JUDGMENT - Qazi M.M., J.:—As these petitions involve common questions of law, they are disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The present petitions have to be allowed on the short ground that the Resident Deputy Collector, Akola, who passed the impugned order, had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeals. According to Clause 21 of the Central Province and Bear Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short, 'Rent Control Order'), an appeal against the order of the Controller has to be presented to the Collector of the District. However, according to Clause 21-A of the Rent Control Order, the State Government is empowered to issue a notification investing any officer with the powers of the Collector under Clause 21. In pursuance of this power, the State Government had issued a notification dated 13th June, 1966, investing various Resident Deputy Collectors with the powers of the Collector. The notification reads thus: “In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-clause (1) of Clause 21-A of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, and in supersession of all previous notifications issued in this behalf, the Government of Maharashtra hereby invests the officers mentioned in Column (1) of the Schedule appended hereto, with the powers of the Collector under Clause 21 of the said Order within the areas mentioned against them in Column (2) of the said schedule : SCHEDULE Officers Areas (1) (2) 1. Additional District Magistrate, Within the limits of Nagpur Nagpur district 2. Resident Deputy Collectors of Within the limits of their Nagpur, Akola, Amravati, respective districts.” Bhandara, Buldana, Chanda, Wardha and Yeotmal. There is no dispute that once such a notification is issued investing the Resident Deputy Collector with the powers of the Collector, the Collector may choose to transfer any appeal to such officer for disposal. The Resident Deputy Collector, Akola, who passed the impugned orders, was also invested with such power which is evident from the notification quoted above. 3. In these cases, the Rent Controller, who passed the orders, was one K.G. Bijwal, who subsequently came to be promoted as Resident Deputy Collector, Akola. Consequently, he became the appellate authority under the Rent Control Order by virtue of the above notification. 3. In these cases, the Rent Controller, who passed the orders, was one K.G. Bijwal, who subsequently came to be promoted as Resident Deputy Collector, Akola. Consequently, he became the appellate authority under the Rent Control Order by virtue of the above notification. However, since he could not hear the appeals arising out of his own orders, a notification dated 7th May, 1984 (Annexure E) came to be issued by the State Government, which is reproduced below : “In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-clause (1) of Clause 21-A of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, the Government of Maharashtra hereby invests the Deputy Collector and Special Land Acquisition Officer (General), Akola, with the powers of a Collector under Clause 21 of the said order for hearing appeals made under the said Clause 21 against orders passed by Shri K.G. Bijwal, Deputy Collector, Akola.” (Emphasis supplied) 4. However, after the above notification was issued, K.G. Bijwal came to be transferred from Akola and in his place one S.G. Paraskar was appointed as Resident Deputy Collector. Naturally thus S.G. Paraskar became the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Order under the General Notification of the year 1966, referred supra. The Collector, Akola, if wanted to transfer these appeals to S.G. Paraskar, then he should have moved the State Government for the withdrawal of the notification of the year 1984, which had invested the Deputy Collector and Special Land Acquisition Officer (General). Akola, with the power of the Appellate Court to hear the appeals arising out of the orders of K.G. Bijwal and the State Government would have normally withdrawn it since the situation had changed. However, the Collector, Akola, instead of adopting proper course, as stated above, chose to transfer these appeals to S.G. Paraskar. When the appeals came up before S.G. Paraskar, the petitioners raised the ground of jurisdiction, in view of the fact that the notification of the year 1984 was still in force. However, S.G. Paraskar took the view that he could hear the appeals notwithstanding the existence of the notification of the year 1984. 5. Therefore, the question that falls for my consideration is whether S.G. Paraskar had jurisdiction to hear the appeals out of which the present petitions have arisen. Mr. However, S.G. Paraskar took the view that he could hear the appeals notwithstanding the existence of the notification of the year 1984. 