JUDGMENT - M.S. RATNAPARKHI, J.:---The order passed by the Civil Judge, (Junior Division), Chandur Railway on 24th April, 1986 overruling the objections raised by the judgment-debtor to the decree of eviction has been the subject-matter of revision before this Court. 2. The controversy covers a very narrow compass. The decree-holder-opponent obtained a decree for eviction against the petitioner-judgment-debtor in Regular Civil Suit No. 138 of 1981. In pursuance of this decree an execution has been filed before the trial Court. It may be pointed out at this stage that the decree obtained from the trial Court was a compromise decree. The judgment-debtor recorded his objection to the execution. The first and foremost objection was that the decree for possession is null and void in view of the judgment of this Court which has declared the notification issued under Clause 30 of the Rent Control Order as unconstitutional. The trial Court on hearing both the parties overruled this objection. This order has been the subject-matter of the present revision. 3. It is not disputed that the decree which has been the subject-matter of execution before the trial Court was a consent decree, but at the same time it is more or less an admitted position that the decree was obtained by the landlord against the tenant and that too without obtaining the permission of the Rent Controller as is required by Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order. To appreciate the real controversy it may be stated at this stage that the Government has issued a Notification purporting to be under Clause 30 of the Rent Control Order exempting the residential premises constructed on or after 1-1-1951 from the operation of the Rent Control Order. This notification prevailed for decades and it was ultimately challenged before this Court on the ground that it was unconstitutional and ultra vires. This Court upheld the contentions and declared this notification as ultra vires. This judgment has been reported in (Prabhakar Rokde v. State of Maharashtra)1, 1985 Mh.L.J. 548. The effect of this judgment is that there has been no exemption and all the tenements are equally governed by provisions of the Rent Control Order. 4. This Court upheld the contentions and declared this notification as ultra vires. This judgment has been reported in (Prabhakar Rokde v. State of Maharashtra)1, 1985 Mh.L.J. 548. The effect of this judgment is that there has been no exemption and all the tenements are equally governed by provisions of the Rent Control Order. 4. It was strenuously contended before me that as there was no exemption available for any of the tenements, a previous permission from the Rent Controller under Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order was sine qua non for initiating the proceedings for eviction before the Civil Court. It was urged that obtaining of the permission from the Rent Controller was a prerequisite for commencing an action of eviction against the tenant by the landlord and unless and until this permission is obtained, a legal disability has been created against a landlord in approaching the Court of law for claiming a relief of eviction against a tenant. Unless that disability is removed, a landlord cannot claim an order of eviction. It was also contended that it is not merely a disability created against a person, but it was also an obligation created on the Court by the statute to see that no claim of eviction can be decreed against a person who still reels under the disability created by the statute. In short, the argument was that the Court, granting a decree to a person reeling under the statutory disability, acts without jurisdiction and the decree as a consequence becomes a nullity, which could be easily agitated even in the Executing Court. 5. It was not much disputed before me that the provisions of Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order do create a legal disability against a landlord and that disability cannot permit him to commence the proceedings for eviction of the rented tenement against a tenant. Mr. Daga, the learned Advocate for the opponent, however, urged before me that a decree cannot be a nullity. Another ground of challenge was that in no case the Executing Court can go behind the decree. It will, therefore be necessary to examine these arguments. 6. Coming to the first point, namely, whether the decree passed by the trial Court is a nullity, Mr. Another ground of challenge was that in no case the Executing Court can go behind the decree. It will, therefore be necessary to examine these arguments. 6. Coming to the first point, namely, whether the decree passed by the trial Court is a nullity, Mr. Daga contended before me that it was a suit for eviction and, therefore, the ordinary Civil Court would definitely have a jurisdiction under section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code to entertain and decide the suit according to law. It was contended before me that as long as this jurisdiction was not taken out from the Civil Court, there was no scope for holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction. This argument overlooks the positive provisions of Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order. The provision creates a definite bar against a person from approaching the Court for a claim of eviction against a tenant if no permission from the Rent Controller is sought and obtained. This provision therefore, creates a disability on a suitor who, without complying with the pre-requisite, rushes to the Court. This is sort of a legal disability created by the statute. This provision does not only disentitle the person under legal disability to approach the Court and claim relief, but on the other hand, it also puts an obligation on the Court. It is equally the obligation of the Court to which such person under disability approaches for relief to see that no relief can be made available to the person under disability. An argument was advanced before me that a disability of a suitor need not affect the jurisdiction of this Court. I find myself unable to subscribe to this proposition hundred per cent. There are instances when the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred even by necessary implication. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure does recognise this limitation. If Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order is read carefully, it would be clear that the bar is not only against the suitor reeling under the legal disability, but it is equally against the Court also. Even assuming for the time being that the bar is only against a suitor, would the Civil Court be justified in granting relief to a person who is under a legal disability to approach the Court? It is from that point of view also that the point needs a close scrutiny. Even assuming for the time being that the bar is only against a suitor, would the Civil Court be justified in granting relief to a person who is under a legal disability to approach the Court? It is from that point of view also that the point needs a close scrutiny. The Court would be acting without jurisdiction in making a relief available to a person, who has been debarred even from approaching the Court for that particular relief. 7. Mr. Daga urged before me that what the Court has done in this case is that it has passed a consent decree to which the plaintiff as well as the defendant are the parties. It was his contention that the parties with free mind have arrived at a contract and the Court has affixed its seal to that contract by passing a compromise decree. He, therefore, urged that now the parties cannot resile from that contract. This argument has be appreciated on the background that is furnished in this case. The plaintiff has come to the Court knowing fullwell that there was a statutory disability imposed upon him by operation of Clause 13(1). The other party was not conscious of this disability. It is under this misconception that the contract between the parties, does not take that contract beyond the realm of law. If a person reeling under disability has approached the Court without getting that disability removed, the Court could not have legitimately granted him the relief inspite of the contract by the parties to that effect. It is this action which goes to the root of the jurisdiction of this Court. Thus in no case can it be said that the decree passed by the trial Court was a valid decree. 8. Arguments were advanced before me that the validity of the decree cannot questioned before the Executing Court and the remedy is to challenge it before the appropriate forum. Thus in no case can it be said that the decree passed by the trial Court was a valid decree. 8. Arguments were advanced before me that the validity of the decree cannot questioned before the Executing Court and the remedy is to challenge it before the appropriate forum. I am not much satisfied with this argument, particularly in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in (Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan)2, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340 where the Supreme Court observed: "It is a fundamental principle that a decree passed by Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties." 9. The trial Court appears to have adopted a reasoning that the judgment of this Court in Prabhakar Rokde v. State of Maharashtra, 1985 Mh.L.J. 548 does not and should not affect the compromise decrees where the parties voluntarily have opted for the contract between themselves and where the Court has given its assent to the contract. This reasoning suffers from two infirmities, namely : (1) that the initial disability of the party coming before the Court is not given due consideration which it deserves and (2) a contract vis-a-vis the local conditions surrounding has not been given due consideration. There are two glaring infirmities which we come across in this case namely : (1) the relief has been given to a party who is suffering under a statutory disability inasmuch as he cannot approach before the Court for a relief of eviction against a tenant and (2) once a tenant gets rights under the Rent Act, the additional protections which are statutory cannot be taken away except in consonance with the provisions of the law itself. The so-called compromise decree has not given any heed to either of these two infirmities. It is from this point of view that the consent decree does not take the case beyond the realm of common law. 10. The so-called compromise decree has not given any heed to either of these two infirmities. It is from this point of view that the consent decree does not take the case beyond the realm of common law. 10. In my opinion, therefore, the order passed by the learned Judge of the trial Court is wrong and it needs to be corrected at the hands of this Court, with the result that this revision deserves to be allowed. The revision is accordingly allowed. The order passed by the trial Court is hereby set aside. The execution is held to be not tenable. Rule is made absolute in terms. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.