JUDGMENT - M.S. RATNAPARKHI, J.:---The petitioner, who was a defendant before the Court of Small Causes, Nagpur in Civil Suit No. 590 of 1983, has challenged the decree of eviction passed by the Court on 2-10-1985. The facts giving rise to this litigation may be briefly stated as follows : The opponent-plaintiff (a landlord) instituted a suit for eviction against the defendant-applicant. It was an admitted position that the plaintiff was a landlord and the defendant was a tenant in respect of these tenements. During the pendency of the suit, there was a compromise arrived at between the contesting parties and according to the terms of the compromise the defendant undertook to vacate the suit tenements by 31st of March, 1986. 2. The defendant was admittedly occupying these tenements for non-residential purposes. Under a Notification issued by the State Government in pursuance of section 30 of the Rent Control Order, 1949 the non-residential premises were excluded from the operation of the Rent Control Order. However, this exclusion was applicable only to those premises which came to be constructed on or after 1-1-1967. This was the only law prevailing in this region for more than a decade and the parties went to the Court with the law prevailing then. 3. This exemption granted by the Government under Clause 30 of the Rent Control Order came to be challenged before this very Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 1670 and 1695 of 1985. This Court, in its judgment, delivered on 29-8-1986, declared this notification as ultra vires. The result of this declaration was that there was no exemption available to any tenements irrespective of the fact whether they were constructed before or after 1-1-1967. The general provisions of the Rent Control Order prevailed and a landlord seeking redress against a tenant for a relief including the eviction was under obligation to comply with certain conditions before he could approach the Court. There was a specific prohibition on the landlord coming to the Court or relief of eviction unless he obtained a previous permission of the Rent Controller. This prohibition can be found under Clause 13(1) of the Order. 4. With this background, it will be proper at this stage to probe into the controversy. It was admittedly a suit for eviction by a landlord against a tenant. This prohibition can be found under Clause 13(1) of the Order. 4. With this background, it will be proper at this stage to probe into the controversy. It was admittedly a suit for eviction by a landlord against a tenant. Apparently under the Notification issued by the State Government these premises (which were non-residential premises) were exempted from the operation of the provisions of the Rent Control Order. It means that the provisions of the Rent Control Order were not applicable. There was thus no statutory protection available to any of the tenants as was available to others in other regions of the State. The landlord, therefore, went before the common law Court with the relief of eviction and that relief was granted by the Court of Small Causes at Nagpur and decree of eviction has been passed against the tenant. 5. This decree came to be passed on the assumption that the premises in dispute were excluded from the operation of the Rent Control Order. There is no dispute regarding this proposition. The only point regarding which there was a controversy was whether inspite of the decision of this Court in (Vidharbha Bhadekaru Sangh v. State of Maharashtra)1, 1986 Mh.L.J. 882, the decree passed by the Court of Small Causes remains a good decree or whether it becomes a decree passed by the Court without any jurisdiction. Obviously in view of the Notification it was only the common law Court which was to decide such subject-matters and under the common law there was neither any restriction nor any prohibition on the landlord to come before the Court for the relief of eviction. It was only under Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order that the landlord was required to obtain previous permission from the Rent Controller before moving the ordinary Court with the relief of eviction. The point of jurisdiction would arise in this case in these circumstances. If the prohibition contained in Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order is made applicable to every landlord irrespective of the provisions excluding clause, then it will have to be held that the landlord could not come to the Court for seeking a relief of eviction. There was a statutory bar. If on the other hand it is held that under the established cannons the landlord could come to the Court without any restrictions, then the matter could be different. 6. There was a statutory bar. If on the other hand it is held that under the established cannons the landlord could come to the Court without any restrictions, then the matter could be different. 6. The whole stress in this case on behalf of the plaintiff-landlord is that under the law which was taken to be valid on the material date, the tenements in suit were exempted from the operation of the Rent Control Order so that the restrictions or a prohibition imposed by Clause 13(1) did not apply to the landlords who had let these premises to the tenants. Had this exemption not been in existence either in fact or in fiction, the provisions of Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order would have taken its own course, meaning thereby that each and every tenement in this region would have been governed by the provisions of the Rent Control Order. The necessary consequences would have been that unless the landlord obtained a permission from the Rent Controller, he could not aspire to approach the Court for the relief of eviction. This disability on the part of the landlord prevented him from going to the Court except with a permission from the Rent Controller. It was on this background that Mr. Dharmadhikari strenuously contended before me that if the exclusion was bad in law, and by fiction it has to be held that it was not on the statute book particularly when this High Court in Vidarbha Bhadekaru Sangh v. State, 1986 Mh.L.J. 882 has struck down that notification. The necessary consequences of striking down that notification was that there was no exception and therefore, the landlord was under obligation to obtain the necessary permission from the Rent Controller before approaching the Civil Court for claiming a decree for eviction. In the present case the decree for eviction has been claimed even without obtaining a permission from the Rent Controller which is a sine quo non for initiating the proceedings for eviction in between the landlord and the tenant. It was his contention, therefore, that when there was a prohibition on the landlord to approach the Court, the decree passed by the Court in absence of this prohibition was nullity inasmuch as the Court passing such decree had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. 7. Mr. It was his contention, therefore, that when there was a prohibition on the landlord to approach the Court, the decree passed by the Court in absence of this prohibition was nullity inasmuch as the Court passing such decree had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. 7. Mr. Daga, the learned Advocate for the opponent contended before me that these two concepts are altogether different. According to him, the prohibition imposed on a suitor does not necessarily affect the jurisdiction of the Court. If a suitor chooses to come before the Court without complying with the requirements of law, it may have the ultimate effect on the claim, but not on the jurisdiction of the Court which is called upon to decide this matter. 