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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1987 DIGILAW 164 (MP)

Steel Authority of India v. Industrial Court

1987-04-28

B.C.VARMA, R.M.RASTOGI

body1987
JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS order shall also govern the disposal of M. R. No. 2819 of 1983 Chulhanram v. The Industrial Court, MP. and Ors. M. P. No. 3138 of 1986; Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Industrial Court and Ors. M. P. No. 3139 of 1986; B. K. Chak-raborty v. Industrial Court, Indore and Anr. These petitions are disposed of by a common order as they involve similar questions. ( 2. ) THIS is petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking to quash the order of the Labour Court, dated 9. 8. 1982, Annexure-J, and the order of the Industrial Court dated 27. 5. 1983, An-nexure-K, in M. P. No. 3138 of 1986 similar orders of the Labour Court and Industrial Court, Annexure-K and Annexure-I, respectively, have been challenged. In M. P. Nos. 2819 of 1983 and 3139 of 1986 the 2 pe-titioners-Chulhanrarm and B. K. Chakraborty have claimed the payment of full back wages. ( 3. ) WE take up first M. P. No. 3137 of 1986. The necessary facts for the disposal of this petition are : The respondent No. 3. Chulhanram was appointed as a shunting porter in the Bhilai Steel Plant at Bhilai in the year 1958. At that time he disclosed his date of birth (on 16. 10. 1958) as 28. 1. 1924 which was recorded in his Service Roll and which was duly signed by him, vide Annexure-A. In the year 1961 the respondent No. 3 had submitted a duly attested copy of the School Leaving Certificate, dated 21. 12. 1961 issued by the Head Master of the Junior Basic Primary School, Mahua, Distt. Ajamgarh (U. P.) in which his date of birth was shown as before to be 28. 1. 1924 vide Annexure-B. In the year 1973 the respondent No. 3 had submitted an application for admission to the Contributory Fund among with a Declaration and Nomination as required by the rules of the Provident Fund, wherein he again declared his date of birth as 28. 1. 1924. The respondent No. 3 had duly signed the said application which was attested by the witnesses, vide Annexure-C. For the years 1968 to 1974 and onward final gradation list was published by the petitioner wherein the date of birth of the respondent No. 3 was always shown as 28. 1. 1. 1924. The respondent No. 3 had duly signed the said application which was attested by the witnesses, vide Annexure-C. For the years 1968 to 1974 and onward final gradation list was published by the petitioner wherein the date of birth of the respondent No. 3 was always shown as 28. 1. 1924 and the respondent No. 3 had never disputed the correctness of his date of birth and had never raised any objection regarding the same. The Standing Order No. 39 of the Standing Orders (Plant), which are duly certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, prescribes the superannuation age of an employee to be 58 years. Accordingly, the petitioner, by its order dated 12. 8. 1981 Annexure-D, communicated to the respondent No. 3, that he was due to retire on 27. 1. 1982 on reaching the age of superannuation. Then the respondent No. 3 for the first time, wrote to the petitioner, vide his letter dated 27. 8. 1981 Annexure-E, that his actual date of birth was 28. 1. 1930 The petitioner rejected the application on 4. 9. 1981 vide Annexure-F, and the respondent No. 3 was retired on 27. 1. 1982. Thereafter, the respondent No. 3 approached the Labour Court, Durg, which by its impugned order dated 9. 8. 1982 Annexure-J, ordered that the respondent No. 3, be reinstated and his full back wages be paid to him. The petitioner appealed to the Industrial Court, Indore, challenging the order of the Labour Court. The Industrial Court, by its impugned order Annexure-K dated 27. 5. 1983 dismissed the appeal and further ordered that back wages from 3. 1. 1982 to 15. 9. 1982 are not payable to the respondent No. 3 and from 15. 9. 1982 only 75% of the average wages till its order were payable to him. It is the impugned Annexures-J and K which are under challenge in this petition. In M. P. No. 819 of 1983, the petitioner Chulhanram has sought modification of the impugned order, Annexure-K and has claimed full back wages. ( 4. ) IN M. P. No. 3 138 of 1986 there is again the problem of the respondent No. 3 B. K. Chakraborty seeking to change his date of birth at the fag end of his career. He was appointed as a Mechanical Fitter on 17. 7. 1961 in the Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai. ( 4. ) IN M. P. No. 3 138 of 1986 there is again the problem of the respondent No. 3 B. K. Chakraborty seeking to change his date of birth at the fag end of his career. He was appointed as a Mechanical Fitter on 17. 7. 