JUDGMENT R. S. Thakur, J.—This appeal against acquittal is directed against the judgment of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba, dated May 3 1983, whereby, respondent Liyakat Ali, (hereinafter referred to as the accused), was acquitted of the offence under section 16 (!) (a) (i) read with section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1955 (hereinafter called as the Act). 2. The facts of the case are that on June, 1981, the accused was intercepted at a place known as Pukhari by the then Food Inspector, Shri Jagat Ram, posted over there while the former was in possession DESI GHEE MEANT for public sale. The said Food Inspector then served notice upon him, (the accused) after disclosing his identity, to the effect that he wanted to purchase sample of Ghee for analysis and thus after purchasing 450 grams of Desi Ghee from the accused against price put them in three separate containers in equal quantity and after properly stoppering and sealing them in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules, sent one of the sample bottles to the Public Analyst for analysis while the remaining two bottles were sent to the Local (Health) Authority, as enjoined by the Act and the Rules. As per the report of the Public Analyst, dated July 30 i98i (Ex. PE), the sample of Ghee was found to be adulterated since its refract meter reading was 47.3 and not within the prescribed limit of variability i. e., 40 to 43. Reichert value was also found to be deficient by 48% than the minimum prescribed standard. There was moisture in excess by 2% than the maximum prescribed limit and also the boudouins test as prescribed for the presence of Vanaspati was positive to the extent of 4 0 red units whereas minimum standard for Vanaspati is 2.0 red units. 3. Reichert value was also found to be deficient by 48% than the minimum prescribed standard. There was moisture in excess by 2% than the maximum prescribed limit and also the boudouins test as prescribed for the presence of Vanaspati was positive to the extent of 4 0 red units whereas minimum standard for Vanaspati is 2.0 red units. 3. On the receipt of this report the Food Inspector concerned launched the prosecution against the accused in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba on August 10, 1981, and the copy of the report of the Public Analyst was sent to the accused through a registered post on August 24, 1981 with the intimation that the accused, if he so desired, could send one of the- samples with the Local (Health) Authority, to the Director, Central Food Laboratory by applying in this behalf to the Court concerned within a period of ten days from the receipt of the said report. The accused, however, did not make any such application expressing his desire to send any of the samples with the Local (Health) Authority, to the Central Food Laboratory, for analysis. The accused was thereafter duly charge-sheeted for the offence in question to which he pleaded not guilty. 4. The prosecution then examined the Food Inspector, Shri Jagat Ram and two more witnesses and then closed the prosecution evidence. 5. The accused in his defence denied that he sold any Desi Ghee for the purpose of analysis to the Food Inspector Shri Jagat Ram. 6. The learned trial Court then in the impugned judgment repelled the defence plea of the accused that he did not sell any impugned sample of Ghee to the Food Inspector, Shri Jagat Ram, and gave a categorical finding that the sample of Desi Ghee in question was purchased by the Food Inspector, Shri Jagat Ram, from the accused and none-else. The learned trial Court then in the impugned judgment repelled the defence plea of the accused that he did not sell any impugned sample of Ghee to the Food Inspector, Shri Jagat Ram, and gave a categorical finding that the sample of Desi Ghee in question was purchased by the Food Inspector, Shri Jagat Ram, from the accused and none-else. The learned trial Court, however, while construing the provisions of Rule 9-A framed under the Act, observed that the provisions of Rule 9-A which enjoin upon the Local (Health) Authority that in case the sample of an article of food purchased by the Food Inspector concerned for analysis is found to be adulterated, he should send a copy thereof immediately after institution of complaint against the vendor to the vendor himself and also the person whose address bad been disclosed in accordance with the provisions of section 14-A with the intimation that he could get the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory, if he so desired within a period of ten days by applying to the Court concerned, which was in the possession of the Local (Health) Authority. These provisions, according to the trial Court, are mandatory in character and their infraction would entitle the accused to acquittal. The trial Court on this short ground acquitted the accused since the compliance of the provisions of said Rule was made after a period of fourteen days of the launching of prosecution. While doing so it relied on a single Bench ruling of Bombay High Court reported in 1982 Cr. L. 3. 1462 (The State of Maharashtra v. Tukaram Baburao Mani), and also a Bench of the same strength of Kerala High Court, reported in 1983 Cr. L. J. 78, (K. Krishnakutty Nair v. The State), and declined to follow the Division Bench ruling of the latter Court, reported in 1983 Cr. L. J. 81. 7. Thus the main thrust of the finding of trial Court was that since there was a delay of 14 days in sending the copy of the report to the accused after prosecution was launched against the accused, it could not be said that it was sent immediately after the launching of the prosecution as enjoined by Rule 9-A and this violation of the said Rule had made the accused liable to acquittal. 