U. P. State Road Transport Corporation, Lucknow v. Shambhu Dayal Awasthi
1987-02-24
D.N.JHA
body1987
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER D.N. Jha, J. - The facts of the case are that respondent I Shambhu Dayal Awasthi was working as Conductor in the U.P. State Roadways. In 1972 U.P. State Roadways was converted into a State undertaking under the name of Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter to be called the Corporation). In June, 1972 the services of Shambhu Dayal Awasthi were placed on deputation with the Corporation. In August, 1973 his services were terminated with immediate effect without notice with one month's pay in lieu of notice. Thereafter a reference under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act was made. The case of the corporation is that the respondent was appointed as a conductor on 1958 in a stop gap arrangement and his appointment was purely temporary. The services of the respondent were extended from time to time but since he continued to indulge in irregularities and malpractices his services were terminated after giving him one month's notice on 30-4-1964. The question of termination of service was hotly debated before the Industrial Tribunal II. 2. The Tribunal held after consideration of the evidence that the dismissal of the respondent was in the garb of discharge simpliciter and it was eventually colourable exercise of power and the impugned order could not be sustained. The termination of his services was illegal and unjust in view of the law laid down in the case of Ram Krishna Yadav (1981 LLT (Services) 103). The respondent was, therefore, entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and consequent benefit of continuity of service, pension, gratuity etc. and the award was made accordingly. It is in these circumstances that the Corporation has preferred this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution impugning the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the averments and cross averments made by the respective parties on oath.
and the award was made accordingly. It is in these circumstances that the Corporation has preferred this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution impugning the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the averments and cross averments made by the respective parties on oath. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued on the basis of disclosures made in para 6 of the writ petition pointing out that the record of service of respondent 1 who was working as Conductor, was most unsatisfactory and he was found indulging in corrupt practices and he did not improve himself in spite of his services being terminated on two previous occasions i.e. on 30-4-1964 and 5-8-1971 and in spite of this fact he was given fresh chance of employment but he continued to indulge in irregularities and Corruption. The instance narrated are as under :- 1. On 27-5-1959 the respondent 1 was detected carrying one passenger without ticket. 2. On 27-9-1961 respondent No. 1 was found carrying 5 Maunds of luggage unbooked in the bus being conducted by him. 3. On 12-5-1962 respondent No. 1 absented from duty without any intimation. 4. On 9-4-1964 respondent No. 1 was caught carrying 8 passengers without ticket in his bus. 5. On 24-11-1966 respondent No. 1 was detected carrying 5 passengers without ticket in the bus being conducted by him. 6. On 21-12-1966 respondent No. 1 was detected carrying 22 passengers without ticket in the bus being conducted by him. 7. On 24-12-1966 respondent No. 1 was caught carrying 1 passenger without ticket in the bus being conducted by him. 8. On 3-9-1970 respondent No. 1 was detected carrying 4 passengers without ticket in the bus being conducted by him. 9. On 20-7-1971 respondent No. 1 was caught carrying 8 passengers without ticket in the bus being conducted by him. 10. On 23-7-1973 respondent No. 1 was caught carrying 43 passengers without ticket in the bus being conducted by him. The services of Shambhu Dayal Awasthi were terminated by a simpliciter order of termination dated 17-8-1973 by giving him one month's pay it lieu of notice.
