JUDGMENT 1. BY order No. 22, dated 21st september 1981, the learned Third Industrial tribunal, West Bengal, rejected the application under S. 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), as filed in Case No. 26 of 1980, and thus the prayer of Kesoram Industries and cotton Mills, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the said company), for approval of an action in dismissing S. K. Samser Ali (hereinafter referred to as the said employee petitioner) was rejected. 2. AGAINST such determinations, this Court was moved in Civil Rule No. 439 (W) of 1982 and by an order, dated 6th May 1985, Sri S. C. Sen. J., was pleased to discharge the said Rule, on consideration of the relevant submissions as were made before him. Against such determinations the appeal in which the present application has been filed was presented on 16th August 1985 and in that appeal the said company filed an application, dated 9th January 1986 and by an order, dated 6th April 1987, a sum of Rs. 37,611 as agreed to be available to the said employee-petitioner by the said company, was directed to be deposited. The amount as mentioned hereinbefore was calculated on the basis of the statements as made by the learned advocate appearing for the said company. Admittedly, such amount has been deposited. 3. BEFORE the passing of the said order, dated 6th April 1987, the said employee-petitioner had filed the present application under S. 17 B of the said Act, which Section was inserted by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (46 of 1982), and which is to the following effect: "17b. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceedings in higher Courts. BEFORE the passing of the said order, dated 6th April 1987, the said employee-petitioner had filed the present application under S. 17 B of the said Act, which Section was inserted by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (46 of 1982), and which is to the following effect: "17b. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceedings in higher Courts. Where in any case, a Labour Court, tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such Court: provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the supreme Court that such workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any such period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this Section for such period or part, as the case may be" 4. THE said amendment was published in the issue of Gazette of India (Extraordinary), part II, Sec. 1, dated 1st September 1982. In fact, the Section in question has made new provisions for payment of full wages to a workman during the pendency of proceedings in higher Courts. It was claimed by the said employee-petitioner that since March 1962, he was employed with the said company in their factory at Nayasarai in the District of Hooghly, west Bengal. He has stated that in 1964, he was promoted to the position of operator and since then till the year 1980 he worked under and served the said company in that capacity. It has further been stated that in or about 1980. the said employee-petitioner was wrongfully and illegally charge-sheeted on an act, alleged theft of an aluminium tumbler of the canteen, and a domestic enquiry was held in respect of the said charge wherein he was found to be guilty. 5. It has further been stated that in or about 1980. the said employee-petitioner was wrongfully and illegally charge-sheeted on an act, alleged theft of an aluminium tumbler of the canteen, and a domestic enquiry was held in respect of the said charge wherein he was found to be guilty. 5. AS at this point of time an industrial dispute in respect of certain claims of the workmen of the said company was pending in terms of an order of reference under S. 10 of the said Act being number 3352 IR, dated 1st July 1978, before the respondent Tribunal as mentioned hereinbefore, the said company made an application under S. 33 of the said Act, for necessary approval of their decision to dismiss him from his employment, as he was found guilty of the concerned charge. It has further been claimed that under S. 33 of the said act, the said employee-petitioner was not liable to be dismissed from the employment till the approval of the action as taken, was granted and accordingly, his services had been continuing. It has also been stated by the said employee-petitioner that on or about 9th June 1980, the said company, simultaneously with the issue of the purported order of dismissal, filed an application under S. 33 (2) (b) of the said Act before the Tribunal concerned, for approval of the action as taken. It was the further case of the said employee-petitioner that he duly appeared in that proceedings and contested the same on filing his written statement and ultimately the learned Tribunal by its order, dated 21st August 1981, held that the domestic enquiry as held in the instant case, was fair and proper. 6. FROM such determinations, the said employee-petitioner moved this Court and obtained Civil Rule No. 1034 (W) of 1982, for setting aside and quashing or expunging those findings. It has further been stated by the said employee-petitioner that the concerned application under S. 33 (2) (b) of the said Act, as filed by the said company, was dismissed by the respondent-Tribunal by its Order No. 22, dated 21st September 1981 and consequently, no approval was granted to the concerned order for dismissing him and according to him, till the approval under S. 33 (2) (b) of the said act, the order of his dismissal remained ineffective. He has stated that in any event, by reason of the order of dismissal of the proceedings under S. 33 (2) (b) of the said Act, his services with the said company had revived. The said employee-petitioner has further given the particulars of the proceedings in c. R. No. 439 (W) of 1982 and the Order was ultimately passed therein by Sri Suhas chandra Sen, J., and he has also indicated that along with the said C. R. No. 439 (W) of 1982, which incidentally was a proceeding by or at the instance of the said company, his C. R. No. 8034 (W) of 1982, was heard. He has also indicated that from the determinations as have been made in the proceedings bearing C. R. No. 8034 (W) of 1982, he has preferred an appeal to this Court and the same is still pending. In fact, by his order, the learned judge of the Court below has dismissed C. R. No. 439 (W) of 1982, and has also discharged the Rule and in view of such order as passed, was also pleased to pass no order in C. R. No. 8034 (W) of 1982. 