5. Therefore, the question that falls for my consideration is whether S.G. Paraskar had jurisdiction to hear the appeals out of which the present petitions have arisen. Mr. Lohiya, appearing on behalf of the respondents, submitted that the notification dated 7th May, 1984 had no effect of withdrawing the powers of the Resident Deputy Collector which were conferred on him by virtue of the notification dated 13th June, 1966. According to him, the present notification cannot be read in supersession of the earlier notification. At any rate, he submitted that since there were two notifications giving power to two different officers, the two officers named therein would be deemed to have been invested by the State Government with the powers to hear the appeal under Clause 21 of the Rent Control Order. There is obvious fallacy in this argument. Mr. Lohiya has lost sight of the fact that the notification of the year 1966 is in general terms conferring appellate powers practically on every Resident Deputy Collector in Vidarbha, whereas 1984 notification confers powers on the Deputy Collector and Special Land Acquisition Officer (General), Akola, to hear only such appeals which arose from the orders of K.G. Bijwal, the Rent Controller, as he then was. Therefore, as long as this notification is in force, the Resident Deputy Collector could not hear these appeals. This notification was obviously in supersession of the earlier notification to a limited extent. The Resident Deputy Collector, Akola who was otherwise empowered under the notification dated 13th June, 1966 to hear the appeals under the Rent Control Order, was prevented from hearing such appeals which arose out of the orders passed by K.G. Bijwal, the Rent Controller, by virtue of the notification of 1984. 6. Mr. Lohiya relied on the decision reported in 1987(1) Bom.C.R. 67 (Hiralal Bagmal Bhandari v. Bhagirathibai Haribakas Agrawal and others)1. This decision, in my view, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In this decision, the petitioner challenged the validity of the two notifications dated 13th June, 1966 and 7th May, 1984. According to him, the State Government had no power to invest any other officer besides the Collector with the powers of the Collector under Clause 21. This challenge was negatived. In this decision, the petitioner challenged the validity of the two notifications dated 13th June, 1966 and 7th May, 1984. According to him, the State Government had no power to invest any other officer besides the Collector with the powers of the Collector under Clause 21. This challenge was negatived. The controversy in the present petition is altogether different. As I have already pointed out above, the wordings of 1984 notification are very specific and unambiguous and do not appear to be capable of any other interpretation. As long as this notification stands, no other authority except the one named in this notification would be deemed to have been authorised under Clause 21-A to hear the appeals arising out of the orders of K.G. Bijwal. 7. In my view, there is much substance in the submission of Mr. Mohta that had the State Government intended to restrict the notification only till such time as K.G. Bijwal was Resident Deputy Collector, Akola, then the wordings of the notification would have been different. An indication could have been given in the notification to that effect. In the alternative, the State Government could have withdrawn the 1984 notification as soon as K.G. Bijwal came to be transferred from Akola. But, since nothing of the sort was done by the State Government, it would not be possible to hold that S.G. Paraskar, the Resident Deputy Collector, Akola, could hear and dispose of the appeals on the basis of the authority conferred on him under the 1966 notification. In view of the plain and unambiguous wordings used in the notification, no other interpretation seems to be possible, except the one as shown above. The Appellate Court has relied on the decision reported in 1953 N.L.J. Note 34, (Shiodinlal v. Mohammadali)2. That decision is not at all relevant for deciding the controversy involved in the present petitions. Mr. Mohta invited my attention to the decision reported in 1987(2) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)496 (Pandurang v. State of Maharashtra)3, in support of his contention that if the decision is given by the forum which is lacking in competence with regard to the subject-matter, that decision is no decision at all. There is no dispute about this proposition. Such a decision is non-existent in the eye of law and hence a nullity. Since the impugned orders are without jurisdiction, it is not necessary to examine the cases on merit. There is no dispute about this proposition. Such a decision is non-existent in the eye of law and hence a nullity. Since the impugned orders are without jurisdiction, it is not necessary to examine the cases on merit. The petitions are allowed and the impugned orders are quashed and set aside. The cases are remanded to the Deputy Collector and Special Land Acquisition Officer (General), Akola, for deciding the appeals according to law. It is needless to say that the State Government can withdraw the notification of the year 1984. In that event, the Collector would be entitled to transfer the appeals to the Resident Deputy Collector, if he so desires. 8. The petitioners have applied for amendment of the petitions. But, since I am remanding the matters back on a pure question of jurisdiction, the applications become infructuous. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Order accordingly.