JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE order in this petition shall also govern the disposal of miscellaneous Petitons Nos. 1197 of 1985, 1257 of 1985, 1277 of 1985, 1291 of 1985, 1346 of 1985, 1430 of 1985, 1754 of 1985, 1813 of 1985, 1814 of 1985, 1916 of 1985, 1966 of 1985, 1989 of 1985, 2045 of 1985, 2076 of 1985, 2250 of 1985,2317 of 1985,2368 of 1985, 2394 of 1985, 2531 of 1985, 2597 of 1985, 2885 of 1985, 2917 of 1985, 2264 of 1985, 338 of 1986, 1341 of 1986, 2387 of 1986, 3148 of 1986, 3431 of 1986 and Miscellaneous Civil case No. 38 of 1986. ( 2. ) THE petitioners in all these writ petitions pray for a direction for appointment to the vacant posts of registration moharrirs in the department of registration. Their claim is that quite a few of them had been working against such post on ad hoc basis for good number of years although those appointments were intermittently terminated and fresh appointments were given to them. It appears that the State Government wanted to make regular appointments against these posts. For that purpose applications were invited by a notification and an examination was held on 20-6-1983. A list of successful candidates was then published under the signatures of Assistant Inspector General registration. It is Annexure P/2 in Miscellaneous Petition No. 3300 of 1985. As many as 168 candidates were declared successful. The petitioners barring a few, are among those successful candidates. Respondents 3, 4 and 5 were also declared successful in that examination and their names also find place in Annexure P/2. Respondent No. 5 manoharlal Mishra is at serial No. 33 in that list. He was given the appointment as in spite of the petitioners being declared successful at the examination and as in spite of their being included in the list Annexure P/2, they except respondent No. 5, were not given any appointment, two of them, viz. , respondents 2 and 4, filed petitions before this court for a direction to the State Government to appoint them as registration moharrirs. These writ petitions were registered as Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 2826 of 1983 and 2862 of 1983. A similar petition was filed at Gwalior Bench of this Court and was registered as Miscellaneous Petition No. 488 of 1983. , respondents 2 and 4, filed petitions before this court for a direction to the State Government to appoint them as registration moharrirs. These writ petitions were registered as Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 2826 of 1983 and 2862 of 1983. A similar petition was filed at Gwalior Bench of this Court and was registered as Miscellaneous Petition No. 488 of 1983. All these petitions were allowed and a direction was issued to the State Government to appoint the petitioners in those writ petitions. Consequently, respondent No. 3 Sushil Kumar Jain, respondent No. 4 Rajkumar Chourasia and Shri Tulsiram Pemde were appointed. ( 3. ) MEANWHILE, the State Government issued notices to all the applicants including the petitioners to take further examination. This was termed as "final examination" (ANTIM PARIKSHA ). A copy of such notices is Annexure P/3 and is dated 21-11-1983. The notice makes it obligatory for the candidates to appear at that examination and it further indicates that no second opportunity shall be given for that purpose. The petitioners are aggrieved by this direction of the State Government contained in Anneuxre P/3 asking to appear at that examination after their being declared successful at the earlier examination, vide list Annexure P/2. Their contention is that a second examination was contemplated at no stage and the first examination held was final for all purposes. The list prepared vide Annexure P/2 was arranged in order of merit and so long as vacancies existed, the State Government has no option but to make appointments in accordance with the list so prepared. ( 4. ) THE petitioners further plead that the decisions in Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 2862 of 1983 and 2826 of 1983, decided on 24-7-1984 (copy of order Annexure P/4)operate as res judicata and bind the State Government which now cannot resist the petitioners claim for appointment in order they have been shown in the list Annexure p/2. It may be mentioned that at an earlier stage the State Government filed return in which certain admissions were made in petitioners favour. However, later another return was filed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 338 of 1986 danying the petitioners claim on certain grounds which were neither agitated while contesting the claim made in miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 2862 of 1983 and 2826 of 1983 nor was put forward when returns were exhibited in few of these petitions earlier. However, later another return was filed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 338 of 1986 danying the petitioners claim on certain grounds which were neither agitated while contesting the claim made in miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 2862 of 1983 and 2826 of 1983 nor was put forward when returns were exhibited in few of these petitions earlier. The State Government has also made applications to withdraw such returns and to substitute by fresh returns as in miscellaneous Petition No. 338 of 1986. The result is that the State Government now wants the Court to look into and consider the plea raised in the return filed in miscelleneous Petition No. 338 of 1986. These applications for amending the return are also to be disposed of by this order. In this regard, the petitioners, contention is that the subsequent returns seeking to amend the previous returns have the effect of withdrawing the admissions made in petitioners favour and thus deprive them of the valuable right accrued to them by those admissions. They also say that in these subsequent returns the State Government has condemned certain act of their own employees and as those employees are not parties to these writ petitions, those allegations cannot be looked into. Their further contention is that the first examination culminating in the publication of merit list of successful candidates, vide Annexure P/2 has neither been withdrawn nor cancelled so far and the action of the State Government in withholding appointments pursuant to the list is not only illegal but also mala fide. ( 5. ) A section of the petitioners claims that they have been working against the posts of registration moharrirs continuously for many years. Although such appointments were termed as ad hoc appointments, they have become entitled to be regularised against those posts particularly because a few of them have now even crossed the upper age limit for appointment in the service of the State of M. P. They also allege that the State Government represented that such persons working as registration moharrirs on ad hoc basis shall be regularised (Annexure-A in Miscellaneous Petition no. 3148 of 1986 ). Pursuant to such representation they continued to work against those posts and sought no appointments elsewhere. 