CALCUTTA METROPOLITAN W. AND S. AUTHORITY v. CHAKRABORTY BROS.
1987-06-03
D.K.SEN, S.K.SEN
body1987
DigiLaw.ai
DIPAK KUMAR SEN, J. ( 1 ) THE material facts in and the proceedings leading up to this appeal are, in short, that a tender of Messrs. Chakraborty Bros. , the respondent, submitted pursuant to an invitation to tender No. SE (N)/sb-k8/1976 issued by the Calcutta Metropolitan Water and Sanitation Authority, the appellant, for the work of laying 48" diameter underground R. C. C. conduit pipe along Prananath Chowdhury Lane and Rustomji Parsi Road, in the Cossipore area of Calcutta, known as Cossipore Chitpore Drainage Project, was accepted by the appellant on or about the 25th March, 1975. The work order was issued by the appellant to the respondent on the 31st March, 1976. The work was completed by the respondent in 1978 and sometime in 1981 a completion certificate was issued by the appellant to the respondent On the final bill for Rs. 4,75,524/- being raised by the respondent on the 6th April, 1983 in respect of the work done disputes and differences arose between the parties. In the terms of the arbitration clause contained in the contract, S. K. Majumdar, Officer on Special Duty of the appellant was appointed the sole arbitrator pursuant to an order dated the 26th/31st March, 1984 to adjudicate upon the said disputes. ( 2 ) THE Arbitrator duly entered into the reference. Statements were filed by the parties before the Arbitrator and documentary and oral evidence were adduced by the parties before the Arbitrator. ( 3 ) THE arbitrator made his award on the 12th November, 1985 in favour of the respondent and awarded a sum of Rs. 2,66,457/- including interest up to the date of the award, to be paid by the appellant to the respondent. The appellant was further directed to pay to the respondent a sum of Rs. 8603/- by way of refund of the balance of security money deposited by the respondent with the appellant. It was provided that if the aforesaid amounts were not paid to the respondent within two months interest at the rate of 10% per annum would run over the amounts awarded till payment of the same. ( 4 ) ON a notice of motion dated the 9th April, 1986 the appellant made an application under Ss. 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, inter alia, for setting aside the said award.
( 4 ) ON a notice of motion dated the 9th April, 1986 the appellant made an application under Ss. 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, inter alia, for setting aside the said award. It was, inter alia, contended in the said application that under one of the items in the contract between the parties the respondent was required to retain 5 cm thick wooden shoring in place with necessary support and ancillary and making it in the same level with the ground level. The respondent was required to execute such work in respect of an area of approximately 2795 sq. m. and the agreed rate for the said item was Rs. 41. 95 per sq. m. ( 5 ) IN respect of the said item, the respondent made a claim contending that he had executed the said item in respect of an area of 2996 sq. m. and claiming at the rate of Rs. 108/- per sq. m. The respondent claimed such enhanced rate on the ground that he had used new wooden planks for the said work instead of old planks, which had been used earlier, for shoring. ( 6 ) IT was contended that the Arbitrator ignored the agreed rate in respect of the said item, accepted the contention of the respondent that it was entitled to claim at enhanced rate and made his award on that basis. It was contended further that in proceeding as aforesaid, the Arbitrator acted in excess of or without jurisdiction and on erroneous appreciation of facts which were apparent on the face of the award. It was also contended that unless the Arbitrator entertained the claim of the appellant on the said item and accepted a substantial part thereof, he could not have arrived at the said figure of Rs. 2,66,457/ -. It was contended that there was no evidence before the Arbitrator that the respondent had used new planks in respect of the entire work under the said item nor was there any evidence to show that the enhanced rate claimed by the respondents had been approved of by the appellant or agreed to by the parties. ( 7 ) IT was contended that the Arbitrator in proceeding as aforesaid misconducted the proceedings and his award was vitiated thereby.
( 7 ) IT was contended that the Arbitrator in proceeding as aforesaid misconducted the proceedings and his award was vitiated thereby. ( 8 ) THE said application was opposed by the respondent, An affidavit of Adhir Chakraborty, a partner of the respondent firm on the 8th May, 1986, was filed in opposition to the said petition. It was, inter alia, contended in the said affidavit that though the contract did not provide for new planks to be used for the work specified in the said item the respondent was required by the appellant to use new planks. Instruction to use new planks were first given verbally by the Executive Engineer and the Assistant Engineer of the appellant and thereafter such instructions were recorded in the instruction book. It was admitted by the respondent that new planks were in fact being used for the work. Usually wooden planks which had been used at least five times for shoring are retained in such work. This was admitted by the appellant before the Arbitrator. The respondent was entitled to the value of new planks. The other allegations in the. plaint were denied and the contentions disputed. ( 9 ) PRABIR Nath Bhattacharjee, a Superintendent Engineer of the appellant affirmed an affidavit on the 19th May, 1986 which was filed in reply to the said affidavit of Adhir Chakraborty. It was, inter alia, contended in this affidavit that the quantity billed in respect of the said item by the respondent was within the permissible limit of the contemplated measurement. It was implied in the contract that the respondent would use good quality of planks for retention which could bear the pressure. Accordingly, the materials brought by the respondent to the site for execution of the said item were found to be of inferior quality and as such the same were rejected, and the respondent was directed to bring materials of quality required for the said work. In any case, the respondent was not entitled to claim at a rate higher than the agreed rate for the said item. ( 10 ) THE said application was disposed of in the first Court by a judgement and order dated the 10th September, 1986.
