JUDGMENT - R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---The appellant, hereinafter referred to as "the accused," has been convicted for an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code by the learned Sessions Judge of Jalgaon in Sessions Case No. 58 of 1983 by his judgment and order dated 30th of November, 1983. By the same order the accused has been sentenced to imprisonment for life. 2. Facts leading to the prosecution must be briefly stated in order to understand the judgment of the Court below and the arguments advanced before this Court challenging the said order of conviction and sentence. The deceased was one Pandit Sukdev Pachonde of Village Tarkhede in Pachora Taluka of Jalgaon District. On 9th of May, 1983, the said Pandit Sukdev and the accused were seen together by at least three persons, two of whom have been examined as prosecution witnesses, in a field belonging to one Narayan Savaji. That field was situated in Village Galan Khurd, also in Pachora Taluka. Some enmity between the deceased and the accused was sought to be established by the prosecution. However, it is not necessary to refer to the same because ultimately the question as to whether the accused is guilty of the offence for which he has been convicted will have to be answered on the basis of the testimonies of two persons who claimed themselves to be eye-witnesses. These two persons namely Bhangraj Gangaram Pawar, examined as P.W. 4 and Chunilal Chandrasing Rathod, examined as P.W. 5, say that at about 4 p.m. on 9th of May, 1983, when they along with the father of P.W. 4 Bhangraj were returning to their village after attending the Bazar day of Village Nagardevala, they noticed the accused and the deceased in the field of Narayan Savaji. They were at that time standing under a Behada tree. Though both these witnesses say that they thought that the accused would steal mangoes, still they did not take any immediate steps. On the other hand, they went to their village and returned to the field of Narayan Savaji on bicycle. At that time on Vishwanath had also accompanied them, but the said Vishwanath has not been examined by the prosecution. 3. On the other hand, they went to their village and returned to the field of Narayan Savaji on bicycle. At that time on Vishwanath had also accompanied them, but the said Vishwanath has not been examined by the prosecution. 3. It is the prosecution case, as unfolded through the testimonies of these two witnesses, that at that time the accused had felled down the deceased by giving him blows with weapons which have been described as blades of harrow. The accused was also abusing the deceased for having not returned an amount of Rs. 80 which the deceased owed on account of consumption of liquor. It has been alleged by the prosecution that after so assaulting the deceased the accused lifted him and took him to the field of Jagan Patil where he was thrown away. These witnesses who returned to their home did not inform anyone about the incident. P.W. 4 Bhangraj, however, says that he informed his father but his father has not been examined. 4. On 10th of May, 1983, the dead body of the deceased was discovered by some persons. Information about the same was relayed to the Police Patil of the village who in turn informed the police station at Pachora. Investigation was taken up. Statements of the two persons who formed the very foundation of the prosecution in this case were recorded as late as on 19th of May, 1983. Statement of another witness, namely Shivaji Shankar (P.W. 8), was recorded on 20th of May, 1983. It is thus clear that for nearly ten days after the incident took place the two key prosecution witnesses, namely P.W. 4 Bhangraj and P.W. 5 Chunilal, had not disclosed to anyone the fact of the assault made by the accused on the deceased on the evening of 9th May, 1983. 5. In due course the body was subjected to postmortem. Consistent with the usual practice of Indian Police, discovery under section 27 of the Evidence Act was made by the accused of the two blades of a harrow alleged to have been hidden in a dung-heap. One shirt worn by the accused was also attached. The said shirt along with the blades of the harrow was sent to the Chemical Analyser. The Chemical Analyser has given his report that these articles were stained with human blood, but the group of the blood itself could not be determined. One shirt worn by the accused was also attached. The said shirt along with the blades of the harrow was sent to the Chemical Analyser. The Chemical Analyser has given his report that these articles were stained with human blood, but the group of the blood itself could not be determined. The description of the shirt worn by the accused, namely Article 17, is that it was having few bloodstains of about 0.1 cm. to 2 cm. in diameter. Apart from the improbability of a person wearing bloodstained shirt for eleven days after having committed such a heinous crime as murder, this piece of evidence, in my case, does not connect the accused with the crime in question because, in the first place, there were only few bloodstains on the shirt as compared to large-scale bloodstains normally to be expected looking to the nature of the injury on the deceased and, secondly, the blood itself, which is found on Article 17, is not shown to belong to the same group to which the blood of the deceased belonged, namely group `B'. 