JUDGMENT - DHABE H.W., J.:---This is a First Appeal arising out of the Award of compensation under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. Briefly, the facts are that on 16-3-1982, at about 9 p.m., one Mahadeo Dehankar, the husband of the respondent No. 1 was going on a bicycle from Arvi after making purchases at Arvi Market. When he arrived at the Arvi railway crossing on Arvi-Pulgaon Road, the bus bearing No. MTB 5559 belonging to the appellant Corporation which was coming from the opposite direction i.e. Pulgaon side, dashed against the cyclist Mahadeo causing him serious injuries as a result of which he died the next day in the General Hospital at Wardha. The respondents 1 to 5 who are his legal representatives and the defendants filed an application under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short the Act) before the Claims Tribunal, Wardha, against the appellant Corporation and the respondent No. 6 i.e. the driver of the aforesaid bus. The respondents 1 to 5 claimed compensation of Rs. 1,68,000/- from the appellant Corporation and the respondent No. 6 on account of the death of Mahadeo, upon whom they were dependent. The appellant Corporation resisted the claim by its written statement of several grounds. 2. The learned Claims Tribunal framed necessary issues on the basis of the pleadings of the parties. After considering the evidence on record, the learned Claims Tribunal came to the conclusion that on 16-3-1982, at about 9.30 p.m., the said Mahadeo was hit by the aforesaid bus of the appellant Corporation. It further held that the said Mahadeo was going on his left side and it was the S.T. bus, which was coming with a high speed which dashed against him and then turned to the right side. The plea of the appellant Corporation that there was contributory negligence on the part of the said Mahadeo because he was driving his bicycle in a zigzag manner under the influence of liquor was negatived by the learned Claims Tribunal. 3. As regard the computation of the claim of compensation, the learned Claims Tribunal held that the total earnings of the deceased Mahadeo, who was doing the business of jute seeds was about Rs. 600/- per month, out of which he spent Rs. 100 upon himself. As such, according to him, the money that was spend by him upon his family was Rs. 600/- per month, out of which he spent Rs. 100 upon himself. As such, according to him, the money that was spend by him upon his family was Rs. 500/- per month. He also held that the age of the deceased Mahadeo at the time of the accident was 45 years. In computing the compensation, the learned Claims Tribunal adopted the multiplier theory. According to him, since the longevity had increased, the life expectancy was upto 70 years of age. The multiplier, therefore, used by him in the instant case was 25 i.e. the difference between the expected age of 70 and the age of 45 of the victim when he died. By this method, he determined the compensation payable to the respondents 1 to 5 as Rs. 1,50,000/-. In addition, he held that the respondents 1 to 5 were entitled to compensation on account of the loss of association and mental agony to them because of the premature death of Mahadeo. As regards of loss of association, he held that the respondents 1 to 5 were entitled to compensation of Rs. 10,000/- and as regards the mental sufferings, they were entitled to a compensation of Rs. 8,000/-. 4. In this manner he upheld the total claim of Rs. 1,68,000/- made by the respondents 1 to 5 in their claim application, although it may be seen that no compensation was specifically claimed by the claimants on account of loss of association and mental agony. In the claim application, the claimants had computed compensation on the basis of multiplier theory only out according to them, the age of the deceased Mahadeo at the time of the accident was 42 years and, therefore, using the multiplier 28, the compensation was claimed by them at Rs. 1,68,000/-. The claims Tribunal granted interest to the respondents 1 to 5 upon the aforesaid claim at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the accident. It further directed that the compensation should be equally distributed between the various claimants. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid award of compensation by the Claims Tribunal, the appellant Corporation has preferred the instant appeal in this Court. 5. It further directed that the compensation should be equally distributed between the various claimants. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid award of compensation by the Claims Tribunal, the appellant Corporation has preferred the instant appeal in this Court. 5. The learned Counsel for the appellant Corporation has raised the following contentions before us : (a) That the learned Claims Tribunal should have made deductions on account of contributory negligence by the deceased Mahadeo; (b) The multiplier used by the Claims Tribunal was not in accordance with law in that regard; (c) The Claims Tribunal erred in law in not making any deductions on account of the factors such as uncertainties or vicissitudes of life and payment of compensation in lump sum to the respondents 1 to 5; (d) That no claim on account of loss of association and mental agony was made by the claimants and even otherwise the Claims Tribunal had no jurisdiction to grant any compensation on account of the said factors in computing the compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act; (e) The Claims Tribunal erred in granting interest from the date of accident because according of section 110-CC, the interest could be granted by him from the date of claim application only; and (f) The Claims Tribunal did not make proper distribution of compensation as per Rule 306 of the Rules. 