JUDGMENT Kamleshwar Nath, J. - These are two connected writ petitions which relate to the conduct of Girja Dayal Srivastava. 2. Girja Dayal Srivastava was an Assistant Agriculture Inspector in Grade III of the Subordinate Agriculture Service in U.P. while working as such at Government Seed Store, Bilhaur, district Kanpur, he was placed under suspension on the basis of some complaints by some cultivators. He was also prosecuted for offences punishable under Sections 468, 471 and 120 - b I. P. C. along with three other persons. By a judgment, dated 31-7-1963, he was acquitted. 3. On 2-8-1965 he applied for being reinstated, and also gave a notice under Section 80, C. P. C on 25-1-66 of a proposed suit for declaration that he should be deemed to be in service and for claim of his arrears of salary. During the proceedings of the suit, departmental disciplinary proceedings were instituted against him. He was served with a charge-sheet dated 10-11-196 6. He filed his reply and also filed a civil suit on 3-10-1967 for recovery of Rs. 20,382.80 as arrears of salary. During the pendency of the suit, the Director of Agriculture passed an order dated 7-7-1972 dismissing the petitioner from service and for recovery of the amounts on account of the loss caused by Girja Dayal Srivastava to the State Government in the course of his employment. 4. The civil suit was transferred to the U. P. Services Tribunal where in he challenged the validity of the disciplinary proceedings and of the dismissal order mainly on the ground that while the dismissal order was passed on 7-7-1972, it was served upon him on 14-7-1972 while, in the meantime, he retired from services on 13-7-1972 on attaining the age of superannuation Since the dismissal order was not served upon him personally before he attained the age of superannuation, he claimed it to be inoperative. 5. The Services Tribunal held in its decision dated 1-3-1982 that the order of his dismissal had been passed by the appointing authority, that there was no illegality in the proceedings or in the order, that the departmental proceedings were on charges different from those which were subject-matter of his prosecution in the criminal court, and that he had been afforded adequate opportunity during the enquiry proceedings. The Tribunal, however, upheld his contention that the order of dismissal could not become effective because it had been served on his after he had retired from service. On this basis of the Tribunal decreed his claim for appears of salary for Rs. 8,14393 with interest. 6. When Girja Dayal Srivastava put the Tribunals decree into execution, the State of U.P. filed Writ Petition No. 3223 of 1982 on the ground that the order of dismissal, passed on 7-7-1972, shall be deemed to have been operative and effective from the date on which it was issued and not from the date of its actual service upon Girja Dayal Srivastava. 7. However, the State of U.P. proceeded to make recovery of the amount, i. e., Rs. 1,54,132.66, determined in the disciplinary enquiry proceedings, as arrears of land revenue. Girja Dayal Srivastava filed Writ Petition No. 2620 of 1985 for quashing the recovery proceedings on the ground that the amount could not be recovered as arrears of land revenue. 8. In respect of the impugned dismissal order, subject matter of Writ Petition No. 3223 of 1982, it was contended on behalf of the State that the despatch of the dismissal order by registered post on 7-7-1972 to Girja Dayal Srivastava constitutes communication there of the latter, and that in the ordinary course of post, it should also be deemed to have been served upon Girja Dayal Srivastava within 2 or 3 days before he retired on 13-7-1972. However, as a fact, the dismissal order was served upon Girja Dayal Srivastava on 11-7-1972, while he had already retired on 13-7-1972. The contention on behalf of Girja Dayal Srivastava is that it is the date of actual service of the dismissal order which will make it effective as held in the case of State of Punjab v. Amur Singli Harika (Civil Appeal No. 938 of 1984 decided on 6-1-1966) reported at page 329, Supreme Court Services Laws Judgments 1935 - 1973, and that a mere passing of the order of dismissal would not be effective unless the same has been published and communicated to the officer concerned. 9. 9. It may be mentioned that the Civil Services (Classification Control & Appeal) Rules, 1930, as applicable in U.P., do not contain any provision about the manner in which an order of dismissal from service, under rule 49 of the Rules, may be s erved upon a Government servant. The Central Civil Services (Classification & Appeal) Rules, 1965 contains Rule 30 which says that every order, notice and other process made or issued under these rules shall be served in person on the Government servant concerned or communicated to him by registered post Similar provision is found under rule 27 of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969. The noticeable feature is that the rules, as applicable to the Central Government employees or to the employees of the All India Services, contemplate two ways of service of orders : (1) either by service in person, or (2) communication by registered post. 10. Prima facie, therefore, communicated by registered post is not required to be accomplished by service in person. These rules, it goes without saying, do not apply directly to the employees of U.P. State, but the principle of service of orders on employees of the Government as set out in these rules, can fairly be adopted as a principle of fairness and justice. This distinction is also discernible from the decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject where there is no specific rule about the manner of service of order, as in the present case 11. In the case of State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika, (1966 SC 1313) (supra) the dismissal order was passed on 3-6-1949, but was not issued to the Government servant at all. It was communicated later on 2/3-1-1953 and was received by the Government servant, but in the meantime the Government servant had come to know about it on 28 - 5 1951 On these facts, the Supreme Court held that a mere passing of the order of dismissal would not be effective unless it - is published or communicated to the Government servant or unless the Government servant knows about it and it is otherwise communicated to all the parties concerned. It was held that there was no communication to the Government servant before 2/3-1-1953, but since the Government servant came to know about on 28-5-1951, it was held to be effective with effect from 28-5-1951. 