In any case, the respondent was not entitled to claim at a rate higher than the agreed rate for the said item. ( 10 ) THE said application was disposed of in the first Court by a judgement and order dated the 10th September, 1986. It was noted by the learned Judge that the Arbitrator had stated in the award that he had considered all the points raised in the reference by the parties, had considered the arguments advanced and also weighed the merits of the facts and circumstances. Save as aforesaid the award was a non-speaking award and it could not be said that there was any error apparent on the face of the award. The Arbitrator had considered the claim of the respondent at an enhanced rate not in the contract and if in arriving at his conclusion the Arbitrator had committed any error the same would not be a ground for setting aside the award as the Arbitrator was the final authority on facts and law. ( 11 ) THE present appeal is from the said judgement and order dated the 10th September, 1986. Before us, it was submitted by the learned Advocate for the appellant that, in the event, the award was held to be a speaking award then the same could not be sustained on the grounds as made out in the petition for setting aside the award. He reiterated the contentions in the pleadings of the appellant before the first Court. ( 12 ) LEARNED Advocate for the appellant submitted in the alternative that if the said award was held to be a non-speaking award where no reasons were given by the Arbitrator then the same could be impugned on that ground alone. This issue was pending before the Supreme Court in a number of cases. In support of his contention he cited Jaipur Development Authority v. Firm Chhokhamal Contractor, reported in 1986 (2) Scale 433 and Laxmi Chand and Balchand v. State of A. P. , reported in 1986 (2) Scale 605 . ( 13 ) LEARNED Advocate for the appellant submitted that the hearing of this appeal should be adjourned till this issue was decided in the Supreme Court. ( 14 ) LEARNED Advocate for the respondent contended to the contrary. He submitted that the matter was pending for a long time.
( 13 ) LEARNED Advocate for the appellant submitted that the hearing of this appeal should be adjourned till this issue was decided in the Supreme Court. ( 14 ) LEARNED Advocate for the respondent contended to the contrary. He submitted that the matter was pending for a long time. The respondent had completed his work in 1978 and his claim still remained undecided. Learned Advocate for the respondent invited us to treat the award as a speaking award and adjudicate on the merits of the controversy raised by the appellant. ( 15 ) IT was submitted that under the item involved the respondent was not required to furnish new planks and would have been entitled to execute the work with old used planks. At the instance of the appellant the respondent had to supply new planks for the work and there was no reason why the respondent should not be paid the value of the new planks by way of enhanced rate. In any event, the said dispute was raised before the Arbitrator and the parties made their submissions on the same. The appellant submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator for adjudication of the said controversy and cannot at this stage challenge the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. It was submitted that the total claim of the respondent before the Arbitrator was for Rs. 3,38,872. 24p. on which the Arbitrator has allowed and awarded a lump sum of Rs. 2,66,457/ -. It, therefore, could not be said that the claim of the respondent has been allowed in full. Learned Advocate submitted further that the law of the land as it stood presently did not stand in the way of a Court enforcing a non-speaking award and therefore, on that ground alone the award should not be set aside. ( 16 ) ON consideration of the facts and circumstances and the respective cases of' the parties we are unable to accept the contentions of the appellant. Even if we assume that the Arbitrator has partly allowed the claim of the respondent on the disputed item at a rate higher than the agreed rate it cannot be said that the impugned award is erroneous on that ground and should be se aside. Admittedly, in the said item in specifications were laid down as to the quality of the planks to be supplied by the respondent for the work.
Admittedly, in the said item in specifications were laid down as to the quality of the planks to be supplied by the respondent for the work. It was in evidence before the Arbitrator that the used planks brought by the respondent to the site were rejected and directed to be replaced with new planks. Apart from the site order book, there were contemporaneous correspondence between the parties on this issue referred to in the statement of the respondent filed in the reference which were before the Arbitrator. In fact, the claim for enhanced rate was made by the respondent at the time of the work itself. The claim of the respondent on this item was denied by the appellant and the parties joined issue on this controversy before the Arbitrator. ( 17 ) IT appears to us that by insisting on supply of new planks the appellant altered the terms and conditions of contract which was accepted by the respondent with a claim for a higher rate and the appellant was not entitled to call upon the respondent to execute the work at the original rate. There was sufficient evidence before the Arbitrator on which he could allow the claim of the respondent. ( 18 ) WE also note that the appellant has not impugned the award before the first Court on the ground that it is a non-speaking award This ground has also not been taken in the present appeal ( 19 ) FOR the reasons as aforesaid, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgement and order dated the 10th September, 1986 and we sustain the same for the reasons as stated hereinabove. ( 20 ) THIS appeal is dismissed with costs. All interim orders are vacated. ( 21 ) SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN, J. :- I agree. Appeal dismissed. .