JUDGMENT - M.S. RATNAPARKHI, J.:---The petitioner who was the defendant before the civil judge (Junior Division) Nagpur, in Regular Civil Suit No. 594 of 1984 is challenging the order passed by that Court on 19-10-1985 holding that the plaintiff was diligently prosecuting his remedy before the Small Cause Court in between the institution of small cause suit from 12-9-1979 and returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court on 18-4-1984. 2. The following facts will be necessary for appreciating the real controversy. Small Cause Suit No. 1219/79 was instituted by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 on 10-7-1979 for eviction, mesne profits charges etc. etc. The suit proceeded before the Small Causes Court. A defence was raised that the Small Causes Court has no jurisdiction. This point was decided on merits by the Small Causes Court at Nagpur on 17-7-1983. It was held that the Small Causes had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. This order came to be challenged before the High Court in revision. The High Court decided this revision some time on 6-2-1984 holding that the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide that suit. Thereafter, when the Small causes Court received the writ from this Court, it passed on order on 12-3-1984 directing the plaintiff and the defendant to appear before the Court of Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Nagpur on 16-4-1984. The endorsement on the plaint shows that the plaint was actually returned to the plaintiff on 18-4-1984 and it is an admitted position that on the very day the plaint was filed before the Civil Judges (Senior Division) Nagpur. These facts are uncontroverted. 3. As the High Court held that the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the suit came to be presented before the Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Nagpur and that too on 18-4-1984. Obviously the question of interpretation and applicability of section 14 of the Limitation Act came. It was strenuously urged on behalf of the present petitioner that section 14 of the Limitation Act enable the Court to exclude the time from commencement of the proceedings till the termination of the proceedings. It was urged that in any case the proceedings terminated in view of the order passed by the High Court on 6-2-1984 holding that the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction. It was urged that in any case the proceedings terminated in view of the order passed by the High Court on 6-2-1984 holding that the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction. It was, therefore, urged that though the time commenced running form the institution of this suit till 6-2-1984 till the decision. High Court could be legitimately excluded under section 14(1), the plaintiff was not entitled as of right to the execution of the period commencing thereafter till the expiry of 18-4-1984. Another point which was urged before me was that, it was necessary for the plaintiff to explain to the satisfaction of the Court the action taken by him during the intervening period, as that would be relevant for determining whether the plaintiff acted diligently or not . It was the contention of Mr. Bobde that the plaintiff has no where shown either in the affidavit or otherwise that he had ben prosecuting his remedies diligently before wrong Court. This point will have to be examined in details. 4. It is an undisputed position that on 6-2-1984 the High Court found that the Court of Small Causes had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is also interesting to note at this stage that the point regarding jurisdiction was raised before the Court of Small Causes and that Court held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is this Court which came to the conclusion that the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to decide this point. When the Revision before this Court was pending, the suit was actually stayed in pursuance of the order passed by this court and it appears from record that the stay order was to continue till 31-3-1984. It has been the contention of plaintiff that after the High Court allowed the revision petition, he went to the trial Court and he was told that the writ from the High Court has not been received. Any how we have on record an application filed by the present petitioner which gives a chronology of events. The plaintiff did filed an application before this Court on 9-6-1986 contending there in that both the parties were directed by the High Court to appear before the Court of Small Causes on 20-8-1984. Any how we have on record an application filed by the present petitioner which gives a chronology of events. The plaintiff did filed an application before this Court on 9-6-1986 contending there in that both the parties were directed by the High Court to appear before the Court of Small Causes on 20-8-1984. However, they told that the writ from the High Court had not been received so far and the suit continued to be stayed till 31-3-1984. The petitioner then contended that on 27-2-1984, he filed an application before the court stating that the revision which was responsible for the stay of the suit had already been disposed of High Court. He requested the court to take up the matter on Board and pass appropriate orders in view of the decision of the High Court. According to him, it is only on 12-3-1984 that the Judge of the Court of Small Causes at nagpur took up the matter on Board. These facts have not been much controverted. 5. What happened on and after 12-3-1984 is evident from the record. On 12-3-1984, the Judge of the Court of Small Causes passed the following order : "The plaintiff by Shri Athayle, Advocates, read application Exh. 20. Perused the High Court writ Exh. 27 and the judgment of High Court Exh. 28 as per the order and direction of High Court, the plaint shall and is hereby returned to the plaintiff for production to the proper Court. The parties are directed before the civil judge (Senior Division), Nagpur on 16-4-1984 without fail positively, Proceeding is closed". This order no doubt mention that the plaint shall and is hereby returned to the plaintiff for the production to the proper Court. However, we find another endorsements made by the same judge on the plaint on 18-4-1984 which reads as follows : "In view of the order dated 12-3-1984 the plaint Exh. 1, list of documents Ex. 4 with two documents, Exh. 13 list of documents with two with two Documents, RA Exh. 2 Vakalatnama Exh. 3 are returned to the plaintiff for the production to proper Court." It is thus evident that through it was observed by the judge on 12-3-1984, that the plaint shall and is hereby returned to the plaintiff for production to the proper Court, factual position remained that till 18-4-1984, the plaint was with the Small Causes Court itself. 