K. P. MOHAPATRA,J. ( 1 ) - The appellants challenge the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sambalpur convicting them under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (I. P. C for short) for having committed the murder of deceased Subhadra and sentencing each of them to undergo imprisonment for life. ( 2 ) BRIEF facts of the prosecution case are that the deceased, a young woman, was the daughter of the informant (P. W. 1) and was married to P. W. 2, son of appellant Sapneswar. Appellant Rajkumari is the wife of appellant Sapneswar. Appellant Kamala their daughter and appellant Sartika is Kamalas husband. All the appellants along with the deceased and her husband (P. W. 2) were living in the house of appellant Sapneswar at village Satkhama. P. W. 1 belongs to village Sahajbahal. Prior to the date of occurrence P. W. 2 had gone to visit his father-in-law (P. W. 1) at village. Sahajbahal. On that day at about 10 am. P. W. 3 came to village Sahajbahal and informed P. Ws. 1 and 2 that the deceased was lying seriously ill. On receiving this information P. W. 1, his wife and P. W. 2 started and arrived at village Satkhama at about 12. 30 p. m. and found that Subhadra was dead and there was an injury on her neck. Appellant Sapneswar, on enquiry by P. W. 1 as to the cause of death, told that the deceased was suffering from diarrhoea and was vomiting which resulted in her death despite treatment by a doctor. The deceased was hale and hearty and her death was sudden. Therefore, P. W. 1 suspected foul play and so he reported the incident on the same day at about 4 p. m. at the Police Station and on his information F. I. R. (Ext. 15) was recorded and investigation was commenced. During investigation, it came to light that the deceased was throttled to death and it was a case of homicide. After close of investigation charge- sheet was submitted against the appellants for having committed the murder of the deceased in the night between 10th and 11th July 1985. According to the defence of the appellants, the deceased died of diarrhoea and vomiting despite medical treatment. ( 3 ) THE learned Additional Sessions TJudge believed the prosecution case and convicted and sentenced the appellants as already referred to above. According to the defence of the appellants, the deceased died of diarrhoea and vomiting despite medical treatment. ( 3 ) THE learned Additional Sessions TJudge believed the prosecution case and convicted and sentenced the appellants as already referred to above. ( 4 ) THE evidence of the Medical Officer (P. W. 12) discloses that he found two ante-mortem bruises on the upper portion of the thighs and one bruise of the size 1 x 11/2on the lower front portion of the throat. On dissection of the throat and from other symtoms appearing on the dead body he came to the conclusion that the death of the deceased was on account of asphyxia as a result of forceful pressure on the throat. He did not also find any symptom of poison or of her suffering from diarrhoea with vomiting (vide reports Exts. 11 and 12/1 ). His evidence is clear enough to show that the death of the deceased was homicidal. During hearing this fact was not: disputed. ( 5 ) MR. S. S. Swain, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, urged that there were no eye witnesses to the alleged murder. Conviction was based purely on circumstantial evidence of a weak nature, which did not conclusively point at the guilt of the appellants. Therefore, their conviction for a serious offence of murder was unjustified. ( 6 ) THE learned Additional Sessions Judge relied upon the following circumstantial evidence: (1) Ante-mortem mark injury on the throat of the deceased and the false explanation given by the appellants that the deceased had suffered from diarrhoea with vomiting which resulted in her death. (2) Ill-feeling and quarrel between the deceased and her mother-in-law, appellant Rajkumari. (3) Wrong information given by appellant Sapneswar to P. W. 2 through P. W. 3 that the deceased was suffering although she was already dead. (4) Information given by appellant Sartika while in police custody leading to the discovery of a stiok (M. O. 11) said to have been used for pressing the throat of the deceased. (7) Before discussing each of the circumstances with reference to the evidence on record it is necessary to state that the prosecution did not lead any evidence to prove that any outsider or outsiders who could have committed the Diurder of the deceased had no access to the house, particularly to the room occupied by her in the fateful night. (7) Before discussing each of the circumstances with reference to the evidence on record it is necessary to state that the prosecution did not lead any evidence to prove that any outsider or outsiders who could have committed the Diurder of the deceased had no access to the house, particularly to the room occupied by her in the fateful night. In my view, in the facts and circumstances of this case it is a lacuna for the reason that scope has been left to believe that some outsider or outsides for some unexplained motive might have been responsible for the murder. 8. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the circumstances on which the prosecution relies must be consistent with the sole hypothesis of the guilt of the accused (see Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra)1. It is true that the evidence of the Medical Officer (P. W. 12) proves that the death of the deceased was due to asphyxia on account of throttling and the appellants explanation that she died of diarrhoea accompanied with vomiting was untrue. Existence of the injuries and false explanation offered by the appellants no not lead to the conclusion that they are the culprits and responsible for the death of the deceased. Falsity of defence cannot take the place of proof of facts, which the prosecution has to establish in order to succeed. A false plea can at best be considered as in additional circumstance, if other circumstances point unfailingly to the guilt of the accused. There is no direct evidence of quarrel or ill-feeling between the deceased and her mother-in-law, appellant Rajkumari. On the other hand, P. W. 2, son of appellant Sapneswar and husband of the deceased stated that there was no quarrel between appellant Rajkumari and the deceased. Only in Ext. 2 a letter written by him to P. W 1 there was reference that appellant Rajkumari had ill-treated the deceased. In a family, there may be some quarrel between the daughter-in-law and mother-in-law, which is not unusual. Even if there might have been some quarrel between the deceased and appellant Rajkumari it cannot be treated as a strong piece of circumstance providing motive for the murder perpetrated by the appellants. In a family, there may be some quarrel between the daughter-in-law and mother-in-law, which is not unusual. Even if there might have been some quarrel between the deceased and appellant Rajkumari it cannot be treated as a strong piece of circumstance providing motive for the murder perpetrated by