8. 8. The learned Assistant Advocate General has assailed this finding and asserted that this view of the trial Court is quite erroneous and I am in agreement with this contention. 9. It is clear law that the violation of mandatory provisions of law is an illegality which must vitiate the trial but that is not so in the case of provision being merely directory. The directory provision, however, is capable of assuming the mandatory character in case it is proved on record that on violation of the same the accrued was prejudiced in his defence in his trial. The Supreme Court has now in no uncertain terms ruled as to how the nature of a particular provision has to be construed, i. e. whether the same is mandatory or directory, in AIR 1983 SC 303, Dal Chand v. Municipal Corporation Bhopal and another. There is the provisions of Rule 9 (j) which have now been supplanted by Rule 9-A of the Act came in for such construction before their lordships. Rule 9 (j) before its amendment read as follows :— To send by registered post a copay of the report received in Form III from the Public Analysts to the person from whom the sample was taken within ten days of the receipt of the said report. However, in case the sample conforms to the provisions of the Act or Rules made thereunder then the person may be informed of the same and the report need not be sent." Rule 9-A of the Act is also substantially the same except that instead of sending the copy of the report to the person from whom the sample was taken within ‘ten days, it is required to be sent immediately on the receipt thereof. The question in the ruling cited above was whether the requirement in the old Rule 9 (j) to send the sample within ten days of the receipt was mandatory or directory in nature and while holding the same as directory, it was observed that the period of ten days prescribed in the Rules was merely incorporated with a view to sending the copy of the report to the person concerned with all despatch and expedition and giving the party sufficient time to challenge the said report by exercising his right to Challenge the report of the Public Analyst by requesting the court concerned to send the other sample in the possession of the Local (Health) Authority to the Director of Central Food laboratory. It may be stated that at that time there was a conflict of finding on this Rule amongst various High Courts, some of which were construing it as mandatory while the others as directory and this judgment put at rest this conflict. In this case it has been succinctly laid down as to what criteria/considerations should weigh with the Courts while arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision was mandatory or directory in nature in the following terms : "There are no ready tests or invariable formula to determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory. The broad purpose of the statute is important. The object of the particular provision must be considered. The link between the two is most important The weighing of the consequence of holding a provision to be mandatory or directory is vital and, more often than not, determinative of the very question whether the provision is mandatory or directory. Where the design of the statute .is the avoidance or prevention of public mischief, but the enforcement of a particular provision literally to its letter will tend to defeat the design, the provision must be held to be directory, so that proof of prejudice in addition to non-compliance of the provision is necessary to invalidate the act complained of. It is well to remember that quite often many rules, though couched in language which appears to be imperative, are no more than mere instructions to those entrusted with the task of discharging statutory duties for public benefit. It is well to remember that quite often many rules, though couched in language which appears to be imperative, are no more than mere instructions to those entrusted with the task of discharging statutory duties for public benefit. The negligence of those to whom public duties are entrusted cannot by statutory interpretation be allowed to promote public mischief and cause public inconvenience and defeat the main object of the statute. It is as well to realise that every prescription of a period within which an act must be done, is not the prescription of a period of limitation with painful consequences if the act is not done within that period. Rule 9 (j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, as it then stood, merely instructed the Food Inspector to send by registered post copy of the Public Analysts report to the person from whom the sample was taken within 10 days of the receipt of the Report. Quite obviously the period of 10 days was not a period of limitation within which an action was to be initiated or on the expiry of which a vested right accused. The period of 10 days was prescribed with a view to expedition and with the object of giving sufficient time to the person from the sample was taken to make such arrangements as he might like to challenge the Report of Public Analyst, for example, by making a request to the Magistrate to send the other sample to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for analysis. Where the effect of non-compliance with the rule was such as to wholly deprive the right of the person to challenge the Public Analysts Report by obtaining the report of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, there might be just cause for complaint was prejudice would then be writ large. Where no prejudice was caused there could be no cause for complaint. I am clearly of the view that Rule 