7. IT has been stated by the said employee-petitioner that by S. 11 of the Industrial disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982, the new S. 17b as indicated hereinbefore, was inserted in the said Act and he has further asserted that since no approval as required under S. 33 of the said Act, has been accorded or granted to the said company, in respect of their purported decision to discharge him from employment, his services have been continuing and should be deemed to be continuing since 9th June 1980 i. e., when his services had been purportedly sought to be terminated by the said company, subject to approval under S. 33 of the said Act. 8. 8. IN the circumstances as mentioned above, the said employee-petitioner has claimed that he would thus be entitled to receive his salaries from the said company from 9th June 1980, till the disposal of the concerned appeal and the effect of the order, dated 21st September 1981 as passed in the proceedings under S. 33 (2) (b) of the said Act, or the dismissal thereof, would be that his services were restored and he was reinstated in the employment of the said company and accordingly, under S. 17b of the said Act, as mentioned hereinbefore, he would be entitled to receive his up-to-date full wages at the rate at which he drew his salaries last and such payments should also include all allowable allowances under the rules framed from time to time or as introduced by the said company. He has also categorically stated that from 21st september 1981, and more particularly after his purported dismissal from his employment, he has not been able to procure any employment and in any event, he has not been employed in any establishment since that date. He has further stated that apart from a sum of rs. 1,000 which was paid under orders of P. C. Barooch, J., (as His Lordship then was) till date, the said company has not paid him any remuneration, wages or allowances whatsoever and immediately after the order, dated 21st September 1981 he approached the said company, for allowing him to resume his work, which was refused. The said employee-petitioner has further stated that he also addressed letters to the Assistant Labour commissioner, Government of West Bengal, about the concerned refusal by the said company to allow him to join his work and requested him to intervene in the matter so that he would be reinstated in his services and paid all back-wages in accordance with law. The said employee-petitioner has further stated that after the concerned order, dated 5th May 1985, and because of the refusal of the said company to allow him to resume his work and to get his payment in the manner as mentioned hereinbefore, he applied before the second Labour Court, West Bengal, under S. 33 C (2) of the said Act, for appropriate reliefs. He has stated that on the plea that an appeal has been preferred by them, wherein an application for stay has also been filed, the said company obtained adjournments of the hearing of the said application under S. 33c (2)of the said Act. It has been stated by the said employee-petitioner that under or in terms of S. 17b of the said Act, he was entitled and still is entitled to receive full remuneration due and payable to him since 9th June 1980 inclusive of all allowances. He has further stated to be a poor man with a family of 9 members to be looked after by him and has also stated that for non-receipt of his due wages, which according to him would be Rs. 59,200 on account of salary for 72 months at Rs. 850 per month and Rs. 14,000 on account of admissible allowances at rs. 200 per month for the said 72 months, he has suffered and is suffering. Thus the total amount of his claim on the basis of the above calculation would be Rs. 73,600. He has further stated that the said company is interested in delaying the proceedings in this court or before any superior Court as they know that because of his poverty, \ the said employee-petitioner would not be in a position to oppose their application or proceedings, if any taken. It has also been stated by the said employee-petitioner that to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated or frustrated, the said company should be directed to perform their obligation under S. 17b of the said Act, and to act in accordance with law by paying to him all remunerations due and payable since 9th June 1980 and in terms of the calculations as indicated hereinbefore. 9. IN the circumstances as above, the said employee-petitioner claimed for a mandate on the said company to pay atleast all arrears of remunerations as mentioned hereinbefore within 48 hours or within such time as this court may deem fit and proper and he has further stated that his monthly remuneration of Rs. 850 is an admitted fact. 10. 