the appellants. It appears from the evidence of P. W. 1 father of the deceased, P. W. 2 and P. W. 3, a co-villager, that appellant Sapneswar sent for P. W. 2 from the village of his father-in-law (P. W. 1) on the pretext that the deceased was suffering although she was already dead. The explanation offered by appellant Sapneswar is that he gave such information so that P. W. 2 would not be shocked to learn about his wifes sudden death. It is not rare to find that close relations at times are not directly informed about a death in the family and they are called on the pretext of serious illness of a member of family. The explanation offered by appellant Sapneswar in this respect appears to be satisfactory which will not constitute an incriminating circumstance. According to the evidence of P. W. 6, in the presence of all the accused persons, appellant Sartika gave the information leading to the discovery of a stick (M. O. 11 ). In cross examination he stated that the information was given by all the accused persons after confessing before the police that they had pressed the stick on the throat of deceased and caused her death. The alleged confession of the appellants while in police custody is not only inadmissible in evidence, but also the joint information given by all the appellants leading to discovery of M. O. 11 does not have such probative value to constitute an incriminating circumstance. That apart, presence of a stick in a household was not unusual. Moreover, the stick (M. O. 11) was not sent for chemical examination to find out if there were skin particles attached to it, if at all it was used for pressing the throat of the deceased causing a bruise. There is yet another circumstance to the effect that P. W. 1 was not given opportunity of seeing the deceased, but later he was permitted to see her. There is yet another circumstance to the effect that P. W. 1 was not given opportunity of seeing the deceased, but later he was permitted to see her. In this respect there is evidence of witnesses to show that they were informed by appellant Sapneswar about the death of the deceased and they were called to see her. The witnesses came and saw her. Even and Pharmacist (P. W. 11) had been consulted by appellant Sapneswar, which shows that if the death of the deceased was shrouded with secrecy he would not have called so many persons to see the deceased. This circumstance favours the appellants. In the fateful night, besides the deceased, there were four occupants of the house. It has also been earlier observed that the prosecution did not lead any evidence to prove that there was no scope for an outsider to enter into the house, particularly the room occupied by the deceased. So it is difficult to pinpoint the actual culprit from out of the appellants who were the occupants of the house in the fateful night. The circumstances, which have been established by the prosecution are very meagre. They are not strong enough so as to lead to the only reasonable conclusion that the appellants were the assailants of the deceased and responsible for her death. In consideration of the evidence, the circumstances and probabilities, I am of the opinion that complicity of the appellants in the commission of the murder of the deceased is doubtful and there is no clear evidence against them so that their conviction in a serious case of murder should be upheld. 9. For the foregoing reasons, I give benefit of doubt to the appellants and accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence. The appellants are acquitted of the charges under section 302/34 I. P. C. and be set at liberty forthwith. 10. In this case, the deceased Subhadra Dehury was the daughter-in-law of appellant Sapneswar Dehury who died in the night between 10th and 11th July 1985 in suspicious circumstances. No doubt, killing of a daughter-in-law these days for non-fulfillment of the demands by her maternal home has become very rampant, but at the same time even in the cases of natural death of a young daughter-in-law, eye brows are raised and suspicion is immediately cast on the in-laws. No doubt, killing of a daughter-in-law these days for non-fulfillment of the demands by her maternal home has become very rampant, but at the same time even in the cases of natural death of a young daughter-in-law, eye brows are raised and suspicion is immediately cast on the in-laws. Here is a case where there is no eye witness and only some of the circumstances which were pressed into service by the prosecution and enumerated in the judgment of my learned brother Mohapatra, the trial court has recorded a judgment of conviction. It is the well settled principle that when a case rests on circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy three tests, i. e. , (i) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established, (ii) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of that accused, and (iii) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else. The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain a conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation on any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. On an evaluation of the circumstances I find it difficult to record a finding of guilt beyond all shadows of reasonable doubt although there may be a strong suspicion against the appellants. 11. It is not the prosecution case that the alleged ill feeling between the mother-in- law of the deceased, namely, appellant Rajkumari Debury or, for the matter of that, the father-in-law, appellant no. 1 was on account of non-fulfillment of the demand, the marriage having taken place quite some time before. From the evidence of the informant, the father of the deceased (P. W. 1), it appears that the deceased was not pulling on well with her mother-in-law, Rajkumari Dehury, appellant no. 2, only 6 to 7 months back, but no reason for the quarrel has been given. A simple quarrel between a mother-in-law and a daughter in-law in normal course of domestic life and family affairs is not very unusual. 2, only 6 to 7 months back, but no reason for the quarrel has been given. A simple quarrel between a mother-in-law and a daughter in-law in normal course of domestic life and family affairs is not very unusual. The prosecution has, however, not led any evidence to show that the relationship between the deceased and the in-laws were so much strained that they could go to the extent of outright killing her. In a crime of this nature, there is always an attempt to dispose of the dead body hurriedly in a clandestine manner. . No such attempt has been made by the accused. It may well be that the deceased was an inmate of the house and the manner of her death gave rise to serious speculation and suspicion against the appellants but that, in the absence of convincing circumstances does not warrant a conviction. 12. I therefore record my agreement with my learned brother that the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt. I would accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court. 1. AIR. 1981 S. C. 765.