JUDGMENT - H.W. DHABE, J.:---This is a writ petition arising out of the proceedings under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (for short the Tenancy Act). Briefly, the facts are that originally suo motu proceedings were started in respect of the filed S. No. 1/5 admeasuring 3 acres of village Vilapur under section 46(1) of the Tenancy Act for transfer of ownership of the said field in favour of the recorded tenants Antu Ragho and Sitaram Dhondu. Both the recorded tenants died during the pendency of the case. The respondent No. 1 is the legal representative of the deceased Sitaram and the respondents 2 to 4 are the legal representatives of the decreased Antu. One Bapurao was the original tenure holder of the suit field. The learned Agricultural Lands Tribunal (for short the A.L.T.) after making necessary enquiry, by its order dated 15-7-1966, held that the respondents 1 to 4 were the statutory owners of the suit field under section 16(1) of the Tenancy Act. Accordingly, the purchase price of the suit filed was fixed by it. The respondents 1 to 4 paid the purchase price for the said field. The order of the learned A.L.T. was not challenged further in appeal or revision and had, therefore, become final. 2. It appears that the respondents 1 to 4 were not placed in possession of the suit field. Therefore, suo motu proceedings were again initiated for delivery of possession to them in the year 1969-70 under section 49-B of the Tenancy Act. These proceedings were, however, dropped by the learned A.L.T. by its order dated 31-7-1970 on the ground that the original tenure holder Bapurao was not in possession of the said field on 31-7-1969, as required by section 49-B of the said Act since in the meanwhile he had sold the land to the petitioner Karnu on 3-6-1969. 3. The Additional Tahsildar, Wani, on the basis of the report of the talathi reported to the Tahsildar on 17-4-1974 that the respondents 1 to 4 i.e. the tenants, were not in possession of the suit field which was in possession of the petitioner, who was not entitled to the possession of the same since the respondents 1 to 4 had become the statutory owners of the suit field prior to its purchase by the petitioner. The Tahsildar, being not himself a competent authority under section 120 of the Tenancy Act, submitted report to the Sub-Divisional Officer (for short the S.D.O.) requesting him to take suitable action under section 120 of the Tenancy Act against the petitioner. Accordingly, the learned S.D.O. issued notices to the parties concerned and by his order dated 9-9-1974, directed eviction of the petitioner from the suit field and restoration of the same to the respondents 1 to 4. The petitioner preferred a revision before the learned Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (for short the M.R.T.) but without success. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the instant writ petition in this Court. 4. The principal question which is raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this writ petition is that the learned S.D.O. had no jurisdiction to initiate suo motu proceedings-under section 120 of the Tenancy Act. It is argued that wherever the Legislature has intended that the authorities under the Tenancy Act should be empowered to initiate suo motu proceedings such a provision is specifically which in the said Act to enable them to initiate suo motu proceedings. To illustrate his submission, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has brought to my notice the provisions in section 49-B and section 122 of the Tenancy Act. On the other hand, it is urged on behalf of the respondents-tenants that the language of section 120 of the Tenancy Act shows that the suo motu proceedings can be initiated thereunder by the Collector. 5. In my view, for a proper interpretation of section 120 of the Tenancy Act, it is necessary to scrutinise its provisions closely and also objects and purpose. If its language construed in the light of its object and purpose shows that the power therein can be exercise suo motu by the Collector, the mere fat that in certain other provisions there is an express provision conferring power for initiation of suo motu proceeding cannot restrict its scope in this regard. In other words, merely because the expression "suo motu" is not used, it would not mean that there is no power to the Collector to intiate proceedings on his own under section 120 of the Tenancy Act. For the sake of convenience, section 120 of the Tenancy Act, whose construction is in issue, is reproduced below : "120. Summary eviction. In other words, merely because the expression "suo motu" is not used, it would not mean that there is no power to the Collector to intiate proceedings on his own under section 120 of the Tenancy Act. For the sake of convenience, section 120 of the Tenancy Act, whose construction is in issue, is reproduced below : "120. Summary eviction. Any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land :--- (a) the transfer of which either by the act of parties or by the operation of law is invalid under the provisions of this Act. (b) the management of which has been assumed under the said provision or (c) to the use and occupation of which he is not entitled under the said provisions, and the said provisions do not provide for the eviction of such person, may be summarily evicted by the Collector after such inquiry as he deems fit." 6. Plain reading of the section 120 itself shows that it confers a power of summary eviction upon the Collector who, after making such enquiry as he deems fit, can direct that any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of