JUDGMENT - SHAH P.S., J.:-This appeal raises a short question as to the interpretation of Clause 46 of the Conditions of the contract providing for arbitration. The appellant is a civil engineering contractor. He submitted a tender for some work of construction for the respondents and the tender was accepted and the formal contract was entered into. Disputes arose in respect of the contract work and the appellant gave notice to the respondents that these disputes should be referred to the arbitration in accordance with Clause 46 of the conditions of the contract. After some correspondence, the appellant filed a petition under section 20 of the Arbitration Act praying inter alia that the arbitration agreement be taken on the file, that a reference be made of the disputes and differences listed by the appellant and that the Court be pleased to appoint an arbitrator to adjudicate upon them. The appellant also prayed that the arbitration agreement is to the extent that it nominates one or the other arbitrator, bad in law and the Court should supply the vacancy by nominating another arbitrator. The learned Single Judge firstly held that no petition can lie under section 20 whereunder the Court is required to pronounce upon the validity of the arbitration agreement or part of it and then to appoint an arbitrator. He also held that the last sentence in Clause 46 of the contract is vitiated by vagueness and cannot be given effect to. Lastly he held that this portion contained in the last sentence forms integral and unseverable part of the entire Clause 46 providing for arbitration and being not severable, the entire clause must fail. In this view of the matter, the learned Single Judge dismissed the petition for appointment of arbitrator. 2. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the appellant has preferred this appeal. The facts are not in dispute. All that needs to be stated is that the appellant's tender for some work of construction for the respondents was accepted and a formal contract was entered into between the parties. Disputes arose in respect of the contract work. It is obvious that the appellant filed application under section 20 on the basis that the arbitration clause, save and except, the last sentence which provides for appointment of either of the two arbitrators is valid and enforceable. Clause 46 of the conditions of contract reads thus: “46. Disputes arose in respect of the contract work. It is obvious that the appellant filed application under section 20 on the basis that the arbitration clause, save and except, the last sentence which provides for appointment of either of the two arbitrators is valid and enforceable. Clause 46 of the conditions of contract reads thus: “46. Arbitration.-In the event of any question or dispute arising between the Engineer appointed by the Undertaking and Contractor as to the true intent and meaning or any part of these specifications or of the Drawing referred to therein, or of the tender or schedule of prices or application of the same to the accounts of the contractor or as to the mode of measuring the work and the computation and payment for the same or as to any other matter or thing connected with this contract or not thereby provided for (save and except for such items enumerated in Clause 17 and specifically excepted from arbitration where the decision of the Engineer shall be final and binding on the contractor) such questions or disputes shall from time to time be referred to arbitration. Such dispute arising, or being dis-satisfied with the decision of the Engineer upon matters that could form the subject of an arbitration within the meaning of these conditions, the contractor shall within 14 days after such dispute or decision of the Engineer give notice in writing through the Engineer to the General Manager that such questions or disputes be arbitrated upon. Such written notice shall specify the matters which are in disputes and only such matters or disputes as of which written notice has been given shall form the subject of arbitration. The general manager or the deputy general manager shall be the sole arbitrator and his decision shall be final and binding on the contractor.” 3. It is urged that the sentence in this clause viz. “The General Manager or the Deputy General Manager shall be the sole arbitrator and his decision shall be final and binding on the contractor's is bad for vagueness. The argument is based on the use of the word 'or' which according to the appellant's Counsel would mean that either of the two Officers viz. “The General Manager or the Deputy General Manager shall be the sole arbitrator and his decision shall be final and binding on the contractor's is bad for vagueness. The argument is based on the use of the word 'or' which according to the appellant's Counsel would mean that either of the two Officers viz. the General Manager or the Deputy General Manager can be appointed and it is not certain whether the choice is left to the appellant or the respondents or they must agree on one of these officers. This argument found favour with the learned Single Judge who in support of his conclusion relied on a decision of a Single Judge of the Punjab High Court in (Delhi and Finance Housing and Construction Ltd. v. Brij Mohan Shah and another)1, A.I.R. 1956 Punjab 205. In that case it was held: “Where the arbitration clause in a contract provided that all disputes between the parties arising out of the contract shall be referred to the sole arbitration of A/B, since the words 'sole arbitration' are used, it must be assumed that the '/' which occurs between the names of the two arbitrators, means 'or' and that one or other of them was to be appointed as arbitrator, and in the absence of any provisions as to how the choice was to be made between the two arbitrators, the clause is invalid as being vague and uncertain.” 4. An argument was advanced in that case that these words implied that one or either should be selected between the parties which was rejected by the Court. It appears that the Punjab High Court relied on an earlier decision of a Single Judge of Calcutta High Court in (Luxmichand Baijnath v. Kishanlal Sohanlal)2, A.I.R. 1955 Calcutta 588. 