BOPANNA, J. ( 1 ) IS appeal by the plaintiff is directed against the judgment and decree dated 2-2-1976 passed by the Principal Civil Judge, Bangalore City, in O. S. No. 337 of 1972 dismissing his suit for certain reliefs against the defendant/bank based on the Desai Award dated 7-6-1962 passed by the national Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes) on the disputes raised between certain Banking companies and Corporations and their workmen. The plaintiff had earlier approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 3695 of 1969 which was filed on 18-6-1969 and that petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court by its order dated 28-7-1972 on the following terms : "petitioners have filed these Writ Petitions against the State Bank of Mysore, Bangalore. This court in W. P. No. 435 of 1969 (Sri C. Sathyamurthy v. State Bank of Mysore) decided on 30-6-1971 has laid down that an order as the one in the present case cannot be interfered with by the Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and whatever else may be open to the petitioner. Following the said decision, we dismiss both the Writ petitions as not maintainable. It is hardly necessary for us to state that the dismissal of these Writ petitions does not prejudice the petitioners or prevent them from taking any other appropriate steps. No costs. " ( 2 ) THEREAFTER, the plaintiff filed the suit on 15-9-1972. On the question of limitation, in para 17 of the plaint he stated as follows : "the cause of action for this suit arose within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court as on 19-5-1969 and subsequent dates and on 28-7-1972. The period of pendency of W. P. No. 3695/1969 from 18-6-1969 to 28-7 1972 is liable to be excluded under Section 14 of the limitation Act 1963 in computing the period of limitation as the plaintiff was prosecuting his claim for declaration of eligibility to continue in service till the 19th May, 1971 and for payment of salary in good faith and the Writ Petition was dismissed for defect of jurisdiction. Article 7 of the Limitation Act governs the suit ; Section 34 of the Act saves the entire claim. Article 7 of the Limitation Act governs the suit ; Section 34 of the Act saves the entire claim. " ( 3 ) THE reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs are : a) A decree declaring that the order of Retirement dated 19-5-1969 made by the Defendant retiring the plaintiff from its services on the ground that the plaintiff has attained the age of superannuation, viz. , 58 years, as illegal, without jurisdiction and void ; b) A decree directing the defendant to pay a sum of Rs. 21,594. 24 by way of compensation or damages, towards arrears of emoluments to the plaintiff ; and c) An accounting by the defendant in regard to the ancilliary benefits which the plaintiff would have earned in the normal course, but for the illegal order of retirement dated 19-5-1969 made by the Defendant. ( 4 ) THE 2 principal contentions taken by the Defendant/ Bank before the Trial Court are (1) that the suit is barred by limitation in view of the fact that the plaintiff cannot claim exclusion of the time spent in prosecuting the Writ Petition from 18-6-1969 to 28-7-1982 and (2) that the plaintiff being an Officer of the Bank drawing more than Rs. 500/ per month at the time of his promotion, he is not entitled to the benefits of the Desai Award. The defendant relied on Exhibit P. 2 which reads as under : "further to our circular letter No. Estt/br/20507, dated 27th April, we give below the eligibility conditions prescribed for promotions to the junior grade of officers and the broad terms and conditions of service of Junior grade officers, for the information of the concerned officials. Please circulate it amongst your supervisory staff (Award) and obtain their initials thereon in token of their having read and understood its contents. 2. Eligibility : xxx XXX XXX 3. It has been decided to apply the following relaxations in the case of supervisors in regard to the ensuing selection and the next one : xxx XXX XXX b) Supervisors who are over 45 years of age will also be eligible for consideration, arid xx xx xx 4. Broad terms and conditions of service governing junior officers are as follows : a) Scale of pay : Rs. 260-15-350-20-450. Broad terms and conditions of service governing junior officers are as follows : a) Scale of pay : Rs. 260-15-350-20-450. xx xx xx i) The employees, on promotion, will be governed by the rules and conditions applicable to officers and not on the basis of the award, except to the extent stated in paragraphs (j) and (k) below. j) The following provisions of the Award will be applicable to junior officers whose total emoluments do not exceed Rs. 500/-per month, or whenever they are not in charge of a branch of the Bank, or holding an administrative post of managerial nature :. . . . . . . . . vi) Age of retirement (Paragraph 15. 13 of the Award ). . . . . . . . . k) Therefore, to the extent the above provisions of the Award are superior to the existing rules of service governing the officers in question, the award provisions will over-ride the Bank's relative rules of service. With a view to securing administrative convenience, the desirability of continuing to apply the above provisions, except in respect of working hours and overtime, to the employees whose total emoluments temporarily exceed Rs. 500/ due to payment of allowance, or who may be incharge of branches/pay offices, without prejudice to the Bank's right to revise the decision at its discretion, if found necessary, at a later date, is engaging our attention. " ( 5 ) IN para 6 of the plaint, the plaintiff in order to claim the benefit of the Desai Award has averred as follows : "the provisions of the Desai Award also apply to the Junior Grade Officers in which cadre the plaintiff was. Junior Grade Officers are those whose total basic salary did not or does not exceed rs. 500/- per month. From 16-5-1964 upto 1-11-1968 the plaintiff was in charge of various branches of the defendant Bank. From 1-11-1968 the plaintiff was doing duty as Assistant accountant in one of the branches in Mysore City upto 