JUDGMENT A. N. Dikshita, J. 1. This civil revision has been filed by the plaintiff-applicant (hereinafter referred to as the applicant) against the judgment and order dated 25-4-85 passed by Sri C. B. Jayaswal, IV Addl. District Judge, Allahabad in Misc. Case No. 4 of 1985 arising out of matrimonial Petition No. 236 of 1984 by which the judgment and order dated 22-9-86 decreeing the suit ex-parte was set aside and restoring the suit to its original number for disposal according to law. 2. The facts encompassing the controversy in brief are that the applicant filed a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the wife for more than 2 years. Inspite of the summons being sent to the respondent (defendant) no appearance was put in to contest the petition. The suit was ordered to proceed ex-parte against the defendant (wife). An affidavit in support of the petition was filed by the applicant and feeling satisfied that the case for dissolution of marriage under Section 13 of the Act on the ground of cruelty and desertion has been made out the trial court (IV Addl. District Judge) decreed the suit ex-parte dissolving the marriage and granting divorce. However, on coming to know about the passing of the ex-parte decree dissolving the marriage and granting divorce the respondent filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the judgment and decree dated 22-9-84 by which the suit was decreed ex-parte. An affidavit in support of the application was also filed stating therein that the respondent (wife) had no knowledge about the pendency of the suit filed by the applicant under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Objections and counter-affidavit were filed by the applicant opposing the application for setting aside of the judgment and decree dated 22-9-84 decreeing the suit ex-parte. 3. The trial Court found as a fact that neither notice nor summons were served on the respondent (wife). It was further found that the applicant who has obtained the decree ex-parte by practising fraud cannot be allowed to derive advantage out of it. 3. The trial Court found as a fact that neither notice nor summons were served on the respondent (wife). It was further found that the applicant who has obtained the decree ex-parte by practising fraud cannot be allowed to derive advantage out of it. It was also found by the trial court that the fraud so practised by the applicant (husband) vitiated the entire proceedings and more so when the defendant (wife) has no knowledge of the proceedings. The judgment and decree dated 22-9-84 decreeing the suit ex-parte and dissolving the marriage and granting divorce was thus set aside by learned IV Addl. District Judge vide judgment and order dated 25-4-85. 4. Feeling aggrieved the applicant has preferred this civil revision. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard at some length. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant Sri K. L. Grover has submitted that the provisions of Order IX Rule 13 CPC would not be applicable in the instant case and as the application was not maintainable under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act the trial court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law and has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally. It has been submitted that the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act clearly contemplate as provided under Section 28 of the said Act that all decrees made by the court in any proceedings under this Act shall be appealable as decrees of the court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. It is difficult to agree with such a submission. Section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides as under : " 21. Application of Act 5 of 1908-Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf, all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated as far as may be, by Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. " It is thus clear from a perusal of the provisions as recited above that all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated as far as may be by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petition under Section 13 of the Act was filed for awarding a decree for dissolution of marriage and thus granting divorce. The trial court entertained the suit and took steps for the service of the summons as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition under Section 13 of the Act was filed for awarding a decree for dissolution of marriage and thus granting divorce. The trial court entertained the suit and took steps for the service of the summons as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. In the absence of the defendant-respondent being present the trial court made an order that the suit be heard exparte. Ultimately the suit was decreed ex-parte. All these proceedings were regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. It may thus be manifest that once the proceedings upto the scage of decreeing the suit ex-parte were regulated under the Code of Civil Procedure it would be a fallacy if other provisions particularly Order IX Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the ex-parte decree are not made applicable. Merely