Judgment :- 1. The petitioner applied for purchase of his kudikidappu (O. A. 149/77) under S.80A and 80B of Act 1/64, claiming that the dwelling house in question was put up by him in 1964 at a cost of about Rs.250/- and that he was residing in it for well over 13 years. When examined before the Land Tribunal as PW1, however, his version was slightly different. The landlord had seven cents of land, and there was a but almost centrally located in it, which he bad let out to some other person, for being used as a tea shop. That person left it, and the but remained unoccupied for some time, and in disrepair. In 1964 the petitioner occupied it and effected some repairs. But in 1971 he was persuaded to shift to the southern corner of the seven cents, lying at a lower level than the rest of the property. Thereafter the extent in his occupation, including the site of the but newly erected by him, was only about 2 cents. The landlord had fenced up the rest of the property and was cultivating it himself. 2. The Authorised Officer's report was also more or less on the same lines. Of the seven cents, one cent had been taken up by a Panchayat road. The petitioner was occupying about 2 cents at the southern end, and the remaining four cents was separately enclosed by the landlord and was being cultivated by him. Local enquiries revealed that this was the position from 1971, though before that period, the petitioner and his family were living in a but which was then in existence within the area fenced up by the landlord. 3. The landlord had a different story; but we are now not concerned with its veracity or details. The Land Tribunal noticed that there was virtually do dispute as to who had constructed the dwelling house in the two cents: it was put up by the applicant, and he was therefore entitled to claim kudikidappu. Of course, the Tribunal bad some doubt whether a Kudikidappu claim could be accepted in respect of the but which was there in 1964. It said: "It is therefore amply proved that the applicant took up residence in the hut. owned by the 1st respondent in the land some time about 1964. Of course, the Tribunal bad some doubt whether a Kudikidappu claim could be accepted in respect of the but which was there in 1964. It said: "It is therefore amply proved that the applicant took up residence in the hut. owned by the 1st respondent in the land some time about 1964. and continued to live there till 1971, when the but was shifted to another site within the 7 cents a doubt crops up in my mind whether it is legalistic ally correct to hold that he used to be a kudikidappukaran as on 1-1-1970 and continues as such even today. In the alternative also he has to be considered as a kudikidappukaran in the land, since 1971. In either case he is a kudikidappukaran eligible for the protection envisaged in the KLR Act. It is therefore immaterial whether he is a kudikidappukaran from 1964 onwards or 1971 onwards". The tribunal was evidently attempting to follow the law laid down by this Court that a kudikidappu could be created even after 1-1-70, and to hold that the applicant before it could be treated as a kudikidappukaran at least in relation to the structure he had erected in 1971, in the two cents of land. The Tribunal was however of the view, apparently because of the language employed in S.80A(1) and the decision of this Court in Kuni Arippandi v. Ummar (1976 KLT 50), that the applicant (the petitioner herein) was entitled to purchase the entire 7 cents. 4. On appeal the Appellate Authority took note of the proviso to sub-a. (3) of S.80A, and held that the petitioner was entitled to purchase only the two cents and the structure therein, but not the remaining 4 cents in the separate possession and enjoyment of the landlord. 5. It is the correctness of the above view which is now under challenge, the petitioner contending that he is entitled to purchase the entire plot of land, on the basis of the law laid down in Kuni Arippandi (1976 KLT 50). It does not appear that the said decision was brought to the notice of the Appellate Authority, but it is a Division Bench decision which should ordinarily bind me also. 6. "Ordinarily", I venture to say, because there are said to be exceptions to the rule regarding the binding nature of precedents. It does not appear that the said decision was brought to the notice of the Appellate Authority, but it is a Division Bench decision which should ordinarily bind me also. 6. "Ordinarily", I venture to say, because there are said to be exceptions to the rule regarding the binding nature of precedents. Where a decision is rendered overlooking the law laid down to the contrary by a higher court, or ignoring relevant and vital statutory provisions, its binding nature is open to serious doubt. In such a case, it will be appropriate to ask the question: would the decision have been the same, if the court's attention had been drawn to the law laid down by the higher court, or to all the relevant statutory provisions in question? If the answer is in the negative, the decision concerned will be regarded as having been given per encuriam, and hence not binding. See Young Bristol Aeroplane Co. (1944 KB 718). R v. Northumberland Compensation Tribunal (1951) 1 KB 711, Moore v. Hewitt (1947) 2 All. ER. 270, Morelle v. Wakeling (1955) 2 QB 379 etc. 7. The facts in Kuni Arippandi (1976 KLT 50) were simple. The kudikidappukaran there was occupying a Kuni ("a small garden in the midst of paddy fields") having an extent of only 31/2 