10. On 23-7-1973 respondent No. 1 was caught carrying 43 passengers without ticket in the bus being conducted by him. The services of Shambhu Dayal Awasthi were terminated by a simpliciter order of termination dated 17-8-1973 by giving him one month's pay it lieu of notice. He argued that the Industrial Tribunal erred in observing that the services of the respondent were terminated in colourable exercise of power and it also committed an error in observing that a charge-sheet should have been served and explanation should have been taken after a full-fledged domestic inquiry and thereafter order for dismissal should have been passed provided his guilt was established. To substantiate his case the learned counsel pointed out that respondent 1 was appointed in the erstwhile U.P. Government Roadways on 20-10-1958 and his services in view of bad record were terminated on 30-4-1964. However, on his representation a fresh chance of employment was provided to him on 30-1-1970 but since there was no improvement again his services were terminated on 5-8-1971. He made a representation and again one more chance of employment on 21-6-1973 was provided by the Assistant Regional Transport Manager. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation. He, therefore, urged that the respondent was not in the employment either with the erstwhile U.P. State Roadways or U.P. State Road Transport Corporation between the period 5-8-1971 and 17-8-1973. This question I shall deal subsequently. 4. The main question to be determined is whether the Tribunal committed an error in observing that dismissal of respondent 1 was in the garb of colourable exercise of power or not. In this connection reference was made to annexure 2 which is the appointment letter of respondent I issued on 21-6-1973. It is being, reproduced hereunder : "Sri Shambhoo Dayal Awasthi, Ex-Conductor, who has been allowed one more chance by the Deputy General Manager (Personnel) U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Lucknow. Vide his office order No. 1253-RWD/238-Appeal/66, dated 19-4-1973 is hereby temporarily appointed to the post of Conductor in the scale of pay of Rs. 80-3-140 plus usual D.A. for the period up to 28-2-74 against anticipated sanction with effect from the date of joining the duties. He is posted at C.B.S. Depot, Lucknow. The appointment of Sri Awasthi made as above is purely temporary and his services are liable to be terminated on one month's notice at any time without assigning any reason thereof.
80-3-140 plus usual D.A. for the period up to 28-2-74 against anticipated sanction with effect from the date of joining the duties. He is posted at C.B.S. Depot, Lucknow. The appointment of Sri Awasthi made as above is purely temporary and his services are liable to be terminated on one month's notice at any time without assigning any reason thereof. This letter of appointment indicates that the services of Sri Shambhu Dayal Awasthi were only up to 28-2-1974 and it could be terminated with one month's notice by either side. The termination order of Shambhu Dayal Awasthi also shows that the nature of service was temporary and since his services were no longer required they were being terminated and instead of one month's notice he was paid one month's salary in lieu of notice. The order of the Tribunal, therefore, suffers from manifest apparent error inasmuch "as it reinstated the petitioner with back wages. the Tribunal did not apply its mind to the "term appointment" given to the respondent which was only to last till 28-2-1974. It is also clear that there was no continuity of service as every time fresh appointment was granted to him. The respondent, therefore, could not be placed at par with other regular employees. Therefore, even if the Tribunal came to the conclusion that it was a colourable exercise of power it should not have gone out of its way by adopting a Pro-labour policy to order reinstatement with back wages. If the Tribunal had only awarded back wages up to 28-2-1974 probably I would not have interfered with its decision. It would also not be out of place to mention that if a Government corporation or a private corporation or any industry has to survive then some restrictions will have to be placed on the activities of workmen. If lavishly wages are paid then the day may not be far off when, what to say of private entrepreneur, even Government enterprises will have to think twice before entering the arena of setting up any industry. It is, therefore, necessary that in labour matter these Tribunals should act with care and caution to ensure that there is neither any demoralisation to the industrial employers or to the workmen.
It is, therefore, necessary that in labour matter these Tribunals should act with care and caution to ensure that there is neither any demoralisation to the industrial employers or to the workmen. It is high time that checks and balances in matters of relationship of master and servant should be struck so as to provide a harmonious working in an organisation, be it a Government corporation or a private industry. The socialistic pattern of social justice envisaged in the Constitution should not be stretched to such an extreme that it may result in creating a deadlock in future. The instant case is a living example. The tribunal has indulged in extreme vagary in order to thrust the service of Shambhu Nath Awasthi on the Government owned Corporation. I have carefully perused the written statement filed by the Corporation and I have no hesitation in observing that if services of a corrupt employee are thrust, there will be no incentive left for the honest people to work diligently and public exchequer will be put to serious loss and a day may come when our national economy may cripple down. These observations should not tend to give an impression that labour should be denied its legitimate right. What actually is intended to convey is that a rational balance has to be struck by Labour Tribunal in order to maintain peace and harmony for smooth functioning of public owned corporations as well as private industries. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently urged that the dismissal of respondent 1 was in the garb of colourable exercise of power inasmuch Article 311(1) of the Constitution gives protection to persons who come within the ambit of the Article against dismissal or removal by an authority. In nut-shell his submission is that it is not a simpliciter order of termination of service but the delinquent officer was punished for his misdeeds. It was, therefore, incumbent on the authorities to have properly charge- sheeted him, conducted a proper inquiry and dismissed him.
