JUDGMENT - GUTTAL G.H., J.:—This appeal has been placed before us upon a reference made by Daud, J., made on 13th March, 1987. The facts giving rise to this reference are as under: 2. The appellant, who is the wife of the respondent to this appeal, instituted M.J. Petition No. 714 of 1977 for divorce on the grounds that the respondent husband was guilty of adultery and cruelty. The parties are Indian Christians and are governed by the Indian Divorce Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). During the pendency of the M.L. Petition No. 714, the appellant made a Petition viz. No. 77 of 1982 for alimony pendente lite under section 36 of the Act. On 25th January, 1983, the Bombay City Civil Court, where the M.J. Petition No. 714 of 1977 was sent for trial and disposal, made an order awarding a sum of Rs. 100/- to the appellant as interim alimony. On 28th January, 1983, the same Court allowed a sum of Rs. 750/- towards the expenses to prosecute the petition. On the same day, M.J. Petition No. 714 of 1977 was disposed of by a decree of divorce in favour of the appellant. In this appeal, the order of the Bombay City Civil Court dated 25th January, 1983 awarding interim alimony of Rs. 100/- p.m. is impugned. This first appeal was filed on 21st March, 1983. An appeal by the respondent challenging the decree of divorce is pending in this Court. The petitioner-appellant claims that the amount of Rs. 100/- is not commensurate with the income of the respondent. 3. When the appeal was called out for hearing before Daud, J., the respondent urged that in view of section 55 of the Act and the Judgment by a Single Judge of this Court in (Prithvirajsinghji v. Bai Shiva Prabhakumari)1, A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 315 : 1960 N.L.J. 92 the order granting interim alimony was not appealable. On consideration of section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, as it then stood, and which is pari materia with section 55 of he Act, Gokhale, J., held that the Appeal against an order of interim alimony was not maintainable. In (Lallubhai v. Nirmalaben)2, A.I.R. 1972 Guj. 174 a contrary view was taken and it was held that the order of interim alimony was appealable. In (Lallubhai v. Nirmalaben)2, A.I.R. 1972 Guj. 174 a contrary view was taken and it was held that the order of interim alimony was appealable. Daud, J., who was inclined to accept the view of the Gujarat High Court, found it difficult to do so in view of the Judgment delivered by Gokhale, J. He, therefore, referred this Appeal to the Division Bench by his order dated 13th March, 1987. 4. Daud, J., has not formulated the question referred to us. In order to focus attention on the exact question referred to us, we formulate the question as under:– “Having regard to the provisions of section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act, is an order of alimony pendente lite made under section 36 of the Act, appealable?” 5. Three sections of the Act are relevant for the consideration of the question that has been referred to us. We will briefly set out the substance of these sections. Section 36 provides that in any suit under the Act, the wife may present a petition for alimony pending the suit. Section 45, which appears in Part XII under the caption “Procedure” reads thus: “Subject to the provisions herein contained, all proceedings under this Act between party and party shall be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure.” The relevant part of section 55, the language of which we are called upon to construe, reads as under: “All decrees and orders made by the Court in any suit or proceeding under this Act... may be appealed from in the like manner as the decrees and orders of the Court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction...may be appealed from under the laws, rules and orders for the time being in force.” (Emphasis supplied) 6. Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, as it stood in 1960, has employed identical words. It reads:– “All decrees and orders made by the Court in any proceedings under this Act shall be enforced in like manner as the decrees and orders of the Court made in the exercise of its Original Civil Jurisdiction are enforced, and may be appealed form under any law for the time being in force: provided that there shall be no appeal on the subject of costs only.” 7. The judgments that have been cited before us, with the exception of (A. v. B.)3, I.L.R. 22 Bom. The judgments that have been cited before us, with the exception of (A. v. B.)3, I.L.R. 22 Bom. 612, are under the Hindu Marriage Act, written with reference to section 28 of the Act. 8. According to the appellant, section 55, of the Act creates a substantive right of appeal, not only against all the decrees, but “all orders”. The words “under he laws, rules and orders for the time being in force”, which occur at the end of the first part of that section do not curtail the right of appeal, but merely prescribe the procedure, such an institution of and the forum for appeals. Thus, all orders are appealable, even if they are interim orders irrespective of the provisions of other laws, rules and orders, which ay be in force According to the respondent, “the laws, rules and orders for the time being in force” refer, in the context of this case, to the Code of Civil Procedure. They qualify the right of appeal. Therefore, if the order is not appealable under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, no appeal against such an order lies, section 55 of the Act notwithstanding. 