3148 of 1986 ). Pursuant to such representation they continued to work against those posts and sought no appointments elsewhere. They therefore, assert that the State government is now stopped from going back on their representation and are under an obligation to regularise their appointments as registration moharrirs as they are otherwise qualified to be so appointed. In Miscellaneous Petition No. 1745 of 1985, certain petitioners have claimed that the legibility qualification regarding upper age limit should be relaxed in their cases as they had been working against those posts on ad hoc basis for more than five years or so. They pray that they also be allowed to compete and till then be retained in service. Such is also the case of petitioner Mannibai in miscellaneous Petition No. 2917 of 1985. ( 6. ) AS we have earlier stated, the contention of the State Government while resisting the petitioners claim has earlier been that the first examination held on 20-6-1983 was only for a preliminary selection and a final examination was held on 29-12-1983. Almost all the petitioners excepting those who had then become ineligible because of their having crossed the upper age limit prescribed for appointment in the service of State of M. P. appeared at that second examination. The result of that examination was stayed by order of the Gwalior Bench in Miscellaneous Petition No. 488 of 1983. The State, submitted that they had a right to hold second examination and they are perfectly justified in doing so. They allege that the appointments cannot be made in accordance with the list Annexure P/2. They deny that the decisions in earlier writ petitions referred to above, operate as res judicata and assert that the decisions rendered in those petitions cannot be held as judgment in rem. It is said that the material facts could not be placed before the Court then. They also say that there had never been any promise on behalf of the State Government to appoint the persons declared successful at the earlier examination and the Government still has authority to make no appointment at all. The assertion is that no appointments have been made as a consequence of selection declared vide Annexure P/2 and the State Government took decision to make no appointments of the candidates so declared successful. The assertion is that no appointments have been made as a consequence of selection declared vide Annexure P/2 and the State Government took decision to make no appointments of the candidates so declared successful. Respondent No. 5 was appointed as his representation made even before the selection was accepted and not because he was found successful at the examination. Respondents 3 and 4, viz. , Sushil Kumar Jain and Rajkumar Chourasia and Shri Tulsiram Pemde had to be appointed pursuant to the writs issued by this Court in the respective writ petitions filed by them. ( 7. ) CONTESTING the petitioners contention that the returns could not be amended, the submission on behalf of the State Government is that before the final decision the returns can always be amended with the leave of the Court and it is claimed that in view of the further scrutiny of the answer books disclosing application of unfair means and favouritism, the State Government is entitled to leave to amend the returns. Admissions even in pleading can be explained at subsequent stage and even be withdrawn like any other admission. It is submitted that certain officers of the State Government including deputy Inspector General of Registration mistakenly admitted the petitioners claim and action is being taken against him for so doing. Learned Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the State, placed before the Court at the time of hearing the relevant record in that behalf. It was added that the Court should not sit as a dumb observer and when facts having a direct consequence upon the controversies raised have been brought to its notice, the Court is bound to look into it particularly while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. ( 8. ) ANSWERING the claim of some of the petitioners to regularise their ad hoc/temporary appointments for the reason of their holding of this office for a pretty long period, it was submitted on behalf of the State that temporary moharrirs on ad hoc basis are appointed from time to time in accordance with the provisions contained in the registration Manual and with the approval of the Inspector General of Registration to meet the rush of work of registration of documents during certain period. Such appointments are not against any service Or post in a cadre. Such appointments are not against any service Or post in a cadre. It is only in terms of paragraph 64 (10) of the Registration Manual that the appointments of moharrirs against regular posts are made. The suggestion is that those petitioners who were being appointed on ad hoc basis were not appointed against any post in a cadre but were appointed temporarily for a certain period to meet the rush of work during a specified period and, therefore, by virtue of such appointments they cannot claim regular appointment as registration moharrirs. Precisely for this reason, it is denied that the state is bound by any rule of promissory estoppel to ask the petitioner to compete through examination for appointment to such posts. ( 9. ) IN the return filed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 338 of 1986, which return is not said to be the final return in all these writ petitions, it is alleged that a re-examination of the answer books shows foul play and unfair means adopted not only by the candidates but also by the valuers and the concerned officers of the State Government. The result of the examination is, therefore, vitiated for these reasons. This has led to the holding of yet another examination which alone shall now be final. Certain answer books were brought in Court and were made available at the time when the Advocate general addressed the Court. Lastly, it was submitted that almost all the petitioners who were eligible at the time of second examination have appeared at that examination and may be appointed against 116 vacant posts of Assistant Moharrirs, if they come out successful. ( 10. ) WE shall first take up the issue relating to the amendment of the returns. Earlier a detailed return filed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 1346 of 1985 was adopted for all other petitions filed till then. There it was stated that in all 180 posts of registration moharrirs were vacant and that appointment orders shall be issued as may be directed by this Court. It was also pleaded that the respondent State has taken a decision to appoint candidates on the basis of merit list according to the need of the State government. There it was stated that in all 180 posts of registration moharrirs were vacant and that appointment orders shall be issued as may be directed by this Court. It was also pleaded that the respondent State has taken a decision to appoint candidates on the basis of merit list according to the need of the State government. The substance of this return thus is that the merit list Annexure P/2 was the select list out of which candidates were to be appointed after the decision of this court in the pending petitions. When notice of writ petition in Miscellaneous Petition no. 338 of 1986 was issued to the State Government and the Inspector General registration, Bhopal, an altogether different return has been exhibited. In that a break up of the existing vacancies of registration moharrirs is as follows: ( 11. ) IT