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1987 DIGILAW 169 (KER)

CHACKO VARGHESE v. KARTHIYANI

1987-04-02

SUKUMARAN

body1987
Judgment :- 1. The revision petition arises out of an interlocutory order passed by the court below. By that order, the court below declined permission to examine the son of the revision petitioner 2nd defendant as a witness in the case. The reason: admittedly he was present in the court throughout, when other witnesses were being examined. Not only that. He was virtually instructing counsel for the 2nd defendant and was following the entirety of the evidence adduced in the case. 2. The suit was for termination of an agreement whereunder some land was given to defendants 1 and 2 for quarrying and for recovery of the property. 3. A statutory provision pointed out as relevant in this connection is S.135 of the Evidence Act. It reads: "Order of production and examination of witnesses: The order in which witnesses are produced and examined shall be regulated by the law and practice for the time being relating to civil and criminal procedure respectively, and, in the absence of any law, by the discretion of the Court." 4. The legal position has been dealt with in Halsbury's 'Law of England', Fourth Edn. Paras 269 and 270. 5. The examination of the case law here and in England would bring out the emphasis given by the Courts on the discretion of the trial court. Some of the Indian decisions on the topic are: (1) Lalmani v. Bejai Ram, AIR 1934 All. 840, (2) A. P. Sarma v. G. C. Veerayya, AIR 1961 AP 420, and (3) Kasi Iyer v. State of Kerala, 1966 KLT 452: AIR 1966 Ker. 316. 6. The Allahabad High Court took an extreme view that the court has no power to exclude a witness, even that witness who bad been present in Court during the examination of other witnesses. (AIR 1934 All. 840 supra). This is in line with an English decision rendered at about that time. Reference may be made to R v. Briggs. (1930, 22 Cr. App. Rep. 68) where it was held that the Court had no right to refuse to bear the evidence of a witness, even when an earlier order of the Court that the witness should be out of Court, had been disobeyed. The Andhra Pradesh High Court, nearly three decades later, considered the law and practice in England and in India (See AIR 1961 AP 420 supra). The Andhra Pradesh High Court, nearly three decades later, considered the law and practice in England and in India (See AIR 1961 AP 420 supra). The discretion of the trial court was pointed out as the prime factor, according to that decision. The inherent power of the Court to order that no witness who is to give evidence should be present when the deposition of other witnesses is being taken until he himself is examined as a witness, has been referred to by this Court in AIR 1966 Kerala 316 supra. The view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court had the approval of this Court in the aforesaid decision I am also in agreement with the approach indicated in the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. The possibility of there being different approaches on this question, had been pointed out by Edmund Davies Q. in Moore v Registrar of Lambeth Country Court, (1969) 1 All. ER 782. But there again the discretion of the Court has been emphasised. The learned judge said: "Whether or not witnesses are to remain in Court being solely a matter for the discretion of the trial judge, judges vary on that as on many other matters. If I may be purely personal for one moment, my own preference... is for witnesses to be out of court." 8. In the present case the learned judge has refused to allow the examination of a witness. Should such an order be interfered with in revision? I am of the view that for more reasons than one, no interference is warranted. 9. The order of the court below does not result in a deflection of the course of justice, having regard to the circumstances. The pleadings in the case, and the relevant issues, do not make out a compulsive case of having the evidence of the 4th witness. The validity of the termination of an agreement does not necessarily depend upon the actual amount, if any, expended in connection with the alleged working out of the terms of the agreement. The termination of the agreement, and the validity of such a termination are essentially dependant upon the terms of the agreement, and the legal provisions applicable to the situation. In relation to such matters, the competent person, the 2nd defendant, himself has already given evidence. The termination of the agreement, and the validity of such a termination are essentially dependant upon the terms of the agreement, and the legal provisions applicable to the situation. In relation to such matters, the competent person, the 2nd defendant, himself has already given evidence. The refusal to examine the 4th witness to prove the management of quarry and the accounts of expenses is, therefore, not unjustified or illegal. 10. Even according to the revision petition, the 2nd defendant-revision petitioner had deposed in the case. There is, therefore, scope for any grievance that the party to the litigation has been prevented from giving evidence. 