9. Before referring to the judgments cited before us, certain consequences of the construction Advocated before us by Mr. Aranha, who appears in person, may be borne in mind. The argument is that though “all” orders are appealable under the first part of section 55, in order that such order is appealable, Order LXIII and section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure must also make the order appealable. In other words, the right of appeal under section 55 may be curtained by the provisions of any other law which may be in force. Secondly, though the right of appeal is apparently unqualified and unlimited, it depends upon what the Code of Civil Procedure enacts. The argument of the respondent, if accepted, would mean that what is created by section 55, can be limited by another law. In other words, by our construction we are asked to limit or curtail the right of appeal granted by section 55. 10. Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, as it stood in 1960, also provides that “all decrees and orders” may be appealed from “under any law for the time being in force”. Prithvirajsinghji v. Bai Shiva Prabhakumari, A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 10. Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, as it stood in 1960, also provides that “all decrees and orders” may be appealed from “under any law for the time being in force”. Prithvirajsinghji v. Bai Shiva Prabhakumari, A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 315 lays down two propositions: (i) Firstly, the words “any law for the time being in force” occurring in section 28, refer to the laws such as the Code of Civil Procedure and that such laws determine the appealability of the orders made under the Hindu Marriage Act; (ii) Secondly, section 104 and Order LXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which set out orders appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure, do not list the orders of alimony pendente lite made under the Hindu Marriage Act. Therefore, order of interim alimony made under the section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act is not appealable. 11. As against this, in three decisions of the Gujarat High Court, Lallubhai Keshavram Joshi v. Nirmalaben Lalluram Joshi, A.I.R. 1972 Guj. 174, (Kadia Harilal Purshottam v. Kadia Lilavati Gokaldas)4, A.I.R. 1961 Guj. 202 and (Bai Umiyabhen v. Ambalal Laxmidas)5, A.I.R. 1966 Guj. 139 a contrary view has been taken. 12. The law laid down by Gujarat High Court may be summarised as under:– (a) section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act does not intend to create right of appeal against decrees and orders passed under that Act by reference to what is enacted by the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no provision in the code of Civil Procedure or in any other law under which any appeal could be filed from orders made under the Hindu Marriage Act. Kadia Harilal Purshottam v. Kadia Lilavati Gokaldas, A.I.R. 1961 Guj. 202, Lallubhai Keshavram Joshi v. Nirmalaben, A.I.R. 1972 Guj. 174. (b) A right of appeal against “all decrees and orders” is created by section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Kadia Harilal Purshottam v. Kadia Lilavati Gokaldas, A.I.R. 1961 Guj. 202, Lallubhai Keshavram Joshi v. Nirmalaben, A.I.R. 1972 Guj. 174. (c) The words “under any law for the time being in force” employed in section 28 are intended to provide procedure for and the forum of such appeals and do not determine appealability of the orders. Kadia Harilal Purshottam v. Kadia Lilavati Gokaldas, A.I.R. 1961 Guj. 202 and Bai Umiyabhen v. Ambalal Laxmidas, A.I.R. 1966 Guj. 139. 13. 174. (c) The words “under any law for the time being in force” employed in section 28 are intended to provide procedure for and the forum of such appeals and do not determine appealability of the orders. Kadia Harilal Purshottam v. Kadia Lilavati Gokaldas, A.I.R. 1961 Guj. 202 and Bai Umiyabhen v. Ambalal Laxmidas, A.I.R. 1966 Guj. 139. 13. Two more decisions are of importance. They are (D.S. Seshadri v. Jayalakshmi)6, A.I.R. 1963 Mad. 283 and (Kode Kutumbha Rao v. Kode Sesharathnamamba)7, A.I.R. 1967 A.P. 323. The Madras High Court, as also the Andhra Pradesh High Court laid down that the right of appeal created by section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act cannot be subject to limitation that such a right should be shown to have existed under some other law, such as Code of Civil Procedure. They held that the words “any law for the time being in force” regulate the forum and procedure and do not restrict the right of appeal created by the Hindu Marriage Act. A similar view was taken in (Sushila Devi v. Dani Ram)8, A.I.R. 1965 H.P. 12 and (Smt. Snehalata Dansena v. Jagdish Dansena)9, A.I.R. 1964 Orissa 122. 