12. It was held that there was no communication to the Government servant before 2/3-1-1953, but since the Government servant came to know about on 28-5-1951, it was held to be effective with effect from 28-5-1951. 12. Amar Sing Harika's case (supra) as well as other earlier decisions of the Supreme Court figured again in the case of State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram, (1970 SC 214) where it was held in paragraph 16 that the ordinary meaning of the word communication is to impart, confer, or transmit information. In that case the Government servant was intimated by means of a telegram dated 31-7-1958 that he was suspended with effect from 2-8-1958, but the telegram was received by him after 4-8-1958, which was the due date of his retirement. It was held that even though the Government servant actually received the telegram after his retirement, it could not be said that the information of his having been suspended with effect from 2-8-1958 had not been imparted or transmitted to him on 31-7-1958. The Supreme Court observed that in all the decisions cited before the Court it was the communication of the impugned order which was held to be essential and not its actual receipt by the officer concerned. 13. The matter again figured before the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh & others, (1972 SC 629). In that case the operation of certain reversion/termination orders passed on 28-10-1966 were under consideration. The authority which passed the orders had forwarded the copies thereof to the Accountant General, the Chief Engineer and the Government servant on 29-10-1966 which were further despatched from the office of the Chief Engineer on 30-10-1966 to the Government servant who had actually received them on 1-11-1966. The Supreme Court held that it could not be said that the orders had been communicated only on or after 1-11-1966 when they were actually received by the Government servant and that these orders were communicated either on 29-10-1966 or surely on 30-10-1966. In taking that view, the Supreme Court adopted the decision of the Four Judges Bench in the case of State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram (supra) and it was held that the orders became effective as soon as they were sent out. 14. In taking that view, the Supreme Court adopted the decision of the Four Judges Bench in the case of State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram (supra) and it was held that the orders became effective as soon as they were sent out. 14. It is also noticeable that Girja Dayal Srivastava was under suspension not only during the disciplinary proceedings but also on the date when the order of his dismissal was passed and despatched by registered post. It is not disputed that the addresses on the letters despatched were correct; indeed, the letter by registered post was delivered to Girja Dayal Srivastava on 14-7-1972. In this situation, it could ultimately be expected that the order of dismissal would be served upon him at any rate, the issue of the orders for the purposes of communication makes it effective from the date of issue as held by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above. The result is that the order of dismissal had become effective on 7-7-1972. Girja Dayal Srivastava, therefore, was not entitled to the arrears of salary and the view of the Services Tribunal to the contrary is incorrect. 15. Writ Petition No. 3223 of 1982 should succeed. 16. In Writ Petition No. 2620 of 1985 the petitioner Girja Dayal Srivastava has prayed for quashing the proceedings for recovery of Rs. 1,54,132.66 as arrears of land revenue and for quashing the citation certificate therefor. The ground taken is that he was not afforded an opportunity to meet the alleged claim for agricultural dues which were not recoverable after the judgment dated 3-2-1982 of the U.P. Public Services Tribunal. It is contended that the amount is not recoverable as the amount of land revenue at all. On behalf of the State the right to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue is sought to be supported by the provisions of the Public Accountants Default Act, 1850. 17. It is contended that the amount is not recoverable as the amount of land revenue at all. On behalf of the State the right to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue is sought to be supported by the provisions of the Public Accountants Default Act, 1850. 17. Section 3 of the Public Accountants Default Act, 1850 defines the expression "Public Accountant" as follows :- "For the purposes of Sections 1 and 2 of this Act, the expression "public accountant" means any person who as Official Assignee or Trustee, or as sarbarahkar is entrusted with the receipt, custody or control of any moneys or securities, for moneys or the management of any lands belonging to any other person or persons, and for the purposes of Sections 4 and 5 of this Act the expression shall also include any person who, by reason of any office held by him in the service of the Central Government or the Government of a State, is entrusted with the receipt, custody of control of any moneys or securities for money, or the management of any lands belonging to such Government." Section 4 of the Act says that the head of the office of the public accountant may proceed against such public accountant for any loss or defalcation in his accounts, as if the amount thereof were an arrear of land revenue due to Government. Section 5 of the Act says that all Regulations and Acts then or thereafter to be enforced for recovery of land revenue to the Government shall apply to the proceedings against such public accountant. 