cents. He applied for purchase of the kudikidappu, and claimed that he was entitled to purchase not only the 31/2 cents of garden land, but also another 61/2 cents from the paddy field adjoining it and belonging to the landlord. The Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority rejected the claim for the extra 61/2 cents, but this Court allowed it, mainly for the following two reasons:- (i) Under S.80A(1) the kudikidappukaran can purchase lands adjoining the kudikidappu also, subject to a maximum of 10 cents (in Panchayat areas) as fixed in Sub-s. (3). There is no restriction in Sub-s. (1) about the nature of the extra land be could purchase, except that it should be "adjoining" the kudikidappu. Therefore, adjoining lands cannot be excluded from the purview of S.80A (1), solely because such land is part of a paddy field. (ii) In Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (1970 KLT 659) a Full Bench of this Court had indicated that the object of the provision was to enable the kudikidappukaran to raise a kitchen garden or carry on other agricultural operations. (ii) In Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (1970 KLT 659) a Full Bench of this Court had indicated that the object of the provision was to enable the kudikidappukaran to raise a kitchen garden or carry on other agricultural operations. The legislative intention was thus to give some extra land to the occupant, for the convenient enjoyment of the kudikidappu. I feel however that some of the other provisions of S.80A which were relevant for a decision on the point were not brought to the notice of their lordships of the Division Bench, as I shall presently attempt to show. 8. As already noticed, S.80A(1) confers a right on the kudikidappukaran to purchase "the kudikidappu occupied by him and lands adjoining thereto." S.2(25) of the Act which defines "kudikidappukaran" also contains a definition of "kudikidappu"; and a close examination of this definition will probably be of some assistance in understanding the scope of "kudikidappu and lands adjoining thereto." S.2(25), in so far as it is relevant for the present, reads: "(25) "kudikidappukaran" means a person who has neither a homestead nor any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in an; Panchayat area or township, in possession either as owner or as tenant, on which he could erect a homestead and (a) who has been permitted with or without an obligation to pay rent by a person in lawful possession of any land to have the use and occupation of a portion of such land for the purpose of erecting a homestead; or (b) who has been permitted by a person in lawful possession of any land to occupy, with or without an obligation to pay rent, a but belonging to such person and situate in the said land; and "kudikidappu" means the land and the homestead or the but so permitted to be erected or occupied together with the easements attached thereto." The scope of clause (a) is clear: when A who is in lawful possession of some land permits B to occupy and use a portion of that land for erecting a homestead, B becomes a kudikidappukaran (subject of course, to the other qualifications and restrictions in the sub-section). Clause (b) deals with a case where A, in possession of land, permits B to occupy a but situated in that land. Clause (b) deals with a case where A, in possession of land, permits B to occupy a but situated in that land. The word portion is not there in this clause; but the but must be situated in the land in the possession of A. Taking into account the concept of 'hut' as set out in Explanation II, and also the context in which clause (b) appears, it may be legitimate to think that under this clause also, what the legislature has contemplated is the grant of permission by A to B to occupy a but situated in a portion of A's land. And "kudikidappu", according to the definition, is: (i) the land that A permits B to occupy plus the homestead constructed thereon; or (ii) the land where the but in B's occupation is situated plus the hut. A mere reading of the above definition is probably sufficient to show that "kudikidappu" does not mean the structure (homestead or hut) alone, but also some land appurtenant thereto. The concept thus involves not only the ground on which the dwelling house stands, but something more. Explanation.2A to S.2(25) which speaks of "land and the dwelling house thereon", and S.79 which permits the kudikidappukaran to reconstruct the building without increasing its plinth area by more than 50 per cent, also support the above view. Now, if it is borne in mind that the extent of land in B's occupation is only a portion of a larger extent of land in the possession of A (except of course, in cases where the extent is very small and permission is granted in respect of the whole), it will not be improper to infer that the "adjoining land" in S.80A(1) which B can seek to purchase must be that portion of the land which remained with A, after carving out B's site. In other words, "adjoining" need not necessarily mean any neighbouring land irrespective of its nature, the use to which it is being put or can be put, its lie and other relevant factors. 9. The above approach may not be fool-proof: the idea is only to suggest that if you attach sufficient significance to the word "portion" in S.2(25), it is possible to give a more practical meaning to "lands adjoining thereto" in S.80A(1), and also to avoid some of the pitfalls referred to in some subsequent decisions of this Court. 