was then stated that after the result of the first examination was declared on 20-6-1983 vide Annexure P/2, the appointments could not be made because complaints regarding mal-practices adopted in that written examination were received. At some centres of examination mass copying was done with connivance of the Invigilators who were employees in the registration department and contents of question papers were leaked at certain centres. In few cases answer books were written in more than one ink. In-some handwriting on the cover page and the inner page did not tally indicating that the inner pages have been replaced. This led to re-examination of the answer books and it revealed that many of the candidates got marks far in excess of what they deserved. It is further stated that Inspector General of Registration made a report to the State government about the mal-practices adopte in that examination. Consequently, the state Government vide letter dated 3-10-1983 cancelled the examination and asked the inspector General to conduct a fresh examination at one centre. Thereupon the inspector General proposed that the first examination the result of which was declared on 20-6-1983 be treated as preliminary and a second examination to be the final examination be again given. Consquently, the second examination was given. There 733 candidates were permitted to appear but the declaration of the result of that examination has been withheld pursuant to the order of this Court referred to earlier. ( 12. Consquently, the second examination was given. There 733 candidates were permitted to appear but the declaration of the result of that examination has been withheld pursuant to the order of this Court referred to earlier. ( 12. ) MANOHARLAL Mishras appointment has been explained saying that it was done as the State Government allowed his representation on 1-9-1983. Shri M. L. Mishra was selected for appointment in the year 1971 but was not appointed. He represented for his appointment pursuant to that earlier selection. That was accepted and he was appointed only as consequence of acceptance of that representation. ( 13. ) THE position, therefore, is that while in few returns the State Government appears to be agreeable to enforce the list Annexure P/2 and make appointments accordingly while in certain other returns including the one filed in Miscellaneous petition No. 338 of 1986, the stand taken is that the first examination stands vitiated because of mal-practices adopted by the candidates and the invigilators and, therefore, that examination was cancelled and a fresh examination was directed and held. Appointments, therefore cannot be made in accordance with the first written examination. Apparently, the two stands are inconsistent with each other and, therefore, a prayer has been made for amending the earlier returns by substituting them with the like returns as has been filed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 338 of 1986. Obviously, the subsequent return which the State Government proposes to be the final return, seeks to withdraw the admission made earlier. This the Government says was due to the negligence and mistake on behalf of the officers of the State Government. One thing which, however, clear is that before the petitions could be finally heard, detailed returns denying the petitioners claim and attacking the validity of the first examination and pleading its cancellation were also filed. The Court had directed all these petitions to be heard together as they invloved a common question viz. , the enforcement of the result of the first examination and appointment in accordance with the list of successful candidates (Annexure P/2 ). We are of the opinion that since all the petitioners are filed invoking the jurisdiction and since the fairness of the examination is in question before us, it shall be just and proper to consider such pleas as have been raised in the return filed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 338 of 1986. We are of the opinion that since all the petitioners are filed invoking the jurisdiction and since the fairness of the examination is in question before us, it shall be just and proper to consider such pleas as have been raised in the return filed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 338 of 1986. A few of these petitions originally adopted the return as filed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 338 of 1986. There the returns are not in substitution of any earlier returns. In these cases, therefore, the plea as to the validity of the first examination and its cancellation shall have to be considered and adjudicated. If we reject the amendment application and do not permit returns to be substituted on withdrawal of the earliers in other groups of cases, the results may be incongruous. It will, therefore, be in the fitness of things to permit amendment of the returns as sought for and allow them to be substituted by the return as exhibited in Miscellaneous Petition No. 338 of 1986. ( 14. ) THE principal objection raised by Shri R. P. Verma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, has been that an amendment permitting withdrawal of such admissions in favour of the adversary should not be allowed. We however, are not in a position to give effect to this contention particularly in these cases. After all, the rules of procedure are only handmade to the administration of justice and are intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. Further like any other admission, a party making such admission in the pleading in entitled to withdraw it and show it to be erroneous. Such a view finds support from a decision of the Supreme Court in Panchdeo Narain Shrivastava vs. Ku. Jyoti Bahav, AIR 1983 SC 462 . It could not be demonstrated that the proposed amendment of the returns seeking to adopt the return filed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 338 of 1986 was in any way mala fide. We, therefore, allow the application filed by the respondents seeking to amend their returns in few of these cases and adopting returns filed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 338 of 1986. ( 15. ) SHRI Verma has, however, relied upon an earlier decision of the Supreme court in MA Modi Spinning and Weaving Milk Co. Ltd vs. Mis Ladha Ram and Co. ( 15. ) SHRI Verma has, however, relied upon an earlier decision of the Supreme court in MA Modi Spinning and Weaving Milk Co. Ltd vs. Mis Ladha Ram and Co. , air 1977 SC 680 , which apparently supports his contention that amendment introducing entirely different and new case and seeking to disable the adversary completely from admissions made in the pleadings should not be allowed. In that case the application proposing amendment in the written statement was made approximately after three years of the filing of the written statement. In substance the defendant wanted to withdraw the admission relating to the plaintiffs position vis-a-vis that of the defendants relating to the suit transaction. It was found that the application to amend was not bona fide and that an alternative plea already existed in paragraph 6 of the original written statement. It was specifically observed that the parties will be able to make their rival contentions on the pleadings as to the issues to be raised. The