held that the bequest to a person who was not born at the time of disposition is perfectly valid. Reliance is also placed upon Section 21 of the Transfer of Property Act by which if an interest is created in favour of a person to take effect only on the happening of a specified uncertain event such interest become vested in the legatee on the happening of the event. The trial Court held that in this case the bequest in favour of the respondent is part of the same transaction and that the testatrix had the good intention to have the male issue of Marudhanayagam take part in the discharge of the trust jointly with the respondent. The trial Court expressed the view that the bequest to an unborn child of Maruthanayagam should acquire joint interest with the appellant as joint trustee does not appear to be irreconcilable with the first clause. Even granting that there is inconsistency between the two clauses of the will, it is the last clause which should prevail. In view of the above reasoning the trial court negatived the contention of the appellant and held that in this case the bequest to an unborn person is of the entire interest of the testatrix and the expression 'remaining interest' means the entire interest of the testatrix less the interest carved out by the prior bequest. In other words the bequest in favour of an unborn person must exhaust the entire interest of the testatrix in the thing and the same had been done in this case. In view of the above conclusion the trial Court passed a decree in favour of the respondent. As against the said judgment the appellant herein filed A.S.No. 107 of 1979 on the file of the District Judge, Tirunelveli. In view of the above conclusion the trial Court passed a decree in favour of the respondent. As against the said judgment the appellant herein filed A.S.No. 107 of 1979 on the file of the District Judge, Tirunelveli. The learned District Judge on a consideration of the will Ex.A1 and the circumstances of the case came to the same conclusion as that of the trial court and dismissed the appeal taking the view that the second clause in the will conferring right on the respondent on the contingency of the birth of lawful son to her another grandson, Maruthanayagam, must be taken to limit the extent of the estate that was given by earlier clause in favour of the appellant and his heirs so as to make it conditional to be divested of his absolute interest therein if the contingency happened. As against the said judgment of the learned District Judge this second appeal is filed by the defendant. 4. Mr. T.R. Mani, learned Counsel for the appellant, raised the following contentions in support of his argument that the judgments and decrees of both the courts below are not sustainable in law: 1. The second clause in the will Ex. A1 being a subsequent disposition is repugnant and is not valid: 2. In any event the child was born after the testatrix's death and the respondent cannot take the benefit of the gift ever; 3. The residue which is given to the born child is not the entirety of the remainder and as such the bequest is invalid. 5. Before stressing his three points Mr. T.R. Mani, learned Counsel for the appellant prefaced his arguments that rules of harmonious construction of wills contained in Chapter 4 of the Indian Succession Act can be resorted to only when doubts are case regarding the interpretation of the several clauses of the will. But if the clauses of the will are illegal under any of the provisions contained in Chapter 6 of the Indian Succession Act then such a will cannot be made legal by process of harmonious construction laid down in Chapter 4 of the Indian Succession Act. The contention of Mr. But if the clauses of the will are illegal under any of the provisions contained in Chapter 6 of the Indian Succession Act then such a will cannot be made legal by process of harmonious construction laid down in Chapter 4 of the Indian Succession Act. The contention of Mr. T.R. Mani is that both the courts below in an attempt to construe the will harmoniously as provided for in Section 82, without rejecting any part of it as destitute of meaning if it is possible to put a reasonable construction upon it under Section 85, failed to take into consideration the fact that the clause under which the respondent claims right to management is illegal and no amount of harmonious construction can make it legal. While this proposition cannot be denied we will have to see whether the appellant had succeeded in establishing that the clause in ExA.1, giving the respondent the right to manage the charities, is invalid as per the provisions contained in Chapter 6 of the Indian Succession Act. 6. The first two contentions of Mr. T.R. Mani may be taken together for discussion. The bequest to the appellant was made with a condition superadded that in case his brother Marudhanayagam gets married and begets male issues in future, such issues also will have the right of joint management of the charities. Section 131 of the Indian Succession Act provides for such bequests and the same is as follows: 131. Bequest over, conditional upon happening or not happening of specified uncertain event: (1) A bequest may be made to any person with the condition super-added that in case a specified uncertain event shall happen, the thing bequeathed shall go to another person, or that in case a specified uncertain event shall not happen, the thing bequeathed shall go over to another person. (2) In each case the ulterior bequest is subject to the rules contained in Sections 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129 and 130. Mr. T.R. Mani while conceding that a bequest like the one in favour of the respondent is contemplated under Section 131, at the same time contends that such bequest is subject to the rules contained in Sections 120, 121 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129 and 130 mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 131. Section 124 deals with contingent bequests and the same is as follows: 124. Section 124 deals with contingent bequests and the same is as follows: 124. Bequest contingent upon specified uncertain event, no tune being mentioned for its occurrence:- Where a legacy is given if a specified uncertain even shall happen and no time is mentioned in the will for the occurrence of that event, the legacy cannot take effect, unless such event happens before the period when the fund bequeathed is payable or distributable. 7. Relying on both the abovesaid provisions it is contended that the bequest in favour of the respondent is not valid since the respondent was not in existence at the time of the death of the testatrix, and as such the bequest cannot take effect. 8. In the matter of construction of a will no rule of law is more firmly established than that the court should ascertain the real intention of the testator appearing from the plain language of the entire instrument. One clause of the will is as important as the other and the dominant intention of the testator can only be gathered from the cumulative effects of all the clauses. Clear dispositive words of bequest conferring an absolute estate are often controlled and restricted by the other clause in the will cutting down the absolute character of the bequest. Such restrictive clauses cannot be construed to be a mere repugnancy and therefore treated as void. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in S. Narayan Dass (Died) and Anr. v. Arumugathammal and Ors. is in all force to facts of the case. One Velayutha Konar, the testator, died in 1927 leaving him surviving his widow Sellathammal and three daughters Arumugathammal Subbammal and Shanmugathammal by his predeceased wife. He bequeathed properties to his three daughters and if any one of the said three daughters had no issue she shall till her life time enjoy the same without subjecting the same to any encumbrance and after her life time the properties shall pass to the other heirs having heirs. The Division Bench of this Court negatived the contention that the subsequent condition imposed is repugnant on the ground that the latter clause must be construed as one by way of defeasance cutting down the conferment of an absolute estate under the former clause and that a defeasance clause of the nature contained in the will have always been upheld as valid in law. In this connection the observation of Sundaram Chetty, J, in the decision reported in Govindaraja Pillai v. Mangalam Pillai 63 M.L.J. 911 setting out the difference between defeasance clause and a repugnant one may be usefully stated: Where the intention of the donor or testator is to maintain the absolute estate conferred on the donee but he adds some restrictions in derogation of the incident of such absolute ownership the clause is a repugnant one and is therefore void. If however the intention expressed or to be necessarily implied is to extinguish the absolute estate on the happening of a contingency and where the effect of the termination of the said estate would not be the violation of any rule of law the clause is defeasance clause and would operate according to its tenor. As per the principle laid down in the above case the clause in ExA-1 that in case Maruthanayagam gets married and begets issues, they are to jointly manage the charities along with the appellant is a defeasance clause which is valid. 9. On behalf of the appellant the following decisions are relied upon. The case reported in Jejangir Dadabhoy v. Kaikhusru Kavasha I.L.R. 39 Bom. 296 is cited in support of the proposition that where the testator made a device to his two sons in equal shares, and if the elder son is to beget a son one half of the estate is to be made over to him, on his attaining full age. The Privy Council held that since the elder son survived the testator there were no words in the will to cut down the interest of the elder son into a tenancy for life. In Tiruchendur Sri Subramaniaswami Temple v. P. Ramaswamia Pillai and Ors. 63 L.W. 193 : (1950) 1 M.LJ. 300 : A.I.R 1950 P.C. 32, the Privy Council held that when the testator stated in his will "I have bequeathed to my son the right to all my properties and moneys, etc., and he shall solely enjoy them. If he or his son has no child, the properties shall pass to Subraminaswami at Tiruchendur", the bequest to the son is unconditional and therefore conferred upon him an absolute estate. If he or his son has no child, the properties shall pass to Subraminaswami at Tiruchendur", the bequest to the son is unconditional and therefore conferred upon him an absolute estate. The provision for devolution of the property in case the son died without issue was not in any way intended to limit either the character of the estate that was given by the earlier bequest in favour of the son or make it conditional and liable to be divested at his death without issue. In Purna Chandra v. Sudhangsha Ghosh A.I.R. 1946 Cal. 55 the testator left a will by which the testator's daughter on her attaining majority to get the property and if she be not there the eldest son of the executor to get the property. The daughter died after majority, held as per Section 124 the bequest to the executor's son does not take effect. In Gauri Shanker v. Ramchander a testator made a bequest in favour of B with a condition superadded that if he as well as his sole issue would die without leaving behind any legitimate male issue then the agnates of the testator will get the properties as absolute owner. The court held that the bequest in favour of the agnates is contingent and subject to rules contained in Section 124 and unless B dies during the life time of testator i.e. specified uncertain even happens, legacy in favour of agnates cannot take effect. In Talkeshwari Devi v. R.R.B. Prasad Singh. The Supreme Court held that in case where there is a bequest to A for life and after A's death to B and C absolutely in equal shares with a condition that in case B or C dies issueless the survivor to get the entire property absolutely. B died issueless after A's death. Subsequent legacy in favour of C does not take effect as B died after the property absolutely devolved on her. Relying on the above cases it is contended that the bequest in favour of the respondent does not take effect since the respondent was not in existence on the date of death of the testator. 