Judgment :- 1. The tenant is the revision petitioner. He has filed this revision petition against the order of eviction passed in R.C.O.P. 2949 of 1982 on the file of the Rent Controller, (VIII Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras, confirmed by the appellate authority in R.C.A. 1233 of 1983. 2. The respondent is the landlord of the petition premises and he filed a petition in R.C.O.P.2949 of 1982, seeking eviction of the revision petitioner-tenant from the upstair portion in the said building on the ground that he had committed wilful default in paying the monthly rent of Rs. 300 for the period from August 1971 to May 1982, under the provisions of S.10(2)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. His contention is that the petitioner became his tenant in the middle of December 1979, that in or about May 1980, the petitioner herein filed a petition in H.R.C.1778 of 1980 against the respondent praying for restoration of amenities and that subsequently the petitioner filed another petition in H.R.C. 4 of 1981, praying for permission to deposit the rents. The petition in H.R.C. 4 of 1981 was disposed of directing the petitioner to pay the arrears of rent directly to the respondent-landlord. It was further contended that even subsequent to that, the petitioner had committed wilful default in paying the rent from July 1980 to December 1980, and therefore the respondent had filed a petition in H.R.C. 653 of 1980. Yet another petition in H.R.C.4104 of 1981, seeking eviction of the petitioner was filed on the ground that the petitioner failed to pay rent for the period from January 1981 to August 1981. The said petitions were dismissed against which he had preferred appeals. The present petition was filed by the respondent on the ground of wilful default committed by the petitioner in the payment of rents from August 1981 to May 1982. 3. The petitioner-tenant resisted the eviction petition contending as follows:— The petitioner has not committed any wilful default in the payment of rents. The petition in H.R.C. 4 of 1981 filed by him was not disposed of on merits. On the other hand, it was dismissed only because of the endorsement made by the respondent agreeing to receive the rent directly. The petitioner-tenant resisted the eviction petition contending as follows:— The petitioner has not committed any wilful default in the payment of rents. The petition in H.R.C. 4 of 1981 filed by him was not disposed of on merits. On the other hand, it was dismissed only because of the endorsement made by the respondent agreeing to receive the rent directly. The petitioner has preferred an appeal against the order of dismissal passed in H.R.C. 4 of 1981, and therefore, it has not become final. The present petition is only a continuation of the respondents attempt to harass him and secure his eviction. As the two earlier eviction petitions filed on the same ground of wilful default have been dismissed, the present revision petition has to be dismissed in limine. According to the petitioner, the allegation that he did not tender or pay rents from August 1981 is not true. He asserts that the entire amount due for the period from September 1980 onwards till date had been duly deposited in separate account in the Corporation Bank, Armenian Street, Madras. Even during the enquiry in the earlier two eviction petitions, he agreed to pay rents in one lump sum, but the respondent refused to receive the same. Even now, he is prepared to pay the entire arrears. 4. After considering the evidence adduced by both parties, the learned Rent Controller allowed the application holding that the petitioner-tenant had committed wilful default in the payment of rents and directed him to vacate and deliver possession of the petition building. The appeal filed by the petitioner in R.C.A. 1233 of 1983 was dismissed by the appellate authority. As against the said decision, the tenant has come up with this revision petition. 5. Mr. V. Narayanaswami, learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently argues that the present eviction petition is barred by res judicata because the two other earlier petitions filed by the same respondent against the same tenant in respect of the same building on the same ground of wilful default were dismissed and the decision in the said petitions will be a bar to the filing of the present petition, under S.19 of the Act. For this position, he relies upon a decision reported in Yamunabai v. Rangasami 1, in which Ramaprasada Rao, J. as he then was, held that if any order has been passed under S.14 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, between the same parties, then the same issue which had been finally decided, cannot be raised again in a later instituted action on the ground that circumstances had allegedly changed. As far as the principles enshrined in S.19 of the Act, there cannot be any difference of opinion. The question to be determined in this case is whether the decision rendered in the earlier eviction petitions H.R.C.653 of 1980 and 4104 of 1981 will operate as res judicata in the present case. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the order in H.R.C. 4 of 1981 came to be passed on 18.6.1981, directing the arrears of rent to be paid to the landlord directly. The petition in H.R.C. 653 of 1980 was disposed of only on 27.2.1932 long after the disposal of H.R.C. 4 of 1981 on 18.6.1981. In those eviction petitions, the tenant filed the order in H.R.C. 4 of 1981, marked as Ex.P4 and the matters were pending in appeal in R.C.A.1306 and 1307 of 1982. The authorities below who dealt with the earlier petitions came to the conclusion that there was no wilful default in the payment of rent taking note of the fact of the petition filed by the tenant in H.R.C.4 of 1981, as well as the various other circumstances for coming to the conclusion that he had not committed wilful default in the payment of rents. As a matter of fact, they found that the tenant was able to prove the tender and payment of rent from May 1980 to December 1980. In those circumstances, the appellate authority was not inclined to interfere with the findings of the learned Rent Controller. However, in this case, it is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that even after the order was passed in H.R.C. 4 of 1981, which is marked as Ex.P1 in this case the tenant did not pay the arrears of rent. Actually the arrears were paid only in September 1982, namely, after 18 months. It is seen from Ex. Actually the arrears were paid only in September 1982, namely, after 18 months. It is seen from Ex. P1, that there was a clear direction by the learned Rent Controller that the petitioner should pay the entire arrears of rent to the respondent directly in person. In spite of it, the tenant did not choose to pay the amount immediately thereafter. Now what the learned counsel for the petitioner wants to argue is that in as much as the order in Ex.P1 was put against the landlord in the earlier eviction petitions and it was only on that basis the said petitions were dismissed, the present eviction petition based on the same cause of action is not maintainable in view of the bar imposed under S. 19 of the Act. I am unable to agree with this contention. It is patent from the allegations contained in the said eviction petitions that they were filed on the basis of wilful default committed by the petitioner during various periods. It is relevant to point out in this connection that the question of wilful default for a particular period will depend upon various circumstances. Such circumstances cannot be the same for all time to come. Taking note of the various circumstances which resulted in the filing of the earlier eviction petitions on the ground of wilful default, the authorities below cams to the conclusion that there was no default during the period. Therefore, it cannot be stated now that because of the said decision in the earlier petitions, the landlord cannot seek to evict the tenant, on the ground of wilful default thereafter. If such a contention is to be accepted, it would only mean that the landlord can never file a petition on the ground of wilful default in future. Another ground, on which the learned counsel for the petitioner based his argument to invoke the provisions of S.19 of the Act is, that the cause of action for filing earlier eviction petitions and the present eviction petition is one and the same and that it cannot be split up. According to him, the cause of action is a continuous one and the earlier eviction petitions having been dismissed, the same cause of action does not survive now to enable the landlord to file the present eviction petition. According to him, the cause of action is a continuous one and the earlier eviction petitions having been dismissed, the same cause of action does not survive now to enable the landlord to file the present eviction petition. He relies upon the decision reported in Linga Gounders v. Kappa Gowder 1, wherein Mohan, J. has held that the correct test in cases falling under O. 2, R. 1 is ‘whether the claim in the new suit is in fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation for the former suit, relying on the decision in Md. Khalil Khan and others v. Mahbub Ali Mian and others 2. It was further held in that case relying on the decision in Suraj Ratan Thurai v. Azambad Tea Co. Ltd 3, that in considering whether the cause of action in the subsequent suit is the same or not as the cause of action in the previous suit, the test to be applied is: are the causes of action in the two suits in substance not technically identical? I fail to understand how this ruling would help the petitioner in establishing that the present eviction petition is barred by res judicata. As I have already stated earlier, the cause of action on the basis of wilful default is different for each petition and it cannot be said that the cause of action is one and the same for all these petitions. In view of this position the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has got to be rejected. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further urges that the arrears of rent having been already paid, the cause of action to file the present eviction petition does not survive. He relied upon the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in Sundaram v. Pattabhiraman 4 wherein the following passage occurs: “So far as this appeal is concerned as the entire rent had been paid up in pursuance of the notice dated 17-9-79, even prior to the tiling of the suit it is manifest that on the date of filing of the suit no cause of action should in presenti have arisen, the suit should have been dismissed on this short ground alone as being not maintainable. As indicated above, it was not open to the landlord after having received the entire amount of arrears before filing of the suit to have filed a suit for past conduct of the tenant. This appeal, therefore, merits dismissal on this ground alone.” He relies upon this passage for the purpose of showing that there is no cause of action and also for purpose of showing that there was no wilful default in the payment of rent. As already stated supra , it has been made clear in this case that the petitioner was not regular in the payment of rents. It is seen that even after the order in H.R.C. 4 of 1981 directing him to pay the entice arrears to the landlord in person, that was not complied within time. The arrears were paid after a long delay of 18 months. It appears that the present eviction petition was filed on 7.7.1982 even before the payment was made in September, 1982. The learned counsel for the respondent points out that both the parties are living in the same building, and, therefore, there was no difficulty in paying rents to the landlord. It was also pointed out that from October, 1982 onwards, the petitioner was sending rents by means of a draft. Nothing prevented the petitioner from adopting the said course earlier. There is absolutely no pleading in the counter statement that the rents were offered by the tenant and the landlord had refused to receive the same. Even if his case is to be accepted, he should follow the procedure contemplated under S.8 of the Act. These circumstances would clearly indicate that the tenant has shown supine indifference in the payment of rent and he has committed wilful default. He relied on the decision reported in Thaiyalnayaki v. Ayyavu Chettiar 1. But the principle decided in that case is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In so far as the decision of the Supreme Court in Sundaram v. Pattabhiraman 2, is concerned, it is not possible to come to a conclusion that the Supreme Court intended to lay down as a principle of law that once payment has been made for the period however long it may be, the right of the landlord to file a petition for eviction is lost. A perusal of the facts involved in the said case shows that there the landlord had received rent before filing of the petition and it was only in these circumstances, the Supreme Court came to the said conclusion. Moreover, it was not a matter which was not the main issue before the Supreme Court in the said case. It is relevant to note the latest Supreme Court cases to understand the real scope of the said decision. In Kameshwar Singh Srivatwava v. Addl. Dist. Judge 3, the Supreme Court has made the following observation;— “It doss not however follow that the tenant is entitled to disregard the landlord or ignore his demand for payment of rent to him. The provisions of the Act safeguard tenants interest but it must be kept in mind that the landlords right to receive rent and in the event of the tenants being in arrears of rent for a period of more than four months his right to evict the tenant is preserved. If the tenant makes the deposit in court without there being any justification for the same or if he refuses to pay the rent even on the service of notice of demand by the landlord, he would be liable to eviction.” Again in Maiku v. Vilayai Hussain 4 the Supreme Court says thus: “The law in our opinion is clear that the tenant must establish before the court in which the suit for eviction has been filed, the factum of refusal by the landlord when the payment was sought, to be made to him. The mere fact that an application under S.7-B for permission to deposit the arrears of rent has been allowed by the Munsif will not absolve the tenant from establishing before the court, where the suit for eviction was filed, that the landlord had refused to accept the rent lawfully tendered.” This position has been elaborately considered by Ratnam, J. in Govindarajulu v. Dhanraj 5, laying down the following principle:— The payment by the respondent subsequent to the initiation of the proceedings for eviction cannot be of any avail as by such payment the wilful default committed earlier by the respondent giving rise to a cause of action to the petitioner to seek an order for eviction against the respondent cannot be wiped out or erased.” 7. Applying these principles, I find no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner has committed wilful default in the payment of rents and that the landlord has got cause of action to file the present eviction petition. It is not necessary to refer to the various decisions cited at the Bar on the question of wilful defaults, since the position is already well-settled. In these circumstances, I find no reasons to differ from the concurrent findings of the authorities below who have rendered concurrent findings on the question of wilful default which is mainly a question of fact. Hence this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. However, the petitioner will have three months, time from this date to vacate the premises and put the landlord in possession of the same.