5. It is true that the clause in the contract in the case referred to above and the clause in the present case are similar and if the view taken by the Punjab High Court and the Calcutta High Court is correct, it must be held that the last sentence of the arbitration clause must be struck down as invalid for vagueness and uncertainty. We are, however, not inclined to agree with this view taken by the two courts. What is to be borne in mind in a contract of this nature is that it is a business contract. We are, however, not inclined to agree with this view taken by the two courts. What is to be borne in mind in a contract of this nature is that it is a business contract. It is not that the words have to be given the literal meaning, but an effort should be made to find out the intention of the parties. While arriving at the contract the parties know what they are agreeing to. Normally, the intention is to give effect to every part of the contract and if that is so, the proper way of construing such a term of the contract is to give meaning which would give effect to the contract rather than frustrate it. If we read Clause 46, it is abundantly clear that the parties intended that the disputes, if any, should be referred to arbitration. The procedure for appointment of the arbitrator has also been provided for and lastly it is stated that the General Manager or the Deputy General Manager would be the sole arbitrator and his decision shall be final and binding on the contractor. It is clear that the parties also desired that the disputes should be resolved by the sole arbitrator. Clause 46 read as a whole would, in our view indicate that the dispute should be resolved by the sole arbitrator and the arbitrator should be the General Manager failing which it is the Deputy General Manager who should be the sole arbitrator. In our opinion it would be just and proper and consistent with the intention of the parties not to read the words giving alternative choice of arbitrator, but the name of the Deputy General Manager is mentioned in a possible contingency of the General Manager not being available for a variety of reasons. It could not have been the intention of the parties that a choice between the two was to be made for the purpose of appointment of the sole arbitrator. We may visualise various contingencies such as the General Manager himself feeling embarrassed in taking up the arbitration, he may have proceeded on leave, he may have gone abroad, he may be ill and so on. It is for this reason to avoid any such contingency the parties seem to have intended to have the Deputy General Manager as the second choice. 6. It is for this reason to avoid any such contingency the parties seem to have intended to have the Deputy General Manager as the second choice. 6. In this connection it would be useful to refer to the passage in Chitty on contracts, twenty-fifth Edition, para-118. The said passage shows that there must be a judicial awareness of the danger that too strict an application of the requirement of certainty could result in the striking down of agreements intended by businessmen to have binding force. The courts are reluctant to reach such a conclusion, particularly where the parties have acted on the agreement. The passage further reads “as Lord Wright said in Hillas Co. Ltd. v. Arcos Ltd.: 'Businessmen often record the most important agreements in crude and summary fashion; modes of expression sufficient and clear to them in the course of their business may appear to those unfamiliar with the business far from complete or precise. It is accordingly the duty of the Court to construct such documents fairly and broadly, without being too astute or subtle in finding defects; but, on the contrary, the Court should seek to apply the old maxim of English Law. That maxim, however, does not mean that the Court is to make a contract for the parties or to go outside the words they have used, except insofar as there are appropriate implications of law'. 7. Viewed in the light of these principles, though the words in the contract may not have been used with precision, the Court is certainly entitled to and in fact should lean in favour of a construction which would not frustrate the contract, particularly when the parties have acted on the agreement or the contract. Viewed in the light of the above principles regarding the interpretation of the contracts, particularly mercantile or business contracts, what we have to see is the intention of the parties gathered principally from the words used as a whole and the conduct of the parties. As pointed out, the parties positively intended to resolve their disputes by arbitration. They have even provided procedure for referring the disputes to the arbitrator. As pointed out, the parties positively intended to resolve their disputes by arbitration. They have even provided procedure for referring the disputes to the arbitrator. They have also indicated that the disputes should be resolved by the sole arbitrator Viewed in this light, the mention of the two officers by using the word 'or' must, in our opinion, mean that the parties intended that it is only if the first named officer is unable to take up the arbitration for one reason or the other, then the second named officer should be the sole arbitrator. 8. The learned Single Judge having held the last sentence in the clause bad for vagueness, further went on to observe that this sentence is unseverable from the rest of the arbitration agreement contained in Clause 46. With respect, we are unable to agree with this view taken by the learned Single Judge. A perusal of Clause 46 makes it implicit that the questions or disputes shall be referred to arbitration. It is only thereafter that the procedure for the appointment as well as the person who is to become the sole arbitrator has been mentioned. The portion relating to the appointment of the sole arbitrator is clearly severable from the rest of the clause which provides for the disputes being resolved by arbitration. Even if we are wrong in regard to the interpretation relating Clause 46, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge was not justified in striking down the entire clause of arbitration and as such the application under section 20 ought to have been granted. We, therefore, set aside the judgment and order dated September 16, 1981, of the learned Single Judge and the suit is decreed in terms of prayers (a) and (b). 9. At this stage the parties agree that instead of referring the dispute to the General Manager or the Deputy General Manager as contemplated by Clause 46, the dispute be referred to the sole arbitration of Shri N.N. Shrikhande. The minutes tendered by the Counsel indicating consent to the appointment of Shri. Shrikhande as sole Arbitrator is taken on record and marked 'X'. 10. No order as to costs. Order accordingly. -----