JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - Second party members are the Petitioners against the order of the Sessions Judge' passed in revision in a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the "Code"). 2. On the basis of an application by the first party, .the Magistrate initiated a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code on being satisfied that the pre-conditions for initiation were there. Pursuant to the notice issued by the learned Magistrate, the Petitioners who were the second party member appeared before the Magistrate and took the stand that the Assistant Commissioner Endowments appointed a trust board in the year 1973 of which one Kapila Nahak was the Managing Trustee. The said Managing Trustee took up management of the property and after him the Petitioners took over the charge as members of the Trust Board. Some of the Petitioners were labourers engaged by Petitioner No. 1 for cultivating the disputed land and thus the Petitioners are in possession of the land in question. 3. The positive case of the first party was that the land belonged to deity Krushneswar Swamy and was in possession and management of the father of the first party who was the Marfatdar. After the death of the father the first party took up management and continued to be in possession of the land in question. As the second party members created trouble over the peaceful possession, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate u/s 145 of the Code was invoked. 4. Both parties adduced evidence in support of their respective claims of possession. The learned Magistrate after a thorough analysis of the evidence came to the conclusion that it was difficult to decide as to which party was in possession of the disputed land as Marfatdar on the date of the preliminary order. He, therefore, attached the disputed land u/s 146 of the Code and appointed the Revenue Inspector to be the receiver until orders of the competent Court determining the rights of the parties were received. The second party members challenged this order of the Magistrate in revision. He, therefore, attached the disputed land u/s 146 of the Code and appointed the Revenue Inspector to be the receiver until orders of the competent Court determining the rights of the parties were received. The second party members challenged this order of the Magistrate in revision. The learned Sessions Judge by the impugned order reappraised the entire evidence and came to the conclusion that it was the Respondent (first party) who must be deemed to be in possession of the disputed land on the date of the preliminary order and on this finding, the Sessions Judge set aside the order of the Magistrate and declared the possession of the first party over the disputed land and restrained the second party members from making any disturbance in the peaceful possession of the first party over the subject-matter of the dispute. It is this order of the learned Sessions Judge which is being impugned in the present writ petition since under the Code of Criminal Procedure a second revision at the instance of the second party members who were the Petitioners before the sessions Judge is not maintainable. 5. Mr. Padhi, the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners, contends that the order of the learned Sessions Judge is paopably erroneous and is wholly without jurisdiction and, therefore, is liable to be interfered with in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227 of 'the Constitution by this Court. According to Mr. Padhi, the Sessions Judge has disposed of the matter as if he had entertained an appeal and has exceeded his jurisdiction in re-appraising the evidence on record and forming his own conclusion on the question of possession. That part, in the absence of any challenge by the first party, the Sessions Judge could not have found possession in favour of the first parry on setting aside the order of the Magistrate and, therefore, the impugned order is palpably erroneous. We find sufficient force in both the contentions of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners. 6. The revisional power of the Sessions Judge enables a Sessions Judge to call, for the records of the inferior criminal, Court and to examine them for the purpose of satisfying as to whether the finding or order of such inferior Court is legal correct or proper. 6. The revisional power of the Sessions Judge enables a Sessions Judge to call, for the records of the inferior criminal, Court and to examine them for the purpose of satisfying as to whether the finding or order of such inferior Court is legal correct or proper. The power of revision is essentially a supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the Sessions Judge to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law or irregularity of procedure. It is obvious that a Sessions Judge in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction can only set right a patent error or defect and cannot make a roving enquiry to find out any possible defect or error. This power of revision, therefore, has to be exercised only if the higher Court finds out some patent error in the order of a lower criminal Court and further comes to the conclusion that such error has caused manifest injustice or there has been gross miscarriage of justice. By no stretch of imagination this power can be exercised as the power of a Court of appeal and the revisional Court will have no jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence and to come to its own conclusion on different questions taking a different view than the Magistrate. Applying the aforesaid tests to the impugned order of the Sessions Judge, we are of the opinion that the Sessions Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in completely re-assessing the evidence and forming his own conclusion about the possession of the land and, therefore, such an order cannot be permitted to be sustained. 7. That apart, we fail to understand how in the absence of a revision by the first party member, the Sessions Judge interfered with the conclusion of the Magistrate and came to the conclusion that it was the first party who was in possession of the land on the date of the preliminary order and further restrained the second party members from interfering with the peaceful possession of the first party. Such a procedure is wholly unwarranted in law and such an error has to be corrected by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. 8. Such a procedure is wholly unwarranted in law and such an error has to be corrected by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. 8. As to whether in view of the bar for a second revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure at the instance of the very party who moved the Sessions Judge in revision, this Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, the same is concluded by the decision of this Court in the case of Sashidhar Naik and Others Vs. Gadadhar Patel and Others etc.. In the aforesaid case, relying upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Swaran Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors. AIR 1916 S.C. 32, this Court has held: ...The legislative policy of not allowing a second revision before the High Court at the instance of the party who has lost in the first revision cannot be relied upon to affect the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.... In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement there can be no doubt that this,Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. 9. In the net result, therefore, we issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the learned Sessions Judge and affirm the order of the learned Magistrate. The writ application is accordingly allowed but in the circumstances, without any order as to costs. K.P. Mohapatra, J. 10. I agree. Final Result : Allowed