1961 in the Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai. He joined his duties on 25. 7. 1961 and signed the posting slip showing his age to be 38 years (Annexure-A), which meant that he was born in 1923. He submitted his Declaration and Nomination, required under the Provident Fund Rules, under his signatures wherein he declared his date of birth to be 24. 7. 1923 (Annexure- B ). In his Service Roll also, which was duly signed by him, he had declared his date of birth as 24. 7. 1923 (Annexure-C ). As per the Standing Order No. 39, he was due to retire on 23. 7. 1981, reaching the age of superannuation of 58 years. On 12. 11. 1979 the respondent No. 3 made an application stating that his correct date of birth was 13. 10. 1924 (Annexure-D ). Along with the application, he enclosed a copy of a certificate from the Technical Training School, Govt. of India, Department of Labour, allegedly issued on 3. 2. 1943, in which his date of birth was shown to be "1924" (Annexure-E ). His application was rejected by the Petitioner by its order, dated 16. 11. 1979 (Annexure-F ). Thereafter, the petitioner informed the respondent No. 3 by its letter, dated 13. 2. 1981, that he would be superannuated on 31. 7. 1981 (which was the last date of the month in which he would be completing 58 years Annexure-H ). The respondent No. 3 then moved the Labour Court, Durg, contending for the first time that he was 19 years of age on 2. 4. 1948 which meant that his date of superannuation would be 2. 4. 1986. For the first time, he also filed a certificate from the Army stating that he was 19 years of age on 2. 4. 1948. The Labour Court, by its order, dated 8. 7. 1982, Annexure-K, accepted the contention of the respondent No. 3 and allowed his application, ordering that he be reinstated and his full back wages be paid to him. The petitioner appealed to the Industrial Court, Indore, which by its order dated 9. 6. 4. 1948. The Labour Court, by its order, dated 8. 7. 1982, Annexure-K, accepted the contention of the respondent No. 3 and allowed his application, ordering that he be reinstated and his full back wages be paid to him. The petitioner appealed to the Industrial Court, Indore, which by its order dated 9. 6. 1983, Annexure-L dismissed the appeal and modified the order of the Labour Court in regard to the payment of back wages as in para 3 above. The impugned Annexures-K and L have been challenged in this petition. In M. P. No. 3139 of 1986 the petitioner, B. K. Chakraborty has claimed full back wages in modification of the Annexure-I. ( 5. ) AFTER hearing the learned counsel and going through the entire record we are of the opinion that both the Labour Court and the Industrial Court have acted beyond the scope of their jurisdiction by trying to make out a new contract for the parties by changing the date of birth of the respondents Chulhanram and B. K. Chakraborty. It is admitted that the superannuation age of an employee is 58 years. The petitioner has issued a Circular No. SPO/mandr-8 (10)/68, dated 2. 8. 1974 (Annexure-G to the M. P. No. 3138 of 1986), which provides that an application by an employee requesting for a change in his date of birth can be made only during the last 5 years of the date of superannuation. The said circular was judicially noticed in Steel Authority of India v. Industrial Court, Indore and Ors. 1986 MPLJ 554 , and it was held to be reasonable and approved. We are in complete agreement with Steel Authority of Indias case (supra ). The said circular is based on sound public policy and it makes for certainty and an orderly state of things which are of essence of good administration, which in the long run are in the best interests of all the employees as well as the management. So it is a sound rule that if an employee seeks a change in his date of birth he has to apply within 5 years of his approaching superannuation. No fault can be found with that Respondent No. 3 Chiilhanram (M. P. No. 3137 of 1986) had filed his application on 27. 8. 1981 for changing his date of birth, and he was due to retire on 27,1. No fault can be found with that Respondent No. 3 Chiilhanram (M. P. No. 3137 of 1986) had filed his application on 27. 8. 1981 for changing his date of birth, and he was due to retire on 27,1. 1982,i. e. just 5 months before his impending superannuation. Similarly, respondent No. 3 B. K. Chakraborty (M. P. No. 3138 of 1986) had filed his application on 12. 11. 1979 for changing his date of birth whereas his superannuation was due on 23. 7. 1981 i. e. within one year and 8 months of his coming superannuation. The petitioner was justified in rejecting both the applications in terms of the said circular. Even otherwise, the applications deserved to be dismissed on merits. ( 6. ) M. P. No. 3137 of 1986-Respondent No. 3 Chulhanram had constantly shown his date of birth to be 28. 