9. IN the circumstances as above, the said employee-petitioner claimed for a mandate on the said company to pay atleast all arrears of remunerations as mentioned hereinbefore within 48 hours or within such time as this court may deem fit and proper and he has further stated that his monthly remuneration of Rs. 850 is an admitted fact. 10. SRI Gupta, appearing in support of the application, after indicating the circumstances upto the orders as made by the concerned tribunal claimed that even though we made our orders on 6th April 1987, and thereby secured to some extent, the payments to be received by the said employee-petitioner, while dealing with the said company's application, dated 9th January 1986, we should make an order whereby the said company should be directed to pay to the said employee-petitioner, the balance of Rs. 73,600 in addition to the amount which is lying with the learned Registrar, Appellate Side and the learned Registrar Appellate Side should also be directed to pay to the said employee-petitioner, the amount which he is holding under our order as mentioned above. In support of his submissions and more particularly while on the effect of S. 17b of the said Act and the retrospectivity of the same, sri Gupta referred to the case of Bharat Singh v. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi, and others (1986-II-LLJ-217) where it has been indicated that S. 17b only codified the rights of the workmen to get their wages which they could not get in time because of the long drawn out process caused by the methods employed by the management. Even before S. 17b was introduced there was no bar for Courts for awarding wages. Of course the workmen had no right to claim it. This Section recognises such a right and gives a mandate to the Courts to award wages if the conditions in the Section are satisfied. There are no words in the Section to compel the Court to hold that it cannot operate retrospectively. In such a situation court should give a purposive interpretation to the Section. This Section recognises such a right and gives a mandate to the Courts to award wages if the conditions in the Section are satisfied. There are no words in the Section to compel the Court to hold that it cannot operate retrospectively. In such a situation court should give a purposive interpretation to the Section. Since the Section was intended to benefit the workmen in certain cases, it would be doing injustice to the Section if it is held to be inapplicable to awards passed prior to coming into force of the Section and such determination has been stated to have been rigid on application of the decision in Ruston and hornsby wherein the Court gave a retrospective construction to S. 2a of the Act even though that is a definition Section. This should also be noted that the decisions in Workmen of firestone Tyre and Rubber Company of India (Private), Ltd. and others v. Firestone Tyre and rubber Company of India, (Private), Ltd. and others (1973-I-LLJ-278) and Gujarat Mineral development Corporation v. P. H. Brahmbhatt (1974-I-LLJ-97) have been distinguished. Sri Ginwalla, appearing for the said company and opposing the application, on a reference to the language of S. 17b of the said act, wanted to establish that the said Section has application only in respect of reinstatements arising out of awards and not in a case where order has been passed under S. 33 (2) (b) of the said Act, which order according to him is not an award. In support of such submissions, he referred to the case of Straw board Manufacturing Company Ltd. etc v. Gobind (1962-I-LLJ-420. The said determination has laid down that S. 33 (2) (b) of the industrial Disputes Act, which exactly corresponds to S. 6e (2) (b) of the Uttar pradesh Act, contemplates that the employer may pass an order of dismissal/discharge before obtaining the approval of the action taken by him of the authority concerned. The changes effected in S. 33 of the Act in 1956 clearly bring out this intention of the legislature. If on subsequent application, the tribunal does not approve of the action taken by the employer, the result would be that the action taken by him would fall and thereupon the workman would be deemed never to have been dismissed or discharged and would remain in the service of the employer. If on subsequent application, the tribunal does not approve of the action taken by the employer, the result would be that the action taken by him would fall and thereupon the workman would be deemed never to have been dismissed or discharged and would remain in the service of the employer. In such a case, no specific provision as to reinstatement is necessary and by the very fact of the Tribunal not approving the action of the employer, the dismissal or discharge of the workman would be of no effect and the workman concerned would continue to be in service as if there never was any dismissal or discharge by the employer. In that sense the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer does not become final and conclusive until it is approved by the tribunal under S. 33 (2) and the proviso to S. 33 (2) (b) contemplates the three things mentioned therein, namely, (i) dismissal or discharge, (ii) payment of wages and (iii) making of an application for approval to be simultaneous and to be part of the same transaction, so that the employer when he takes the action under S. 33 (2) by dismissing or discharging an employee, should immediately pay him or offer to pay him wages for one month and also make an application to the Tribunal for approval at the same time. The employer's conduct should show that the three things contemplated under the proviso are parts of the same transaction. If that is done, there will be no occasion to fear that the employee's right under S. 33a would be affected. The question whether the application was made as part of the same transaction or at the same time when the action was taken would be a question of fact and will depend upon the circumstances of each case. 11. IN fact, it was also submitted by Sri ginwalla that since there was no industrial dispute in the instant case an order as made, should not have the effect of a charge, so S. 17b of the said Act would not apply. To have his submissions supplemented Sri Ginwalla also