facts there were thus different. In our opinion, looking to the circumestances of the present case and on the authority of the decision in Panchdeo Narain Shrivastavas (supra) the petitioners opposition to the allowing of the applications for amending the returns on this ground cannot be accepted. ( 16. ) WE are also not impressed with the argument that because of the persons/officials who are said to have adopted unfair means at the examination are not parties to these petitions, the amendments should not be allowed. In fact, what is being shown by the amendment is that the examination stood vitiated. The plea raised is that finding the examination to be unfair and finding that mal-practices have been resorted to, the State Government cancelled that examination proposing further examination which was subsequently held. We are, therefore, not called upon on these pleadings to adjudicate upon the conduct of those officials who acted either as Invigilators or valuers of the answer books. This objection in our opinion, is therefore, completely groundless. Shri Verma, however, tries to support this contention by decision of the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Yadav vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 454 . This objection in our opinion, is therefore, completely groundless. Shri Verma, however, tries to support this contention by decision of the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Yadav vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 454 . In that case, certain selection made by the Haryana Public Service Commission to the Haryana Civil Service (executive and other allied services) was attacked on the ground that the Chairman and the Members of the Haryana Public Service Commission were not appointed according to law and that they were not possessed of integrity, calibre or qualification. Such a challenge was not permitted in collateral proceedings. With reference to the decision in raju Rangraju vs. State of A. P, AIR 1981 SC 1473 , it was observed that the appointments of Members of Haryana Public Service Commission cannot be allowed to be placed in jeopardy in a proceeding for challenging the selection made by them in a proceeding to which they were not parties. It was, however, observed in paragraph 9 of that report that the selections made by Chairman and Members of the Haryana Public service Commission may be quashed if they are found to be vitiated by the influence of extraneous considerations or made in breach of the Rules. We are of the opinion that the decision does not help the petitioners contention at all. The respondents have quashed the result of the earlier examination not because the examiners were incompetent or lacked necessary qualifications but because unfair means and mal-practices were adopted in that examination. What is alleged is that the result of that examination was influenced by unfair means. In our opinion, such a plea cannot be prevented to be raised even in absence of those who were either Invigilators or valued those answer books. ( 17. ) IN our opinion, in the circumstances of the present case, the respondents cannot be prevented from amending their returns in few of these petitions and in adopting the return filed in Miscellaneious Petition No. 338 of 1986 in all the petitions. We hereby permit the respondents to make such amendments and allow their applications in that behalf. The result is that we have now to consider the pleas raised in defence as contended in the detailed return filed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 338 of 1986. ( 18. We hereby permit the respondents to make such amendments and allow their applications in that behalf. The result is that we have now to consider the pleas raised in defence as contended in the detailed return filed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 338 of 1986. ( 18. ) COUNSEL for the petitioners were at pains to convince the Court that the findings and decision given in Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 2826 of 1983 and 2862 of 1983 and 488 of 1983 (Gwalior) operate as res judicata and, therefore, the same question cannot be reagitated. A copy of the order passed in those petitions is Annexure P/4. There it has been held that the first examination the result of which was declared vide annexure P/2 was final and as vacancies existed, the Government was bound to appoint those successful candidates as registration moharrirs in order of merit as shown in that list. Further finding recorded therein is that Shri Manoharlal Mishra has been appointed by the Government consequnt upon his being successful at this examination. It has been the contention that these findings operate as res judicata. Further submission has been that all such questions which are now sought to be raised might and ought to have been raised in defence by the State Government in those petitions. Having failed to do so the state Government is now precluded from agitating those pleas and these questions which might and ought to have been raised earlier should be deemed to be heard and finally decided against the respondents. In substance the submission was that the rule of constructive res judicata applies debarring the respondents to agitate those pleas now. In support of the plea of res judicata, reliance was placed upon explanation VI appended to Section 11, Civil Procedure Code and it is urged that the petitioners in those petitions who were persons among those declared successful vide Annexure P/2 were agitating a private right in common for themselves and similar others including the petitioners and, therefore, all these petitioners must be deemed to be claiming under the petitioners in those writ petitions. We are unable to accept this contention. ( 19. ) IT is obvious that the present petitioners were not parties to the earlier litigation, i. e. , Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 2826 of 1983, 2862 of 1983 and 488 of 1983 (Gwalior ). We are unable to accept this contention. ( 19. ) IT is obvious that the present petitioners were not parties to the earlier litigation, i. e. , Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 2826 of 1983, 2862 of 1983 and 488 of 1983 (Gwalior ). It is also not disputed that there has been no notice of the earlier writ petitions in terms of Order 1, Rule 8, Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise. The learned advocate General, appearing for the State, though conceded that the rule of constructive res judicata is applicable to the writ petitions, submitted that the earlier petitions were not filed in representative capacity nor the right claimed by those petitioners was in common for themselves and others, i. e. , present petitioners, and, therefore, it cannot be said that the present petitioners be deemed to claim under the earlier petitioners. The answer to the questions so raised will turn upon the meaning to be assigned to the terms of Explanation VI to Section 11, Civil Procedure Code. It reads thus : "11 Res judicata. No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. Explanation VI. Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. " This rule in effect forms an exception to the general principle that all persons interested in a suit litigation shall be parties thereto. It is an enabling rule of convenience prescribing the conditions upon which such persons when not made party to a suit may still be bound by the proceedings therein. Before, however, this explanation is applied, it has to be shown that the litigation was in respect of a public right or a private right claimed in common for himself and others and that the litigation was conducted bona fide. Before, however, this explanation is applied, it has to be shown that the litigation was in respect of a public right or a private right claimed in common for himself and others and that the litigation was conducted bona fide. The terms emphasise that the right must be claimed in common for himself and others, i. e. , it should be claimed in a representative capacity. The Supreme Court, in forward Construction Co. vs. Prabhat Mandal, AIR 1986 SC 391 , held that Explanation vi, Section 11 applies to public interest litigation as well but it has to be shown that the previous litigation was the public interest litigation not by way of a private grievance. It has to be bona fide litigation in respect of a right which is common and is agitated in common with others. It may be that the right claimed may be common to others but in order to make the Explanation applicable what is to be shown is that the party litigating claimed that right not only for himself but in common for others. This Explanation will not apply where all the persons intending to be represented are not necessarily interested in obtaining the relief sought for. In that event the litigation cannot be said to be a representative one. This Explanation will also not apply where the right is claimed only for the litigant itself although that right may be common to others as well. If the pleadings in the earlier litigation eliminate any trace of representation, the decision will not bind any person other than the party to the litigation even though the right claimed may be common and other persons may be equally interested therein. As pointed out by the Privy Council in the leading case of Mumaravelu vs. Ramswami, AIR 1933 PC 183, there is no bar to a member of community from maintaining a suit in his own right although the act complained of may be injurious to the whole community. It was emphasised in that case that the pleading in the earlier litigation must be cerefully scrutinised in order to know if the private right was claimed in a representative capacity and it was observed : "omission of all references to representation cannot be properly regarded as a mere question of form. " ( 20. It was emphasised in that case that the pleading in the earlier litigation must be cerefully scrutinised in order to know if the private right was claimed in a representative capacity and it was observed : "omission of all references to representation cannot be properly regarded as a mere question of form. " ( 20. ) IN Kumaravelus case (supra), the Privy Council with regard to Explanation vi to Section 11 laid down yet another important rule. It negatived the finding of the full Bench of the Madras High Court (against which the appeal was taken to the Privy council) that Explanation is not controlled by Order 1 Rule 8 Code of Civil Procedure. After tracing the history of the enactment, their Lordships concluded that the explantion is not confined to the cases covered by the rule (Order I Rule 8) but extends to include any litigation in which, apart from the Rule altogether, parties are entitled to represent interested persons other than themselves. Their Lordships then proceeded to say that before a decision in litigation can be held binding on persons not party thereto, they should have noticed and criticised the High Court of Madras while taking a contrary view and discounting altogether the requirement of notice thereby made so prominent. The observance of terms of Order 1 Rule 8 was held to be essential. This is how the matter has been put by their Lordships : "they constitute the nearest available substitute when dealing with numerous persons, scattered it may be throughout India, for the personal service upon a defendant required in the case of an ordinary suit. It is no more permissible to dispense with the one requirement than with the other if the person in view is to be bound by the decree. It may indeed be the case that in some representative suit, however, far reaching the notice, absent persons will have only a chance of knowing that litigation affecting their interests is on foot. But of that chance they are not to be deprived. It will be as good a chance as the court can give, and they are entitled to rely on the due discharge by the Court of its duty in this matter - one of the most responsible with which it could be entrusted. " It was further observed : "bona fide litigation will not excuse the neglect of statutory conditions. It will be as good a chance as the court can give, and they are entitled to rely on the due discharge by the Court of its duty in this matter - one of the most responsible with which it could be entrusted. " It was further observed : "bona fide litigation will not excuse the neglect of statutory conditions. If the litigation be not bona fide the most complete observance of these conditions will not give to the decree the force of a res judicata. " A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in Mohan Kishan vs. Ram Prasad, AIR 1949 All. 761, understood the aforesaid dicta of the Privy Council to mean that failure to comply with the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 in previous litigation will not attract the provisions of Explanation VI of Section 11 in any subsequent litigation. Although this decision of Allahabad High Court was referred to by a single Bench of the same Court in surjapati vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1981 All. 265 but this aspect of the matter was not touched at all. In that case, it was only emphasised that the earlier litigation (suit) must be bona fide but whether the procedure of notice envisaged under order 1 Rule 8 should or should not be followed before making the provisions of explanation VI to Section 11 Civil Procedure applicable was not considered. The decision of the Privy Council in Kumaravelu s case (supra) in later years was considered by the different High Courts. A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Masid Shahid ganj vs. Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1938 Lahore 369, observed : "even in 56 Mad 657 (AIR 1936p. C. 183), their Lordships of the Privy Council recognised that there may be exceptional cases where it could be shown that the omission to follow the procedure in Order 1, Rule 8, Civil Procedure Code was a technical irregularity which caused no prejudice and the litigation having been bona fide, the previous decision would be binding. " There the question was whether the decision taken by the Sikh Gurudwara Tribunal operated as res Judicata in the subsequent suit giving rise to that appeal before the Privy council. " There the question was whether the decision taken by the Sikh Gurudwara Tribunal operated as res Judicata in the subsequent suit giving rise to that appeal before the Privy council. It was held that the facts of the earlier litigation before the Sikh Gurudwara tribuanl showed that it was a representative suit by a Muslim organisation representing the Muslim community and that a notification under section 3 of that Act was issued inviting persons interested to participate in the litigation. It was held that it was incumbent upon a person interested who claimed any right, title or interest in the property to file an objection under Section 5 of the Punjab Sikh Gurudwaras Act to establish a claim. For that reason, it was held that the provisons of Order 1 Rule 8, Civil procedure Code, were not strictly applicable and even if it were held applicable the case would fall in the category of the exceptional cases referred to by their Lordships. The decision in the earlier litigation was, therefore, held as res judicata and it was so because the earlier litigation was in the representing nature and notification was poublished under that Act inviting objections. A Single Bench of the Punjab High Court in Chuhar singh vs. Raghbir Singh, AIR 1956 Pun. 241, after quoting a few passeges from kumaravelus case (supra), found a particular litigation which was sought to operate as res judicata in view of Explanation VI to Section 11, Civil Procedure Code, was really a representative one. It was found on examination of the plaint in the earlier suit that the plaintiff society there claimed the site in suit for all the proprietors and that the suit was for the benefits of the proprietors of the Patti. It was, therefore, held that the proprietors of the Patti other than those who are members of the plaintiff society would be deemed to be claiming under the proprietors of the Patti. In a subsequent decision, in Sant kewala Nand vs. Mongol Singh, AIR 1964 Pun. 227 the same High Court held that if such a highly technical view as to the compliance of Order 1 Rule 8 is taken for the purpose of explanation VI to section 11 Civil Procedure Code, the purpose itself shall be defeated. In a subsequent decision, in Sant kewala Nand vs. Mongol Singh, AIR 1964 Pun. 227 the same High Court held that if such a highly technical view as to the compliance of Order 1 Rule 8 is taken for the purpose of explanation VI to section 11 Civil Procedure Code, the purpose itself shall be defeated. In that case, it was held that it must be presumed to have come to the notice of all the residents by proclamation in the village though names of six and seven remained to be included in the list of proclamation. On facts, therefore, it was held that there being a general proclamation in the village, the matter be presumed to have come to knowledge of all the residents that die disputes raised in the subsequent suit were before the Court in the earlier suit and if the plaintiff in the subsequent suit failed to make them parties in the earlier suit, they cannot be allowed to raise the controversy once again after the same has been decided. Emphasis seems to be laid upon the knowledge of the earlier litigation to the subsequent litigants who are sought to be found by the earlier decision and its representative character. In Manathunainatha vs. Sundaralingem, AIR 1971 Mad. 1 , it was held that although in the earlier suit which was one for joint management of a temple where all persons interested in the management were made parties, the decision in the earlier suit would operate res judicata as the plaintiff in the subsequent suit were fully represented in the former suit although the former suit was not under Order 1, Rule 8, Civil Procedure Code. In Venkatashwara Prabhu vs. Krishna prabhu, AIR 1977 SC 1268 the following passage from Kumaravelus case (supra) was referred : "explanation 6 is not confined to cases covered by O. 1 R. 8 but extends to include any litigation in which, apart from the Rule altogether, parties are entitled to represent interested persons other than themselves. " There, Lordships were dealing with a partition suit. It was observed that in a partition suit each party claiming that the property is joint, asserts a right and litigates under a title which is common to other who make identical claims. " There, Lordships were dealing with a partition suit. It was observed that in a partition suit each party claiming that the property is joint, asserts a right and litigates under a title which is common to other who make identical claims. If that very issue is litigated in another suit and decided, we do not see why the others making the same claim cannot be held to have a right in common for themselves and others. Each of them can be deemed, by reason of Explanation VI, to represent all those the nature of whose claims and interests are common or identical. a reference to the above decisions where Kumaravelus case (supra) has referred to, applied, explained, understood and distinguished shows that in order to attract the provisions of Explanation VI to Section 11, Civil Procedure Code, it is of the essence that the earlier litigation should be bona fide litigation and that the private right claimed must be common to all those who are sought to be bound by that decision although were not parties to it. The stress, therefore, is that the earlier suit should be a representative suit. It must be demonstrated that those who were not parties to the earlier litigation but are sought to be bound by it must have had a knowledge of that litigation either in terms of the provisions of any specific statute or under Order 1 Rule 8 Civil Procedure Code. If by inadvertence, the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 Civil Procedure Code was not complied with and even if strict compliance is not necessary or even ignored as a mere irregularity, yet it has to be demonstrated by a party who seeks to bind persons not parties to the earlier litigation by a decision in that litigation, that there had been a notice to them and that the litigation was in fact brought and bona fide litigated in a representative capacity in respect of a private right common to all of them. Unless this is done, it will be difficult to hold the earlier litigation binding upon persons not parties there to for then it will not be possible to say that those persons must be deemed to claim under those persons who were litigating earlier. ( 21. ) THE pleadings in the earlier litigation are set out in sufficient details in order annexure P/4. ( 21. ) THE pleadings in the earlier litigation are set out in sufficient details in order annexure P/4. The claim therein was that no appointment of Manoharlal Mishra, the petitioners were discriminated when their appointments were withheld. They allege that the first examination was final and that the petitioners who came out successful in that examination must be appointed. The Court there held that the petitioners who also like Manoharlal Mishra successfully passed that examination should not be allowed to suffer the vice of discrimination and should be appointed. This is how in paragraph 5 of the order, the Court expressed itself: "in view of the discussion aforesaid, it must be held that the petitioners having successfully passed the departmental examination on 20-6-1983, have become entitled to an appointment on the basis of their placement in the list of successful candidates in the same manner as such an appointment had been given to the respondent No. 3". it nowhere indicates that any public notice of those proceedings was given. At all events from the date of filing upto the issuance of the writ, those petitions