GULAB C. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is complainant's appeal filed by Special Leave and is directed against the judgment of acquittal, dated 10/11/1981, passed by Shri B. S. Makram, Magistrate, First Class, Raipur in Criminal Case No. 19 of 80. ( 2 ) THE appellant is a practicing Advocate and so is respondent No. 1. It is alleged that the respondent No. 1 presented an application with the signature of respondent No. 2 to the Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur (Ex. p. 3), containing allegations against the appellant amounting to his defamation. Respondents No. 2 to 4 are parties in different cases pending at the Court at Gariabund. It is alleged that the complainant was engaged in most of these cases and appeared for respondent No 1. Since respondent No. 1 lost some of those cases, he felt that he should harm the prestige of appellant complainant. During the trial of Criminal Revision No. 68 of 65 and transfer petition No. 26 of 65 in the Court of Sessions Judge in which the appellant appeared and opposed the respondent No. 1. It was found that some of the documents were missing from the file and the statement of Smt. Thanwarin was tempered with. An application was, therefore, made by the appellant and others bringing these facts to the notice of the learned Sessions Judge who called for the report or the lower Court. The appellant thereafter moved the learned Sessions Judge for Contempt of Court against the Magistrate Shri S. P. Mishra, Gariabund and respondent No. 1. Thereafter, it is alleged that the respondent No. 1 filed an application dated 9-5-1966 before the State Bar Council under section 35 of the Advocates Act together with affidavits of respondents No. 3 and 4 praying for action against the appellant for misconduct and striking off the name of the appellant from the role of the Advocates. It was alleged that the application was dismissed. The said application was alleged to be containing allegations extracted in para 3 of the impugned judgment. The appellant, therefore filed a, complaint under section 500, I. P. C. alleging that the aforesaid defamatory allegations were made and published maliciously with an intention to harm the reputation in the eyes of public and the members of the Bar. The said application was alleged to be containing allegations extracted in para 3 of the impugned judgment. The appellant, therefore filed a, complaint under section 500, I. P. C. alleging that the aforesaid defamatory allegations were made and published maliciously with an intention to harm the reputation in the eyes of public and the members of the Bar. Since the trial Judge took cognizance of the matter the respondents were put on trial under section 500. I. P. C. The learned trial Judge on appreciation of evidence on record held that it was established beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent No. 1 had published defamatory imputations against the appellant. Learned Judge, however, found that the evidence on record does not establish that the aforesaid imputations were made with an intention to harm the reputation of the appellant. That is how the respondents have been acquitted. ( 3 ) THE essential ingredients of offence under section 500, I. P. C. are that the imputations should not have only been made but they should have been made with the intention of harming or with the knowledge or having reasons to believe that the imputations will harm such persons. There are as many as 10 Exceptions to this rule, which have been detailed in section 499. I. P. C. The first exception to the rule is that imputation of truth, which public good requires to be made or published does not amount to defamation. Eighth Exception to the rule is that it is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject matter of accusation. Exception nine to this rule is that it is not defamation to make any imputation on, the character of another provided that imputation is made in good faith for the protection of interests of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good. Exception nine to this rule is that it is not defamation to make any imputation on, the character of another provided that imputation is made in good faith for the protection of interests of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good. In Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab it was held that in order to establish good faith and bonafide it has to be seen (1) what were the circumstances under which the imputations were made, (2) whether was any malice, (3) whether the accused made any inquiry before the made allegations, (4) whether there are reasons to accept version that he acted with care and caution and (5) whether there was preponderance of probability that the accused acted in good faith. Since the learned trial Judge has found that the respondent No. 1 had acted in good faith it may be examined whether the evidence on record justifies. the aforesaid conclusion. ( 4 ) A perusal of the application made to the Bar Council (Ex. p 3) would indicate that it was signed by the respondent No. 1 as an Advocate, it was accompanied by an affidavit by respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 respondent No 2 has also put her thumb, impression on the application. This application was sent to the Bar Council which failed to find any reason to believe that the appellant was guilty of professional misconduct, which is clear from the document, Ex. p 4. Affidavit of respondent Parasram is Annexure P-IT and has been sworn before the -Executive Magistrate, Gariband on 14/1/1966. Similarly, the affidavit of respondent No. 3 is Ex. p. 12, which has been sworn before the Executive Magistrate on 4/4/1966. These facts are not even denied. It must therefore be held that the facts stated in the complaint, Ex. P. 3 were based on the affidavits of respondents Nos. , 2, 3 and 4. The respondent No. 1 has thus acted as the Advocate of other respondents and had made these imputations in discharge of his duties as an Advocate, which he was duty bound in law. Under the circumstance, the only question for consideration is whether this respondent acted malafide in accepting the affidavits of his clients and filing the application? The respondent No. 1 has thus acted as the Advocate of other respondents and had made these imputations in discharge of his duties as an Advocate, which he was duty bound in law. Under the circumstance, the only question for consideration is whether this respondent acted malafide in accepting the affidavits of his clients and filing the application? It is true that a person acting on behalf of some body else is required to act in good faith or else he would incur liability, under section 500, I. P. C. The relationship of the respondent No. 1 with other respondents is however different. The relationship is of trust and confidence and an Advocate is usually not expected to carryon investigation into the truth or otherwise of the statements made by his client. Indeed the respondent No. 1 by requiring affidavits of the other respondents has proved that he had not accepted these statement in a routine manner. Acting on the affidavits of clients indicates scrutiny and care and not the lack of bona fide. Under the circumstances, it is not possible to hold that respondent No. 4 did not act bonafide is accepting the affidavits. It must consequently be held that the respondent No. 1 committed no offence in accepting instructions of the respondents and drafting and filing the applications on their behalf. In this view of the matter, it must be held that the acquittal of the respondent No. 1 by the learned trial Judge was fully justified. As regards other respondents, the only thing that can be said about them is that they expected a better professional conduct from the appellant and felt frustrated when the appellant did not come upto that expectation. Since they made the application to the authority to whom such an application should have been made in accordance with law, they acted legally and bonafide. There is nothing on record to indicate that their complaint was baseless or cooked up with a view to wreck vengeance upon the appellant. The concern of the respondent was to protect not only their own interest but also the public interest. This reasoning and the view of this Court are fully supported by the judgment of Honble Bhatt, J. Banaram Kriplani v. Trivenilal Shrivastava and another, which decided yet another case in between the appellant and the respondent No. 1. The concern of the respondent was to protect not only their own interest but also the public interest. This reasoning and the view of this Court are fully supported by the judgment of Honble Bhatt, J. Banaram Kriplani v. Trivenilal Shrivastava and another, which decided yet another case in between the appellant and the respondent No. 1. ( 5 ) THE appeal is found to be without any substance and is hereby dismissed. .