Judgment :- 1. The unsuccessful landlord before the appellate authority is the revision petitioner herein. 2. The petitioner is the owner of the building bearing door No. 109, Pattamangala Street, Mayiladuthurai, and the said building was leased to the respondent on a monthly rent of Rs. 700 for running a textile business. After the expiry of the lease in his favour and after giving due notice to quit and terminating his tenancy, the petitioner filed R.C.O.P.23 of 1981 on the file of the Rent Controller (District Munsif) Mayiladuthurai, for eviction of the respondent on the ground of wilful default in the payment of rents and on the ground of personal occupation. According to the petitioner, the respondent committed default in the payment of rents from January, 1981 to March 1981. According to him, he is not possessed of any other building in the town and that the petition building is required for his son Mohamed to start his cloth business. 3. The respondent resisted the eviction petition contending that the requirement is not bona fide , that the petitioners son was already carrying on business in several places and that the petitioner is possessed of other buildings at Mayiladuthurai, and he is not carrying on any business. Since the respondent was not willing to pay the enhanced rent as demanded by the petitioner, the present petition for eviction has been filed. According to him, the petition has been filed only in respect of the ground floor and that he has taken the entire building including the upstairs on lease agreeing to pay a rent of Rs. 650 per month and he has been carrying on cloth business in the ground floor and running a lodge upstairs. The rent was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 700 per month and later on to Rs. 1,500 for the entire building. After the lease period was over, the petitioner demanded Rs. 2,500 per month as rent for which the respondent was not agreeable. He has not committed any wilful default in the payment of rent. 4. The learned Rent Controller, on a consideration of the entire evidence, held that the claim on wilful default and personal occupation has been proved and therefore, he ordered eviction. As against the said order, the respondent herein filed an appeal in R.C.A.3 of 1983 before the appellate authority (Subordinate Judge), Mayiladuthurai. 4. The learned Rent Controller, on a consideration of the entire evidence, held that the claim on wilful default and personal occupation has been proved and therefore, he ordered eviction. As against the said order, the respondent herein filed an appeal in R.C.A.3 of 1983 before the appellate authority (Subordinate Judge), Mayiladuthurai. The appellate authority held that there was no wilful default in the payment of rents. On the question of requirement for personal occupation, it was held that in view of the earlier petitions filed by the petitioner in R.C.O.P.15 of 1974 and 2 of 1975, the present petition for eviction is barred by the principles of res judicata. Aggrieved against this decision, the landlord has filed this revision petition before this Court. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not seriously challenged the finding on the question of wilful default in the payment of rents. From the materials placed before the authorities below, it is seen that there are no sufficient grounds to come to the conclusion that the respondent has committed wilful default, and, therefore, the finding of the appellate authority on this question does not call for any interference in this revision petition. However, he would vehemently contend that in so far as the petitioners requirement for personal occupation is concerned, the appellate authority erred in deciding itself sua motu the question of res judicata on the ground that the petitioner had filed petitions previously and the same were dismissed. He contends that the plea of res judicata was not raised in the pleadings before the Rent Controller and no point was taken up for determination on that ground. The said plea was also not raised in the grounds of appeal filed by the tenant before the appellate authority. He also drew my attention to the fact that the records relating to the previous proceedings have not been marked in this case. Therefore, according to him the appellate authority was not justified in reversing the finding of the learned Rent Controller in so far as this ground is concerned. 6. He also drew my attention to the fact that the records relating to the previous proceedings have not been marked in this case. Therefore, according to him the appellate authority was not justified in reversing the finding of the learned Rent Controller in so far as this ground is concerned. 6. It is seen from the order of the learned Rent Controller that though certain vague allegations have been made by the tenant stating that the petitioner herein had filed R.C.O.P.15 of 1974 and 2 of 1975 and the same were dismissed, no particulars have been given in the grounds on which the said petitions were filed and the reasons for the dismissal of the same. In answer to the said contentions, learned counsel for the respondent states that the tenant mentioned about the earlier eviction petitions in R.C.O.P.15 of 1974 and 2 of 1975 for the purpose of showing that the landlord is in the habit of filing some such petitions in order to get enhanced rent. He further contends that the lease deed Ex. A-1 was executed by the respondent on behalf of New Colombo Stores as its mandate holder, and, therefore all the partners of the New Colombo stores ought to have been added as parties. According to him, an eviction petition under the Act against the firm alone is not maintainable. 