18. It is clear, therefore that if the petitioner Girja Dayal Srivastava was a public accountant and the amount, sought to be recovered, was found due from him in departmental proceedings for loss caused to the Government, it would be recoverable from him as arrears of land revenue. The principle question is whether the petitioner was a public accountant within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act. 19. The section speaks on an official assignee, trustee or sarbarahkar and any person who by reason of any office held by him in the service of the Central Government or the Government of State, is entrusted with receipt, custody or control of any moneys or securities for money or the management of any lands belonging to such Government. 19. The section speaks on an official assignee, trustee or sarbarahkar and any person who by reason of any office held by him in the service of the Central Government or the Government of State, is entrusted with receipt, custody or control of any moneys or securities for money or the management of any lands belonging to such Government. The petitioner did not belong to the first three classes ; the question is does he belong to the fourth class In order to place him in that class, it shall have to be found that he is a person, who by reason of the office held by him, was entrusted with the receipt, custody or control of any moneys or securities for money or the management of any lands belonging to such Government. The nature of the functions of the petitioner, by virtue of his office, would appear from the charges framed against him in the disciplinary enquiry proceedings and the post which he held It would appear from the judgment of the Public Services Tribunal that the petitioner was an Assistant Agriculture Inspector in Grade III and had been charged on five counts (1) credit sale against rules, (2) shortage of stock, (3) misappropriation of Government stock, (4) flouting of departmental instructions, and (5) dereliction of duty. There is nothing on the record to show that as an Assistant Agriculture Inspector, Grade III, he was entrusted with receipt, custody, or control of any moneys or securities for money ; of course, he was not concerned with management of any lands belonging to the State Government. None of the five heads of charges against the petitioner relate to "any moneys or securities for money" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act. Credit sales, prima facie, could not imply receipt of money no money could have passed in a credit sale. Shortage and misappropriation of Govesnment stocks is not the same thing as shortage or misappropriation of money or securities for money. Learned counsel for the parties have not invited our attention to any ruling on the subject. A decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Kundan Lal v. The Collector, Gurdaspur, (1969 Lab IC 294) has come to our notice. Learned counsel for the parties have not invited our attention to any ruling on the subject. A decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Kundan Lal v. The Collector, Gurdaspur, (1969 Lab IC 294) has come to our notice. The petitioner there was a Wasil Bagi Nawis and it had been conceded by the State Government that the duties of the office of the petitioner did not include the duty of receiving or handling any money. A contention was raised before the Court that if, nevertheless, the petitioner had, contrary to the requirements of the duties of his office, actually received money and embezzled it, he should be deemed to have been a public accountant within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act. The Court repelled the contention and it was observed that the scheme of the Act showed that its provisions were intended to apply to only Government servants who were expected to come into possession or control of money by reason of their office. It is clear to us from the material on record that the petitioner could not be said to have been entrusted with the receipt, custody, or control of any moneys or securities for money within the meaning of Section 3 of the Public Accountants Default Act, 1850. We, therefore, hold that the amount could not be realised from the petitioner as the arrears of land revenue. 20. The ordinary procedure for imposition of pecuniary liability and for recovery thereof is the process of the civil court ; the process of recovery as arrears of land revenue is an exception to the ordinary process. The right of recovery as arrears of land revenue must be shown to be permitted by a statutory provision including statutory rules. In respect of Government servants, the loss caused to the Government may be recovered from their salary under Rule 49 of the Civil Services (Classification Control & Appeal) Rules, 1930, as applicable in U.P. ; it may also be recovered from their pensions under Rule 351-A or 470 of the Civil Services (Classification Control & Appeal) Rules, 1930 as applicable in U.P. Learned counsel for the State had not been able to show that there is any other Act, Rules or Statutory provision under which the amount in question would be recovered as arrears of land revenue. Writ Petition No. 2620 of 1985, therefore, should also succeed. 21. Writ Petition No. 3225 of 1982 is allowed and the judgment and order dated 1-3-1982 of the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition, is set aside, and the claim of opposite party No. 1 Girja Dayal Srivastava for the sum of Rs. 8,140.93, before the said Tribunal, is dismissed. 22. Writ Petition No 2620 of 1985 is allowed and the proceedings for recovery of Rs. 1,54,132.65 as appears of land revenue from petitioner Girja Dayal Srivastava are quashed; it will, however, be open to the concerned opposite parties to pursue such other remedy, in receipt of that amount, as may be available under the law. 23. Parties shall bear their costs of both the writ petitions.