were one "from which every trace of representation was eliminated. " For the aforesaid reasons, the respondents not parties to earlier litigations cannot be debarred from agitating the same question or even such questions which might and ought to have been raised in those petitions in defence in the present set of petitions, by force of Section 11, Explanation iv and VI, Civil Procedure Code. ( 22. ) THERE, however, appears some force in the contention that the first examination, the result of which was declared by publication of the list of successful candidates vide Annexure P/2 was never intended to be preliminary or as an interim measure. For all intent and purposes, it was a step towards final selection and the list annexure P/2 also gives a similar indication. Even the stand taken by the State government in the previous litigation, i. e. Miscellaneous Petition Nos. 2826 of 1983, 2862 of 1983 and 488 of 1983 (Gwalior), indicates that only one examination was to be given for purposes of selection. However, the stand now is that mass copying were resorted to by the candidates and the invigilators connived. The valuation was not impartial and the examination of answer books shows not only fabrication and interpolation but also favouritism. However, the stand now is that mass copying were resorted to by the candidates and the invigilators connived. The valuation was not impartial and the examination of answer books shows not only fabrication and interpolation but also favouritism. That examination was, therefore, scraped and a fresh examination was directed. The State Government has not charged any individual with unfair means so as to entitle that individual to an opportunity to defend. The stand clearly is that on re-examination of the answer books and on enquiry the authorities, viz. , the Inspector General of Registration, were satisfied (and whose recommendation the State Government accepted) that the majority of candidates adopted unfair means and that the answer books show favouritism. To support this a few answer books were placed before the Court. We perused them and we are of opinion that the State was right in concluding that the whole examination should be cancelled. Such a course has been held permissible by the Supreme Court in Bihar School Examination Board vs. Subhas chandra, AIR 1970 SC 1269 , wherein it has been emphasized that in such a case notice to show cause to any individual examinee or the candidate is not necessary as the charge is not levelled against any particular individual but the entire examination is said to be vitiated by practising unfair means on a mass scale. That being so, we are of opinion that the action of the State Government in scraping the first examination and in directing the second examination cannot be questioned. The petitioners, therefore, are not entitled to any direction to enforce the result of the first examination and for a further direction to appoint all those who figured in Annexure P/2 as registration moharrirs. ( 23. ) WITH this conclusion, the question whether the State is bound to appoint persons declared successful at the first examination if the vacancy exists is rendered little more than academic. We will, therefore, leave that question undecided although numerous authorities were cited at the Bar in support of rival contentions in that behalf. ( 24. ) THIS now brings us to the last question which was agitated with great deal of vehemence by sarvashri Ravindra Shrivastava, appearing for the petitioners in Misc. Petition No. 3148/83, P. D. Tiwari appearing for the petitioner in Misc. Petition No 1754/85 and 2368/85, A. K. Jain in Misc. ( 24. ) THIS now brings us to the last question which was agitated with great deal of vehemence by sarvashri Ravindra Shrivastava, appearing for the petitioners in Misc. Petition No. 3148/83, P. D. Tiwari appearing for the petitioner in Misc. Petition No 1754/85 and 2368/85, A. K. Jain in Misc. Petition No. 1277/85 and K. N. Agarwal in M. P. No. 2197/85. The contention has been that quite since a few of the petitioners had been working as registration moharrirs on ad hoc basis for a long period although intermittently, their appointment should be directed to be regularised against those posts. Rule of promissory estoppel was called into aid with reference to Annexure A in m. P. No. 3148/86. To this the reply on behalf of the State Government is that the ad hoc/temporary appointments as registration moharrirs were made to meet unusual rush of work in busy season. Such appointments were not against any existing post and there had been no promise either express or implied for continuance or for their absorption against vacancies in the cadre posts. Reference was made to clause 27 of the registration Manual which reads as under : "27. Temporary Moharrirs -To meet any unusual rush of work in the busy season the I. G. R. will sanction temporary R. Ms. to registration offices. It should, however, be noted that the services of temporary R. Ms. should be dispensed with as soon as the necessity of them ceases, irrespective of the period for which sanction may have been accorded. D. Rs. should not recommended the appointment of the temporary r. Ms. unless they are satisfied that the permanent staff is capable to cope with the work inspite of hard work. Particular care should be taken to ensure that s. Rs. do not apply for temporary help in order to cover their own slackness. " the submission made on behalf of the State Government appears to have force. As appears from clause 27 of the Registration Manual, the Inspector General Registration may sanction temporary posts of registration moharrirs in different registration offices to meet any unusual rush of work in a busy season. There is a clear direction in unequivocal terms that such appointment should be dispensed with as soon as the necessity ceases, irrespective of period for which the sanction was accorded. There is a clear direction in unequivocal terms that such appointment should be dispensed with as soon as the necessity ceases, irrespective of period for which the sanction was accorded. That the appointments were so made in terms of clause 27 is reflected in Annexure P/13 which has been filed by the petitioners themselves in Miscellaneous Petiton No. 3148 of 1986. it is clear from that order that in certain registration offices temporary registration moharrirs were permitted to be appointed for specified period to meet the rush of work and it was made clear that it was only a temporary arrangement to meet the existing need. It was also made clear in paragraph 3 of that order that the period so served by any appointee shall not be excluded from computing his age for appointment as registration moharrirs. Yet another document to which reference in this regard be made is annexure P/17 filed in that very petition. We are, therefore, of opinion that on the basis of such appointments expressly made in accordance with paragraph 27 of the registration manual, the petitioners cannot claim a direction for continuance or for regularisation of the appointments. Paragraph 64. (10) of the Manual prescribed procedure for appointments of registration moharrirs against regular posts. Under these circumstances, the petitioners cannot claim a direction for regularisation of their appointment as registration