ANIL KUMAR CHATTERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner No. 1 Mansur Ali Khan Pataudi an internationally renounced name in the field of cricket and editor of a weekly magazine Sports worldt is sought to be prosecuted along with the petitioner No. 2 Sarajit Deb an author of article under the title Est Zone Cricket; Promise of better days aheadt which was published in 21st October 1981 issue of the said magazine indicating in substance that the cricket pitch at Eden Garden had deteriorated and the complainant opposite party Sachidananda Chatterjee who was in firm control of the ground committee of the Cricket Association of Bengal was responsible for the same. It also stated that said Mr. Chatterjee was inefficient, incompetent and his knowledge of cricket ground was probably on part with his understanding of Greek Grammar. For such imputation a competent Magistrate has taken cognizance upon a complaint filed by the opposite party and issued process against the petitioners under section 500, I. P. C. By the instant rule the petitioners seek to quash the proceeding on the grounds that there was absolutely nothing on the record to indicate that any of the petitioners had any malice for making or publishing the allegedly offending statements and in any case it constituted only a fair criticism of the performance of a person in public office and as such cannot amount to any defamation. ( 2 ) TO take up the later ground first Mr. Banerjee the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has argued that a person holding a public office ought not to be thin skin and in the instant case the statements in question were made only in the hope that the condition of the wicket at the Eden Garden would improve. In this connection reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh and others v. The State of Punjab1 in which it was held by their Lordships that whoever fills a public position must accept an attack as a necessary, though unpleasant, appendage to his office and that public men may as well think it worth their while to ignore any vulgar criticisms and abuses rather than give an importance to that same by prosecuting the person responsible for it. I have gone through this judgment and it appears that in that case certain persons were prosecuted by a competent Magistrate under section 9 of the Punjab Security of the State Act (12) of 1953 for uttering abusive slogans against a Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of Punjab. They were convicted by the learned Magistrate which wall upheld by the learned Sessions Judge and also by the Honble High Court of Punjab, but on appeal to the Supreme Court by Special Leave it was held that even though the slogans directed against the two Ministers were indecent and vulgar still it was hardly calculated to under-mine the public order decency or morality or incitement to an offence prejudicially to the maintenance of public order. Their Lordships while deprecating the conduct of the appellants held that the prosecution bad failed to bring on the charge. In this connection it was observed that the slogans were certainly defamatory but the redress of that grievance was personally to the individuals i. e. to say the two concerned Ministers both of whom, however, took no notice of it which was consistent with the best tradition of democracy and quoted with approval the observation of Bramwell. B in Kelley v. Sherlock2, C. that whoever fills a public position renders himself upon thereto and must accept and attacking as a necessary though unpleasant appendage to his office. Thus, it appears that their Lordships bad clearly found that the statements were derogatory but the conduct of the defamed Ministers is not taking any notice of it was thought to be laudable being consistent with the best tradition of democracy. Therefore to my mind it is by no means an authority for any general proposition that if any imputation is made against a person filling a public office would not amount to defamation if it was otherwise defamatory. ( 3 ) MR. Banerjee has also referred to a Single Bench decision of this Court in Dhirendra Nath Sen and Another v. Rajatkanti Bhadra3. This was a case under section 500, I. P. C. against the Editor, Printer and the Publisher of a Bengali Daily, which was started on the complaint of one Rajat Kanti Bhadra claiming himself to be a member of Shoulmari Ashram alleging that some defamatory statements had appeared in the Daily in respect of the Ashram. This was a case under section 500, I. P. C. against the Editor, Printer and the Publisher of a Bengali Daily, which was started on the complaint of one Rajat Kanti Bhadra claiming himself to be a member of Shoulmari Ashram alleging that some defamatory statements had appeared in the Daily in respect of the Ashram. The accused persons came up in revision to quash the proceeding on three grounds namely, non-performance to the provision of section 198, Code of Criminal Procedure, non-application of section 500, I. P. C. In that case as the Ashram was an indeterminate body and thirdly that the impugned publication was not in any way defamatory. His Lordship made the rule absolute upholding the first two contentions and regarding the third contention it was observed that whether the impugned publication was defamatory or not was a question of fact and must abide a full flagged trial. There is nothing in that judgment to show that a person filling a public office is not defamed even if an imputation is made which would be regarded as defamatory in other cases which was the bone of contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the instant case. ( 4 ) THE petitioners apparently seem to rely on the 9th exception to section 499, I. P. C. I have no manner of doubt that the imputation in the instant case namely that the opposite party was inefficient and incompetent and further that his knowledge of game was as much as his knowledge of Greek Grammar are per se defamatory. In such situation in order to take advantage of the 9th exception to section 499, I. P. C. it is entirely upon the petitioners to establish by evidence that the imputation was made in good faith and for protection of the interest of the person making it or any other person or for public good. Reference may also be made in this connection to the 10th exception to section 499, I. P. C. which also seems to be a ground taken on behalf of the petitioners. This protection too cannot be claimed by the petitioners at least at this stage as the enquiry and good faith which are the fundamentals of proof on which this exception can be attracted. This protection too cannot be claimed by the petitioners at least at this stage as the enquiry and good faith which are the fundamentals of proof on which this exception can be attracted. Thus, in order to claim any benefit whether on the 9th or under the 10th exception to section 499, I. P. C. it must be established by evidence that the imputation was made in good faith and also on proof of some other facts. The learned Advocate for the petitioners had taken me almost through the entire article containing the alleged libel and my attention was drawn to certain statements which according to him indicated that due enquiry was made regarding the condition of the wicket at preset and as it was before. This argument hardly comes to the aid of the petitioners because the condition of the wicket or alleged deterioration thereof are by no means incriminating statements and, therefore, even if any enquiry was made in this regard it would not show that there was any good faith in making statements like that the opposite party was an incompetent or inefficient person or that his knowledge of cricket ground was probably on par with his understanding of Greek Grammar. Moreover the supposed enquiry even regarding the condition of the wicket is not proved merely by reason of some of the statements appearing in the articles as it is only in the nature of a mere statement of the accused. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners has also argued that there was no and indeed could not be any malice behind the alleged imputation and in the absence of any material on record to show prima facie that there was malice, the instant prosecution for defamation cannot be proceeded. It is relevant in this connection to record the provision of section 499, I. P. C. which defines defamation. This section shows that whoever makes or publishes any imputation intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of a person is said to defame him except in the cases covered by the several exception. This section shows that whoever makes or publishes any imputation intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of a person is said to defame him except in the cases covered by the several exception. Therefore, intention or even knowledge that such imputation will harm the reputation is enough to constitute the requisite mens rea for an offence punishable under section 500, I. P. C. Since a man is presumed to intend the normal consequence of his act it can be said without any fear at least at the present stage that the petitioners had the intention to harm the reputation of the opposite parties by describing him as inefficient or incompetent or that his knowledge of cricket ground was probably on par with his knowledge of Greek Grammar. At any rate they being fairly prudent persons can be credited with the knowledge that the aforesaid imputation would harm the reputation of the opposite party. Thus, the instant prosecution cannot be quashed on the ground that prima facie mens rea is lacking. ( 6 ) ON the above premises I do not see any ground to quash tile prosecution in question. The Rule is, therefore, discharged. Record be sent down at once and the learned Magistrate is directed to dispose of the proceeding with utmost expedition. Rule discharged.