9 (j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules was directory and not mandatory. The decisions in Public Prosecutor v. Murli Dhar, 1977 Cr LJ 1634 (AP), and Bhola Nath v. State, 1977 Cr LJ 154 Cal, to the exetent that they h old that Rule 9 (j) was mandatory are not good law." 10. The decisions in Public Prosecutor v. Murli Dhar, 1977 Cr LJ 1634 (AP), and Bhola Nath v. State, 1977 Cr LJ 154 Cal, to the exetent that they h old that Rule 9 (j) was mandatory are not good law." 10. This ruling in short lays down that since the Act and the Rules framed thereunder have been brought on the Statute-Book to achieve a laudable purpose of great public interest, namely, to promote the public health by safeguarding it from ruthless adulterators, the provisions thereof should be construed in a manner which may further its aims and object and not frustrate them. Thus where the Act and the Rules lay down certain formalities to be observed so as to determine whether a particular item of food is free from adulteration, then if in carrying out those formalities there is some minor lapse on the part of the authorities concerned, but there is substantial compliance thereof, the minor lapse should not be allowed to frustrate the object of the Act itself unless it is shown that the strict non- compliance of any of such formalities has resulted in prejudice to the accused. 11. It is also clear from the impugned judgment that the same position has come to prevail amongst the various High Courts even with respect to the construction of Rule 9-A, some of them holding it as merely directory and others as mandatory, as has been held in the case in hand. This conflict has again now been set at rest by the Supreme Com tin 1984 Cr LJ 1731, Tulsi Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, wherein it has been held :— "The expression "immediately" in Rule 9-A is intended to convey a sense of continuity rather than urgency. What must be done is to forward the report to the person from whom the sample was taken at the earliest opportunity, so -as to facilitate the exercise of the statutory right under section 13 (2) in good and sufficient time before the prosecution commences leading evidence. Non-compliance with Rule 9-A is not fatal. It is a question of prejudice. Rule 9-A as amended carefully refrains from mentioning any definite limit of time such as that found in old Rule 9 (j) which gave rise to the controversy whether the Rule was mandatory or directory, and instead uses the general expression immediately. Non-compliance with Rule 9-A is not fatal. It is a question of prejudice. Rule 9-A as amended carefully refrains from mentioning any definite limit of time such as that found in old Rule 9 (j) which gave rise to the controversy whether the Rule was mandatory or directory, and instead uses the general expression immediately. The Local (Health) Authority is now required to forward to the person from whom the sample was taken in the manner prescribed a copy of the report of the Public Analyst immediately after the institution of the prosecution. While prescribing the manner in which the Report may be forwarded the opening words of Rule 9-A "The Local (Health) Authority shall (Immediately) after the institution of the prosecution forward" are borrowed verbatim from section 13 (2) with the word immediately’ inserted in between. The Rule-making authority could never have intended to amend the statute by superseding the word immediately as indeed it was not competent to do. Rule 9-A has to be interpreted so as to keep it in tune with and within the bounds of section 13 (2). The departure farm the previous rule by refraining from mentioning a definite period of time as was done in the old rule makes it evident that the expression immediately is used to convey a sense of continuity rather than a sense of urgency. It is not to be understood to mean the very next instant, the very next hour, that very day or the very next day. It must be construed in its setting. It is no use turning to dictionaries. Dictionaries give variegated meanings to words. What meaning is to be adopted depends on the context. Rule 9-A is made in the context of the amended section 13 (2) which provides for the forwarding of the Public Analaysts Report to the person from whom the sample was taken after the institution of prosecution and enables that person to apply to the court to have analysed by the Central Food Laboratory the sample keep with the Local (Health) Authority. In the context the expression immediately is only meant to convey reasonable despatch and promptitude and no more. The idea is to avoid dilatoriness on the part of officialdom and prevention of unnecessary harassment to the accused. But the idea is not to penalise the prosecution and to provide a technical defence. In the context the expression immediately is only meant to convey reasonable despatch and promptitude and no more. The idea is to avoid dilatoriness on the part of officialdom and prevention of unnecessary harassment to the accused. But the idea is not to penalise the prosecution and to provide a technical defence. First to construe immediately as meaning at once or forthwith and next to hold delay to be fatal to the prosecution would perhaps be to make Rule 9-A ultra vires section 13(2). It is not permissible to interpret Rule 9-A in such a way. The real question is, was the Public Analysts Report sent to the accused sufficiently early to enable him to properly defend himself by giving him an opportunity at the outset to apply to the court to send one of the samples to the Central Food Laboratory for analysis. If after receiving the Public Analysts Report he never sought to apply to the court to have the sample sent to the Central food Laboratory, as in the instant case, he may not be heard to complain of the delay in the receipt of the report by him, unless of course, he is able to establish some other prejudice." 