6. The learned Counsel for the claimants has resisted the above contention raised on behalf of the appellant. In addition he has urged that the Claims Tribunal should have granted the interest at the rate of 12% per annum instead of 6% per annum, which contention is strongly opposed on behalf of the appellant corporation. 7. As regards the deductions claimed on account of the contributory negligence, it may be seen that there is evidence of only two witnesses in the instant case, who claim to have seen the accident. They are Dr. Trilokchandra Dhanraj Paliwal (A.W. 4) and Vithal Bajirao Wankhede (A.W. 5) examined on behalf of the claimants. Both these witnesses were travelling by the same State Transport bus in question. They are Dr. Trilokchandra Dhanraj Paliwal (A.W. 4) and Vithal Bajirao Wankhede (A.W. 5) examined on behalf of the claimants. Both these witnesses were travelling by the same State Transport bus in question. Both of them have stated in their evidence that the deceased Mahadeo was going on his bicycle by the left side of the road, but the State Transport bus coming towards Arvi side, was travelling with high speed and went on the wrong side and hit the cyclist Mahadeo and then swerved towards the right side of the driver. In cross-examination they have stated that the cyclist Mahadeo was unsteady because of the glare of the lights of the bus in his eyes. They, however, did not state that the cyclist was driving his bicycle in a zigzag manner. It is true that they stated in evidence that the driver tried to apply brakes and, therefore, the vehicle swerved towards right but as regards the question of contributory negligence, their evidence does not support the said case of the appellant Corporation. No evidence is adduced on behalf of the appellant corporation on this question of contributory negligence particularly when they could have examined the driver himself upon the said question. The evidence on behalf of the claimants has thus gone unchallenged. From their evidence it is clear that the deceased was not driving the bicycle in a zigzag manner. 8. The only evidence which is relied upon on behalf of the appellant Corporation in support of the above case is the evidence of Dr. Suresh (N.A.W. 1), who has stated in his examination-in-chief that the deceased was under the influence of alcohol. However, in cross-examination he admitted that there is a possibility of dilation of pupils and incoherent speech and unsteady gait because of the head injury sustained by the deceased and that there is possibility of smell of alcohol coming from his mouth because of consumption of lime juice. It is pertinent to see that the deceased vomited within 5 to 10 minutes after he was brought to him and that there was smell of lime juice in his vomit. Intake of acidic juice, therefore, gives alcoholic smell as deposed to by Dr. Suresh. It cannot thus be said definitely from the evidence of Dr. Suresh that the deceased was under the influence of liquor. Intake of acidic juice, therefore, gives alcoholic smell as deposed to by Dr. Suresh. It cannot thus be said definitely from the evidence of Dr. Suresh that the deceased was under the influence of liquor. However, assuming that he might have consumed alcohol, what is required to be proved is that due to the influence of alcohol he was not driving his bicycle properly as a result of which the accident had taken place. As already pointed out in the absence of any positive evidence in that regard and in particular the evidence of the driver, no such inference can be drawn that the deceased was not driving his bicycle properly. The case, of the appellant Corporation that there was contributory negligence because the deceased was himself not driving the bicycle properly cannot, therefore, be accepted and no deduction from the compensation payable to the claimants can be allowed on account of the aforesaid factor. 9. The next point raised on behalf of the appellant corporation is as regards the computation of the pecuniary loss to the claimants on account of loss of life of the deceased mahadeo. The submission is that the Claims Tribunal was in error in taking the multiplier as 25 instead of the normal multiplier of 20. It is urged that the age of the deceased determined by the learned Claims Tribunal was 45 and considering the longevity upto 65 years, the learned Claims Tribunal should have adopted the normal multiplier. He has further urged that the Claims Tribunal was in error in not making any deductions on account of uncertainties of life, payment in lump sum etc. for which deduction on 25% is normally made. In considering the above submission on behalf of the appellant Corporation, it may be seen that the Claims Tribunal has held that the monthly earnings of the deceased from his business were approximately Rs. 600/-, out of which he was spending upon him Rs. 100/- per month and the rest of the amount was spent upon his family. The Claims Tribunal has, therefore, taken Rs. 500/- per month as benefit which would have accrued to the family from the earnings of the deceased. The submission on behalf of the appellant Corporation is that on the basis of the benefit of Rs. 500/- per month, the benefit for the year would have been Rs. The Claims Tribunal has, therefore, taken Rs. 500/- per month as benefit which would have accrued to the family from the earnings of the deceased. The submission on behalf of the appellant Corporation is that on the basis of the benefit of Rs. 500/- per month, the benefit for the year would have been Rs. 6,000/- to the family and after multiplying it by the multiplier 20, the total compensation would be Rs. 1,20,000/- from which, according to him, after deducting 20% on account of uncertainties of life and payment in lump sum, the compensation payable to the claimants would be Rs. 1,00,000/-. 