JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) FIVE eminent judges of the highest Court of land rendered the decision in the case of Sathappa Chettiar (AIR 1958 S. C. 245) long time ago winch should have set at rest controversy on the interpretation of Section 8 of the Suits; Valuation Act (for short the S. V. Act) but legal ingenuity of counsel is proverbially endless. ( 2. ) NON-PETITIONERs counsel, Shri K. N. Gupta, is vocal in supporting the impugned order relying mainly on Section 8 aforesaid, which I feel tempted to extract in extenso:- "8. Court-fee value and jurisdictional value to be the same in certain suits :-Where in suits other than those referred to in the Court-fees Act, 1870, section 7, paragraphs v, vi, and ix, and paragraph x, clause (d) court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Court-Fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. " The contention of the learned counsel is that the trial Court acted rightly within its jurisdiction" in deciding against the plaintiff-petitioner the question of court-fees on the basis of the aforesaid provision holding him liable to pay ad valoram Court-fees on the sum of Rs. 22,734. 30, taking that to be the valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction. ( 3. ) THE admitted facts pertaining to the controversy are short and few. The plaintiff-petitioner has challenged as illegal the demand raised in the bill served on him by the defendant-non-petitioner (M. P. Electricity Board) claiming from him a sum of rs. 22,734. 30 and he has challenged further the right of the said defendants to execute the threat held out against him of disconnecting his electric connection. What is also not disputed is that the plaintiff has sought a declaratory relief and has paid fixed court-fees in respect thereto as contemplated under the law. Additionally, he has paid ad valoram court-fees on Rs. 200/- for the relief of perpetual injunction at which he valued the said relief for protecting himself against the threat held out by the defendant to disconnect his electric connection. Additionally, he has paid ad valoram court-fees on Rs. 200/- for the relief of perpetual injunction at which he valued the said relief for protecting himself against the threat held out by the defendant to disconnect his electric connection. The trial Court held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to value the suit separately for the relief of declaration and injunction and that the suit ought not to have been valued separately for relief of declaration inasmuch as it was a suit for perpetual injunction and the plaintiff should have valued the suit for perpetual injunction and that too at Rs. 22,734. 30; and not at Rs. 200/ -. ( 4. ) IN assailing the holdings of the trial Court petitioners counsel, Shri N. K. Jain, has submitted that the Court below acted illegally in ignoring the provisions of Section 7 (iv) (d) for taking the view that the valuation of the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff was not tenable in law. Counsel has contended that the plaintiff is entitled in law to pay court-fees for the relief of declaration (that the demand notice of the defendant raised an illegal demand which was not enforceable in law) in accordance with Article 17 (iii) Of schedule II of the Court-Fees Act (for short die (C. F. Act) and that he was also entitled in law to value the relief of permanent injunction and to pay ad valorem court-fees thereon inasmuch as Clause (iv) of Section 7 itself contemplated that plaintiff could state the amount at which he valued the relief sought ( 5. ) THE contention advanced by Shri Gupta in substance is that even for the purpose of valuation of a suit for payment of court-fees recourse must be had to section 8 of the S. V. Act and accordingly valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction should be valuation of the suit for the purpose of court-fees. When the subject matter of the suit could be valued at Rs. 22,734. 30, in accordance with the provisions of section 8 the plaintiff was liable thereunder to pay ad valorem court-fees on the said amount. To this contention, as I have indicated at the outset, the short and simple answer is given unequivocally and unambiguously in Sathappa Chettiar (supra ). 22,734. 30, in accordance with the provisions of section 8 the plaintiff was liable thereunder to pay ad valorem court-fees on the said amount. To this contention, as I have indicated at the outset, the short and simple answer is given unequivocally and unambiguously in Sathappa Chettiar (supra ). Pithily and pointedly it was held by their Lordships that "his the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court-fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa. Indeed, it was clearly laid down that the effect of provision of section 8 is to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the valuation as determined for computation of the court-fees and that the converse was not true or correct. ( 6. ) IF I have to say anything more it is merely necessary to be made clear with