JUDGMENT By Court. – In this case, the petitioners have prayed for a declaration that the entire land acquisition proceeding in L.A. Case No. 9 of 1964-65 including the award said to have been made on 30.10.1986 by the respondent no. 4 are ultravires and without jurisdiction in view of the express provisions of section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 as amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment Act 1984) (the Act) and for quashing the notice purported to have been issued under section 12 of the Act after the award was published. 2. A notification (annexure 2) under section 4 of the Act for acquisition of land including those of petitioners for public purpose as village Dindli in Singhbhum district was issued on or about 30.3.1964. A declaration (annexure 3) under section 6 of the Act was published on 21.4.1964. No further step was taken by the respondents. The validity of the notification was challenged by the petitioners and others by filing application at Patna under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and the same was registered as M.J.C. No. 1073 of 1964. The land acquisition proceeding was not stayed. That case was dismissed on 14.5.1965. The petitioners and others after obtaining certificate of fitness, flied in Supreme Court Civil Appeal Nos. 2286 and 2287 of 1970. The Supreme Court did not pass any order staying the land acquisition proceeding. Meanwhile the Act was amended in 1984 and the amendment came into force on 24.9.1984. The relevant section in this case is section 11A which was introduced by the amending Act of 1984. The two Civil Appeals were dismissed by the Supreme Court on 25.2.1986, copy of the order is annexure 4 to this writ petition. There is no dispute with regard to these facts. 3. According to the petitioners since the proceeding was not completed and the award was declared within a period of two years from the date of the commencement of the Act, the entire proceeding lapsed by reasons of the operation of the law. Respondent no. 4, however, without service of notice under section 9 and without making any enquiry, on 30.10.1986 purported to declare an award, which having been done after the proceeding had lapsed was of no effect. Respondent no. Respondent no. 4, however, without service of notice under section 9 and without making any enquiry, on 30.10.1986 purported to declare an award, which having been done after the proceeding had lapsed was of no effect. Respondent no. 4 thereafter by notices, sample copy of which is annexure 5 to this writ petition, offered to pay the amount as awarded. The petitioners did not accept it. Possession of the land was not taken by the respondents. 3. Respondent no. 4 filed counter affidavit. Inter alia, it was stated in the counter affidavit that notices under section 9 of the Act were issued to the persons having interest in the land under acquisition. No action in the proceeding was taken as the matter was pending in the High Court and thereafter in the Supreme Court. The delay in completing the proceeding was, therefore, made by the petitioners by moving High Court and Supreme Court. Immediately after having learnt in February, 1986 about the dismissal of Civil Appeals by the Supreme Court, steps were taken to publish the award which was valid in, the eyes of law. He has not denied that the petitioners did not accept the award. There is no assertion that possession of the land of the petitioners had been taken. 4. It will thus appear that there is no controversy about the fact that although neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court stayed the land acquisition proceeding, the respondents did not publish the award before 30.10.1986. We are, therefore, to decide whether the award published on 30.10,1986 may be held to be valid. 5. Section 11 A of the Act which came into force on 24.9.1984 reads as follows : “11-A. Period within which an award shall be made. – The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse : Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation. Explanation. – In computing the period of two years referred to in this section the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded” In this case as the declaration was made on 21.4.1964, the proviso to the section shall apply. The award in this case was required to be made within a period of two years from the commencement of the Amendment Act, i.e. within 24.9.1986. We have already noticed that the award was made on 30.10.1986, i.e. beyond the period prescribed in the statute. 6. According to the respondents, in view of the pendency of the matter in the High Court and Supreme Court, no award was published. Admittedly, the proceeding was not stayed either by the High Court or by the Supreme Court. The explanation to section 11A also is, therefore, not attracted in this case. There is no substance in this stand of the respondent. 7. It was contended by Mr. Gadodia, learned Standing Counsel No. 1 appearing for the respondents, that the proviso to section 11A was not mandatory, but directory and award published beyond that period specified therein will be valid in law. Mr. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that the provision is mandatory. 