11. In ground 5 of the Revision Petition, it is stated that the 2nd defendant's son was instructing the Advocate of the petitioner in the conduct of the case. It is further stated: "This is clear from the deposition of the petitioner and it was noted and recorded that Thomas was present in Court when the petitioner was examined." Thomas is none other than the son of the 2nd defendant, who was sought to be examined as the 4th witness on the side of the defendants. 12. It cannot be said that the order of the court below is in any way improper, having regard to the circumstances. The witness sought to be examined is not a party to the suit. In some cases, a conflict regarding two competing interests, namely the entitlement of a party to be present when the cause against him is being tried; and the necessity for a sequestration of a witness to ensure that there is no possible attempt to falsify the testimony of a prospective witness. 13. The power of the court to order ah unexamined witness out of court on the request of either party has been recognised from very early times. The parties can be competent witnesses. Being witnesses, they, like other witnesses, are liable to be excluded from the court during the examination of any other witness. In situations where competing interests arise in the trial of the suit, it is essentially for the trial court to use its discretion. 14. The justification for examining the son of the second defendant is put forward on the ground that he is in management of the business affairs of the 2nd defendant. It is pointed out that he had been mentioned as the 4th witness in the witness schedule. 14. The justification for examining the son of the second defendant is put forward on the ground that he is in management of the business affairs of the 2nd defendant. It is pointed out that he had been mentioned as the 4th witness in the witness schedule. The revision petitioner has stated that the 4th witness is in charge of the accounts and in management of the quarry. If the revision petitioner had the full knowledge of all these facts, he should have taken care not to have been present in Court when other witnesses were giving evidence in the case. That was not done. The Court could not anticipate that a person who was very actively associated with the conduct of the suit and was giving instructions to counsel throughout the trial, would insist on being examined as a witness for that party. If the son of the second defendant is to give evidence after the examination of three witnesses, in his presence, will doubtless have the full opportunity to falsify his evidence, in the light of the information and experience he had in the courts of the trial. To permit such an evidence to come on record, would be unjust and unfair and contrary to well accepted practice. If the court, in such circumstances, exercised its discretion to exclude him from the category of witnesses to be examined, the exercise of such discretion, cannot be interfered with. 15. It is unfortunate that the revision petitioner has chosen to adversely comment about the conduct of the judicial officer in this revision petition. In Para.10 of the revision memo, it is stated as follows: "The talk and conduct of the Honourable Court after this was quite improper. During the course of taking evidence also, petitioner felt and convinced that the court is taking an attitude prejudicial to him. Evidence for the side of the petitioner was not correctly recorded and it was not read over after recording the same. Details are not necessary for this petition matter and it will be submitted at the appropriate proceeding." No "details" were placed before this Court at the time of arguments. No material was pointed out in justification of the serious statements referred to above. An attack on the presiding officer of the court in the above manner, is totally unjustified. Details are not necessary for this petition matter and it will be submitted at the appropriate proceeding." No "details" were placed before this Court at the time of arguments. No material was pointed out in justification of the serious statements referred to above. An attack on the presiding officer of the court in the above manner, is totally unjustified. It is certainly legitimate for a party to complain about an order passed by any court and put forward strongly, and in a forth-right manner, all his contentions, legal and factual. However, it is improper to attribute motives against the judicial officer. Equally objectionable is the reckless comment made about the presiding officer. Vague allegations made in a lighthearted manner against a judicial officer cannot go unnoticed when they are brought to the notice of this Court. The conduct of the revision petitioner is culpable and condemnable. Having regard to the various circumstances, I do not, however, wish to pursue the matter except by expressing a strong disapproval of such a conduct, and reflecting such disapproval in the award of costs. 16. The suit is one of the year 1983. A further prolongation of the suit is to be avoided. The court below will dispose of the same within four months from the date of receipt of records The revision petition is. therefore, dismissed with costs. Advocate fee, Rs. 500.