14. We now proceed to consider the question referred to us. Under section 55 “all” decrees and orders may be “appealed from”. Since “all” orders may be “appealed from” under section 55, the question is whether the words “all..orders” mean every order or such order as may be appealed from under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the decision of Gokhale, J., in Prithvirajsinghji's case is accepted, it would mean that what is given by the first part of section 55, is taken away by the latter words “under any law for the time being in force” used in the same section. Words have meaning. They mean what they say. Therefore, when Section 55 says “all orders” may be appealed from it means that every order made under the Act is appealable. 15. Consider the consequences of the decision in Prithvirajsinghji's case. The first part of section 55 grants a right of appeal. That the first part of section 55 itself confers the right of appeal from all decrees and orders, was recognised as early as 1898 in 'A' (husband-plaintiff) v. “B” (wife-defendant) I.L.R. 22 Bom. 612. 15. Consider the consequences of the decision in Prithvirajsinghji's case. The first part of section 55 grants a right of appeal. That the first part of section 55 itself confers the right of appeal from all decrees and orders, was recognised as early as 1898 in 'A' (husband-plaintiff) v. “B” (wife-defendant) I.L.R. 22 Bom. 612. The latter part “under any law for the time being in force” of the same section is supposed to say whether you have a right of appeal will be determined by section 104 and Order LXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure”. Such a construction is not only meaningless, but is destructive of the right granted by the same section. The legislative purpose is to make “all orders” appealable. In order to determine whether a particular order is appealable, one has to turn to the other laws, thereby introducing absurdity in the construction. It is an established rule of interpretation of statues that a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility should be avoided. To quote, Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, pg. 45:– “If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which could reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept...the construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result.” Thus, with respect, the construction adopted in Prithvirajsinghji's case renders the legislative intent of conferring an unqualified right of appeal futile. We prefer the construction adopted by the decisions of the Gujarat, Madras and Andhra Pradesh High Courts, because they effectuate the Legislative intent by creating right of appeal and achieves the manifest purpose of the legislation. The second consequence is this : A right of appeal is made to depend upon and limited by another law like the Code of Civil Procedure. This would introduce the words to the effect “if the Code of Civil Procedure permits, appeals against such decrees and orders” to qualify the right of appeal. Such a consequence, which would limit the right of appeal by the provisions of another law, was not intended by the Parliament. There is one more reason which supports the construction which we propose to adopt. Such a consequence, which would limit the right of appeal by the provisions of another law, was not intended by the Parliament. There is one more reason which supports the construction which we propose to adopt. The effect of the decision in Prithvirajsinghji's case is to deny the right of appeal to litigants aggrieved by orders which do not find a place in section 104 and Order LXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the Legislature intended such as result, it would have so enacted. Where it did intend to deny the right of appeal, it has clearly asserted such intention. For example, the first proviso to section 55 expressly takes away the right of appeal from a decree of dissolution of marriage or nullity of marriage made by the District Judge or a decree of the High Court confirming or refusing to confirm such a decree. Similarly, the second proviso excludes appeals from orders for costs only. In our opinion, the Parliament did not intend to limit the right of appeal created by section 55 by referring to the Code of Civil Procedure, for if it did, it would have said so, as indeed it said so in the cases referred to in the proviso. It was pointed out to us that section 45 of the Act lays down that “all proceedings under this Act between party and party shall be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure”. This section was relied upon to urge that the appealability of the orders made under section 36 depends upon the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not possible to accept this submission, because, the words of significance are “shall be regulated”. Section 45, which makes the Code of Civil Procedure applicable, intends to regulate the proceedings under the Act. The Act itself does not prescribe the procedure either for the trial or for the appeals. It was, therefore, necessary to provide the manner in which the trial and the appeals should proceed. That is why