Judgment :- 1. These petitions are filed to transpose the first petitioner M. Sivaraman as party respondent in C.M.P. Nos. 3284 and 3285 of 1987. It is alleged in the of affidavit filed in support of these petitions by Rathinavel Chettiar, who is the third respondent in the Appeal and who is the first petitioner in these petitions, that the second petitioner, who is the fourth respondent in the appeal is bis wife and that on the application filed by the appellant, who is the first respondent herein, they were added as respondents 3 and 4 by the order made in C.M.P. 5608 of 1984 under O.1. R.10, C.P.C. On 20.3.1985. It is further stated that the first petitioner purchased the western portion of the A Schedule property from the third respondent Sivaraman, while his wife purchased eastern portion, each for Rs.36,000 on 9.9.1983 under two separate registered sale deeds and by virtue of the sale deeds, they have become the absolute owners of the property and they are transferees for value. Although the transactions are hit by pendent lite, they are entitled to continue proceedings as per O.22, R.10 read with the O.22, R.11, C.P.C. Their vendor along with the petitioners filed two petitions in C.M.P. Nos. 3284 and 3285 of 1987 to vacate the stay granted in C.M P. No. 3932 of 1984 and to appoint a receiver. But, now, they come to know that their vendor, who is the first petitioner in these petitions, is colluding with the first respondent in the appeal and hence he should be transposed as the third respondent in these two applications. 2. The respondents have not filed counters. But they resisted the said petition and they contended that since the petitioners purchased the property pendente lite, they have no right through their vendor who was the first respondent in the appeal and in whose favour the decree was passed, has filed a memo that the suit which is not under appeal may be dismissed as not pressed and as a consequence there of the appeal may be allowed so far as he is concerned and the petitioners who purchased the property pendente lite had no right to oppose and that they cannot oppose the said request of the first respondent in not pressing the suit and allowing the appeal so far as he is concerned. On the other hand, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that though they purchased the property during the pendency of the proceedings, it is only at the instance of the appellant Sakunthala, they were brought on record on the ground that they are purchasers for a valuable consideration of Rs. 38,000 each pendente lite. In the circumstances, the withdrawal of the suit by the plaintiff cannot be made by him especially when the rights have got vested in the petitioners. They have got every right to object to the compromise arrived at by the plaintiff and the appellant, Sakunthala. Further, the sale in favour of the petitioners is only by way of the assignment of the decree. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. R S. Venkatachari drew my attention to the decision reported in Saila Bala v. Nirmala Sundari 1, wherein it was held:— “An appeal is a proceeding for the purpose of S.146, C.P.C., and further the expression “claiming under” further the expression “claiming under” is wide enough to include cases of devolution and assignment mentioned in O. 22, R. 10. Whoever is entitled to be but has not been brought on record under O. 22, R. 10 in a pending suit or proceeding would be entitled to prefer an appeal against the decree or order passed therein if his assigner could have filed such an appeal, there being no prohibition against it in the Code.” Sitharamaswami v. Lakshmi Narasimha 2 —approved. Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co., Ltd. 1, followed:— It has been farther held:— S. 146 was introduced for the first time in the Civil Procedure Code 1908 with the object of facilitating the exercise of the rights by persons in whom they come to be, “vested by devolution or assignment, and being a beneficent provision should be construed liberally and so as to advance justice and not in a restricted of technical sense.” “The right to file an appeal must be held to carry with it the right to continue an appeal which had been filed by the person under whom the applicant claims and the petition of the appellant to be brought on record as an appellant in an Appeal must be held to be maintainable under S.146.” Muthiah Chettiar v. Gondoss Krishna doss 2 and Moidinkutty v. Duraiswami 3 approved. “As a purchaser pendente lite, a person will be bound by the proceedings taken by the party in whose favour the decree is passed in execution of her decree, and justice requires that she should be given an opportunity to protect her rights. The Court can, if necessary, take action suo motu either under O.1, R.10 or in Its inherent jurisdiction and transpose an appellant as respondent in the appeal. Vanjappa