6. In support of its case, the prosecution examined, naturally, two persons who claimed to be eye-witnesses. The prosecution also examined one Shivaji Shankar as P.W. 8 in order to prove the possession of two blades of harrow by the accused on the date of the incident. Police Patil Pitamber Patil has been examined as P.W. 2. Evidence of motive, namely robbery of Rs.100/- which the deceased is alleged to have possessed at the time of the incident, was also sought to be proved by the prosecution by examining one person, namely Shantaram Patil, examined as P.W. 6. The learned Sessions Judge was sufficiently impressed by the prosecution evidence which was led before him to convict the accused of the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and to sentence him as mentioned earlier in this judgment. The said order of conviction and sentence is challenged in this appeal. Mr. P.L. Shetty, learned Advocate, appears in support of the appeal. 7. Mr. Shetty has contended, and rightly, that ultimately the prosecution case must stand or fall on the credibility of the three prosecution witnesses, namely P.W. 4 Bhangraj, P.W. 5 Chunilal and P.W. 8 Shivaji Shankar. The said order of conviction and sentence is challenged in this appeal. Mr. P.L. Shetty, learned Advocate, appears in support of the appeal. 7. Mr. Shetty has contended, and rightly, that ultimately the prosecution case must stand or fall on the credibility of the three prosecution witnesses, namely P.W. 4 Bhangraj, P.W. 5 Chunilal and P.W. 8 Shivaji Shankar. If the testimonies of these three witnesses are not found acceptable, then the conviction recorded against the accused will, naturally, have to be set aside. This submission of Mr. Shetty is fully justified because the other evidence which has been led on behalf of the prosecution, namely evidence relating to the motive and to the discovery of Articles 18 and 19, is not inconsistent with the innocence of the accused. In any case, the said evidence does not connect the accused with the murder for which he has been charged. One must, therefore, proceed to examine the testimonies of the two eye-witnesses and one witness who claims to prove that the accused was in possession of the weapons of offence. 8. P.W. 4 Bhangraj states that on the day on which the incident took place, he himself, his father Gangaram and his uncle Chunilal had been to Village Nagardevala to attend the Bazar. They had gone to the Bazar in a bullock-cart. When they were returning to their village at about 4 p.m., they saw the accused and one person of Tarkheda village standing under a Behada tree on the Bandh of one field. Thereafter he states as follows :--- "As soon as we saw the accused, we thought that he would steal the mangoes and therefore, after reaching home we took bicycle and went towards the field of Narayan Savaji in order to guard the mango tree which was standing there." One Vishwanath had accompanied them. When Bhangraj had reached the place along with Chunilal and Vishwanath, the accused was hitting that other person whose name they did not know at that time, with the blade of harrow on his stomach, back and head. The incident was seen by these persons from a distance of about 30 to 35 feet. After the person had fallen down the accused had given him kicks and also heaped certain abuses upon him. Thereafter he was removed from that place and thrown in the land of a neighbour called Jagan Patil. The incident was seen by these persons from a distance of about 30 to 35 feet. After the person had fallen down the accused had given him kicks and also heaped certain abuses upon him. Thereafter he was removed from that place and thrown in the land of a neighbour called Jagan Patil. The assaulted person was recognised by this witness and the other witness Chunilal as a person belonging to village Tarkhede, though his name was not known to them. The maternal uncle of the deceased person resided in the same village in which this witness and Chunilal reside. On the next day this witness came to know that the person who was assaulted by the accused was dead. Still he did not inform about the incident to other persons due to fear of the accused. 