LAXMESHWAR, J. ( 1 ) THE above revision petition is directed against the order dated 5th July, 1980 passed by the Additional Munsiff, Civil station, Bangalore, in Execution Case no. 48/1980. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in brief are as follows : That the petitioner who was a vendor filed execution petition in the above Court. The decree holder obtained a compromise decree for the Specific performance of contract against the judgment debtor in O. S. No. 104/78 and has brought this decree for execution. Before filing this execution petition, the judgment debtor had previously filed execution Petition No. 8/77 and that was dismissed. In this Execution Petition no. 48/80 the decree holder prays for a direction to the judgment debtor to execute the sale deed in teems of the decree. Along with this petition the decree holder has filed an application under. Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying that the Executing. Court may be pleased to order that the decree holder should deposit the balance of the sale consideration as per the decree after judgment debtor pays Rs. 3667-00 to the bangalore Development Authority and obtains the title deed. In support of this application i. e. , IA. I, the decree holder has filed his affidavit swearing to the fact that on the assurance held by the judgment debtor to the effect that he is the absolute owner of the site agreed upon to sold. A degree for Specific Performance as per the compromise petition filed was passed. However the decree holder did not deposit the balance of the sale consideration as the judgment debtor informed him that he is unable to execute the sale deed on the ground that he had not obtained clear title deed from the city Improvement Trust Boafd concerning the site and that if he does not deposit he would invite complications later. But, he contends that the judgment debtor had promised to obtain the title deed from the City Improvement Trust Board and informed the decree holder to renew the execution proceedings after depositing the sale consideration. Accordingly the decree holder was meeting the judgment debtor now and then to find out he fact as regards to the title over the property. Often, the decree holder was assuring that they will obtain perfect title over the property. Accordingly the decree holder was meeting the judgment debtor now and then to find out he fact as regards to the title over the property. Often, the decree holder was assuring that they will obtain perfect title over the property. ( 3 ) THE Bangalore Development Authority had issued a letter on 4-12-1979 to the judgment debtor calling upon to deposit a sum of Rs. 3667-00 in respect of the site in question for taking further needful action in the matter. Lastly he prayed, under the circumstances that the decree holder may pay or deposit the balance of the sale consideration as per the decree after the judgment debtor obtains title and produce the same in the court. ( 4 ) NOW, it is necessary for me to know how the litigation started. 1 st respondent and petitioner are the parties who entered into an agreement to sell the property in question. Here the petitioner's vendor agreed to sell his property that is a vacant site to 1st respondent for 'total consideration of Rs, 10,000/ -. An agreement to sell was executed for the same and he paid Rs. 1,500/- as earnest money and agreement to sell was executed between the two. The said agreement was executed on 10-11-1971. According to the said agreement, 1st respondent has to pay the balance of the agreed sale price to the petitioner within a period of three months and get the register-sale deed executed by the petitioner. I have gone through the entire agreement. No where 1 st respondent expressed any doubt about the title of the petitioner. No where it is asserted by the petitioner regarding absolute title of the same. Therefore, it can be inferred from this agreement to sell that the petitioner had the absolute ownership over the property, for which the respondent never raised his little finger. First respondent though it was agreed upon to pay the balance of the sale price within three months from the date of the deed he did not pay. But however before expiry date, it is said that he has paid another sum of Rs. 1,000/- to the petitioner. Wherefore he had still to pay more than Rs. 7,000/- towards the agreed sale price. But however before expiry date, it is said that he has paid another sum of Rs. 1,000/- to the petitioner. Wherefore he had still to pay more than Rs. 7,000/- towards the agreed sale price. Thereafter without paying or depositing the remaining amount, 1st respondent filed a suit for the specific Performance on 28-2-19/3 either to execute and register the sale deed in his favour or to refund his money. I have already mentioned that he neither paid the balance of the sale price to the petitioner nor deposited in the Court, calling upon the petitioner to execute a register sale deed. Thereafter a compromise petition dated 18th August, 1976 duly signed by the parties and their respective Counsel was filed which runs as under :-"the parties pray that the above suit may kindly be decreed for Specific performance directing the defendant to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property on payment of the balance of the sale consideration amount of Rs. 7,025-00. The plaintiff shall pay the