JUDGMENT - SHARAD MANOHAR, J.:---A very narrow, but very interesting question is raised by Mr. Desai in this appeal concerning the provisions of section 85 and 85-A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity called 'the said Act') read with section 32-G of the said Act. 2. The facts are very simple. The plaintiff, who is the appellant before me (since deceased, through his legal representatives), was admittedly the tenant in respect of the land which is the subject matter of this appeal. In fact, he was a tenant of a piece of land of which suit land formed a part. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 were owners of this piece of land. Without entering into the other part of this litigations, all that needs to be stated herein is that respondent Nos. 1 to 4 had made an application to the Tenancy Court for recovery of possession of the land lease by them to the plaintiff under section 32 read with section 29 of the said Act on the ground of their personal bona fide requirement. The litigation had reached the precincts of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 492 of 1960. This Court passed an order on 24th August, 1960 to the effect that respondent Nos. 1 to 4 were entitled to recover possession from the appellant plaintiff in respect of the half portion of that parcel of land. The result was that the appellant plaintiff continued to be tenant in respect of the remaining half portion as from the said date i.e. 24th August, 1960 and by virtue of and subject to the provisions of the said Act he would be deemed to have become owner of the said half portion of the land with effect from 24th August, 1968. It is this half portion of the said land which is the subject matter of the instant suit out of which this appeal arises. The grievance of the plaintiff is that after the said date, i.e. 24th August, 1960, respondent Nos. 1 to 4 persuaded the plaintiff to surrender even the suit land to them, i.e. the remaining portion of the land allowed to be retained by him to respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and they recovered the possession of the suit land from him on 10th April, 1961. 1 to 4 persuaded the plaintiff to surrender even the suit land to them, i.e. the remaining portion of the land allowed to be retained by him to respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and they recovered the possession of the suit land from him on 10th April, 1961. According to the appellant-plaintiff the surrender is bad and illegal on the face of it because on that date he had become deemed purchaser of the land with effect from the postponed date viz. 24th August, 1960. Hence, he filed the instant suit in the Civil Court for a declaration that the said surrender taken from him by respondent Nos. 1 to 4 was bad and illegal because no such surrender can be countenanced either under the said Act or under the general law. It is significant that the suit was filed practically on the last date of the limitation. It may be mentioned here that after taking the surrender and possession from the appellant-plaintiff, respondent Nos. 1 to 4 sold the suit land to the present respondent No. 5 and this is the reason why present respondent No. 5 was impleaded by the plaintiff as defendant No. 5 in the suit in which landlord were impleaded defendant Nos. 1 to 4. 3. In the suit the respondents filed written statement and contended, inter alia, that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The trial Court framed a preliminary issue as to whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit and to give necessary relief as prayed for by the plaintiff. The Court recorded the finding against the plaintiff on that issue holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The suit is, therefore, dismissed by the trial Court and, hence the appeal. 4. The question is very narrow and is capable of being disposed of just by reference to the provisions of section 85 of the said Act. But before going to the provisions of said section 85, it is necessary to set out certain basis positions : (a) The fact that the appellant-plaintiff was tenant of the suit land till 24-8-1960 can not be disputed; (b) The fact, and legal position, is that if the plaintiff had become deemed purchaser of the land with effect from the postponed date, viz. 24th August, 1960, the so called surrender taken by respondent Nos. 1 to 4 from the appellant plaintiff would have no legal basis, for the simple reason that there can be no surrender form one owner to another owner. A surrender can be either from a tenant to the landlord or from a widow to a revisionary member of the joint family. One cannot surrender his own land to another person though the latter might have been the ex-owner of the very land; (c) If it is held that the appellant-plaintiff had become deemed purchaser of the land of which he was dispossessed by the erstwhile landlord, his remedy for possession would lie in the Civil Court. On the backdrop of this legal position, it will be seen that the question to be decided by the Court is as to whether appellant-plaintiff had become deemed purchaser of the said land with effect from the postponed date viz. 24-8-1960. If it is found by a competent Court that he had become a deemed purchaser, the subsequent surrender taken by respondent Nos. 1 to 4 would be non-est and of no legal consequence and the courts, whether Tenancy Court or Civil Court; would be entitled, nay, bound to ignore the surrender. If on the other hand, the appellant plaintiff had not become deemed purchaser of the land, he would continue to be tenant and in that case surrender might be valid or might not be valid. But even assuming that the surrender was invalid, still, the remedy for the tenant for possession against his landlord would be under section 29 of the Act in the Tenancy Court; not in the Civil Court. It would, thus follow that if the appellant-plaintiff was held to be deemed purchaser, the suit for possession will have to be decreed subject, of course, to the equities of respondent No. 5 about which I shall express no opinion whatsoever at this stage. On the other hand, if