9. In the cross-examination P.W. 4 Bhangraj has stated that the field of Narayan Savaji is situated at a distance of about two miles from his house. Though Vishwanath had accompanied him and Chunilal, he did not make any inquiry as to why the accused was assaulting the deceased. This witness claims that he had informed the name of the accused to Vishwanath. It is interesting to note that though Vishwanath was present to be examined, because he was shown to one of the witnesses in the Court, he was not in fact examined by the prosecution. Witness Bhangraj has specifically stated that he had not informed the Police Patil about the incident. He did not inform about the incident to anybody except to his father. The father, however, has not been examined. The reason given by him for not informing about the incident to others was the fear of the accused. 10. The question now is whether the testimony of this witness can be accepted. Mr. Shetty has rightly contended that this testimony cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the conduct of this witness immediately before, at the time and after the incident is wholly unnatural. The testimony of a witness, though given traditionally on oath in the Court, has still to be judged by the Court on the basis of the probabilities of the case and the conduct of the witness. If there is inherently something improbable in the testimony of a witness, then the question of seeking corroboration to it does not arise. The testimony of a witness, though given traditionally on oath in the Court, has still to be judged by the Court on the basis of the probabilities of the case and the conduct of the witness. If there is inherently something improbable in the testimony of a witness, then the question of seeking corroboration to it does not arise. One need not ask a question as to why a particular witness is deposing on oath in a particular manner if the testimony itself is found to be unacceptable for one or the other reason. The acceptability of the testimony of a witness is not determined by the mere fact that testimony is given on oath. Though there is sanctity to oath, this sanctity is not always recognised by the witnesses. If merely because a witness has stated something on oath the Court accepts it, then the Court would be failing in its duty of testing the veracity of the testimonies given in the Court. 11. There is no particular cross-examination by which the credibility, of a witness can be judged. It is to be weighed and examined in the light of normal human conduct, the probabilities of the incident deposed to by the witness and, in certain cases, by the subsequent conduct displayed by that particular witness. As a rule, one would normally seek corroboration to the testimony of a witness, especially when there is something improbable in the testimony of that witness. In law, undoubtedly, the testimony of a single witness can be made the sole basis of conviction. However, as a rule of prudence, Courts have always insisted on corroboration, especially in criminal cases. 12. Now to test the credibility of this witness, namely P.W. 4 Bhangraj, one would notice that he has stated that as soon as he and the other person saw the accused standing under the Behada tree along with another person, they thought that he, namely the accused, would steal the mangoes. If this was so, one does not understand as to why this witness and P.W. 5 Chunilal, who, as it will be seen later, was specifically entrusted with the task of guarding the mango tree, did not immediately get down to see that the accused would not pursue his nefarious act. If this was so, one does not understand as to why this witness and P.W. 5 Chunilal, who, as it will be seen later, was specifically entrusted with the task of guarding the mango tree, did not immediately get down to see that the accused would not pursue his nefarious act. On the other hand, they quietly go home and return to do the proverbial job of locking the stable after the horse is stolen. They return on bicycles and come to the field of Narayan Savaji, in whose land the mango trees were standing. This conduct of this witness as well as that of Chunilal is hopelessly unnatural, suggesting that on their way to their village from the Nagardevala Bazar they had not seen the accused at all. In any case, if they had seen the accused it is impossible that they could think that the accused would steal the mangoes. 13. Coupled with this is the hopelessly improbable conduct of this witness of not informing any other person, except his father, about the incident that took place on that day. The assault that this person along with Chunilal witnessed was of such a grievous kind that it would be regarded as an act of irresponsibility not to disclose the same to the persons in the village. The witness has graphically, described the manner in which the accused assaulted the deceased. The assault was made by the blades of a harrow on the stomach, back and head of the deceased. After the deceased had fallen on the ground, the accused according to this witness, gave two kicks on his stomach and abused him for not having paid the amount which the deceased owed to the accused on account of the liquor consumed by the deceased. The witness has even made himself bold to say that the accused looked at him and others and threatened them as to whether they would go away or they should also be beaten. Hence this witness and others retreated. 14. This witness knew that the maternal uncle of the deceased resides in the same village in which this witness resides. It is, therefore inconceivable that P.W. 4 Bhangraj would not disclose the incident to the maternal uncle of the deceased. It is also inconceivable that he would not disclose about the incident to anyone else in the village except his father. It is, therefore inconceivable that P.W. 4 Bhangraj would not disclose the incident to the maternal uncle of the deceased. It is also inconceivable that he would not disclose about the incident to anyone else in the village except his father. It suits him to say that he disclosed the incident to his father. The prosecution should have examined his father to corroborate this witness under section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act. This has not been done by the prosecution. What is most hopelessly improbable is the fact that this witness did not disclose about the incident of 9th May, 1983 for nearly ten days even after he came to know that on the next day, that is 10th of May, 1983, the dead body of the deceased was found at a place where the incident, according to him had taken place. The explanation given by this witness that he did not inform anyone about the incident as he was afraid of the accused is unacceptable because on 19th of May, 1983 when his statement was recorded by the police the accused was still at large. There was still ground for entertaining the fear from the accused even on that day. How is it then that this witness became fearless on 19th of May, 1983 and did not become fearless on any other earlier day ? There was a Police Patil who was a resident of this village. There is no reason as to why the information could not be conveyed to him earlier. The witness has also not disclosed as to what special fear he felt from the accused which he would not have felt from any other person who would have indulged in similar action. The fact that no information about the occurrence of 9th May, 1983 was given by this witness as well as the next witness P.W. 5 Chunilal, whose testimony will be examined shortly, indicates, if anything, that this witness has not seen any incident on 9th May, 1983. In any case, it would be hazardous to base a conviction for an offence of murder on the testimony of a witness who does not bestir himself to tell about the same for nearly 10 days after witnessing the incident. 15. The conduct of P.W. 5 Chunilal is no less improbable. In any case, it would be hazardous to base a conviction for an offence of murder on the testimony of a witness who does not bestir himself to tell about the same for nearly 10 days after witnessing the incident. 15. The conduct of P.W. 5 Chunilal is no less improbable. After narrating about the trip to village Nagardevala and after narrating, as P.W. 4 Bhangraj has earlier narrated, that while returning from the Bazar they saw the accused and one person of village Tarkhede under a Behada tree, P.W. 5 Chunilal also has stated as follows :--- "After we saw the accused there, we thought that he would steal away the mangoes and hence immediately after reaching the house, we took the bicycle and went towards the said mango tree along with one Vishwanath." The criticism which has already been levelled against this part of the deposition of P.W. 4 Bhangraj would be naturally valid even in respect of this witness. Rest of the deposition is almost in similar terms in which P.W. 4 Bhangraj has given his testimony. Naturally, therefore, the criticism of this witness would be the same. P.W. 5 has in his cross-examination insisted that when they saw the accused they thought that he would steal away the mangoes. It is not as if that the thought that the accused would steal away the mangoes occurred to him or to Bhangraj after they reached home. If that were so they would have explained their conduct in that manner and then their subsequent conduct of returning to the scene of offence would have been understandable. But unfortunately, in his cross-examination P.W. 5 Chunilal insists that the thought that the accused would steal the mangoes occurred to them as soon as they saw the accused while they were returning from the Bazar from Nagardevala. P.W. 5 Chunilal, however, has stated that on the day after the incident he informed the persons of the village about the incident because at that time he had learnt that the person from Tarkhede was dead. It is thus clear that as far as Chunilal was concerned he was not afraid of the accused. Chunilal is unable to give the name of any persons to whom he had conveyed the incident of 9th May, 1983. It is thus clear that as far as Chunilal was concerned he was not afraid of the accused. Chunilal is unable to give the name of any persons to whom he had conveyed the incident of 9th May, 1983. If Chunilal is to be believed, he gave the information to the persons in the village on 10th of May, 1983 immediately after the dead body of the person from Tarkhede was discovered. If this is so, how is it that the police party which had visited the village did not come to know from anyone that the accused was involved in the incident of 9th May, 1983 ? The P.S.I. himself has admitted that till he recorded the statements of P.W. 4 and P.W. 5, Bhangraj and Chunilal respectively, the name of the accused as a possible assailant had not surfaced. It is thus clear that the claim of Chunilal that he had given the information of the assault which took place on 9th May, 1983 is wholly unsustainable. The testimony of Chunilal has, therefore, to be rejected on much stronger ground than the ground on which the testimony of P.W. 4 Bhangraj is to be rejected. 16. Authorities could be cited as to the credibility of the witnesses whose statements are recorded much later. If the statements of the witnesses are recorded after an unusually long time when they could have been recorded or when there was sufficient opportunity of those statements to be recorded earlier, then the explanation as to why those statements could not be recorded earlier has to come from the prosecution. In all criminal matter, the early recording of a statement, especially when it relates to the commission of a cognizable offence, is regarded as a rule. If this rule is not followed, the exception has to be explained by the prosecution. No burden is case upon the defence to ask the prosecution witnesses as to why they have not disclosed their information to the concerned persons at the earliest opportunity. When witnesses insist that they had disclosed the information to certain persons, it is the bounden duty of the prosecution to examine those persons to whom such information is alleged to have been disclosed because in that case corroboration as contemplated by section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act would be available. When witnesses insist that they had disclosed the information to certain persons, it is the bounden duty of the prosecution to examine those persons to whom such information is alleged to have been disclosed because in that case corroboration as contemplated by section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act would be available. The value of the early disclosure of knowledge about the commission of a cognizable offence by witnesses who have seen the commission of such offence cannot be overemphasised and the importance of the same has been pointed out by the Supreme Court (Mannam Venkatdri v. State of A.P.)1, A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 1467 and (G.B. Patel v. State of Maharashtra)2, A.I.R. 1979 Supreme Court 135. In (Lalji v. State of West Bengal)3, A.I.R. 1986 Supreme Court 990, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the delay of about 56 days recording the statement of a witness could not be used for rejecting the evidence of that witness. If one reads the judgment of the Supreme Court in Lalji's case, it is easily seen that the question was whether the recording of the statement by the police after a delay of 56 days was justified. In the present case the question is not as to why the investigating officer recorded the statements of P.W. 4 Bhangraj and P.W. 5 Chunilal belatedly. The question is why these two witnesses, who were eye-witnesses to the assault, kept quiet for nearly eleven days, despite the fact that a close relative of the deceased was residing in the very village. Moreover, in the abovementioned case the Supreme Court noted that is the evidence led by the prosecution a clear, cogent and satisfactory explanation had been given as to why the statement of the witness concerned was recorded after a laps of 56 days. The learned Judge had carefully considered that explanation and had accepted it. So also the High Court had accepted it and, therefore, the Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the concurrent finding recorded by the courts below. 17. In the instant case, no explanation has been given by the prosecution as to why the two alleged eye-witnesses disclosed the information so belatedly. The claim of P.W. 5 Chunilal that he disclosed the information to some of the villagers must be rejected because he refuses to disclose the name of the persons to whom he disclosed the information. 17. In the instant case, no explanation has been given by the prosecution as to why the two alleged eye-witnesses disclosed the information so belatedly. The claim of P.W. 5 Chunilal that he disclosed the information to some of the villagers must be rejected because he refuses to disclose the name of the persons to whom he disclosed the information. In these circumstances, it is impossible to accept that these two persons, namely P.W. 4 Bhangraj and P.W. 5 Chunilal, were eye-witnesses. The learned Sessions Judge has, in paragraph 18 of his judgment, referred to the testimonies of these witnesses, but has miserably failed to examine the same on the touchstone of probabilities and the conduct of the witnesses. See the following to be found in the said part of the judgment:- "I have carefully gone through their evidence. It appears to me that their evidence is consistent, satisfactory and has a ring of truth." This is the most unsatisfactory method of assessing the testimonies of witnesses appearing in Court and especially in a trial for murder. The learned Sessions Judge has not cared to give one reason as to why their evidence is satisfactory and why their evidence has a ring of truth. The improbabilities of their testimonies have already been pointed out earlier in this judgment. The learned Sessions Judge has followed the line of least resistance and chose to accept their testimonies, probably because they stated so on oath. 18. A judgment cannot be a proper judgment unless the Judge concerned gives reasons as to why he finds a particular testimony acceptable. The judgment must be a reasoned judgment. (See LXXXVI Bom.L.R. 408). It has already been indicated in the earlier part of this judgment that it is not necessary for the accused to suggest and to prove that there is some motive on the part of the witnesses to give false evidence if it is found that the evidence given by the witnesses is inherently improbable considering the probabilities of the case and the conduct of those witnesses. If so considered, the testimonies of P.W. 4 Bhangraj and P.W. 5 Chunilal cannot be accepted. They claim that they well eye-witnesses must be rejected. If this happens, there is nothing else which could connect the accused with the offence in question. However, a brief reference must be made to the testimony of P.W. 8 Shivaji Shankar. If so considered, the testimonies of P.W. 4 Bhangraj and P.W. 5 Chunilal cannot be accepted. They claim that they well eye-witnesses must be rejected. If this happens, there is nothing else which could connect the accused with the offence in question. However, a brief reference must be made to the testimony of P.W. 8 Shivaji Shankar. He is an ironsmith of 18 years age. He knows the accused who is a resident of Village Galan Khurd. The witness himself is from Village Brahamshevge. About six months before he gave evidence in the Court, on a Monday, this witness was proceeding to Village Nagardevala in order to attend the weekly Bazar. He was carrying with him two iron blades of a harrow. His cousin-brother Gaibu was with him. On their way the accused met them at a distance of about four miles from Village Galan Khurd. According to this witness, the accused was alone, but was under the influence of liquor. The accused asked him about the price of the blades of harrow, which was told to be Rs. 50/-. The accused thereafter gave two slaps to him as well as to his cousin and snatched away those blades of harrow and went away. According to this witness, he proceeded to the Village Galan Khurd. 19. Like P.W. 4 Bhangraj, this witness also does not tell anyone about the incident nor does he file a complaint against the accused. His explanation is, again, fear. The statement of this witness was recorded on 20th of May, 1983, which means for nearly eleven days this witness kept silent. There is no other witness who could possibly corroborate the testimony of this witness. Though his cousin Gaibu was with him, the said Gaibu has not been examined by the prosecution. Like P.W. 5 Chunilal, P.W. 8 Shivaji has insisted that he had given the information about this incident to two or three persons of village Galan Khurd, but like P.W. 5 Chunilal, P.W. 8 Shivaji also is unable to give the names of those two or three persons. Both these prosecution witnesses are having convenient lapse of memory. It is, therefore, impossible, on the bald statement of this witness, to accept the fact that the accused had come in possession of the two blades of harrow on the day on which the incident had taken place. Both these prosecution witnesses are having convenient lapse of memory. It is, therefore, impossible, on the bald statement of this witness, to accept the fact that the accused had come in possession of the two blades of harrow on the day on which the incident had taken place. Bereft of this evidence, there is nothing else in the prosecution evidence in the instant case which could connect the accused with the offence in question. Hence the conviction recorded by the learned Sessions Judge and the sentence passed against the accused will have to be set aside. 20. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence recorded against the accused by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Jalgaon in Sessions Case No. 58 of 1983 are set aside. The accused is acquitted of the offence with which he has been charged. He shall be set at liberty forthwith. Appeal allowed. ------