because an appeal is provided under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act that by itself would not deny the right of the aggrieved party to file an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the decree passed ex-parte against the defendant. The submission made on behalf of the applicant that the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was not maintainable is untenable and has to be discarded. Further there are other provisions of the Code which would equally be applicable in the case of a petition under the Hindu Marriage Act. Where a suit for divorce was filed on the ground of adultery but the adulteror was not impleaded, the provisions of Order I Rule 10 CPC would be attracted for the impleadment of such a person as he would be a necessary party. Similarly where the pleadings of the parties require amendment, Order VI Rule 17 CPC would be equally attracted for incorporating such amendments in the suit. Another case may also arise where a suit is dismissed in default of the plaintiff, it cannot be said that an application under Order IX Rule 9 CPC would not lie. The inherent intention of the Hindu Marriage Act is to limit litigation. If a petition is not restored to its original number, then another petition on the same ground would bar the maintainability of the suit as it would not be maintainable on the same cause of action. Can it be said that the provisions of Section 11 would not be attracted in the matter of a dispute between the parties ? If a petition is not restored to its original number, then another petition on the same ground would bar the maintainability of the suit as it would not be maintainable on the same cause of action. Can it be said that the provisions of Section 11 would not be attracted in the matter of a dispute between the parties ? A person who is aggrieved or who intends to seek redress to his grievances is fully entitled to the aid of the provisions of the CPC. The petition under Section 13 of the Act would be treated as a suit by operation of Section 21 of the Act. It is very difficult to conceive of a situation where a rule of procedure may be applied to one case and may not be available for application to another case and more so at the discretion of the court. Section 21 of the Act clearly states that subject to other provisions contained in the Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf all proceedings under the Act " shall be regulated as far as may be by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. " The Hindu Marriage Act nowhere provides for the dismissal of a petition in default or for decreeing the suit ex-parte. In the instant case there is no other escape except applying the provisions of Order IX Rule 13 CPC by the operation of Section 21. All the provisions of the CPC shall apply to the proceedings under the Act which are neither inconsistent with any provisions of the Act nor contrary to its scheme or purpose. It is nowhere provided in the Code or in the Act that a particular rule or procedure contained in the Code may be applied to one case but not to the other. It nowhere provides that it may be applied with full force with one set of case and not without full rigour in another set of case. In the case of Smt. Manjit Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Gangawala, AIR 1978 Punjab and Haryana 150 it was held that the provisions of Order IX Rule 9 CPC would be applicable where a suit has been dismissed in default of the plaintiff. In the case of Smt. Manjit Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Gangawala, AIR 1978 Punjab and Haryana 150 it was held that the provisions of Order IX Rule 9 CPC would be applicable where a suit has been dismissed in default of the plaintiff. Such a view finds support in the case of Tirukappa v. Vamalamma, AIR 1966 Mysore 1, where a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court held that the provisions of Rules 8 and 9 of Order IX of the Code have application to proceedings under Section 10 of the Act. Once it is found that the provisions of Order IX Rule 9 CPC would be applicable for the restoration of the suit to its original number, it cannot be said that the provisions of Order IX Rule 13 CPC would not be attracted for the setting aside of an ex-parte decree. 6. In the case of Udai Narain Bajpai v. Smt. Kusum Bajpai, AlR 1975 Alld. 94 it was found that in a petition under the Hindu Marriage Act the provisions of Order I Rule 10 CPC aswell as the Order VI Rule 17 CPC and Section 151 CPC would be applicable. In the case of S. P. Srivastava v. Smt. Prem Lata Srivastava, AIR 1980 Alld. 336 it was held that an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC would be maintainable. 7. A matter regarding applicability of Order IX Rule 13 CPC came up before the Supreme Court in the case of Rani Choudhary v. Lt. Col. Suraj jit Choudhary, AIR 1982 SC 1397 and it was found that an application under order IX Rule 13 would be maintainable but where no appeal has been preferred because the explanation clearly forbids the maintainability of such an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC when an appeal has already been preferred against the ex-parte decree. 