In nut-shell his submission is that it is not a simpliciter order of termination of service but the delinquent officer was punished for his misdeeds. It was, therefore, incumbent on the authorities to have properly charge- sheeted him, conducted a proper inquiry and dismissed him. To support his contention he placed reliance on Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1980 SC 1896 : 1980 Lab IC 1004 wherein at page 1910, para 52, it was held : "If the basis or foundation for the order of termination is clearly not turpitudinous or stigmatic or rotted in misconduct or visited with evil pecuniary effects, then the inference of dismissal stands negated and vice versa These canons run right through the disciplinary branch of master and servant jurisprudence, both under Article 311 and in other cases including workmen under managements. The law cannot be stultified by verbal haberdashery because the court will lift the mask and discover the true face." It may be mentioned that his view has continued to be in force from the time of decision in Dhingra's case AIR 1958 SC 36 . The law, as has boiled down, is that 'in a situation where the order of termination purports to be a mere order of discharge without stating the stigmatizing results of the department enquiry a search for the substance of the matter' will be indistinguishable from a search for the motive (real unrevealed object) of the order. Failure to appreciate this relationship between motive (the real, but unrevealed object) and from (the apparent; or officially revealed object) in the present , context has led to an unreal inter-play of words and phrases wherein symbols like 'motives" substance" from' or 'direct' parade in different combinations without communicating precise situations or entities in the world of facts. 6. The Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd., (1980 lab IC 1004) (supra) further observed : "Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological cover-ups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed.
The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is, if, thus scrutinised, the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal, if it falls short of this test, it cannot be called a punishment. To put it slightly differently a termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, it is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged disconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non-injurious terminology is used." Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Anoop Jaiswal v. Govt. of India, AIR 1984 SC 636 : 1984 Lab IC 343; Nepal Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC 84 : 1985 Lab IC 587 ; Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1986 SC 1626 : 1986 Lab IC 1086 and State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Misra, AIR 1971 SC 1011 : 1971 Lab IC 724. There is no dispute so far as the proposition of law enunciated in these decision is concerned. Each case has to be decided in the light of attending circumstances. Some of the guidelines have been elucidated in the case of State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur, AIR 1968 SC 1089 : 1968 Lab IC 1286. These are as under : 1. The services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination without anything more would not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. 2. The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination have to be examined in each case the motive behind it being immaterial. 3.
The services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination without anything more would not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. 2. The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination have to be examined in each case the motive behind it being immaterial. 3. If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an assertion against his character or integrity, it must. he considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. 4. An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. 5. If there be a full-scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311 i.e. an Enquire officer is appointed, a charge-sheet submitted. Explanation called for and considered. an) order of termination of service made thereafter will attract operation of the said article." It is no doubt true that no rigid principle can be laid down by a Court that one has only to look to the order and if it does not contain any imputation of misconduct or words attaching a stigma to the character or reputation of a Government Officer it must be held to have been made in the ordinary course of administrative routine and the Court is debarred from looking at all the attendant circumstances to discover whether the order had been made by way of punishment. The form of the order is not conclusive of its true nature and it might merely be a cloak or camouflage for an order founded on misconduct. It may be that an order which is innocuous on the face and does not contain any imputation of misconduct is a circumstance or a piece of evidence for finding whether it was made by way of punishment or administrative routine. In fact the entirety of circumstances preceding or attendant on the impugned order must be examined and the overriding test will always be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or is the very foundation of the order. 7.