12. This ruling is indubitably a complete answer to the question in hand, namely, whether the provisions of Rule 9-A are mandatory as held by the trial Court or merely directory. Obviously, they are directory in nature. It may be stated that in Tulsi Ram case (supra) their lordships were dealing with the case where there was a delay of 18 days in sending the report of the Public Analyst to the vendor after the prosecution was initiated against him, whereas in the instant case there is delay or 14 days only. It may be stated that in Tulsi Ram case (supra) their lordships were dealing with the case where there was a delay of 18 days in sending the report of the Public Analyst to the vendor after the prosecution was initiated against him, whereas in the instant case there is delay or 14 days only. In that case the accused or the vendor had not cared to exercise his right of taking steps to send the sample kept with the Local (Health) Authority to the Director Central Food Laboratory after the receipt of the report of Public Analyst and had not proved that any prejudice had been caused to him on account of this report having been sent to him after 18 days of the filing of the complaint against him and it was thus held that since no prejudice was caused to the accused no acquittal could be passed on this fact alone that the report was sent to him after 18 days, Similarly in the instant case when the report was sent to the accused after 14 days of the institution of the prosecution case against him, he did not care to apply to the Court concerned requesting it to send the sample of Desi Ghee kept with the Local (Health) Authority for analysis to the Director of Central Food Laboratory nor did he show that any prejudice had been caused to him on account of this delay of 14 days. In these circumstances the Rule 9-A being merely directory could not be allowed to frustrate the laudable purpose of the Act so as to record an order of acquittal on such a technical ground. 13. Our own High Court in ILR 1983 H. P. (Vol. XII) 230 (HP Series), State of Himachal Pradesh v. Thakur Dass9 has also taken the same view while construing the provisions of Ruls 9-A as follows :—- “Keeping in view the purport of the legislation to curb the public mischief and the legislative history, it is not correct to hold that Rule 9-A is mandatory and its infraction will entitle an accused to acquittal. The primary object of the rule is to ensure that a vendor accused does not lose, due to the fault of the prosecution, his right to have the sample of food analysed by the Director of Central Food Laboratory- With that end in view it has been enjoined upon the Local (Health) Authority to send a copy of the report with reasonable promptness. Where this is done there is a substantial compliance of the rule. If the delay in sending a copy of the report has, in fact, caused prejudice to the accused, then there is no substantial compliance of this rule." 14. In view of the above, it is apparent that the judgment of the lower Court in question cannot be allowed to hold the held and has to be set aside. It may be noted that while construing the word immediately’ the lower Court has, while comparing the wording of Rule 9-A with other Rules and the sections of the Act has completely misconstrued the import and connotation of the word immediately. It has said : — "In Rule 9-(a) of the Act, word immediately is not qualified by any other word. But there are certain other rules, wherin this word has been qualified. For instance in Rule 17 of the rules, which prescribes manner for dispatching container of the sample by the Food Inspector, the word immediately is further qualified by not latter than succeeding working day by any suitable means and same is wording in Rule 17 (b) of the Rules, Almost similar is the wording in section 11 (3) of the Act where word immediately is qualified with word succeeding working day. No such qualification is appended to word immediately in Rule 9-A of the Rules. This shows eagerness of the Legislature and promptness with which, informing about the right of the accused under section 13 (2) of the Act is to be complied with." 15. The boot is rather on the other foot. No such qualification is appended to word immediately in Rule 9-A of the Rules. This shows eagerness of the Legislature and promptness with which, informing about the right of the accused under section 13 (2) of the Act is to be complied with." 15. The boot is rather on the other foot. When the word immediately is qualified in Rules 17 and 17-B and section 11 (3) of the Act this rather reflects the urgency in the mind of the framers that the word ‘immediately should not be construed as within reasonable time and that is why they have qualified this word immediately by adding that the compliance thereof should not be made latter than the succeeding working day and this obviously is to curtail the time to the barest minimum whereas when the word immediately is unqualified it would rather connote within reasonable time’ and not at once or forthwith. 16. In view of the above discussion, I set aside the judgment of the lower Court, dated May 3, 1983 and hold the accused guilty for the offence under section 16 (1) (a) (i) read with section 7 of the Act and sentence the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000 and in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months. The bail bonds stand cancelled and he should surrender to his bail at once to run out the sentence. Appeal allowed.