7. As stated earlier, the appellate authority has disposed of the matter solely on the ground of res judicata. In this context, it is relevant to note that the tenant-respondent has not raised the plea of res judicata either in his counter statement before the learned Rent Controller or in the grounds of appeal before the appellate authority. Even though a reference has been made to the said prior two applications no details have been furnished regarding the grounds on which those petitions were filed. Even according to the counter statement, R.C.O.P.2 of 1975 was filed only on the ground of wilful deault. In so far as R.C.O.P. 15 of 1974 is concerned, he has not chosen to file the copies of the earlier proceedings in order to establish that the present eviction petition is based on the same grounds as in R.C.O.P.15 of 1974. There is no acceptable materials to prove that identical grounds are raised in the present petition. In so far as R.C.O.P. 15 of 1974 is concerned, he has not chosen to file the copies of the earlier proceedings in order to establish that the present eviction petition is based on the same grounds as in R.C.O.P.15 of 1974. There is no acceptable materials to prove that identical grounds are raised in the present petition. In any event, without exhibiting the petition and orders in the earlier proceedings, it is not possible to come to a conclusion that the same identical questions are being raised now. However, this point was not taken earlier before the learned Rent Controller or before the appellate authority. There is absolutely no material on which this Court can come to a conclusion that the present petition is hit by S.19 of the Rent Control Act. It is no doubt true that in Yamuna Bai v. Rangasami 1, this Court has held that if any order has been passed under S.114 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act between the same parties then the same issue which had been finally decided cannot be raised again in a later instituted action on the ground that circumstances had allegedly changed. However the said principle cannot come to the rescue of the tenant in this case, because of his failure to raise appropriate pleas invoking the provisions of S.19 of the Act and to place sufficient materials before the Court to enable it to decide the issue. In view of such failure, neither the order of the learned Rent Controller nor the order of the appellate authority contained sufficient materials to enable this Court to invoke the provisions of S.19 of the Act. On the peculiar facts of this case, I am unable to support the view of the appellate authority that the present eviction petition is barred by res judicata. The appellate authority has not chosen to consider the bona fides of the landlord on merits excepting a passing reference to the same. 8. Regarding the objections raised by the respondent on the ground that all the partners of New Colombo Stores were not impleaded in the petition, it is relevant to note the definition of ‘tenant’ in the Act which says as follows— “ ? 8. Regarding the objections raised by the respondent on the ground that all the partners of New Colombo Stores were not impleaded in the petition, it is relevant to note the definition of ‘tenant’ in the Act which says as follows— “ ? 145Tenant’ means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son, or daughter, or the legal representative of a deceased tenant who- (i) in the case of a residential building had been living with the tenant in the building as a member of the tenants family upto the death of the tenant; and (ii) in the case of a non-residential building, had been in continuous association with the tenant for the purpose of carrying on the business of the tenant upto the death of the tenant and continues to carry on such business thereafter, and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but doss not include a person placed in occupation of a building by its tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter-house or of rents for shops has been farmed out or leased by a municipal council or a panchayat union council or the municipal Corporation of Madras or the Municipal Corporation of Madurai.” As per the said definition, any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building is a tenant. In this case, the respondent has entered into the lease agreement as a mandate holder of New Colombo Stores, and as such he is liable to pay rent to the landlord. Moreover, in this case, no such objection was taken by the tenant either before the learned Rent Controller or the appellate authority. It is too late in the day to raise such a technical objection since there are no materials on which such an objection can be decided. On this ground alone, the said contention of the learned counsel for the respondent should fail. 9. If the findings of the appellate authority are considered in the background of the above discussion, I find that it is difficult to support the findings. The decision arrived at by the appellate authority on the question of res judicata is not supported by evidence. 9. If the findings of the appellate authority are considered in the background of the above discussion, I find that it is difficult to support the findings. The decision arrived at by the appellate authority on the question of res judicata is not supported by evidence. Even though certain vague questions appeared to have been put to the landlord in cross-examination, it is not sufficient to bring home the basis requirements of S.19 of the Act. The tenant has not been diligent in defending the action and he should blame himself for the same. Hence this revision petition is allowed. The order of the appellate authority is set aside and the order of the learned Rent Controller is restored. Consequently, the petition for eviction is allowed. However, the respondent is given six months time from this date to vacate the petition building and put the petitioner-landlord in possession of the same. The petitioner has no objection for granting the said time. No costs.