pay land should be summarily evicted if the case falls under any of the three categories referred to in the said section. It may be seen that section 120 of the Tenancy Act does not specifically require any party to file an application for claiming relief under the said section. Examining further the scheme of section 120 of the Tenancy Act, it may be seen that it provides for summary eviction of a person who is in illegal and unauthorised occupation of land (a) the transfer of which either by the act of parties or by the operation of law is invalid under the provisions of the Tenancy Act, (b) the management of which has been assumed under the provisions of the Tenancy Act and (c) to the use and occupation of which he is not entitled under the Tenancy Act. 7. Perusal of the Clauses (a) and (b) of section 120 would show that the person interested in summary eviction of a trespasser in the categories covered b them would be the State. 7. Perusal of the Clauses (a) and (b) of section 120 would show that the person interested in summary eviction of a trespasser in the categories covered b them would be the State. In this regard, it may be seen that if the transfer of any land is invalid under any provision of the Tenancy Act, then such land vests in the State under section 122(3) of the said Act. Similarly, in case the management of the land is assumed under the provisions of section 81 of the Tenancy Act, it is the State who would be interested in the land because the State assumes the management and the manager appointed by the Collector under section 82 of the said Act is in charge of such land. If the State is thus interested in summary eviction, it is natural to infer that the power of summary eviction would be conferred upon and could be exercised by the Collector suo motu under section 120 of the Tenancy Act for evicting the trespasser. There is therefore, no reason why in the category under Clause (c) also where the State may not be interested he cannot exercise suo motu powers for evicting the trespassers. 8. It may be seen that the Tenancy Act has a social purpose to achieve and the class of persons for whose benefit it is enacted are ignorant persons who are exploited by the landlords and other rich agriculturists who illegally deprive them of their lands. Even by amending the statute as for instance by introducing section 49-B in the Tenancy Act, the Legislature has ought to protect the rights of the tenants who would have but could not become statutory owners because of the loss of possession of their lands before the relevant dates prescribed for becoming a statutory owner of the tenanted land. It is a well settled cannon of construction that the construction of social laws should be purposive. I am, therefore, of the view that the language of section 120 of the Tenancy Act read with its purpose and object indicates that the Collector can exercise the power of summary eviction suo motu thereunder. The contention in this regard of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, deserves to be rejected. 9. I am, therefore, of the view that the language of section 120 of the Tenancy Act read with its purpose and object indicates that the Collector can exercise the power of summary eviction suo motu thereunder. The contention in this regard of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, deserves to be rejected. 9. Even otherwise, since it is the view of this Court that no period of limitation applies to an application under section 120 of the Tenancy Act, no useful purpose would be served by giving effect to the above contention urged on behalf of the petitioner because the respondents 1 to 4 can move the Collector under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act again at any time. It may also be seen that even assuming that I could have been persuaded to accept the above contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, in my view this is not a fit case for exercising discretion in his favour because the fats of the instant case are so patent that it cannot but be held that the petitioner is a trespasser since admittedly the learned A.L.T. has conferred statutory rights of ownership upon the respondents 1 to 4. 10. Lastly, it is urged on behalf of the petitioner that the order of the learned A.L.T. conferring statutory rights of ownership on the respondents 1 to 4 is itself illegal and without jurisdiction because the respondents 1 to 4 were not in possession of the suit field on the relevant date i.e. 1-4-1961. The above question urged on behalf of the petitioner raises a question of fact and, therefore, it cannot be allowed to be raised in these proceedings under section 120-C of the Tenancy Act, because per se the order of the learned A.L.T. cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. It my be seen that it was open to the original tenure holder to challenge the said order of the learned A.L.T. which he has not done. The respondents 1 to 4 have become not only the statutory owners of the suit field but they have thereafter paid the purchase price also as fixed by the learned A.L.T. The above contention on behalf of the petitioner, therefore, cannot be accepted. In the result, the instant writ petition fails and is dismissed. The respondents 1 to 4 have become not only the statutory owners of the suit field but they have thereafter paid the purchase price also as fixed by the learned A.L.T. The above contention on behalf of the petitioner, therefore, cannot be accepted. In the result, the instant writ petition fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs in this petition. Petition dismissed. -----