10. 9. The above approach may not be fool-proof: the idea is only to suggest that if you attach sufficient significance to the word "portion" in S.2(25), it is possible to give a more practical meaning to "lands adjoining thereto" in S.80A(1), and also to avoid some of the pitfalls referred to in some subsequent decisions of this Court. 10. To proceed with the provisions of the statute, seems to me that an examination of Sub-s.(3) and (6) of S.80A is vital for a proper understanding of the scope of Sub-s.(1). The two sub-sections are therefore extracted below: "(3) The extent of land which the kudikidappukaran is entitled to purchase under this section shall be three cents in a city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in a Panchayat area or township: Provided that where the land available for purchase in the land in which the kudikidappu is situate, or the land in which the kudikidappu is situate, is less than the extent specified in this sub-section, the kudikidappukaran shall be entitled to purchase only the land available for purchase or, as the case may be, the land in which the kudikidappu is situate." "(6) No kudikidappukaran shall be entitled to purchase any land which is not in the lawful possession of the person who holds the land in which the kudikidappu is situate or which is not within the boundaries of such land." Ignoring sub-s.(3) and the proviso thereto for a moment (and a moment only), and concentrating on the latter part of Sub-s.(6), what it seems to say is that the kudikidappukaran cannot purchase any piece of adjoining land for the only reason that it is adjoining: he can purchase only part of the land within the boundaries of the area from which the kudikidappu was carved out, and which still remains in the possession of his grantor. Lands outside those boundaries are not available for purchase, under S.80A(1). 11. Even assuming that the above construction of Sub-s.(6) is open to doubt, what is to be emphasised is that the provision is intended to limit the broad sweep of "lands adjoining thereto" in Sub-s. (1) of S.80A, and that such restriction had escaped the notice of the Division Bench in Kuni Arippandi (1976 KLT 50). 12. 11. Even assuming that the above construction of Sub-s.(6) is open to doubt, what is to be emphasised is that the provision is intended to limit the broad sweep of "lands adjoining thereto" in Sub-s. (1) of S.80A, and that such restriction had escaped the notice of the Division Bench in Kuni Arippandi (1976 KLT 50). 12. Turning now to Sub-s.(3) it is obviously intended to specify that the total extent of land a kudikidappukaran can purchase under S.80A(1), including adjoining lands, will be 10 cents in a Panchayat area (and 3 or 5 cents in other areas). The proviso thereto recognises further restrictions and these appear to be two-fold: (i) where what is available for purchase in the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is less than 10 cents, the kudikidappukaran can purchase only that lesser extent; and (ii) where the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is less than 10 cents, the kudikidappukaran can purchase only that extent i. e. the extent in his occupation. The first restriction, corresponding to the first limb of the proviso, creates no difficulty. For example, where the total extent in A's possession is only 8 cents and he has permitted B to occupy a portion of the same extending to 3 cents for erecting a homestead, B can seek to purchase only 5 cents more as adjoining land, because that alone will be "available." Taken by itself, the second limb recognising the second restriction also creates no difficulty: where B's occupation extends only to 4 cents in a given case, he can purchase that alone, even if some extent more may be available with A. But when the two are read together, irreconcialability or at least some incongruity raises its head: if the extent of land a kudikidappukaran can purchase is to be limited to the extent actually occupied by him (where it is less than 10 cents) as indicated by the second part of the proviso, what is the purpose of its first limb dealing with'land available for purchase', or even "adjoining lands" in S.80A(1)? If I am not wrong in interpreting the proviso in the manner attempted above, the only method to avoid absurdity seems to be to make a more pragmatic approach to the meaning of "adjoining" and "available" in the context in which they appear. 13. If I am not wrong in interpreting the proviso in the manner attempted above, the only method to avoid absurdity seems to be to make a more pragmatic approach to the meaning of "adjoining" and "available" in the context in which they appear. 13. Here again, it is necessary to point out that Kuni Arippandi (1976 KLT 50) makes no reference at all to the aforesaid proviso, though it is of considerable importance in deciding what extent of land a kukidappukaran can purchase under S.80A. 14. The decision in Madhavan Kutty Nair v. Appellate Authority (1976 KLT 629) shows that a kudikidappukaran cannot invariably lay claim to adjoining paddy fields under S.80A(1), in order to make up the 10 cents specified in Sub-s.(3), ignoring the prescriptions of the proviso thereto. That was a case where apart from the kudikidappu, the land available in the land in which the kudikidappu was situate was only 4 cents, though some extent of paddy fields were also adjoining the site. The Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority proceeded to hold that the kudikidappukaran was entitled to purchase some part of the paddy field also, for making up the 10 cents, but Vadakkel J. thought that the proviso to sub-s.