6. 3 are returned to the plaintiff for the production to proper Court." It is thus evident that through it was observed by the judge on 12-3-1984, that the plaint shall and is hereby returned to the plaintiff for production to the proper Court, factual position remained that till 18-4-1984, the plaint was with the Small Causes Court itself. 6. Mr. Bobde, the learned Advocate for the petitioner strenuously urged before me that it was incumbent on the part of the plaintiff to explain before the Court that in pursuance of the orders passed by the High Court in Civil Revision, he took all these steps, diligently, which were necessary in furtherance of taking back the plaint from the Small Causes Court and presenting it before the Judge of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagpur. What he urged before me was that there is nothing on record, not even an averment in the affidavit that any such step was taken by the plaintiff. A reliance has been placed on Note No. 51 reported in (Mooijee Sika Co. v. Union of India )1, 1971 Mh.L.J. 25 where it was observed that the party plaintiff cannot allow the plaint which has been order to be returned for presentation to proper Court to remain in Court without taking any steps to take it back and yet claim the benefit of section 14(1), Limitation Act. Burden is always on the plaintiff to show that during the period between the order of returning the plaint and the actual return of the plaint he was diligent and that he took some steps to obtain back the plaint which was ordered to be returned and the delay was because of causes beyond his control. The Court further observed:-- "It may be that for purposes of completing the records of the Court, it may not be possible to return the plaint immediately. But that is not to say that the plaintiff can allow the plaint to lie in the Court for an indefinite length of time. That will amount to allowing plaintiff to take advantage of his own laches and unless. But that is not to say that the plaintiff can allow the plaint to lie in the Court for an indefinite length of time. That will amount to allowing plaintiff to take advantage of his own laches and unless. Therefore, it is shown that the plaintiff has made any efforts to get back the plaint and that he was prevented from getting it back for reasons behind his control, it cannot be assumed that the plaintiff has been acting with due diligence and that he was prosecuting the proceeding with due diligence". 7. These observations came to be made when an unduly long period of 8 months and 15 days lapsed in between the order directing the return of the plaint to the proper Court and actual filing of that plaint before the proper Court. 8. The above observations not doubt refer to some acts on the part of the plaintiff to show that he has been diligent all throughout. We have to consider equally the set of circumstances that have crept in, in the present case. What happened in the present case is quite clear. The High Court decided on 6-2-1984 that Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction. Till 20-2-1984 the writ from the High Court did not reach the Court of Small Causes. According the orders passed by that Court, the suit was kept stayed till 31st March, 1984. On 27-2-1984, the plaintiff did apply before the Court for taking the case on Board and passing appropriate orders. Appropriate orders did necessarily mean the orders contemplated under Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is interesting to note at this stage that when this revision was decided, the Code of Civil Procedure suffered change by way of amendments and Rule 10-A was incorporated. Rule 10-A prescribes some steps mandatorily to be taken or some procedure mandatory to be observed by the Court which returns the plaint for preservation to the proper Court. The scheme of the rule is very specific. It shows that unless the mandatory procedures specified in that rule are completed, the plaint cannot be returned to the party for presentation to the proper Court. Compliance of this mandatory provisions are left to the Court alone and not to the party who gets the benefits of the order. The scheme of the rule is very specific. It shows that unless the mandatory procedures specified in that rule are completed, the plaint cannot be returned to the party for presentation to the proper Court. Compliance of this mandatory provisions are left to the Court alone and not to the party who gets the benefits of the order. The sum and substance of what is contained in Rule 10-A is that unless these procedures are completed by the Court directing the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court the plaint does not become ripe for being handed over to the plaintiff for preservation before the proper Court. 