In fact the entirety of circumstances preceding or attendant on the impugned order must be examined and the overriding test will always be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or is the very foundation of the order. 7. Applying the test in the instant case, no doubt it would be evident that the services of Shambhu Dayal Awasthi were terminated because he was found to have indulged in malpractice of carrying passengers without ticket. It would not have been difficult to set aside the simpliciter order of termination but in the instant case that history of employment of Shambhu Dayal Awasthi reveals that in spite of the fact that repeated chances were given to him for showing improvement he proved to be incorrigible inasmuch as he persistently kept on abusing his authority as a conductor. It has already been observed above that the appointment of Shambhu Dayal Awasthi was only to last till 28-2-1974. Even assuming that the foundation of the termination order was because he was found guilty of carrying 43 passengers without ticket even then he could not have been continued beyond 28-2-1974. If enquiry was conducted after submission of charge-sheet probably the. delinquent officer must have remained under suspension for all the period and ultimately the result would have been his dismissal. Carrying of 43 passengers in a bus without ticket calls for no further evidence or enquiry and if the authorities took a lenient view by terminating his services without any stigma being attached to it, in my opinion, it cannot be said that the authorities went astray and if a strict view of interpretation of law is to be attached then it would have only entailed perpetration of hasrdship on the respondent. In the present circumstances the delinquent officer could seek job elsewhere. I, therefore, do not find myself in absolute agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that the services of Shambhu Dayal Awasthi were dispensed with in the garb of colourable exercise of power in view of the peculiar circumstances of the instant case. 8. It was next argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the finding of the Tribunal that services of Shambhu Dayal Awasthi could not be terminated by Sri P. N. Prasad, Assistant Regional Manager, as Shambhu Dayal Awasthi was on deputation cannot be sustained.
8. It was next argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the finding of the Tribunal that services of Shambhu Dayal Awasthi could not be terminated by Sri P. N. Prasad, Assistant Regional Manager, as Shambhu Dayal Awasthi was on deputation cannot be sustained. In my opinion this finding is also incorrect as it is based on misappreciation of facts and circumstances of the case. If the delinquent officer was on deputation then Sri P.N. Prasad was also similarly placed as his services where also on deputation. Therefore, the services of a Government employee, who was on deputation, could be terminated by an officer who was also on deputation. If Shambhu Dayal Awasthi was a Government servant then Sri P. N. Prasad also fell within the category of Government servant and it is not disputed that Sri P. N. Prasad was incompetent to terminate the services of the respondent, If the respondent is deemed to be an employee of the Corporation then Sri P. N. Prasad would also be treated as belonging to the Corporation. Therefore, in my opinion in either of the contingencies Sri P. N. Prasad was competent to terminate the services of Shambhu Dayal Awasthi. The argument is that the subsequent appointment made in 1973 would bring Shambhu Dayal Awasthi in the category of employee of the Corporation and, therefore, the termination of his services by Sri P. N. Prasad, who was on deputation, would be illegal In that event the entire case of continuity of service of Shambhu Dayal Awasthi falls to ground. There is no dispute that Shambhu Dayal Awasthi was employed by the U.P. Government Roadways and then he became Conductor in the Corporation where his services were terminated He was again given a chance but since he did not refrain from his activities his services were again terminated and then subsequently after a lapse of time he was again given an employment as a conductor in the Corporation. I am therefore, of the view that Shambhu Dayal Awasthi could not be allowed to blow hot and cold simultaneously. The finding of the Tribunal is, therefore, wholly erroneous and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law as it cannot be said that their services of Shambhu Dayal Awasthi were terminated by an officer who was not competent to do so. 9.
The finding of the Tribunal is, therefore, wholly erroneous and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law as it cannot be said that their services of Shambhu Dayal Awasthi were terminated by an officer who was not competent to do so. 9. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that reference was made under S. 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act after 11 years viz. On 3-3-1984 and, therefore, reinstatement was bad in law. It is not necessary to enter into the discussion of this question as in view of the aforesaid discussion it is not at all relevant. 10. I would further like to make a mention that the Tribunal in the narration of fact has observed that the workman maintains that this summary dismissal amounts to retrenchment under S. 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and since the conditions precedent to retrenchment being violated he would be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. If the case of the respondent was with respect to his retrenchment then the entire discussion and findings recorded by the Tribunal fall to ground. They would be rendered maninfestly illegal and perverse. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, urged that Shambhu Dayal Awasthi had not based his case on retrenchment and it is not preseed It is not necessary, therefore, to go into the discussion with respect to this point. Nor has the Tribunal held it as a case of retrenchment. 11. Thus, on giving my anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion the award dated 25-4-1986, contained in Annexure 1, cannot be sustained in the eye of law and is accordingly quashed The petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed I. however, make no order as to costs.