said amount of Rs. 7,025/- within a period of four months. If the payment is not paid within the said period of four months, the plaintiff shall have no right to claim specific performance and the defendant will not be under any obligation to execute any sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant is handing over to the plaintiff the certified copy of the index of lands in respect of Survey No. 37, out of which the suit site has been formed. " ( 5 ) IT is further agreed between the parties that they shall bear their own costs in the suit. "wherefore, the parties pray that the above compromise may kindly be accepted and a decree be passed in terms of the compromise and refund of half the Court fee may kindly be allowed. "accordingly a compromise decree was passed. According to the said compromise petition which was filed under the signatures of the parties and their respective Counsel four months time was stipulated and it was specifically made clear that in case of default the plaintiff shall have no right to claim Specific performance and the defendant will not be under any obligation to execute any sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Hence, default clause is also included by the parties themselves in their, petition. Hence, default clause is also included by the parties themselves in their, petition. According to which the Court has made its order. According to the compromise decree, time mentioned expires on 18-12-1976. ( 6 ) THEREAFTER execution petition No, 8/77 was filed on 5-1-1977 and the same was dismissed. The petitioner failed to pay the balance amount within the. time extended by the Court below, he did not pay the balance.-After a long lapse of time that is on 4-2-1980 1st respondent has filed another Execution Petition No. 48/80. Then also, he neither deposited in the court nor paid the balance of the sale consideration to the vendor. It is also noted here that the previous decree wherein four months time granted was also not extended. In the said execution petition the learned trial judge after hearing the parties passed the following order extending time for depositing the money in the Court by one month and also directed the judgment debtor to pay or deposit in the Court a sum of Rs. 3667 00 due to the City Improvement trust Board within that period on 5th july, 1980. Being aggrieved by the said order, this revision petition was filed by the vendor (petitioner) on 8-8-1980 and stay was granted by this Court on 14-8-1980. Even according to the impugned order time Was extended by one month that is up to 4-8-1980. ( 7 ) IT is submitted by Sri S. L. Simha, learned Counsel for the petitioner that even though the time extended in the impugned order, 1st respondent has failed to pay or deposit the balance amount. He further submits that even till today he has not paid or deposited in the Court the balance of the sale consideration. He vehementally urged that 1st respondent was given time of three months in the agreement to sell to pay the balance of the sale price and get the sale deed registered. Time was the essence of contract then. He failed to pay the said amount. Thus he committed the breach of contract for the first lime. Thereafter 1st respondent filed a suit for Specific performance on 28-2-1973, wherein he has not only asked for the Specific Performance alternatively he prayed for the refund of money. Even while filing the original suit for Specific Performance he neither pay the balance of sale price nor deposited in the court. Thereafter 1st respondent filed a suit for Specific performance on 28-2-1973, wherein he has not only asked for the Specific Performance alternatively he prayed for the refund of money. Even while filing the original suit for Specific Performance he neither pay the balance of sale price nor deposited in the court. But however by compromise which I reproduced the entire contents of the petition was filed duly signed by the parties and their respective counsel. A compromise decree was passed on 18-8-1976. In the said compromise decree some default clause was mentioned which clearly indicates that in case he does not pay the balance amount within a period of four months he has no right of remedy against the defendant and also the defendant will not be under any obligation to execute any sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. This default clause was mentioned in the compromise petition. In terms of this, a decree was passed. Therefore 1st respondent is estopped from taking a different stand. ( 8 ) MR. Simha, learned Counsel for the plaintiff submits that when time is fixed in a judgment or decree by compromise, the date cannot be extended by the court. However, he cited number of decisions. The ratio decidendi of which says the Court may extent time and also some decisions say that the Court cannot extend the time, when the time was fixed by compromise between the parties. However, Sri. Munivenkatappa, learned Counsel for respondent-1 through out contended that the Court has power to extend time for payment. He cited a decision, wherein their Lordships have held that even though time is extended by compromise between the parties the terms of compromise by the parties if incorporated in the judgment, it becomes an order of the court. Therefore, if it is an order of the Court, further time can be extended by a Court. He relied