referred to the case of Bharat Singh v. New delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi and others (supra), and has claimed that in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Para 11 at pp. To have his submissions supplemented Sri Ginwalla also referred to the case of Bharat Singh v. New delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi and others (supra), and has claimed that in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Para 11 at pp. 220-221 of the report (1986-II-LLJ-217) which is to the following effect: "in interpretation of statutes, Courts have steered clear of the rigid stand of looking into the words of the Section alone but have attempted to make the object of the enactment effective and to render its benefits to the person in whose favour it is made. The legislators are entrusted with the task of only making laws. Interpretation has to come from the Courts. Section 17b on its terms does not say that it would bind awards passed before the date when it came into force. The respondent's contention is that a Section which imposes an obligation for the first time, cannot be made retrospective. Such Sections should always be considered prospective. In our view, if this submission is accepted we will be defeating the very purpose for which this Section has been enacted. It is here that the Court has to evolve the concept of purposive interpretation which has found acceptance whenever a progressive social beneficial legislation is under review. We share the view that where the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, effect must be given to them. Plain words have to be accepted as such but where the intention of the Legislature is not clear from the words or where two constructions are possible, it is the Court's duty to discern the intention in the context of the background in which a particular Section is enacted. Once such an intention is ascertained the Courts have necessarily to give the statute a purposeful or a functional interpretation. Now, it is trite to say that Acts aimed at social amelioration giving benefits for the have-nots should receive liberal construction. It is always the duty of the Court to give such a construction to a statute as would promote the purpose or object of the Act. A construction that promotes the purpose of the legislation should be preferred to a literal construction. A construction which would defeat the rights of the have-nots and the underdog and which would lead to injustice should always be avoided. A construction that promotes the purpose of the legislation should be preferred to a literal construction. A construction which would defeat the rights of the have-nots and the underdog and which would lead to injustice should always be avoided. This section was intended to benefit the workmen in certain cases. It would be doing in justice to the Section if we were to say that it would not apply to awards passed a day or two before it came into force and when the order for payment that has been asked for on rigid interpretation of the provisions of the said S. 17b of the said Act, such prayer should not be allowed. " 12. SRI Ginwalla, on a reference to S. 33 of the said Act, pointed out that under the same conditions of service of an employee or his terms of employment should remain unchanged under certain circumstances during the pendency of the proceedings. It was his contention that the said Section indicates the various prerogatives of the management in respect of the employee concerned in connection with pending disputes and the same really introduces fundamental change in the law of master and servant and further recognises circumstances when occasion may arise, authorising the employer to justify their action in discharging or punishing by dismissal an employee and thus, the Section allows the employer to take such action, subject to the conditions as expressed in the Section itself. According to him, S. 33 has three parts and in no circumstances, any order made in favour of an employee under any of those parts, would not be an award and as such, as indicated hereinbefore, an application of the present nature would not be maintainable. Hearing the learned advocates on the point as indicated hereinbefore and considering them with the definition of an "award" as in S. 2 (b) of the said Act and the definition of "industrial dispute" as in S. 2 (k)of the same, we feel it difficult to hold in favour of the submissions of Sri Ginwalla. Hearing the learned advocates on the point as indicated hereinbefore and considering them with the definition of an "award" as in S. 2 (b) of the said Act and the definition of "industrial dispute" as in S. 2 (k)of the same, we feel it difficult to hold in favour of the submissions of Sri Ginwalla. We are of the view that an order made under S. 33 (2) (b)of the said Act can be enforced in an application under S. 17b of the said Act and thus it is also very difficult to hold in agreement with the submissions of Sri Ginwalla, that on the basis of the language of S. 17b, the same has application only in respect of reinstatement arising out of awards and not in a case where order has been passed under S. 33 (2) (b)of the said Act. In fact, we are also of the view that the determinations in Straw Board manufacturing Company, Ltd. etc. v. Gobind (supra), on which Sri Ginwalla placed great reliance, will not really help him, but the observations as made therein will really go against his contentions. 