all emphasis at my command that for the purpose of computation of court-fees recourse has to be made hot to the provisions of section 8 of the S. V. Act but the relevant provisions of the Court Fees Act because the object of the S. V. Act is clearly stated by the legislature in the long title of the Act - "to prescribe the mode of valuing certain suits for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of Courts with respect thereto". This also appears clear from the scheme of the Act of which Part I deals with "suits relating to land" and Part II with "other suits" There should be no scope for any confusion that section 8 makes it imperative that computation of Court-fees payable! in any suit has to be made in accordance with the provisions of section 8 and (hat the provision of section 8 is to the effect that ad valorem court-fees is payable on all suits which are covered by different Paras of section 7 of the C. F. Act, excepting paragraphs (v), (vi), (ix) and clause (d) of paragraph (x ). It is to be noted that a reference to the provisions of C. F. Act is not made only in section 8 but also in sections. 3,4 and 9 Of S. V. Act and on that ground it cannot be said that the provisions of the later enactment, S. V. Act, is meant to prevail over the earlier one. It is to be noted that a reference to the provisions of C. F. Act is not made only in section 8 but also in sections. 3,4 and 9 Of S. V. Act and on that ground it cannot be said that the provisions of the later enactment, S. V. Act, is meant to prevail over the earlier one. The drafting technique of referential legislations is not unknown to law. The difference is in criteria adopted for different classes of cases in section 7 of the C. F. Act has also been followed in section 8 of C. F. Act which merely say that in those classes of suits in which (according to the relevant provision of section 7 of the C. F. Act) ad valorem court-fees is payable, the same valuation shall also be applicable for determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court competent in law to entertain and try the suit. ( 7. ) ON both sides are cited authorities galore. Shri Jain has cited 1980 JLJ SN 70; 1981 (I) MPWN 182 ; and 1985 JLJ 747. In the first mentioned case of Badrilal vs. Surajbai, the Court referred to the Full Bench decision in the case of Motiram vs. Daulat, AIR 1939 Nagpur 50, to say that law was well-setded long ago and it has since remained settled that if the plaintiff seeks the relief of permanent injunction for protecting his possession on certain property the value of such relief as claimed by the plaintiff has to be accepted and not value of the property itself because the consequential relief of permanent injunction could be valued separately by the plaintiff. In the second case of Ratlam Bone Mills an attachment of property valued at Rs. 27,000/- for arrears of Sales-tax was challenged. This Court held that payment of fixed court-fees under Art. 17 (i) of Schedule JJ of C F. Act and ad valorem Court fees on Rs. 300/- on the relief of injunction so valued by the plaintiff, was in order. 27,000/- for arrears of Sales-tax was challenged. This Court held that payment of fixed court-fees under Art. 17 (i) of Schedule JJ of C F. Act and ad valorem Court fees on Rs. 300/- on the relief of injunction so valued by the plaintiff, was in order. The last mentioned decision is in the case of Linmat vs. Purushottam wherein the view taken is that when a sale-deed is wholly void and a suit is filed for a declaration to that effect fixed court-fees may be paid for declaratory relief only For the relief of possession no separate court-fees is required to be paid, inasmuch as the consequential-relief was implicit in the relief for the declaration. ( 8. ) I have no hesitation to hold that the decisions discussed above support Shri jains contention to sustain which, in my opinion, the language of section 7 (iv) (d) itself is very clear in that the plaintiff is allowed to value the relief of injunction claimed in any suit. Indeed, in Sathappa Chettiar (supra) itself it was held that when the plaintiff had failed to state in the plaint the amount at which he valued the relief sought he should be allowed to amend the plaint to make up the default Their Lordships went on to add further that, "it would not be reasonable or proper in such a case to hold the plaintiff bound by the valuation made by him for the purpose of jurisdiction and to infer thai the said valuation should also be taken as the valuation for the payment of court-fees. In the instant case, therefore, the court below having usurped the right of the plaintiff and having valued itself the suit for court fees taking the valuation of the suit for jurisdiction also as valuation for court-fees, I must say that the impugned order is wholly void and it does not stand even a moments scrutiny. ( 9. ) IN support of his contetions Shri Gupta has cited the following decisions :- (1) Shamsher Singh vs. Rajinder Prasad, AIR 1973 SC 2304; (2) Comolate vs. Ishwar Industries, AIR 1966 MP 169 ; (3) Badrilal vs. State, 1963 