upon a decision reported in Sarupi v. Har Glan (AIR 1975 Punjab and Haryana 231 ). His lordship was pleased to hold that :"the case may be different when the court records a direction in the decree for specific performance that in the event of default of deposit of the purchase money within the prescribed time the suit shall stand dismissed. His lordship was pleased to hold that :"the case may be different when the court records a direction in the decree for specific performance that in the event of default of deposit of the purchase money within the prescribed time the suit shall stand dismissed. In such a case it would be deemed that the Court has also in substance passed the order of rescission of contract as contemplated by the concluding portion of sub-section (1) of S. 28 of the Specific Relief Act. " ( 9 ) BUT Sri H. B. Datar, learned Counsel for Respondents 2 and 3 invited my attention to the same decision at para-5. The particular portion reads thus :-"the default on his part to make the deposit within the time allowed by the decree would entitle the vendor to apply to the Court for rescission of the contract. But so long as he (the vendor) does not make application for the said relief, the decree for specific performance subsists and the decree holder can still execute it within the period of limitation by depositing the purchase money within the time allowed or extended by the Court. " ( 10 ) THEREFORE, from the above para, it is necessary that he has to apply. But before applying for the same, he must deposit the balance of the purchase money. Sri. Datar, learned counsel for respondents-2 and 3 draws my attention to another portion in paragraph 6 which runs thus :-"the decision of the Calcutta High court in Bhutanath Das v, Sahadeb chandra Pan/a A. I. R. 1962 Cat. 485, relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant for contending that the decree had lapsed because the respondents had failed to deposit the amount within one month from July 14, 1972 when the appeal was dismissed relates to the decree which specified the penal consequence in case of the decree- holder's default to make the deposit within the prescribed time. "therefore contention of Sri Munivenkatappa, learned Counsel for respondent- 1 does not hold any water. Besides this, Sri Datar, learned Counsel for respondents 2 and 3 also relied upon another decision reported in Smt. Periyakkal and others v. Smt. Dakshyani (AIR 1983 Supreme Court 428 ). "therefore contention of Sri Munivenkatappa, learned Counsel for respondent- 1 does not hold any water. Besides this, Sri Datar, learned Counsel for respondents 2 and 3 also relied upon another decision reported in Smt. Periyakkal and others v. Smt. Dakshyani (AIR 1983 Supreme Court 428 ). Relevant portion of which reads thus :-"the time for deposit stipulated by the parties became the time allowed by the Court and this gave the Court the jurisdiction to extend time in appropriate cases. Of course, time would not be extended ordinarily not for the mere asking. It would be granted in rare cases to prevent manifest in justice. " ( 11 ) WHEREFORE, Sri Simha learned Counsel submitted that at the time of entering into agreement, time stipulated was three months. He did not comply with the terms of the agreement that is he failed to do his part of contract first time. Thereafter when the compromise decree was passed on 18-8-1976 four months time were given then also he did not comply with the direction of the Court. For the third time when he filed execu tion Petition No. 8/77 he neither deposited the money in the Court nor paid to the parties. Again on 4-2-1980 when he filed Execution Petition No. 48/80 he had not paid or deposited the money that was due. Thereafter when the present prder was passed on 5-7-1980 the execution Court gave him time for one month further before which he should either pay or deposit the balance of the amount. So the petitioner filed the present revision petition and obtained stay on 14-8-1980. Nearly 10 days have passed he did not pay or deposit the arrears of the sale consideration. Therefore the conduct of respondent-1 is simply to harass the parties. It may not be out of place if it is said here that respondent-1 being goaded by evil motive is trying to harass the parties with malafidd intention and to extract something from them. ( 12 ) IN view of my above discussion and also in view of the decisions referred to above by both parties, there is some force in the contention advanced by Sri Simha, learned Counsel for the petitioner and sri. H. B. Datar, learned Counsel for respondents-2 and 3. Wherefore, the revision petition is liable to be allowed. In the result, I pass the following :"the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. H. B. Datar, learned Counsel for respondents-2 and 3. Wherefore, the revision petition is liable to be allowed. In the result, I pass the following :"the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The order of the lower court dated 5-7-1980 is hereby set aside and the execution petition is dismissed. Respondent-1 who has paid earnest money of Rs. 2975-00 is entitled to get back his earnest money. But, respondents 2 and 3 who are in possession of the site and have constructed the building are willing to pay that earnest money. Therefore, they are directed to pay that amount to him immediately. No costs. " --- *** --- .