8. It is thus clear that the trial court was right in entertaining the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and finally allowing it and setting aside the judgment and decree dated 22-9-1984 decreeing the suit ex-parte. Learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon the case of Anjan Kumar Kataki v. Smt. Minakshi Sarma, AIR 1985 Gauhati 44. It is thus clear that the trial court was right in entertaining the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and finally allowing it and setting aside the judgment and decree dated 22-9-1984 decreeing the suit ex-parte. Learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon the case of Anjan Kumar Kataki v. Smt. Minakshi Sarma, AIR 1985 Gauhati 44. No doubt a single judge of the Gauhati High Court has held that an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC would not be maintainable but in view of the law laid down as discussed above it is difficult to agree with the view taken in Anjan' Kumar's case (Supra). 9. Learned counsel for the applicant Sri K. L. Grover has fairly conceded that he does not intend nor would challenge the finding of fact recorded by the court below as regards the service of the summons on the respondent (wife). 10. Learned counsel for the applicant then urged that on the applicant's marriage with respondent having been dissolved by a decree of divorce he has married Smt. Manorama after the period provided for preferring an appeal and such marriage has to be protected. The trial court has set aside the ex-parte decree dissolving the marriage and granting the divorce. It is thus manifest that there was no decree dissolving the marriage and granting the divorce. Analysing the provisions of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act it can conveniently be found that it shall be lawful for either party to enter into matrimonial alliance after the marriage has been dissolved by a decree of divorce. The circumstances in which either party may marry again may be where there is no right of appeal against the decree of divorce, secondly, if there is such a right of appeal such time for filing the appeal has expired without any appeal having been presented and lastly where such an appeal having been presented has been dismissed. A fresh marriage would be lawful only after one of the three circumstances takes place. In the case of Jamboo Prasad Jain v. Smt. Malti Prabha, AIR 1979 Alld. page 260, it was held that a marriage contracted in contravention with the provisions of section 15 would not be lawful. In the instant case the marriage was contracted by the applicant by obtaining an ex-parte decree of divorce thus dissolving the marriage. In the case of Jamboo Prasad Jain v. Smt. Malti Prabha, AIR 1979 Alld. page 260, it was held that a marriage contracted in contravention with the provisions of section 15 would not be lawful. In the instant case the marriage was contracted by the applicant by obtaining an ex-parte decree of divorce thus dissolving the marriage. The respondent (wife) had no knowledge about the pendency of the proceeding for the dissolution of the marriage and immediately in coming to know about such an ex-parte decree steps were taken for the setting aside of the ex-parte decree. The respondent (wife) having no knowledge of the passing of the ex-parte decree could not have preferred an appeal. But instantly an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was filed which was allowed. In the case of Smt. Chandra Mohini Srivastava v. Snri Avinash Prasad Srivastava, AIR 1967 SC 58 it was held that a person on getting a decree for dissolution of marriage cannot by marrying immediately take away from the losing party the chance of presenting an application. It was held as under : " These two sections make it clear that where a marriage has been dissolved, either party to the marriage can lawfully marry only when there is no right of appeal against the decree dissolving the marriage or, if there is such a right of appeal, the time for filing appeal has expired without an appeal having been presented, or if an appeal has been presented it has been dismissed. It is true that section 15 does not in terms apply to a case of an application for special leave to this Court. Even so, we are of opinion that the party who has won in the High Court and got a decree of dissolution of marriage cannot by marrying immediately after the High Court's decree and thus take away from the losing party the chance of presenting an application for special leave. Even so, we are of opinion that the party who has won in the High Court and got a decree of dissolution of marriage cannot by marrying immediately after the High Court's decree and thus take away from the losing party the chance of presenting an application for special leave. Even though section 15 may not apply in terms and it may not have been unlawful for the first respondent to have married immediately after the High Court's decree, for no appeal as of right lies from the decree of the High Court to this Court in this matter, we still think that it was for the first respondent to make sure whether an application for special leave had been filed in this court and he could not by marrying immediately after the High Court's decree deprive