JLJ 674; (4) Mangilal Jain, 1977 (II) MPWN 480; (5) Shriram trading Corp. vs. M. P. K B. Indole, 1981 (II) MPWN 63 ; and (6) Babulal jain vs. M. P. Electricity Board, 1982 MPWN 56 . ( 10. vs. M. P. K B. Indole, 1981 (II) MPWN 63 ; and (6) Babulal jain vs. M. P. Electricity Board, 1982 MPWN 56 . ( 10. ) IN the Shamsher Singh (supra) the decision is only to the effect that for deciding the question of Court-fees the Court should look into the allegation of the plaint to see what substantial relief is asked for], it is not in the scope of section 8 of S. V. Act, the decision of this Court but I have no doubt that though some observations therein support Shri Gupta but they are in direct opposition to what is held by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Sathappa Chettiar (supra) and I have doubts if law in that regard has been correctly laid down in that case. Indeed, this might have happened due to the fact that the attention of the Division Bench was not drawn to the decision in sathappa Chettiar (supra) which was not even cited before the Division Bench but it is not necessary for me to enter into the controversy as those "observations" do not clinch the issue before me. Happily, in the later Division Bench decision in Badrilal vs. Stipe (supra) the Supreme Court decision was noted but it was merely held that although the plaintiff had liberty to put his own valuation under section 7 (iv) (c) of the C F. Act the valuation should not be made arbitrarily. True it is that Mangilal Jains case {[supra)provides parallel on facts to the instant case like that of Badrilal vs. State (supra) and both support the contention advanced by Shri K. N. Gupta. According to me, in both cases the Court having been of the view on the allegations made in the plaint in those cases that the relief for declaration was redundant and the "value of consequential relief given in the plaint was arbitrary, the decisions are distinguishable on facts. I would not like to say anything more about those decisions though I have grave doubts if such a view could aft all be taken. Unfortunately, another learned Single Judge,of this high Court has, to following Badrilal (supra), also resorted to the test of "real money value" of the relief but such a test I do not read in the decision of the Supreme Court in sathappa Chettiar (supra) which was considered in Badrilal (supra ). Unfortunately, another learned Single Judge,of this high Court has, to following Badrilal (supra), also resorted to the test of "real money value" of the relief but such a test I do not read in the decision of the Supreme Court in sathappa Chettiar (supra) which was considered in Badrilal (supra ). I am of the view that such a test would make nugatory the statutory provision enabling a plaintiff to seek declaratory relief and therefore such a (est, even if accepted, must operate only within defined limits and the least that can be done is that the test is not made applicable blindly to each and every case of a declaration. Access to justice constitutionally under-written by Article 34-A must prevail over the judicial test ( 11. ) THE decision of a learned Single Judge in Babulal Jain. (supra) also appears to proceed on the same basis though it does not explicitly speak in terms, of the "real money value" test. In this connection, therefore, I have to add further that even the three decisions of this Court cited by the other side and discussed in para 7 above, dp not speak of the said test and yet take a contrary view which accords more with the supreme judicial dicta of Sathappa Chettiar (supra ). Indeed, I feel therefore that I must discharge my constitutional duty to speak, under compelling necessity, the truth that "real money value" test Is not sustainable constitutionally, inasmuch as it goes against the view expressed by the apex Court. In Sathappa Chettiar (supra) their Lordships held in categorical terms : the question of court-fees must be considered in the light of the allegations made in the plaint and its decision cannot be influenced either by the pleas in the written statement or by the final decision of the suit on the merits. " in determining the question of court-fees no attention has to be paid at all to the written statement or even to the final decision that may be rendered on merits in the suit, there remains no basis at all for the "real money value" test inasmuch as the test envisages ex hypothesi consideration of defence, to counter the allegations made in the plaint, for the purpose for determining the "real money value" of the controversy. Not only Article 141, but Article 39-A also, as already alluded, mandates such a view. ( 12. Not only Article 141, but Article 39-A also, as already alluded, mandates such a view. ( 12. ) FOR all the foregoing reasons, I am compelled to hold that the impugned order is not sustainable in law and accordingly it is set aside. The trial Court shall proceed with the trial of the suit because full court-fees in accordance with law has been duly paid by the plaintiff, on law and facts discussed above. Order accordingly.