9. It is interesting to note at this stage that when this Court made observations in Note No. 55, this amendment was not on the Statute Book, though the provision of sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 7 were very much there. That provisions prescribed a general procedure. The provisions contained in Rule 10-B, however, specify a detailed procedure and that too of a mandatory nature. It is obvious that this Court was not required to consider this amendment as it was not on the Statute book then. 10. We have now to consider the whole question on the background of the orders actually passed. The mandatory procedures that were to be complied with by the Court, and then examine the consequences of these different actions. As already pointed out, on 12-3-84 the Judge of the Small Causes Court took up the case on Board and declared his intention of returning the plaint for production before the proper Court. At the same time, he directed both the parties to appear before the Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Nagpur, on 16-4-1984. Obviously, the parties were not expected to go before the Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Nagpur merely as invitees or as casual visitors. There was a purpose for this direction and the purpose was that this plaint which was to be returned by the Court of Small Causes was to be handed over to plaintiff and the plaintiff was to produce or present this plaint before the Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Nagpur. It was the only purpose of this direction. There was a purpose for this direction and the purpose was that this plaint which was to be returned by the Court of Small Causes was to be handed over to plaintiff and the plaintiff was to produce or present this plaint before the Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Nagpur. It was the only purpose of this direction. For complying with this direction, what was necessary for the Court was to keep all the endorsement ready by 16-4-1984 so that the plaint could, without any difficulty, be handed over to the party or to his Counsel for further presentation to the Proper Court. Mr. Bobde urged before me that there is nothing on record to show that the parties did attend the Court either of the small Causes or of the Civil Judge, (Senior Division) on 16-4-1984. Let me assume that neither of the parties when before the Court on that day, though there was a direct mandate given by the Court. That does not solve the real problem. That may merely be a non-compliance of the directions given by the Court. The real question that arises is, weather the Court was prepared to hand over the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court on that day. We find no endorsement in the plaint that it was ready for handling over to the plaintiff. On the other hand, what we find is the endorsement made on 18-4-1984 by the Judge and the endorsement shows that all the papers and the plaint were handed over to the plaintiff. There is nothing on record to show that these papers were ready for being handed over to the plaintiff on any day in between 16-4-1984 and 18-4-1984. It could have been the legitimate argument had there been any endorsement made by the Court, that the papers were ready even prior to 16-4-1984 but the parties did not come to receive those papers. 11. Thus, as the record stands, the parties were directed to appear before Civil Judge, (Senior Division) on 16-4-1984 which means that there was nothing which the parties could do at least till 16-4-1984, and therefore, the argument that the plaintiff ought to have shown the acts on his part to show his diligence becomes futile, because there was nothing which the plaintiff could show. The Court had already directed them to come on 16-4-1984 and not before that. The Court had already directed them to come on 16-4-1984 and not before that. There is noting on record to show that the mandatory procedures required to be compiled with under Rule 10-B of Order 7 were completed by the Court before 18th. In view of this there is nothing to show that the plaintiff could have taken any steps in furtherance of the final act, but he has not taken those steps. The question of conduct in these circumstances becomes completely irrelevant as far as the record goes. 12. Mr. Bobde urged before me that section 14 of the Limitation Act enables the Court to exclude only that much time commencing from the Institution of the suit till the date of termination of the proceedings before the wrong Court. He urged that the time till 6-2-1984 could be legitimately excluded under section 14. He was even prepared to say that the time till 12-3-1984 could be legitimately excluded because the parties were called upon to appear on that day. His main grudge was that the time commencing from 12-2-1984 onwards till 18-4-1984 was to be accounted for, positively. It is difficult to accept this argument in view of the discussion in the preceding paragraph. Because the proceedings cannot be said to have terminated as soon as the High Court passed the order on 6-2-1984. On that day there was merely a declaration that the Court of Small Causes at Nagpur has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. However, for return of the plaint, the procedure necessary under order 7, Rule 10-B was to be complied with and that procedure being mandatory and the plaintiff having no voice in that procedure, these procedure, could not be completed except on taking some steps by the Court itself. From that point of view, the steps which the Court was required to take, were beyond the control of the plaintiff. It was only the Court which could do these things and the plaintiff except for asking the Court to take case on board could not legitimately do anything in the matter. Without the completion of the mandatory procedure, proceedings could not be held to have been legitimately terminated in the real sense of the term. This itself would explain the whole delay. In fact there is no question of delay. Without the completion of the mandatory procedure, proceedings could not be held to have been legitimately terminated in the real sense of the term. This itself would explain the whole delay. In fact there is no question of delay. Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not speak of delay, but it speaks only exclusion of time required by the proceedings before the trial Court. The proceedings must held to have been terminated effectively only when the plaint was ready for handing over to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court. It was so on 18-4-1984 and admittedly enough it was presented before the proper Court on the very same day without wasting any further time. 13. In these circumstances, the order passed by trail Court appears to be quite correct and there is no reason to interfere with this order, with the result that the revision deserves to be dismissed. Rule is discharged. The petitioner shall bear the costs of the respondent in addition to his own. As the case is very old, the trial Court is directed to give top priority to this case and decide it according to law. Rule discharged. -----