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1987 DIGILAW 179 (KER)

COMMR. OF WEALTH TAX v. MARY ROCKIE

1987-04-07

RADHAKRISHNA MENON, T.KOCHU THOMMEN

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Judgment :- 1. The following questions have been at the instance of the revenue, referred to us by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench: 1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law and fact in finding that 'the idea of the assessee is to cultivate it till it is disposed of and is not the above finding wrong, unreasonable and without materials and based on surmises and conjectures? 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law and fact in holding that the land is 'agricultural in character' and is not the above finding insufficient, wrong and without materials?" 2. The assessment year is 1969-70. During the relevant accounting year the assessee owned 62 cents of land in Survey No. 977/5 on the eastern side of the M.G. Road, Ernakulam. Out of this area, 9 cents had been set apart for three kudikidappukars. The assessee claimed that the balance area of 53 cents in her possession was exempt from the levy under the Wealth Tax Act. 1957 (the "Act") as it then stood, by reason of its being an agricultural property. The assessee's claim was disallowed by the Wealth Tax Officer on the ground that there was no evidence of any agricultural activity in the property during the relevant period. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the finding of the Wealth Tax Officer as regards its ineligibility to exemption under the Act, but he reduced the value of the land to some extent. On further appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal noticed that there was a tank in the property extending to about 10 cents. The rest of the property, being 43 cents in extent, had 16 trees standing on it. The Tribunal stated that there was no evidence to show that the land in question had been put to any non-agricultural activity. On the basis of that finding, the land was treated as an agricultural property exempt from the levy of wealth tax. 3. The Tribunal applied the wrong test. The question was not whether the land had been put to any non-agricultural activity. The question which the Tribunal ought to have asked itself was whether the land was used for agricultural purposes in the relevant accounting year. Was there any evidence of agricultural activity during that year? 3. The Tribunal applied the wrong test. The question was not whether the land had been put to any non-agricultural activity. The question which the Tribunal ought to have asked itself was whether the land was used for agricultural purposes in the relevant accounting year. Was there any evidence of agricultural activity during that year? That was the right question which the Tribunal ought to have asked itself. If it had done so, it would have come to the opposite conclusion. 4. If the Tribunal had asked itself the right question it would have, on the basis of the evidence on record, found that there were only 16 trees in the property. The Tribunal also would have found that the assessee did not supply any evidence as regards the age of those trees or as regards agricultural activity at the relevant time in the nature of weeding, tilling, sowing, watering, planting, etc. There was total absence of evidence of agricultural activity during the relevant year or at any other time except the presence of a few trees in the property. in Krishna Iyer v. Addl. Income-Tax Officer, (1966) 59 ITR 145, this Court found that 34 trees in a total area of 57 cents on the M.G. Road, Ernakulam did not make the property an agricultural property. The density of trees in that case was indeed higher than in the present case with 16 trees in 43 cents. 5. If the Tribunal had addressed itself to the principle stated by the Supreme Court in Commr. of Inc.- Tax v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, 1957(32) ITR 466 (SC) and CWT v. Officer-in-charge (Court of Wards). Paigah, (1976) 105 ITR 133 (SC), and by us in Kalpaka Oil Mills v. CIT (1986) 160 ITR 604 (Ker),'it would have, on the evidence on record, come to the conclusion opposite to which it reached. The finding of the Tribunal was, therefore, perverse: See also the decisions of the Madras High Court in M. Ranganatha v. T. Commr., Madras, (1980) Tax LIZ 574 and Gemini Pictures Circuit Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1981) 20 CTR (Mad.) 301. 6. Counsel for the assessee submits that a second opportunity should be given to the assessee to address the Tribunal with reference to the right principle. 6. Counsel for the assessee submits that a second opportunity should be given to the assessee to address the Tribunal with reference to the right principle. If there was evidence on record, we would have readily acceded to the request, or we would have ourselves applied the right principle to the available evidence. But it will be wrong in principle to allow the assessee a second opportunity to improve the evidence. The burden was on the assessee to adduce at the appropriate time evidence in support of her case. She cannot ask for a second opportunity to improve on the evidence. This is what we stated in Travancore Tea Estates Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1985) 154 ITR. 745 (Ker). In the present case we are not satisfied that, even by a second opportunity the assessee would succeed in adducing better evidence of agricultural activity in the property, the bulk of which she lost when it was acquired by the Government as early as 1969. It would, therefore, be not only wrong in law, but an exercise in futility to accede to the request for another opportunity. In the circumstances, we answer the questions in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. 7. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in this Tax Referred Case.A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.