the Legislature has imported the procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of regulating proceedings under the Act. The Act itself does not prescribe the procedure either for the trial or for the appeals. It was, therefore, necessary to provide the manner in which the trial and the appeals should proceed. That is why the Legislature has imported the procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of regulating proceedings under the Act. Merely, because, the procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure has been made applicable, it does not follow that the right of appeal, which is substantive right created by Section 55, is restricted by application of the Code of Civil Procedure. The application of the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be construed to mean that the unqualified right of appeal created by section 55 of the Act is controlled by the Code of Civil Procedure. The reason is simple. Right of appeal is substantive right. It is not a matter of procedure. The grant of right of appeal is signified by the words “all decrees and order...may be appealed from”. What is sought to be regulated under the Code of Civil Procedure are the matters of procedure like the institution and forum. This view finds support from the Judgment of the Allahabad High Court in (Sarla Devi v. Balwan Singh)10, A.I.R. 1969 All. 601. There are two other decisions in which the view taken by Gokhale, J., was followed by two other High Courts. They are: (Mohan Rani v. Mohanlal)11, A.I.R. 1965 J. K. 88 and (Gopendra Nath Basu Malik v. Prativa Rani Basu Malik)12, A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 455. In our opinion, section 55, which creates a substantive right of appeal, cannot be so construed as to negative that right by making it dependent upon the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which makes only certain orders appealable. The words “any law for the time being in force” in section 55 of the Act clearly refer to the matters of procedure and do not indicate curtailment of the right granted in respect of all the orders. We do not, therefore, follow these two decisions. 16. As already stated, the result of the acceptance of the view taken by Gokhale, J., (supra) is to undo what is granted by section 55. We do not, therefore, follow these two decisions. 16. As already stated, the result of the acceptance of the view taken by Gokhale, J., (supra) is to undo what is granted by section 55. We cannot construe the provisions of a Statute to mean that the Legislature, which created a substantive right of appeal by one clause of the section intended to take away such a right by referring to a matter of procedure. Such a construction would be clearly opposed to the plain intendment of the Legislature. A Statute should be so construed as to advance a remedy created by the law and not to curtail it. Significantly, section 55 has referred to the appealability of “all orders” which means every order. We accept the view of the Gujarat High Court, Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Madras High Court in the decisions earlier cited that the words “under any law for the time being in force” are not intended to curtail or take away the right of appeal granted by first clause of section 55. Any other view attributes to the Legislature the intention to curtail or limit the right of appeal granted in so clear words. Such a construction is plainly inconsistent with the grant of unqualified right of appeal by section 55. 17-18. In our opinion, the right of appeal created by Section 55 is unqualified and absolute. No words of limitation of this right of appeal are discernable to us. The words “under any law for the time being in force” in the first clause of section 55 refer to the procedure and do not relate to the right of appeal. Similarly, the language of section 45 which imports the regulation of the proceedings by the Code of Civil Procedure, does not suggest that the substantive right of appeal created by section 55 is controlled or restricted by such procedure. Section 45 is intended to regulate the proceedings and is not intended to limit the right of appeal. 19. We, therefore, hold, that Prithvirajsinghji's case was not correctly decided. For the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, we hold that the decision of the Single Judge in Prithvirajsinghji v. Bai Shiva Prabhakumari, A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 315 does not correctly interpret section 55 of the Act. 20. 19. We, therefore, hold, that Prithvirajsinghji's case was not correctly decided. For the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, we hold that the decision of the Single Judge in Prithvirajsinghji v. Bai Shiva Prabhakumari, A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 315 does not correctly interpret section 55 of the Act. 20. We, therefore, answer the reference as under:– The order of alimony Pendente Lite made under section 36 of the Indian Divorce Act is appealable under section 55 of the Act. 21. The Appeal may now be placed before the learned Single Judge for disposal in accordance with law. Reference answered accordingly.