10. The above contention raised on behalf of the appellant Corporation about the multiplier, however, stands concluded by the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Jyotsna Dey others v. The State of Assam others)1, 1987(1) A.C.C. 173. The Supreme Court has held in the above case that in view of high rise in life expectancy, the span of life should be taken to be 70. In that case, the multiplier adopted by the Supreme Court was 25 and on that basis, after making deduction for uncertainties of life, payment in lump sum etc. the compensation was calculated by the Supreme Court. In fact, except for the rate of wages the facts in the Supreme Court case are identical with the facts in the instant case. 11. Calculating thus the amount of compensation on the basis of the multiplier 25, the amount of compensation in the instant case would come to Rs. 1,50,000/-. The learned Counsel for the appellant Corporation has rightly urged that deduction has to be made from the amount of compensation on account of uncertainties for life, payment in lump sum etc. which is normally upto 25% of the aforesaid amount. The appellant corporation has claimed deduction of 20% on account of the above factors. Deducting, therefore, 20% amount from the above amount Rs. 1,50,000/-, the amount of compensation comes to Rs. 1,20,000/- on account of pecuniary loss suffered by the claimants due to untimely death of Mahadeo. The learned Counsel for the claimants has, however, relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of (Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Babalal Daud Mulani others)2, 1985(1) Bom.C.R. 701 in support of his contention that no deduction on account of the aforesaid factor can be allowed to be made. The learned Counsel for the claimants has, however, relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of (Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Babalal Daud Mulani others)2, 1985(1) Bom.C.R. 701 in support of his contention that no deduction on account of the aforesaid factor can be allowed to be made. No such proposition as canvassed on behalf of the claimants is stated in the aforesaid case. On the contrary, reading of para 11 of the said judgment would show that the order of the Claims Tribunal deducting 25% on account of lump sum payment and uncertainties and hazards in life is not disturbed by this Court. The contention which was really raised in that case was whether any further deduction should be allowed on the basis of the age theory which contention was rejected by this Court. Moreover, in that case, the learned claims Tribunal had not fixed the compensation by taking into consideration the total span of life of the deceased. However, it is pertinent to see that in that case also the life expectancy was considered upto 70 years of age. The above judgment is, therefore, of no assistance to the claimants in this case. It has, therefore, to be held that on account of the pecuniary loss caused to the claimants due to the death of Mahadeo, the reasonable and just compensation under section 110-B of the Act would be Rs. 1,20,000/-. 12. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the learned Claims Tribunal was right in awarding the compensation on the ground of loss of association and mental agony, which it has estimated at Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 8,000/- respectively. The finding of the learned Claims Tribunal in this regard is contained in para 40 of its award. The learned Counsel for the appellant corporation contends that thee was no claim for compensation made by the respondents 1 to 5 in the claim petition before the Claims Tribunal on the ground of loss of association and mental agony and it was not, therefore, open to the learned Claims Tribunal to grant any compensation on that ground. He also contents that in fact no compensation could be granted on these counts under section 110-B of the Act. He also contents that in fact no compensation could be granted on these counts under section 110-B of the Act. Apart from the pleadings, according to the learned Counsel for the appellant Corporation, there was also no evidence in the instant case to support the finding rendered by the Claim Tribunal in this regard. 13. In support of the first limb of his submission that there are no pleadings, the learned Counsel for the appellant Corporation has drawn my attention to section 110-A of the Act, according to which, an application is to be made before the Claims Tribunal in the prescribed form containing the particulars to be furnished by the claimant/s. It may be seen that the form is prescribed under Rule 291 of the rules. It is Form No. COMP. A, which contains particulars to be furnished by the claimant/s. Relying upon Columns 21 and 22 of the said Form, it is urged that it was necessary for the claimants to supply necessary information in regard to their claim on the grounds of loss of association and mental agony. It is also submitted that since no claim is made by the claimants in their application, the principles of natural justice are breached because there is no opportunity to the appellant corporation to meet such a case. In our view, there is no specific column in the said application form making it obligatory upon the claimants to state under which heads of compensation is being claimed by them although it is true that Column No. 22 requires the claimants to furnish such information as may be necessary or helpful in the disposal of the claim. 14. However, in the facts of this case, we feel that the above objection raised by the appellant corporation is hyper-technical. All the facts and circumstances on the basis of which the compensation on the ground of loss of association and mental agony is awarded by the learned Claims Tribunal were in a sense undisputed facts. As regards the actual damages to be awarded on such grounds, there is no definite measure to compute such damages and looking to the facts of the instant case, the learned Claims Tribunal has fixed some reasonable compensation or damages in regard to the same. As regards the actual damages to be awarded on such grounds, there is no definite measure to compute such damages and looking to the facts of the instant case, the learned Claims Tribunal has fixed some reasonable compensation or damages in regard to the same. A perusal of para 40 of the award of the Claims Tribunal would show that it has based its finding only upon such facts and circumstances which are undisputed on record. We cannot, therefore, accept the submission on behalf of the appellant Corporation that in the absence of any pleadings the learned Claims Tribunal could not grant such compensation and that their case was prejudiced because of lack of pleadings. It may be stated that the learned Claims Tribunal has not exceeded the maximum compensation which is claimed by the claimants in their application or which is claimed by them as per Column 21 of the prescribed application form. The above contention, in regard to the procedural aspect of the matter, therefore, deserves to be rejected. 15. Turning now to the main limb of the submission whether compensation could be granted on account of loss of association and mental agony to the claimants, it may be seen that both the sides have relied on several decisions in that regard. A brief reference to the scheme of the relevant provisions of the Act would be apt in this regard. The Claims Tribunal is constituted under section 110 of the Act. Section 110-A provides for an application for compensation to be made by the persons belonging to the categories A to C in sub-section (1) thereof. Section 110-B, which is important, provides that the Claims Tribunal, after making an enquiry into the claim or as the case may be, of each of the claims determine the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just. Section 110-CC enables the Claims Tribunal to grant simple interest upon the compensation determined by it at such rate as it may consider fit and from the date not earlier than the date of making the claims before it. 16. It is clear from the above provisions that it enacts a complete code in itself in regard to the claims which lie before the Claims Tribunal. The substantive power conferred upon the Claims Tribunal is to fix a just compensation. 16. It is clear from the above provisions that it enacts a complete code in itself in regard to the claims which lie before the Claims Tribunal. The substantive power conferred upon the Claims Tribunal is to fix a just compensation. What the just compensation is would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, there are certain guidelines which are available and which have been evolved by the courts in deciding the cases arising under the provisions of the Fatal Accident Act. A perusal of some of the decisions arising under the said Act would, therefore, be of assistance in considering the above contention raised in the instant appeal. 17. We may first refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Gobald Motor Service Ltd. another v. R.M.K. Veluswami others)3, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1. The whole scheme of section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act is considered by the Supreme Court in the said case. As regards section 1 of the said Act, it is held by the Supreme Court that the rights of action in the two cases under sections 1 and 2 are quite distinct and independent. If a person taking benefit under both the sections is the same, he cannot be permitted to recover twice over for the same loss. It is held by the Supreme Court in the above case that in awarding the damages under both the heads, there shall not be duplication of the same claim. However, para 13 of the said judgment shows that in the case under section 1 of the Act, compensation was allowed to the claimants on the ground that the said compensation would represent reasonable provision which the deceased, if alive, would have made for them. Such a compensation was calculated on the basis of pecuniary loss to them as per the multipliemethod. However, under section 2, which permits compensation for loss to the estate, certain amount of compensation was awarded on the ground of mental agony, suffering and loss of expectation of life, which the Supreme Court held was not duplication of the claim awarded under section 1 of the Act. 18. However, under section 2, which permits compensation for loss to the estate, certain amount of compensation was awarded on the ground of mental agony, suffering and loss of expectation of life, which the Supreme Court held was not duplication of the claim awarded under section 1 of the Act. 18. Relying, however, upon the decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of (Lachhman Singh others v. Gurmit Kaur others)4, A.I.R. 1979 Punjab and Haryana 50, it is urged on behalf of the appellant Corporation that on account of loss of association and mental agony, compensation cannot be awarded. The learned Counsel for the claimants has, however, relief upon the Full Bench judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of (Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Smt. Kistoori Devi others)5, A.I.R. 1986 Rajasthan 192 in support of the submission that such a compensation can be awarded. It is, however, clear from reading even the judgment in the Rajasthan case that the claimants cannot claim any compensation on account of the mental agony, pain and suffering suffered by them but that the compensation under the aforesaid head can be claimed if the deceased has suffered pain and suffering before his death after the fatal accident. 19. The above view finds support in a number of judgments of the Supreme Court. For instance, see the case of (N. Sivammal others v. The Managing Director, Pandian Roadways Corporation another)6, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 106. In the said case, compensation of Rs. 5,000/- was granted by the High Court on account of the mental agony suffered by the claimants as a result of the death of the deceased. The Supreme Court held in para 4 that the amount of compensation of Rs. 5,000/- awarded on account of the mental agony to the claimants was not legally sustainable. However, although the award on that ground was inadmissible, the Supreme Court held that it would be admissible on another head viz. the pain and suffering suffered by the deceased for 19 days during which he was alive before his death. It would be thus clear that although the compensation cannot be granted on the ground of mental agony to the claimants, the said compensation can be granted if there is any pain and suffering suffered by the deceased before his death. the pain and suffering suffered by the deceased for 19 days during which he was alive before his death. It would be thus clear that although the compensation cannot be granted on the ground of mental agony to the claimants, the said compensation can be granted if there is any pain and suffering suffered by the deceased before his death. The above case also shows that if the compensation granted by the Claims Tribunal is below the maximum claimed in the claim application, it is open to the Court to support its finding under another head although no compensation is claimed under that head. 20. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that after the decease met with the accident at about 9 p.m. on 16-3-1982, he was alive till about 5 p.m. on the next day i.e. 17-3-1982 when he died in the civil hospital at Wardha. It is clear from the evidence that the deceased had suffered head injuries in the instant case in the accident. He had also suffered other injuries which are all ante mortem injuries as deposed to in para 2 of his evidence by Dr. Ashok Bhalme (A.W. 1) who has performed the post mortem examination upon the dead body of the deceased. It is, therefore, clear that suitable compensation could be granted to the claimants on the ground of pain and sufferings suffered by the deceased although not on the ground of mental agony suffered by the claimants. As regards the claim for loss of association, it is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R.M.K. Veluswami others, cited supra, that compensation could be granted on the ground of loss of expectation of life as provided under section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act relating to loss to the estate provided that it was not in duplication of the claim which is granted under section 1 of the said Act. 21. It may be seen that there is no limitation upon the powers of the Claims Tribunal in granting just compensation and, therefore, the same principle which is made applicable to the cases under the Fatal Accidents Act can be and are made applicable in the cases to which section 110-B of the Act is applicable. 21. It may be seen that there is no limitation upon the powers of the Claims Tribunal in granting just compensation and, therefore, the same principle which is made applicable to the cases under the Fatal Accidents Act can be and are made applicable in the cases to which section 110-B of the Act is applicable. The learned Counsel for the appellant Corporation has, however, urged on the basis of the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Lachhman Singh v. Gurmit Kaur, cited supra, that no compensation can be granted on the grounds like love, affection, mental agony or any such similar considerations. However, the judgment of this Court in the case of (Abdulkadar Ebrahim Sura v. Kashinath Moreshwar Chandani)7, A.I.R. 1968 Bom. 267 has taken a view that compensation can be awarded for consortium. The Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, after considering the judgment of this Court, has also taken a view that if the compensation for loss of expectation of life is not covered by the compensation for loss of life under the first head, then separate compensation can be granted for loss of association. The above view is consistent with the view taken by the Supreme Court in the case cited supra. The learned Claims Tribunal, therefore, did not commit any illegality in awarding the compensation for loss of association. 22. The question, however, is about the quantum of compensation payable on the basis of the aforesaid principles. In para 40 of the judgment the learned Claims Tribunal has referred to the undisputed facts on record to show how the claim of compensation for loss of association is justified. He has observed that the wife and the children are orphaned and the old father of Mahadeo is left bereft of his son; more so when he was the only earning member. He has, however, awarded the compensation of Rs. 10,000/- on that count and considering the mental agony suffered by the claimant, he has awarded further compensation of Rs. 8,000/-. As already held by us, no compensation can be granted on account of the mental suffering by the claimants. However, the compensation is payable on the ground of pain and suffering suffered by the deceased Mahadeo. We have already pointed out that the deceased Mahadeo was alive for about 20 hours. 8,000/-. As already held by us, no compensation can be granted on account of the mental suffering by the claimants. However, the compensation is payable on the ground of pain and suffering suffered by the deceased Mahadeo. We have already pointed out that the deceased Mahadeo was alive for about 20 hours. It is also clear that he had suffered injuries to his head. It cannot, therefore, be disputed that he must have suffered pain and agony due to the injuries. However, in our view, the compensation of Rs. 8,000/- would be on a higher side looking to the period during which the agony was suffered by the deceased Mahadeo. As regards the compensation of Rs. 10,000/- fixed for the loss of association by the Claims Tribunal, we feel that the same would also be on a higher side. The total compensation, in our view, which would be reasonable and just for the loss of association and for the pain and suffering suffered by the deceased Mahadeo should be Rs. 10,000/-. Thus the total compensation payable to the claimants would come to Rs. 1,30,000/-. 23. The next question which needs consideration is about the interest payable upon the above amount. The learned Counsel for the claimants has urged before us that the interest at the rate of 6% per annum was on a very lower side and in fact the learned Claims Tribunal should have granted interest at the rate of 12% per annum. The learned Counsel for the appellant Corporation has urged that the Claims Tribunal committed an error in granting interest from the date of the accident when under section 110-CC of the Act he could award interest from the date of the claim application only. As regards the contention raised on behalf of the appellant corporation, it is clear that it is well founded. Section 110-CC of the Act enables the Claims Tribunal to grant interest from the date of the claim application and not from the date of accident. The claimants would, therefore, be entitled to interest not from the date of the accident but from the date of the claim application. 24. Section 110-CC of the Act enables the Claims Tribunal to grant interest from the date of the claim application and not from the date of accident. The claimants would, therefore, be entitled to interest not from the date of the accident but from the date of the claim application. 24. As regards the contention raised on behalf of the claimants that they are entitled to higher rate of interest, the submission on behalf of the appellant Corporation is that since no appeal is preferred by the coamants, they cannot make such a claim in the appeal filed by the appellant Corporation. He has drawn our attention to the Rules framed under the Act, which make applicable the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short the Code) or in other words the provisions of Order 41 of the Code for decision of the appeal under the Act. The learned Counsel for the claimants has, however relied upon the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of (Sonaram v. Jaiprakash others)8, A.I.R. 1986 M.P. 21 to show that the higher rate of interest should be granted to the claimants by taking recourse to the provisions of Order 41, Rule 33, of the Code. The other cases which are relied upon by him would show that the claimants were themselves the appellants in the said cases in which the rate of interest was enhanced. They are, therefore, of no assistance to him. As regards the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, cited supra, we cannot agree with the extreme view taken in that case because not only the interest but the higher compensation was also allowed in that case although no appeal was preferred by the claimants in that case. When the provisions of Order 41 of the Code are made applicable, it means that the provisions relating to the cross-objection in Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code are also applicable. It is thus open to the claimants to prefer cross-objection if no appeal is preferred by them against the part of the award which is against them. Neither any appeal nor any cross-objection is preferred in the instant case by the claimants claiming higher rate of interest. 25. It is thus open to the claimants to prefer cross-objection if no appeal is preferred by them against the part of the award which is against them. Neither any appeal nor any cross-objection is preferred in the instant case by the claimants claiming higher rate of interest. 25. It is well settled that the provisions of Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code can be resorted to exdebito justitiae i.e. to do justice between the parties in exceptional cases by varying the decree in favour of the respondents although they might not have preferred any appeal against the decree. It is, therefore, clear that although we cannot consider the plea of the claimants for higher rate of interest in the absence of any appeal or cross-objection preferred by it, it is still open to us to pass appropriate orders about the interest when we are modifying the award of compensation at the instance of the appellant Corporation in the appeal preferred by it. In our view, the just order in this regard would be to direct the appellant corporation to deposit the modified amount of compensation within one month from the date of judgment with interest as directed by the learned Tribunal but from the date of claim petition failing which the rate of interest should be 12% per annum from the date of claim petition. 26. The last contention which has to be considered is about the distribution of the compensation amongst the various claimants. The learned Counsel for the appellant Corporation has urged that the learned Claims Tribunal has not at all applied his mind to the relevant question of distribution of compensation amongst the various claimants. It is only in the operative part of its order that the learned Claims Tribunal has directed that the compensation shall be shared equally amongst the claimants. He has drawn our attention to the judgment of this Court in the case of (M/s. Nav Bharat Builders another v. Smt. Pyarabai w/o. Dadu Mane others)9, 1984(2) Bom.C.R. 9 . This Court has considered the effect of sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 306 of the Rules relating to the distribution of compensation amongst the claimants. In para 2 of its judgment this Court has referred to certain guidelines which although are not exhaustive are illustrative in considering the question of distribution of compensation. This Court has considered the effect of sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 306 of the Rules relating to the distribution of compensation amongst the claimants. In para 2 of its judgment this Court has referred to certain guidelines which although are not exhaustive are illustrative in considering the question of distribution of compensation. It is clear that the learned Claims Tribunal has not applied its mind at all to the question of distribution of compensation in the light of sub-rule (3) and (4) of Rule 306 and also in the light of the above judgment of this Court. It would, therefore, be necessary to remand the proceedings to the Claims Tribunal for passing appropriate orders regarding distribution of the compensation amongst the claimants in the light of sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 306 of the Rules and in the light of the judgment of this Court, cited supra. It should pass appropriate order after hearing the parties in this regard. In the result, the instant appeal partly succeeds. The award of the Claims Tribunal is party modified. It is directed that the respondents 1 to 5 are entitled to the award of compensation of Rs. 1,30,000/- from the appellant corporation instead of Rs. 1,68,000/- as directed by the Claims Tribunal. The appellant is directed to deposit the above amount in the Court of the Claims Tribunal within one month from the date of this judgment, failing which the respondents 1 to 5 would be entitled to interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the claim petition. It is, however, made clear that the amount of Rs. 1,30,000/- would otherwise bear interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of claim petition, and not from the date of the accident as directed by the learned Claims Tribunal. The adjustment should be given to the appellant Corporation, if any amount is deposited or paid by it to the claimants. The respondents 1 to 5 would be entitled to costs in both the courts which are quantified at Rs. 2,000/-. The adjustment should be given to the appellant Corporation, if any amount is deposited or paid by it to the claimants. The respondents 1 to 5 would be entitled to costs in both the courts which are quantified at Rs. 2,000/-. The order of the Claims Tribunal that the amount of compensation should be distributed equally amongst the claimants is set aside and the Claims Tribunal is directed to consider the said question about distribution of compensation amongst the claimants afresh and pass an appropriate order in that regard in the light of the observations made in this judgment after giving an opportunity of hearing to the claimants. The parties are directed to appear before the Claims Tribunal, Wardha, on 9-6-1987. Appeal partly allowed. -----