1. 1924. In his Service Roll, duly signed by him, his date of birth was shown as 28. 1. 1924 (Annexure-A ). He had submitted in 1961 an attested copy of his School Leaving Certificate, dated 21. 12. 1961, issued by the Head Master of the Junior Basic Primary School, Mahua, District Azamgadh (U. P.), in which his date of birth was shown to be 28. 1. 1924 (Annexure-B ). Again in the year 1973, he had submitted an application for admission to the contributory Provident Fund along which he had also submitted Declaration and Nomination, which was duly signed by him declaring his date of birth as 28. 1. 1924 (Annexure-C ). From 1968 to 1974 and onward, the final gradation list was published by the petitioner, wherein his date of birth was shown as 28. 1. 1924. And the respondent No. 3 Chulhanram never raised any objection to it. So, throughout the span of his long career he had given his date of birth as 28. 1. 1924. It was at the fag end of his career that he wanted to have it changed as 28. 1. 1930. For the first time, the respondent No. 3 Chulhanram produced another School Leaving Certificate from the very School from which he had earlier produced the certificate Annexure-B. The new certificate has shown his date of birth 28. 1. 1930. It was not explained why there was discrepancy in the two certificates. 1. 1930. For the first time, the respondent No. 3 Chulhanram produced another School Leaving Certificate from the very School from which he had earlier produced the certificate Annexure-B. The new certificate has shown his date of birth 28. 1. 1930. It was not explained why there was discrepancy in the two certificates. The Labour Court as also the Industrial Court were not justified in basing their conclusions on the subsequent school certificate, which was very much suspect. Their conclusions are based on no legal evidence. Therefore, the orders of the Labour Court and Industrial Court, Annexures J and K respectively are liable to be set aside. ( 7. ) M. P. No. 3138 of 1986-Similarly, respondent No. 3 B. K. Chakraborty when entering in service on 17. 7. 1961, had declared in the posting slip (Annexure-A) which was duly signed by him, his age to be 38 years, meaning thereby that he was born in 1923. He submitted his Declaration and Nomination form and he had declared therein his date of birth to be 24. 7. 1923 (Annexure-B ). In his service book duly signed by him, he had again declared his date of birth to be 24-7-1923 (Annexure-C ). So, consistently he had been showing his date of birth as 24. 7. 1923. Accordingly, he was due to retire on superannuation on 23. 7. 1981. Towards the fag end of his career, on 22. 11. 1979, he made the application that his correct date of birth was 13. 10. 1924. Along with the said application, he produced a copy of certificate from the Technical Training School, Govt. of India, Department of Labour, allegedly issued on 3. 2. 1943, in which his date of birth was stated to be "1924" No exact date of birth was given and only the year of birth was shown in that certificate. Before the Labour Court, he produced yet another different certificate about his age. This time it was from the Army which only stated that he was of 19 years of age on 2. 4. 1948, i. e. he was born in 1930. Again no exact date of birth was given in the Army Certificate also. This certificate from the Army was also interpolated. The Labour Court also did not record any exact date of birth and only vaguely held that he was of 19 years of age on 2. 4. 1948. 4. 1948, i. e. he was born in 1930. Again no exact date of birth was given in the Army Certificate also. This certificate from the Army was also interpolated. The Labour Court also did not record any exact date of birth and only vaguely held that he was of 19 years of age on 2. 4. 1948. This finding also was unjustified and based on no legal evidence. The Industrial Court found his conduct dishonest, and observed that all the confusion and mess was of his own making. Therefore, the order of the Labour Court, Annexure-K. and that of the Industrial Court, Annexure-L which affirmed the order of the Labour Court on the question of date of birth, are liable to be set aside, being beyond the scope of their jurisdiction. ( 8. ) IN the result, M. P. No. 3137 of 1986 is allowed Order of the Labour Court, dated 9. 8. 1982, Annexure-J and the order of the Industrial Court, dated 27. 5. 1983 Annexure-K. are hereby quashed. Similarly, M. P. No. 3138 of 1986 is also allowed. The order of the Labour Court dated 8. 7. 1982 Annexure-K and the order of the Industrial Curt, dated 9. 6. 1983. Annexure-L, are also quashed. Subsequently M. P Nos. 2819 of 1983 and 3138 of 1986 are dismissed. No orders as to costs. The security cost be refunded to all the petitioners. ?