8. In Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone : A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 303; the Supreme Court laid down the test to determine whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory. It observed : “The difference between a mandatory rule and a directory rule is that while the former must be strictly observed, in the case, of the latter, substantial compliance may be sufficient to achieve the object regarding which the rule is enacted. Certain broad propositions which can be deduced from several decisions of courts regarding the rules of construction that should be followed in determining whether a provision of law is directory or mandatory may be summarised thus: The fact that the statute used the word ‘shall’ while laying down a duty is not conclusive on the question whether it is a mandatory or directory provision. In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the court has to ascretain the object which the provision of in law question is to subserve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the court has to ascretain the object which the provision of in law question is to subserve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. If the object of law is to be defeated by non-compliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory. But when a provision of law relates to the performance of any public duty and the invalidation of any act done in disregard of that provision causes serious prejudice to those for whose benefit it is enacted and at the same time who had no control over the performance of the duty, such provision should be treated as a directory one.” “Where however, a provision of law prescribes that a certain act has to be done in a particular manner by a person in order to acquire a right and it is coupled with another provision which confers an immunity on another when such act is not done in that manner, the former has to be regarded as a mandatory one. A procedural rule ordinarily should not be construed as mandatory if the defect in the Act done in pursuance of it can be cured by permitting appropriate rectification to be carried out, at a subsequent stage unless by according such permission to rectify the error later on, another rule would be contravened. Whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to, be done in a particular manner and also lays down that a failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow”. Section 11A not only prescribes the period, but also the consequence for such non-compliance. But Mr. Gadodia urged that the consequence has not been incorporated in the proviso therefore the proviso is not mandatory. 9. It is true that in the proviso it has not been said that the proceeding will lapse although in the proceeding part of section 11 A it has been stated. How one is to interpret a proviso? What is the scope of a proviso? We may refer to S. Sundaram v. V.R. Pattabhiraman: A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 582. 9. It is true that in the proviso it has not been said that the proceeding will lapse although in the proceeding part of section 11 A it has been stated. How one is to interpret a proviso? What is the scope of a proviso? We may refer to S. Sundaram v. V.R. Pattabhiraman: A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 582. At para 42 of the report, the four different purposes which a proviso may serve has been laid down and the relevant purpose for this case is: quantifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment. It will be noticed that by the proviso, proceeding for which declaration has been made before commencement of the Amendment Act of 1984 i.e. pried to 24.9.1984 are excepted from the preceding part for the purpose of calculating two years. Parliament, therefore, made separate provision for the purpose of computing two years for those proceeding in which declaration has been made before 24.9.1984. In Sundaram’s case Supreme Court quoted with approval principles for interpreting proviso from “Interpretation of Statutes” by Sarthi. One such principle is that a proviso must be construed with reference to the preceding part of the section to which it is appended. Reading the proviso with its preceding part, it must be held that the purposes of the proviso in section 11 A is only to provide the date from which in a particular class of land acquisition proceeding the period of two years shall be calculated. With this exception only the main enactment of section 11A shall apply to all proceedings, pending on 24.9.1984 or commencing after that date. 11. This interpretation is further fortified by the Explanation appended to section 11A. In both proviso and its preceding part the period prescribed is two years. In Sudaram's case (supra) the Supreme Court also laid down the impact of an Explanation either to a proviso or to a section. It will be noticed that in the Explanation the section has been referred and the section includes the proviso. We are, therefore, of the definite opinion that the land acquisition proceeding in which declaration was made prior to 24.9.1984, as the award has not been made within two years from that date, the proceeding has lapsed. 12. It will be noticed that in the Explanation the section has been referred and the section includes the proviso. We are, therefore, of the definite opinion that the land acquisition proceeding in which declaration was made prior to 24.9.1984, as the award has not been made within two years from that date, the proceeding has lapsed. 12. It must, therefore, be held that in this case as the award was not published by 24.9.1986 the proceeding lapsed and any award with regard to the land of the petitioners made there after was of no effect. The application is, therefore allowed. Let approriate writ be issued granting reliefs to the petitioners as noticed in paragraph 1 of this judgment. There shall be no order as to costs. Application allowed.