moharrirs. ( 25. ) REFERENCE, however, was made by the petitioners counsel to a few decisions which according to them, support their contention. These are Surya Narain Yadav vs. Bihar State Electricity Board, AIR 1985 SC 941 , Dhirendra Chamoli vs. State of U. P. , 1986 (1) SCC 637 , and Rattanlal vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1987sc478. In the first case, certain trainee engineers appointed in service of the Bihar State Electricity Board, claimed continuance or regularisation of their appointments. These are Surya Narain Yadav vs. Bihar State Electricity Board, AIR 1985 SC 941 , Dhirendra Chamoli vs. State of U. P. , 1986 (1) SCC 637 , and Rattanlal vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1987sc478. In the first case, certain trainee engineers appointed in service of the Bihar State Electricity Board, claimed continuance or regularisation of their appointments. The circumstances found were : (i) the Board did represent to the trainee engineers from time to time that after their training was completed, they would be absorbed in regular appointments of the board, (ii) when some of the engineers were getting age bar for Government employment and had left the Board, they were told to come back under temptation of getting permanent employment in the Board, (iii)when the Board was reeling under a strike of its employees, the trainee engineers had stood by the Board to keep up the generation and distribution of electricity and had been assured of absorption; and (iv)the Board had decided to absorb them on permanent basis but initially on a probation of two years without conducting any further examination. It was under these circumstances that it was held that the Electricity Board was bound to regularise the appointments of those who had been taken as trainee engineers initially and had been continued since long to be in the employment of the Board. The facts in the present case given a contra indication. The appointments were made under specific provision of the registration Manual which clearly indicated that the appointments were made specifically to meet a specific contingency, viz. , rush of work in certain registration offices, during a specified period. The decision, therefore, is clearly distinguishable on its own facts and has no application here. In the second case, certain persons were employed as casual workers in an organisation named nehru Yuvak Kendra. Such casual appointments were invoked for a long period of about twelve years. When such appointments were terminated and the termination was questioned, the defence raised was that as the organisation itself was temporary there were no sanctioned posts of class iv employees against which the workers could be appointed. The Court expressed the hope that in different Yuvak Kendras shall sanction certain posts against which those casual workers could be absorbed on regular basis. The Court expressed the hope that in different Yuvak Kendras shall sanction certain posts against which those casual workers could be absorbed on regular basis. It was observed that it is not desirable that any management and particularly the Central Government should continue to employ persons on casual basis in an organisation which has been in existence for twelve years. Clearly in our opinion, this case renders no help to the petitioners. Since petitioners appointments as registration Moharrirs on ad hoc basis were not against any existing posts (although such posts did exist in the cadre) and as stated earlier, were only to meet a given contingency, a direction or hope as expressed by the Supreme Court, cannot be made here. The third case is also of little assistance to the petitioners. There certain teachers were appointed in a given academic year and their service were terminated before the summer vacation. Such policy was condemned and was held to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. A direction was issued to the State Government to make appointments as per rule and fill up vacancies in which teachers on ad hoc basis were then working. In the instant case, the government had actually advertised the posts and has conducted a test to select person for appointment against existing contingencies. Those including persons had worked or were working as registration moharrirs in terms of paragraph 27 of the Registration manual, were also permitted to compete, if they were otherwise eligible so to do. They had taken the examination and can be appointed only if they succeed. ( 26. ) THE argument that the State Government is stopped to terminate the appointments because of its representation made vide Annexure A in Miscellaneous petition No. 3148 of 1986 is also devoid of any substance. Properly read, this document only indicates that whenever appointments are made against the posts sanctioned in different registration offices in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Manual, such persons alone if available shall be appointed who had earlier worked against those posts and had thus acquired some experience. The practice to recruit absolutely raw hands without prior experience was depricated. It is difficult to infer any promise from this communication. Besides this the petitioners have no other material from which a promise on behalf of the State Government is inferred. The practice to recruit absolutely raw hands without prior experience was depricated. It is difficult to infer any promise from this communication. Besides this the petitioners have no other material from which a promise on behalf of the State Government is inferred. As pointed out in M/s. Motilal padampat Sugar Mills vs. State of U. P. , AIR 1979 SC 621 , the essence of doctrine of promissory estoppel is that where one party by its words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. We are of opinion that the petitioners have placed no such material on record which may permit the Court to hold the State bound by any promise. This submission made on behalf of the petitioners also is thus rejected. ( 27. ) IT was also suggested that out of list Annexure P/2 certain persons have been appointed as registration moharrirs and thus this list has been acted upon by the government. It is, however, clear that the appointments have been made following the directions issued by this Court in the writ petitions filed by those persons. This circumstance, therefore, is of no consequence and does little to tilt the scale in petitioners favour. ( 28. ) AS regards Miscellaneous Civil No. 38 of 1986 which is one for taking action against certain officers of the State Government in Registration Department for disobedience of some interim order of this Court passed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 1197 of 1985, rule nisi was issued. However, in view of our aforesaid findings, we feel that no further action is necessary and the rule issued is discharged. ( 29. ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, all the petitions are dismissed. However, in view of our aforesaid findings, we feel that no further action is necessary and the rule issued is discharged. ( 29. ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, all the petitions are dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Security amount, if any, be refunded to the petitioners. Petitions dismissed.