the appellant of the chance to present a special leave petition to this Court. If a person does so, he takes a risk and cannot ask this Court to revoke the special leave on this ground. We need not consider the question as to whether the child born to the new wife on May 20, 1965 would be legitimate or not, except to say that in such a situation section 16 of the Act may come to the aid of the new child. " Learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the case of Mrs. Suresh Bala v. Major Gurmohinder Singh Bala, AIR 1983 Delhi 230 but this authority is of no avail to the applicant. In this case the controversy was that a decree for dissolution of marriage was passed in favour of husband on 11-7-80 and the husband got remarried on 18-8-80 i. e. after the expiry of 30 days from the date of decree. Appeal filed by wife against the said decree on 5-9-80 was found to be in time after the exclusion of time spent in obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and decree. The contention of the husband that the appeal had become infructuous was repelled and it was found that the appeal was maintainable. It is thus clear that during the pendency of the appeal the parties are not competent to contract another marriage. They are absolutely incapacitated to do so. The contention of the husband that the appeal had become infructuous was repelled and it was found that the appeal was maintainable. It is thus clear that during the pendency of the appeal the parties are not competent to contract another marriage. They are absolutely incapacitated to do so. It is evident that the either party may prefer an appeal against the decision of the court within the meaning of section 28 of the Act but such a situation was not permitted by the applicant in the instant case where the respondent (wife) was not aware about the proceedings and the consequent dissolution of the marriage by a decree for divorce. If the applicant obtained the decree exparte by practising fraud on the court as has been found by the trial court it would not be available to the erring husband to raise the plea that the second marriage has been duly solemnised within the postulates of section 15 of the Act. This marriage would not be deemed to be solemnised within the meaning of section 15 of the Act as the circumstances discussed above were not satisfied. 11. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that a child has been born to the applicant from the second wife after the first marriage had been dissolved and the decree for divorce had been granted. This aspect does not require any consideration at this stage. 12. Learned counsel for the applicant has urged that section 21 over-rides the provision of General Law and has placed reliance in the case of Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava, AIR 1984 SC 967 . This authority is also of no avail to the applicant. Section 21 CPC no where over-rides the provisions of the Act. It only aids and helps by providing a procedure for the disposal of a suit. Learned counsel for the applicant then submitted that the court should adopt harmonious interpretation of the statute as has been held in A. Madan Mohan v. Kalavakunta Chandrasekhara, AIR 1984 SC 871 . This authority is again of no assistance to the applicant. It is true that the provisions of the Act have to be strictly construed to promote its object. This authority is again of no assistance to the applicant. It is true that the provisions of the Act have to be strictly construed to promote its object. Section 28 would be attracted where a person was contesting the suit but where the aggrieved party has another remedy in the event of a suit being decreed exparte then it was open to such party either to avail the benefit of Order IX Rule 13 CPC or that of section 28 of the Act. Both the remedies may not be available to such aggrieved party in view of the Explanation being provided to Order IX Rule 13 CPC. I do not find any conflict in such provisions. 13. This revision in view of the above discussions is wholly ill merited and deserves to be dismissed. 14. In the above case after the hearing had concluded the judgment was reserved but before its delivery an application on behalf of the respondent was filed that in view of the death of the applicant who expired on 15-11-1986 the revision had become infructuous and it may be dismissed as infructuous. A counter-affidavit was filed by Smt. Manorma Srivastava (the second wife) opposing the above application. Learned counsel for the applicant Sri K. L. Grover submitted that the case had been finally heard and the judgment was reserved and in view of Order 22 Rule 6 CPC there could be no abatement and the judgment requires to be pronounced. Agreeing with the counsel for the applicant who claimed application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure the above application of the respondent was rejected by me vide separate order dated 17-12-1986. Before parting with this case it may be mentioned that in such matters haste in decreeing the suit ex parte may be prejudicial and it would be necessary to exercise caution and restraint. 15. In the result the revision is hereby dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed.