BOPANNA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the learned Counsel for the appellants. ( 2 ) A question on Court Fee payable by the appellants-Bank has been raised in these two appeals. The office is of the view that the appellants have to pay court Fee on ad-valorem basis since the relief against respondents 2 and 3 has to be valued as per the provisions of Section 49 of the Karnataka Court-Fees and Suits valuation Act, 1958, (in short the 'act' ). ( 3 ) THE suits against respondents 2 and 3 for the recovery of a sum of rs 35. 157-68/- were dismissed by the trial Court, but the suits against respondents 1 and 4 were decreed although the appellants had prayed for a decree jointly and severally against respondents 1 to 4. The appellants have come up in these appeals seeking a decree against respondents 2 and 3 jointly and severally with the other two respondents. The relief claimed by the appellants. Bank against respondents 2 and 3 is the same as claimed by it in the trial Court. Therefore, the provisions of Section 49 read with explanation (1) of the Act are attracted. They read as under:-"49. Appeals : Save as provided in section 48, the fee payable in an appeal shall be the same as the fee that would be payable in the court" of first instance on the subject matter of the appeal: provided that, in levying fee on a memorandum of appeal against a final decree by a person whose appeal against the preliminary decree passed by the court of first instance or by the court of appeal is pending, credit shall be given for the fee paid by such person in the appeal against the preliminary decree. Explanation: (1) Whether the appeal is against the refusal of a relief or against the grant of the relief, the fee payable in the appeal shall be the same as the fee that would be payable on the relief in the court of first instance. Explanation: (4) Where the relief prayed for in the appeal is different from the relief prayed for or refused in the court of first instance, the fee payable in the appeal shall be the fee that would be payable in the court of first instance on the relief prayed for in the appeal. Explanation: (4) Where the relief prayed for in the appeal is different from the relief prayed for or refused in the court of first instance, the fee payable in the appeal shall be the fee that would be payable in the court of first instance on the relief prayed for in the appeal. "note: For our purpose, Explanations (2), (3) and (5) are not necessary. ( 4 ) SRI Prabhu, learned counsel for the appellants relies upon Explanation (4) to Section 49 of the Act and submits that as the appellants have sought for a direction for payment of the decretal amount against all the defendants, the relief sought for by it is not the one sought for by it in the trial court, and therefore, the provisions of Section 49 are not attracted; as such it has valued the relief at Rs. 1000/- and paid a court fee of Rs. 15/- under Schedule II Article 3 (iii) (1) (a) of the Act on the ground that the relief is incapable of valuation. In our view, the submission is untenable. ( 5 ) FIRSTLY Article 3 (iii) of Schedule ii is applicable to an appeal presented to this court only when there is no other provision in the Act which is applicable to such an appeal. The submission of the appellant that Section 49 of the Act is not attracted to the relief prayed for in the appeal is only stated to be refected. "from the provisions contained in Section 49 of the Act, it is clear that the principles applicable to the valuation of the appeal are the same as those applicable to the suits. There is no change in the application of those principles to the appeal where the appeal is filed against the decree dismissing the suit or decreeing it or partly decreeing and partly dismissing it. Of course, the relief sought for in the appeal, if it is confined to the whole or part of the relief sought for in the suit, has to be valued in the same manner in which that relief would be valued in the suit for obtaining that relief. Of course, the relief sought for in the appeal, if it is confined to the whole or part of the relief sought for in the suit, has to be valued in the same manner in which that relief would be valued in the suit for obtaining that relief. It is also clear from Explanation (1) that where the appeal is against the refusal of a relief or against the grant of the relief, the fee payable in the appeal shall be the same as that would be payable on the relief in the court of first instance. In the instant case, the appellants-plaintiffs sought for a decree for recovery of certain sum against respondents 1 to 4 jointly and severally. Respondents 2 and 3 were the sureties and respondents 1 and 4 were the principal debtors. The trial court has decreed the suits as against respondents 1 and 4 and has dismissed them as against respondents 2 and 3 (sureties ). Thus the suit claims stand dismissed as against respondents 2 and 3. The value of the suit claimed against respondents 2 and 3 was the same as was against respondents 1 and 4. In the appeal, the plaintiffs appellants want to have the decrees of the trial court in so far it has dismissed the suits as against respondents 2 and 3 set aside and to have the suits decreed against them also. That being so, it is not possible to appreciate the submission the the reliefs sought for in the appeals are incapable of valuation. Merely because the appellants-plaintiffs have prayed for in the appeal for issue of a direction for payment of the decretal amount against all the defendants, it does not make the reliefs different from the one sought for in the suits. It is not the wording of the relief that always determines the nature and effect of the relief; but it is the substance of the reliefs that determines the nature of the reliefs. The mere fact that the appellants have tried to make it appear that the reliefs sought for in the appeals are only to seek a direction, it does not make the relief different from the one sought in the trial court inasmuch as in effect and in substance the appellants want that the suit claim should also be decreed as against respondents 2 and 3. Therefore, the reliefs sought for in the appeals are capable of valuation and are not different from these prayed for in the suit and as such the same are to be valued in the same manner in which they are valued in the suits and the fee payable on the appeals is the same as paid in the court of first instance on the subject matter of the appeals. Thus we are of the view that as the reliefs sought for in the appeals in substance and in effect are not different from the reliefs sought for and refused by the court of first instance it is not Explanation (4) but it is Explanation (1) to section 49 this is attracted. Hence the submission of Sri Prabhu is rejected. " ( 6 ) HOWEVER, Sri Prabhu, learned counsel for the appellants has brought to our notice and has relied upon in support of his submission two decisions of this court rendered by two different Division benches in R. F. A. No. 353/85 dated 25- 7-1985 and in R. F. A. No. 607/85 dated 18-11-1985 over-ruling the office objections regarding the payment of court fee raised in similar appeals. In R. F. A. No. 353/1985, the following order is passed on 25-7-1985 :"office objection is over-ruled. Accept. " In R. F. A. No. 607/85, following the aforesaid decision in R. F. A. No. 353/1985, the following order is passed on 18-11-1985: "sri Shivaprakash, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in r. F. A. 358/85, under similar facts and circumstances, the court fee, as paid here, was held sufficient, Following the order dated 25-7-1985 in that appeal, the office objection as to adequacy of court fee is over-ruled. "on verification it is found that the reference to R. F. A. No. 358/85 in the aforesaid order appears to be a typographical error inasmuch as in R. F. A. No. 358/85 no order regarding sufficiency or otherwise of the court fee is passed. It is also stated before us that the aforesaid order is passed following the aforesaid decision in R. F. A. No. 353/1985. ( 7 ) FROM the aforesaid two orders, it is apparent that the relevant provisions of the Act had not been brought to the notice of the respective Division Benches. It is also stated before us that the aforesaid order is passed following the aforesaid decision in R. F. A. No. 353/1985. ( 7 ) FROM the aforesaid two orders, it is apparent that the relevant provisions of the Act had not been brought to the notice of the respective Division Benches. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that those decisions form a binding precedent inasmuch as those decisions are per incuriam as the same have been rendered without noticing the relevant provisions of the Act and the same had not been brought to the notice of their Lordships constituting the Division Benches. Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the two decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants are not of any assistance to the appellants. ( 8 ) IN addition to the above, the decision as to court fee paid on a suit or memorandum of Appeal can be revised at any time before the appeal is decided as provided in Section 15 read with Section 11 of the Act. ( 9 ) IN the circumstances, the office objections are sustained. The appellants are directed to pay the deficit court fee on the Memorandum of Appeal as per explanation (1) to Section 49 of the Act as paid in the trial court. ( 10 ) NEEDFUL by two weeks, office objections sustained. --- *** --- .