19-5-1969 when the defendant purported to retire the plaintiff from service on the ground that he had attained 58 years of age, the age of retirement. A true copy of the order dated 19-5-1969 is produced herewith and marked as document 'b'. But the plaintiff submits that on 19-5-1969 when the plaintiff's basic salary was Rs. 480/- only. Together with all allowances it was Rs. A true copy of the order dated 19-5-1969 is produced herewith and marked as document 'b'. But the plaintiff submits that on 19-5-1969 when the plaintiff's basic salary was Rs. 480/- only. Together with all allowances it was Rs. 899-76 Ps. " This averment of the plaintiff was met by the defendant in para 7 of its written statement as follows : "the provisions of the Desai Award are applicable only to 'workman' as defined under the industrial Disputes Act and not to officers to which class the plaintiff belonged at the material point of time. The age of retirement of an officer is 58 years and as such the plaintiff was made to retire on his attaining the age of retirement The defendant submits that it is not the basic salary that-is-relevant to decide whether a person is a workman or an officer but the total emoluments and since the Plaintiff's total emoluments exceeded Rs. 500/- at the material point of time he is not entitled to claim the benefits applicable to a workman. " On this pleading of the defendant, its definite case before the Trial Court was that the plaintiff being not a workman was not entitled to the benefits of the Desai Award. ( 6 ) ON the question of retirement, the Desai Award is applicable to all workmen, as is clear from para 15. 13 of the Award at page 331. It reads as : "taking every relevant factor into consideration, I am inclined to take the view that the provisions contained in the Sastry Award are reasonable and that at present no change is called for I accordingly direct that after a workman has reached the age of 55 years, he may be retired after giving him two months' notice in writing in case his efficiency is found by the employer to have been impaired. Subject to this rule and also subject to any rule under an existing pension fund, a workman should not be compelled to retire before he is 58 years old. Banks, however, will be at liberty, wherever they consider it, to make rules providing for a higher age of retirement. " The parties had also gone to trial on the basic question whether the plaintiff was a workman within the scope of the Industrial Disputes Act for claiming the benefits of the Desai Award. Banks, however, will be at liberty, wherever they consider it, to make rules providing for a higher age of retirement. " The parties had also gone to trial on the basic question whether the plaintiff was a workman within the scope of the Industrial Disputes Act for claiming the benefits of the Desai Award. In his evidence before the Trial Court, the plaintiff has stated as follows : "i joined the defendant Bank - the Mysore Bank Ltd. , in 1946 as a clerk, I served as a clerk for about 8 years. Later I was appointed as Award Supervisor in which capacity I worked in 1964 the Sastry Award came to be made in 1956. On the agitation of the staff association, the Desai award came to be made in 1959 as per Ex. P. 1. I was then the Award Supervisor. The Award supervisors came under the category of workmen. "When he stated that he came under the category of workman it is obvious that, regard being bad to the terms of the Desai Award and to the pleadings of the parties before the Trial Court, he was a workman as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act. In his Cross-examination the suggestion put to him is that the Desai Award, Sastry Award and bipartite agreement govern the service conditions of workmen working in Banks. Therefore, on these pleadings and the evidence of the plaintiff before the Trial Court, the 2 questions arise for consideration are : i) Whether the suit is barred by limitation on the ground that Section 14 of the Limitation Act did not enable the plaintiff to exclude the time taken by him in prosecuting the Writ Petition before this Court ? and ii) Whether the benefits of the provisions relating to retirement under the Desai Award are applicable to the plaintiff if he is found to be a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act? ( 7 ) IN our view, the reasons given by the Trial Court on the question of limitation do not commend themselves to us since the proper provision to be applied is Section 14 and not Article 7 of the Limitation Act. ( 7 ) IN our view, the reasons given by the Trial Court on the question of limitation do not commend themselves to us since the proper provision to be applied is Section 14 and not Article 7 of the Limitation Act. The decision of this Court in the Writ Petition was based on the earlier decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 435 of 1969 dated 30-6-1971 dismissing the petition of another workman of the respondent/bank following the decision of the supreme Court in Indian Air Lines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rao, C. A. No. 1171 of 1967 decided on 27-4-1971 on the ground that the petitioner therein was not a Government servant nor a worker governed by the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, he should make out that the dismissal was one made in contravention of a statutory obligation binding on the Bank governing the exercise of the power of dismissal. This Court further observed that the principle grievance of the petitioner that there had been a breach of the principles of natural justice did not entitle him to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226, whatever may be the other remedies available to him under the law This decision was followed by the Division Bench in the Writ Petition filed by the plain tiff/appellant. In the light of these 2 decisions of this Court declining to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 22 of the Constitution, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was not prosecuting the Writ Petition with due diligence in this Court. Further, it cannot be said that the suit filed by the plaintiff was not on the same cause of action. In our view, the plaintiff was prosecuting the Writ Petition in good faith and this Court was unable to entertain the Writ petition on account of defect of jurisdiction or other causes of like nature. The principles enunciated by the Supreme Court on the proper application of Section 14 of the limitation Act in Madhavrao Narayanrao Patwardhau v. Ram Krishna Govind Bhanu and ors. , AIR1958 SC 767 , [1959 ]1 SCR564 are fully satisfied by the appellant/plaintiff. They are : (1) That he had been prosecuting with due diligence the previous Writ Petition in this Court. (2) That the previous Writ Petition was found upon the same cause of action. , AIR1958 SC 767 , [1959 ]1 SCR564 are fully satisfied by the appellant/plaintiff. They are : (1) That he had been prosecuting with due diligence the previous Writ Petition in this Court. (2) That the previous Writ Petition was found upon the same cause of action. (3) That it had been prosecuted in good faith in this Court, and (4) That this Court was unable to entertain that Writ Petition on account of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. Applying these principles we are of the view that the suit is within the time and, therefore, the finding of the Trial Court on that point has to be affirmed though not for the reasons given by the trial Court. ( 8 ) THE second point need not detain us for long. In South Indian Bank Ltd. v. A. R. Chacko, AIR1964 SC 1522 , (1964 )I LLJ19 SC , [1964 ]5 SCR625 the Supreme court has ruled that the distinction between an Accountant and an Officer will have to be taken note of for determining whether the person working in the position of an Accountant is a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court after considering the duties of an Accountant came to the conclusion that he was merely a senior clerk doing mainly clerical duties and going by the designation accountant he was in reality a workman as defined in the industrial Disputes Act and doing an element of supervisory work and such a person, therefore, does not cease to be a workman on his being appointed as an Accountant. The Supreme Court on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence affirmed the finding of the Labour Court on this point and observed that though on paper certain rights and powers were assigned to him and occasionally he acted in the place of the Agent when the Agent was absent, such duties did not form part of his principal and mam duties. The Supreme Court referred to me Sastry Award on this point at para 167. It reads as : "in several cases they will indisputably be officers. It is difficult to Jay down a hard and fast rule in respect of them. An Accountant often times is the second officer in-charge of branches, particularly where the branches are comparatively small. The Supreme Court referred to me Sastry Award on this point at para 167. It reads as : "in several cases they will indisputably be officers. It is difficult to Jay down a hard and fast rule in respect of them. An Accountant often times is the second officer in-charge of branches, particularly where the branches are comparatively small. In big banks where there is a hierarchy of officers there may be a chief accountant, accountants, and sub-accountants. In most of those cases the 'accountants' will probably be officers. There will however be incumbents of such posts, though going under the dignified designation of accountants who are in reality only senior clerks doing higher type of clerical work involving an element of supervision over other clerks as part of their duties. In such cases where they can properly be regarded as workman the minimum allowances which we have fixed tor sub-accountant would equally apply to them. " The Supreme Court also observed : "it is pertinent to notice that on the Bank's case a workman in the position of Chacko would on promotion to the rank of an officer from that of a workman be financially a loser by being deprived of the special allowance which he would have got as a workman with supervisory duties without obtaining sufficient recompense for the same because of the performance of the so-called managerial and administrative duties. It is not unreasonable to think that this so-called promotion to officer's grade was really intended to undo the effect of the recommendations of the sastry Award for this supervisory allowance. It is difficult to understand otherwise that person with higher responsibilities and managerial duties to perform would in fact be getting less in rupees and annas than what they would be getting as workmen. In the circumstances, the finding of the Labour Court that the respondent was a workman entitled to the benefits of the Sastry award cannot be successfully challenged. " In our view, these observations are applicable with full force to the facts of this case and, therefore, the finding of the Trial Court that the plaintiff is an officer drawing more than Rs. 500/- and hence he is not entitled to the benefits of the Desai Award is liable to be set aside. " In our view, these observations are applicable with full force to the facts of this case and, therefore, the finding of the Trial Court that the plaintiff is an officer drawing more than Rs. 500/- and hence he is not entitled to the benefits of the Desai Award is liable to be set aside. ( 9 ) ACCORDINGLY, this appeal is allowed ; the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is set aside and in substitution thereof firstly there shall be a decree declaring that the order of retirement dated 19-5-1969 terminating the plaintiff's services on the ground that he had attained the age of super annuation is illegal and without jurisdiction and secondly there shall be a decree directing the respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 21,595/- by way of compensation or damages towards arrears of emoluments that the plaintiff would have otherwise received from the defendant/bank had he continued in service till the age of superannuation. The plaintiff will be entitled to interest at 6% per annum from the date of the suit till the date of realisation. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs in this Court.