Goundan v. Annamalai Chettiar 4 —Approved”. My attention was also drawn to Fall Bench decision in Veeraraghava Reddi v. Subba Reddi 5, wherein it was held:— “An alienee pendente lite of the whole or any portion of the subject matter of a suit who is brought on record as such, is not bound by a compromise though not fraudulent or collusive, effected between his transferor and the opposite party subsequent to the transfer in his favour; and a decree cannot be passed on such a compromise so as to effect his rights in the suit, and the suit should be tried on evidence as regards the alienee.” Learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to the decision reported in Nanja-ammal v. Easwaramurthi 6, where it was held that the purchasers pendente lite can object to the compromise if it is to defeat their rights. 3. Learned Counsel for the respondents relied on the decision reported in Anna-poorani Ammal v. Jayavelu Mudaliar 7, where it was held:— “A purchaser of an item of property from a vendee, who himself purchased that item from a party to a suit for partition, after a preliminary decree was passed cannot be impleaded as a party to the proceedings under O.1, R.10, Civil Procedure Code. Neither the purchaser nor his predecessor-in-title had any interest in any item of the suit property on the date of the suit. Neither the purchaser nor his predecessor-in-title had any interest in any item of the suit property on the date of the suit. Hence the purchaser is not necessary party in the suit for a complete and final adjudication and settlement of rights and claims.” It was further held in that decision:— “The provisions of O.22, R.10 Civil Procedure Code, cover cases, where the totality of the interest of a party to the suit is transferred to another person during the pendency of the proceedings and not where only a fraction of the interest is transferred.” In this case, admittedly, on the application filed by the appellant himself, the petitioners were added as respondents in view of the purchase made by them pendente lite and both the petitioners have purchased the entire A Schedule Property. The Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the said decision is not relevant as it is not directly in point and on the other hand, the decisions in Adhappa Chettiar, C.K.R. C.N.K.R. v. R.N. Meenakshi Achi 8 , rendered by Sathar Sayeed, J., is quite relevant and directly in point as the entire interest in the suit property has been assigned in favour of respondents 3 and 4 completely and in its entirety. I find much force in the said contention in this regard. In view of the ratio laid down in the various decisions, since the petitioners were already added as respondents in the appeal at the instance of the appellant on the ground that they are purchasers for value during the pendency of the proceedings. They are entitled to protect their rights and they can object to the withdrawal of the suit by the plaintiff/first respondent so far as their claim is concerned. It is to be noted that in the alleged memo filed by the first respondent in court, no notice was given to these petitioners who are arrayed as respondents 3 and 4. Farther no petition was filed for withdrawal of the suit under O.23, R. 3, C.P.C. In this connection, it was also brought to my attention that the appellant was directed to deposit Rs. 8,000, within six weeks from 25th July, 1984 while making the stay absolute as a condition precedent and the trial court was directed to proceed with the enquiry in regard to mesne profits. 8,000, within six weeks from 25th July, 1984 while making the stay absolute as a condition precedent and the trial court was directed to proceed with the enquiry in regard to mesne profits. On 18th April, 1985 in C.M.P. No. 3587 and 3588 of 1985 the plaintiff (first respondent) who is the alienor of these properties was permitted to withdrew half of the amount on furnishing security and the other half without furnishing security and the appellant was directed to deposit Rs. 250 every month to the credit of the suit commencing from 4th May, 1985. Since the appellant failed to comply with the said condition, the two petitions C.M.P. Nos. 3284 and 3285 of 1987 were filed to vacate the order of stay as well as to appoint a receiver was only at this stage, the aggrieved plaintiff colluded with the appellant and filed this letter behind the back of the petitioners for permitting him to withdraw the suit and consequently to allow the appeal. As already observed, in view of the ratio laid down in the above decisions, the petitioners have got every right to protect their rights and that the plaintiff cannot ignore them and withdraw the suit. 4. In the result, C.M.P. Nos. 8409 and 8410 are allowed. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Post the other petitions, C.M.P. Nos. 3284 and 3285 of 1987 for hearing after 10 days.