8. As has been already observed, Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order debars a landlord from coming to the Court for a relief of eviction except he fulfils the condition precedent, namely, the obtaining of the permission from the Rent Controller. We may call this a legal disability crated by the statute's against the landlord in approaching the Court for the relief. What has been urged before me by Mr. Daga, the learned Advocate for the opponent is that the disability created by Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order need not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. It is difficult to appreciate this argument because if a disability is created against a party, by a statute to approach the Court then it is equally the duty and responsibility of the Court, to see that the party suffering any legal disability should not come before the Court. If at all they come before the Court with the disability standing as it is then it should be equally the duty of the Court to see that the disability created by the statute is not circumvented. From the point of view, it can be legitimately said that the Court would be acting beyond the scope of its jurisdiction in granting relief to the parties who suffer from disability created by the statute. This is exactly the crux of the whole matter. The Court has to act within the four corners of the statute and if the statute creates a disability against a suitor the suitor cannot be allowed to circumvent that disability otherwise. This is exactly the crux of the whole matter. The Court has to act within the four corners of the statute and if the statute creates a disability against a suitor the suitor cannot be allowed to circumvent that disability otherwise. For example, disability is created by the statute against minors from approaching the Court except when they are represented through proper persons. In case a minor comes before the Court without being represented by a proper person, then the Court would exceed its jurisdiction or perhaps the Court may be acting without jurisdiction in proceeding with that claim further. The same analogy can be made applicable in the present case. 9. My attention was invited to (Ratilal v. Velji)2, 1975 Mh.L.J. 137. The landlord obtained a permission from the Rent Controller and thereafter instituted a suit for ejectment against a tenant. During the pendency of this suit there was a compromise between the parties and as a result of the compromise the landlord's right to eviction became effective on the failure of a tenant to pay the rent. It was therefore, held that a fresh tenancy came to be created under the consent decree and, therefore, the landlord was not entitled to claim eviction unless a fresh permission was obtained. The rationale adopted in this case proceeds on the bar enacted in Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order. 10. Thus what we find in the present case is that the exemption available under Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order was declared as ultra vires and therefore, in the eye of law there was no exemption at all at any stage. All the premises were equally governed by the provisions of the Rent Control Order. As a consequence, a landlord was barred from instituting a suit for eviction without obtaining the permission of the Rent Controller as required under Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order. This permission was a sine quo non for initiating the proceedings for eviction against a tenant. It was not only a bar created against a suitor, but it was also obligation on the Court to see that no suitor could come to the Court in contravention of the mandatory provisions of Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order. It is no use saying that this obligation has nothing to do with the jurisdiction. It was not only a bar created against a suitor, but it was also obligation on the Court to see that no suitor could come to the Court in contravention of the mandatory provisions of Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order. It is no use saying that this obligation has nothing to do with the jurisdiction. On the other hand, it being a legal disability imposed upon the suitor, there was definitely a limitation against the jurisdiction of the Court in taking cognizance of such matter. Thus these two concepts are intimately connected with each other. This, in my opinion the Court could not proceed with the matter particularly when there was a statutory car against the plaintiff in initiating the eviction proceedings against a tenant. 11. Mr. Daga, the learned Advocate for the opponent strenuously urged before me that knowing full-well the provisions of law prevailing at the relevant time, the parties with open eyes and with full understanding have entered into a compromise and there is nothing in law to show that this compromise could not be effected by the parties or that it is opposed to public policy or that either of the parties was incompetent to enter into this compromise. He urged before me that when the parties competent to contract have entered into a contract with full knowledge, the contract could bind the parties and there was no case of deviation from the contract. I find myself unable to accept this argument, particularly in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case. It is more or less an admitted position that when the parties entered into the contract and effected this compromise, the defendant-tenant was not conscious of the fact that the landlord was suffering from a legal disability. He was not conscious of the fact that the landlord could not even approach the Court. It was in this frame of mind that the contract was entered into. This was a contract between the defendant on the one hand and the plaintiff who was not competent to come to the Court to claim relief of eviction on the other. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that this contract would bind the defendant particularly when this contract could not be effected at all because the proceedings which gave rise to this contract were themselves incompetent. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that this contract would bind the defendant particularly when this contract could not be effected at all because the proceedings which gave rise to this contract were themselves incompetent. Thus though there may be consent decree, the background on which the consent decree came to be passed by the Court cannot be ignored. Legal consequences have to follow and irrespective of the fact that the decree is based upon the contract entered into by the parties, it remains a contract with the party who was barred from coming to the Court and used this Tribunal for securing the claim for eviction of the defendant. Thus the Tribunal itself was incompetent to grant that claim as there was clear contravention of law prevailing. 12. My attention was invited to a principle laid down in (Ponnammal v. Srinivasarangan)3, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 162 where it has been held that the validity of the Act depends on the facts existing at the time when the act was done and will not be affected by subsequent judicial determination. In normal course this proposition cannot be disputed. But what is apparent in the present case is that the alleged right had no basis in law inasmuch as it was unconstitutional. It makes all the differences between the two. 13. In the result, it must be held that the trial Court was not only wrong in passing the decree of eviction, but there was an established bar of jurisdiction in entertaining and deciding the suit, particularly in view of the positive bar created by Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order. The trial Court was not, therefore, justified in passing a decree and this Court as a revisional Court would have to exercise its jurisdiction for nullifying that decree. The revision, therefore, succeeds. The decree passed by the trial Court directing eviction of the defendant deserves to be set aside and consequently the suit deserves to be dismissed. The rule is made absolute in those terms. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. -----