JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. 1. This revision is directed against the order dated 8-12-86 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Hamirpur, summoning the applicant under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the Code) to show cause as to why he should not execute bond and furnish two sureties to maintain good conduct and peace for a period of two years. 2. The Station Officer, Khuraila, district Hamirpur, submitted a challani report dated 25-10-86 indicating that the applicant Bhagwan Singh is a man of Goonda Type and that he was earlier convicted for an offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act and has been challaned under the provisions of U. P. Control of Goondas Act, 1971. Learned counsel for the applicant urged that there was nothing to indicate in the impugned order summoning the applicant under Section 110 of the Code that the applicant is habitually committing the offence under chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code or habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offence prejudicial to peace nor, there was any allegation that the applicant was so desperate or dangerous as to render his being at large without security, hazardous to the community, the learned Magistrate did not apply his mind to the offence indicated or the conditions precedent to be fulfilled before passing the order under Section 110 of the Code. He placed reliance on Bangi Lal v. Emperor, AIR 1931 Alld. 437, Thakur Ram v. State of Bihar, 1962 (1) CrLJ 665, Bhubneshwar Kuer v. King Emperor, AIR 1927 Patna 126, Ishwari Dutta v. Emeror, AIR 1918 Alld. 318, Sheikh Amjad Ali v. King Emperor, AIR 1924 Pat. 498. I am of the view that the revision is devoid of merits. Before proceeding further, it is better to ascertain the object of the legislature in enacting Sections 110, 111 and 112 of the Code. These sections have been placed under Chapter VIII of the Code dealing with security for keeping peace and for good behaviour. 498. I am of the view that the revision is devoid of merits. Before proceeding further, it is better to ascertain the object of the legislature in enacting Sections 110, 111 and 112 of the Code. These sections have been placed under Chapter VIII of the Code dealing with security for keeping peace and for good behaviour. The object of the legislature in enacting Section 110 is preventive and not punitive and action under this section is not intended as punishment for the past offences, rather it is aimed at protecting the society from persons having dangerous character so that those persons may be kept under security as would be just a step for precaution to prevent them from becoming hazardous to the community. In other words, it is intended to put a curb on persons dangerous to the society. 3. A bare perusal of Section 110 of the Code makes it crystal clear that it is intended not to deal with the convicts, rather with habitual criminals and dangerous and desperate out laws, who have become in fact, incorrigible and that that the ordinary provisions of penal law are not sufficient nor they appear to be adequate for putting safeguard. The proceedings under Section 110 of the Code have to be initiated with these objects in mind. 4. In the instant case the scope of enquiry by this Court at the initial stage when the notice under Section 110 of the Code has been issued to the applicant to appear on a future date is limited. It is not that the Magistrate has finally pronounced his opinion nor it can be said that there was absolutely no evidence at all in as much as the applicant has been challaned under the Convention of Goondas Act and has also been convicted under Section 25 of the Arms Act. It could not accordingly be said that the Magistrate has no material at all to issue the notice. At the initial stage before issuing the notice the Magistrate has just to see whether there exists some prima facie evidence and in case it is so, the proceeding can be started. It could not accordingly be said that the Magistrate has no material at all to issue the notice. At the initial stage before issuing the notice the Magistrate has just to see whether there exists some prima facie evidence and in case it is so, the proceeding can be started. The applicant shall have opportunity after notice to contest those proceedings, to cross-examine the witnesses and lead his own evidence to indicate that he was not such a person nor he has got such antecedent as indicated under Section 110 of the Code. At that stage the evidence would be weighed by the Magistrate. The objection of Section 110 is not that the person must be punished indirectly when he could not be punished directly for a substantive offence. The Magistrate should scrutinise the evidence led by the police with greatest care. The jurisdiction is preventive with a view to serve the interest of the community. The power under Section 110 must be exercised with caution and circumspection. In Gopalanchari v. State of Kerala, AIR 1981 SC 674 = 1981 CrLJ 337 the Supreme Court on page 677 observed as follows : "We direct the trial Magistrates to discharge their duties, when trying cases under Section 110, with great responsibility and whenever the count petitioner is a prisoner give him the facility of being defended by a counsel now that Article 21 has been reinforced by Article 39-A. Otherwise the order to bind over will be bad and void. We have not the slightest doubt that expressions like ' by habit ', Habitual ' desperate ', ' dangerous ', hazardous can not be flung in the face of a man with laxity of semantics. The Court must insist on specificity of facts and be satisfied that one swallow does not make a summer and a consistent course of conduct convincing enough to draw the rigorous inference that by confirmed habit which is second nature, the counter petitioner is sure to commit the offences mentioned if he is not kept captive." 5. It is accordingly abundantly clear that if the person against whom a notice has been issued, appears and evidence is led by the prosecution, and if necessary by the accused, great precaution has to be taken in passing the final order. It is accordingly abundantly clear that if the person against whom a notice has been issued, appears and evidence is led by the prosecution, and if necessary by the accused, great precaution has to be taken in passing the final order. Unless facts have been ascertained with utmost clarity and unless it has been found that the person concerned was a habitual, desperate or dangerous, who is not bound down, would be hazardous to the security, the notice would be discharged and the proceedings dropped. 6. Now turning to the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, suffice it to say that those cases are in respect of precaution to be taken by the Magistrate in scrutinising the evidence, and unless it was found that the person concerned against whom the notice has been issued, was a habitual offender, the show cause notice would be discharged. I need not emphasise much, but as a matter of fact, habit implies a tendency or capacity resulting from frequent repetition of the same acts. The words ' by habit ' and habitual ' implying frequent practice are used, in the sense of deprivity of character as evidenced by frequent repetition or commission of offences mentioned in the section It has unless, therefore, been proved that by repetition of the same acts the person has assumed the deprivity of character, the notice would be discharged. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant lay down the principles to be taken into account after the entire evidence has been led. In the instant case the evidence has not as yet been led and only just a show cause notice has been issued to the applicant. The prosecution can lead evidence. The applicant would be free to avail the right of defence, to cross examine the witnesses or to engage a counsel of his choice, who would defend him and cross examine the witnesses. The applicant would also be free to lead evidence in his defence in support of his innocence or to prove that he was not habitual offender, nor the offence, if any, committed by him was prejudicial to the peace and tranquility of the community at large, nor it was necessary at all that unless he furnishes security for maintenance of peace a good behaviour, he would become hazardous to the community. Those cases, I am of the view, lay down the salutary principles that would be kept in mind by the Magistrate while passing the final order. But they are of no assistance at present. I am of the view that when the evidence is led after the applicant appears, the Magistrate must scrutinise the same with greatest care and unless it appears that there was convincing and positive evidence to indicate that the applicant was so desperate and dangerous as to render him, to beat large, without security as hazardous to the community, he would discharge the notice. Otherwise, in case it appears that there was positive evidence indicating that unless the petitioner applicant furnishes security for good behaviour, he was dangerous to the community, he may pass an appropriate final order. 7. With these observations, I don't find any merit in the present revision and the same is accordingly dismissed. Revision dismissed.