10. In the case reported in Akhoy Kumar v. Indira Rani A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 499 a testator executed a will leaving his estate half and half to his two sons. If any son dies sonless the surviving son is to take his share. 10. In the case reported in Akhoy Kumar v. Indira Rani A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 499 a testator executed a will leaving his estate half and half to his two sons. If any son dies sonless the surviving son is to take his share. Sons are held to take a vested interest which is liable to be divested on either son dying sonless under Section 131. Section 124 has no application in such a case. The above decisions regarding requests have no application to clause in defeasance as in the present case. 11. In the present case taking into consideration the intention of the testatrix gathered from Ex.A-1 as well as the provision in Section 131 of the Indian Succession Act, the defeasance clause in Ex A-1 that if Maruthanayagam gets married and begets issues, they are also entitled to manage the charities jointly with the appellant is perfectly valid in law and I have no hesitation in negativing the first two contentions of the appellant. 12. The third contention is the bequest to the respondent which is subject to the prior bequest, is bound to fail on account of the fact that the respondent was not in existence at the time of the testatrix's death as per Section 113 of the Indian Succession Act, the bequest must comprise of the whole of the remaining interest of the testator and in this case the right to enjoy the income is not given to the respondent and hence the bequest is void as per Section 113 of the Indian Succession Act which reads as follows: 113. Bequest to person not in existence at testator's death, subject to prior bequest. Where a bequest is made to a person not in existence at the time of the tester's death, subject to a prior bequest contended in the will, the later bequest shall be void, unless it comprises the whole of the remaining interest of the testator in the thing bequeathed. This section contains the provision analogous to Section 13 of the Transfer of Property Act, which is as follows: 13. This section contains the provision analogous to Section 13 of the Transfer of Property Act, which is as follows: 13. Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not in existence at the date of the transfer, subject to a prior interest created by the same transfer, the interest created for the benefit of such person shall not take effect, unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property. Under both the above provisions if a bequest is made subject to a prior bequest there is a possibility of the interest given to the beneficiary being defeated either by contingency or by a clause of defeasance, and the beneficiary under the later bequest does not receive the interest be quested in the same unfettered form as that in which the testator held it and the bequest to him does not comprise the whole of the remaining interest of the testator in the thing be quested. Such a bequest is void under Section 113 of the Indian Succession Act, if the beneficiary is not in existence at the time of the testator's death. Mr. T.R. Mani, learned Counsel for the appellant, contended that though there can be a bequest to a per son not in existence as per Section 13 of the Indian Succession Act yet in this case the bequest to him is only the right to manage the trust and it did not comprise the right to enjoy the surplus income. This contention is not acceptable in view of the fact that the testator is at liberty to bequeath certain interest to a particular person and then the remainder to another. Section 113 cannot be taken to mean that the testator can only bequeath the entire interest to the person not in existence at the time of his death as that would prevent the testator from giving a restricted estate by means of a prior bequest. The effect of Section 113 can only be that in the matter of disposition to an unborn person it should comprise of the entire remaining interest of the testator in the thing bequeathed. What the said section contemplates is that no interest of the testator should survive the bequest to an unborn person. The effect of Section 113 can only be that in the matter of disposition to an unborn person it should comprise of the entire remaining interest of the testator in the thing bequeathed. What the said section contemplates is that no interest of the testator should survive the bequest to an unborn person. In Sopner v. Administrator General, Bengal A.I.R. 1944 P.C. 67 the Privy Council had also affirmed the above view. 13. In the present case the bequest to the respondent comprises of the entire interest left in the testator and nothing was restrained by the testator and the bequest is not hit by Section 113 and there is no substance in the third contention of the appellant. 14. In the result, the concurrent findings of both the Courts below will have to be sustained and there are no merits in this second appeal and the same is dismissed, but without costs.