the plaintiff-appellant is held not to have become deemed purchaser, the suit will have to be dismissed whether surrender was valid or invalid. If the surrender was invalid, the suit will have to be dismissed, because the Civil Court will be having no jurisdiction to grant relief of possession to the tenant against the landlord. If the surrender was valid, the suit will have to be dismissed on merits. If the surrender was invalid, the suit will have to be dismissed, because the Civil Court will be having no jurisdiction to grant relief of possession to the tenant against the landlord. If the surrender was valid, the suit will have to be dismissed on merits. It will be thus seen that the crucial question and the only question required to be decided is as to whether the appellant-plaintiff had become deemed purchaser of the land with effect from 24th August, 1960. The question then arises as to which Court is empowered to decide this question. Even a cursory perusal of section 85 of the said Act, as it now stands, is enough to give answer to this question. 5. Section 85 of the Act, as it stands at present, runs as follows :--- "Section 85 --------------- (1) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question (including a question whether a person is or was at any time in the past a tenant and whether any such tenant is or should be deemed to have purchased from his landlord the land held by him) which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar or Tribunal, a Manager, the Collector or the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in Appeal or revision or the State Government in exercise of their powers of control. (2) No order of the Mamlatdar, the Tribunal, the Collector or the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal or the State Government made under this Act shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court. Explanation.---For the purpose of this section a Civil Court shall include a Mamlatdar's Court constituted under the Mamlatdar's Courts Act, 1906." I may mention here that this phraseology of section 85 of the said Act did not obtain at all time. The phraseology which is relevant for our purpose was incorporated in this section by Amendment to the said Act brought about by the Maharashtra Act No. LIX of 1969. By the amendment it has been provided that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question, including a question...whether any such tenant is or should be deemed to have purchased from his landlord the land held by him (emphasis supplied). By the amendment it has been provided that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question, including a question...whether any such tenant is or should be deemed to have purchased from his landlord the land held by him (emphasis supplied). This means that a question as to whether a person has become or had become a deemed purchaser of the land or not under section 32 of the said Act, is a question which falls within the exclusive competence of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under section 32-G of the said Act. If this is the position, it follows that the Civil Court's jurisdiction is barred to that extent. Prima facie, therefore, it will have to held that the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with this issue, viz. whether appellant-plaintiff had become the deemed purchaser of the land or not as on 24th August, 1960. 6. This, however, would not mean that the suit could have been dismissed by the Court. If it is held that the appellant-plaintiff had become deemed purchaser, the remedy for him to get possession from the erstwhile landlord who had disposed him on the basis of an illegal surrender would be in the Civil Court, not in the Tenancy Court. The Tenancy Court has jurisdiction to deal with the relevant questions between landlords and tenants but once it was held that the appellant-plaintiff was a deemed purchaser, he would cease to be tenant of the erstwhile landlords respondent Nos. 1 to 4 because, such a suit will be between an owner and trespasser which would be lie in Civil Court and not in the Tenancy Court. A proper course in such a case, therefore, is the one provided by section 85-A of the said Act. As per provisions of the said section if a suit is instituted in a Civil Court by the erstwhile tenant for possession against his erstwhile landlord, the Civil Court has to frame an issue as to whether plaintiff had become deemed purchaser of the suit land from the relevant date and has to refer the said issue to the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, and to stay the suit pending return of the finding from the Tribunal. Dismissal simpliciter of such a suit can not be held as legal. Dismissal simpliciter of such a suit can not be held as legal. It may be mentioned here that the original plaintiff-appellant died pending hearing of this appeal and his legal heirs and representatives have been brought on record. Reference in this judgement to the plaintiff, would therefore, mean as reference to his heirs and legal representatives. 7. The appeal is allowed and the decree of dismissal of the trial Court is set aside and the suit is remanded to the trial Court which shall in turn refer the following issue to the Agricultural Lands Tribunal for its decision and on receipt of the finding on the same the trial Court to decide the suit in the light of observations hereinabove, and according to provisions of said Act. (i) Whether original plaintiff Mahadu Dipa Koli had become deemed purchaser of the suit land with effect from 20th August, 1960. The Agricultural Lands Tribunal, to whom this issue shall be referred by the trial Court, shall issue notices to the appropriate parties, shall record evidence on the said issue and shall record its finding on the same. The parties shall be entitled to file appeal or revision application as permitted by law, including writ petition, etc. and the ultimate finding of the Court shall be returned to the trial Court which shall decide and dispose of the suit in accordance with the provisions of law. Costs to be costs in the cause. Appeal allowed. -----