13. SECTION 17b as incorporated, certainly is a piece of social welfare and beneficial legislation, enacted with a view to do away with the hardship cast to the employees who are deprived from the benefits of the order of reinstatement as made in their favour and more particularly when orders are passed staying the operation of such order of reinstatement by the High Court and the supreme Court. The said Section cast an obligation on the employer to pay to the employee concerned on his reinstatement, full back-wages on the basis of his last pay drawn, including any admissible allowance for maintenance under any rules. An application under S. 17b will not certainly be maintainable or an employee would be entitled to the benefits of the same if, during the pendency of the proceedings in a High Court or the supreme Court, he has been employed in any establishment or elsewhere. The Section thus requires a specific affidavit from the workman concerned to the effect that he was not employed in any establishment during the period of continuance of the proceedings before the High Court or the Supreme Court. The Section thus requires a specific affidavit from the workman concerned to the effect that he was not employed in any establishment during the period of continuance of the proceedings before the High Court or the Supreme Court. Here in this case, there has been such a statement made by the said employee-petitioner and such statement has not been appropriately dealt with or contradicted by the said company. Thus on the basis of the averments as available and on our findings as above, it can be observed that the application by the said employee-petitioner is maintainable and he will be entitled to the orders as asked for and as a consequence thereof, the said company should pay him a sum of Rs. 73,600 as indicated hereinbefore after deducting the sum of Rs. 37,611 which they have already deposited with the learned registrar, Appellate Side. The balance of the amount as indicated hereinbefore should be deposited within three weeks after the reopening of the Court after summer holidays and on such deposit being made, we request the learned Registrar, Appellate Side, to handover or pay to the said employee-petitioner, a sum of Rs. 20,000 out of the amount which would be so deposited or which has been deposited earlier, without asking for any security, 14. AS indicated earlier, we feel that in appropriate cases, where the proceeding is being delayed at the instance of the company, the employer concerned should be directed to pay the whole of the amount but in this case there is no such appropriate evidence excepting that some time was asked for by the said company on the ground that an appeal has been preferred to this Court from an order made by the learned Single Judge and in that appeal an application for stay has been filed, which is pending, where some prayer was made by the employee-petitioner before the authorities concerned for having the order made in his favour effective. If we had enough materials to justify or establish the case that the proceeding was being held up unneccessariiy because of any inaction or non-action of the said company, we would not have hesitated to direct the entire payment to be made available to the employee-petitionr. If we had enough materials to justify or establish the case that the proceeding was being held up unneccessariiy because of any inaction or non-action of the said company, we would not have hesitated to direct the entire payment to be made available to the employee-petitionr. While making the above order, we have also considered that an appeal from an order made by a learned Single Judge to a Division Bench under the rule of this Court is a direct one and the same is to be decided, both on facts and law. When such an appeal has been preferred, we are also of the view that unless satisfactory evidence is available to satisfy the inaction or non-action on the part of a company, such order which we have proposed should be made, so that nobody would suffer any grave or irreparable loss and injury. If such an order as proposed by us now is made, we also feel that the balance of convenience of all will be satisfied as, if the appeal fails, the employee concerned would at once be able to get hold of the entire money on adjustment of the sum which he will be receiving now and if, on the other hand, the appeal succeeds, the said company will be entitled to have back a portion of the balance amount which will be lying with the learned Registrar, Appellate Side, and in any event, we shall not be required to make a final determination at this interlocutory stage. Considering the above facts and circumstances, we direct that the appeal should be heard out and disposed of as expeditiously as possible and as such, we direct that within four weeks after the reopening of the Court after summer holidays, paper-books be it typewritten or cyclostyled, incorporating all relevant and necessary papers, be filed. Filing of index is dispensed with. The service of notice of appeal is waived by the answering respondents. Immediately the paper-books are filed, the appeal will be placed for orders for fixing a date. 15. THE application is thus disposed of with the observations as above. There will be no order as to costs. Filing of index is dispensed with. The service of notice of appeal is waived by the answering respondents. Immediately the paper-books are filed, the appeal will be placed for orders for fixing a date. 15. THE application is thus disposed of with the observations as above. There will be no order as to costs. We further direct that in addition to the earlier directions which we have given, for having the amount as received, to be invested in short-term deposit with any nationalised Bank, the learned Registrar should also have the balance of the money, which will be available to him after the present deposit and after paying of Rs. 20,000 to the employee-petitioner, also deposited in short-term deposit with any Nationalised Bank. 16. IF the conditions as indicated hereinbefore are satisfied there will be stay of the impugned order. We further keep it on record that in default of any of the terms, the stay order will stand vacated.