(3) would be rendered otiose if it were to be held that 10 cents should be assured to the kudikidappukaran in all cases, irrespective of whether the adjoining land was a paddy field, a water-logged area or a part of a bill etc. Dealing with the proviso, the learned judge said that it ".........also contemplates cases where the land owner has larger extent of adjoining lands than the extent which as per the body of sub-s.(3) the kudikidappukaran is entitled to purchase. The proviso makes it clear that in two contingencies the kudikidappukaran would not be entitled to purchase the full extent of the land he is entitled to purchase under sub-s. (3) of S.80A. The proviso makes it clear that in two contingencies the kudikidappukaran would not be entitled to purchase the full extent of the land he is entitled to purchase under sub-s. (3) of S.80A. The first is where the 'land available' for purchase in the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is less than 'the extent specified in the body of sub-s. (3); the second is where the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is less than the extent specified in the said sub-section." As for the scope of the expression "land available" in the first part of the proviso, his lordship expressed the following view: "In my view, 'the land available in the land in which the kudikidappu is situate' has to be reckoned with reference to the sense in which the words 'available land' are popularly understood in the locality in which the kudikidappu is situate. For example, it may be that a kudikidappu is situate on a small plot less in extent than that is prescribed, say by 2 or 3 cents, and which is 20 or 25 feet higher in level than the adjoining land belonging to the land owner. I do not think that in such a case it could be contended that the full extent of land belonging to the land owner taken from the land situate in both levels are available for purchase, for that would obviously mean that a small strip of land becomes a useless piece of land. In short therefore the phrase, 'the land available' has to be understood as a reasonable man understands those words in the area in which the kudikidappu is situate. If so understood it is a matter for determination by the Land Tribunal, if necessary, on evidence adduced before it as to how much land is available for purchase in the land in which the kudikidappu is situate. The Land Tribunal has also to determine whether 'the land in which the kudikidappu is situate' can reasonably be understood as the whole of the land as in this case, inclusive of the paddy fields, or it may be, inclusive of some water logged lands or even, as in the example pointed out, inclusive of the land lying 20 or 25 feet lower in level. These are matters, as earlier pointed out, to be decided, if not with reference to the particular facts of the cases, certainly with reference to how those words are popularly understood in the particular locality in which the kudikidappu is situate." A possible approach, I should say with respect, though the scope of the second part of the proviso and also of sub-s. (6) did not seem to have received full attention. 15. Another instance of the unjust, if not absurd, consequences of allowing a kudikidappukaran to purchase 10 cents of land simply because adjoining lands are available (in their literal sense) for purchase, is to be found in Sadananda Kamath v. Nagamma 1987 (1) KLT 329. The kudikidappukaran and the landowner there were both having their dwelling houses in a total extent of 12 cents. The Tribunal and the Appellate Authority held that the kudikidappukaran could purchase 10 cents, leaving only a balance of 2 cents to the landlord. This conclusion was itself somewhat startling. What was more, there was evidence to show that the land owner's house alone occupied 31/2 cents so that the result would have been to compel him to demolish his dwelling house, and be satisfied with a practically useless strip of 2 cents of land. Balakrishnan J. was not prepared to accept the concurrent view taken by the two Tribunals below, and remitted the matter, apparently for construing the term "available" in the proviso to S.80A(3), in a more reasonable manner. 16. The question still remains what the true scope of the proviso to S.80A(3) is, consisting as it does of two parts or, in the words of Vadakkel J., contemplating two contingencies. The other provisions of the Act, to the extent my attention has been drawn to them, also do not furnish much of an assistance. On the other hand, amendments made to Act 1/64 from time to time have made things more difficult. The definition in S.2(25) was originally differently worded. S.75 to 80 of the Act, as it originally stood, dealt with the "rights and liabilities of kudikidappukaran"; and all except S.76 were subsequently subjected to amendments. S.79A, and 80A to 80G, were new provisions added wholesale. The right to purchase kudikidappu was for the first time recognised only by the amendments made as per Act 35/69, effective from 1-1-70. S.75 to 80 of the Act, as it originally stood, dealt with the "rights and liabilities of kudikidappukaran"; and all except S.76 were subsequently subjected to amendments. S.79A, and 80A to 80G, were new provisions added wholesale. The right to purchase kudikidappu was for the first time recognised only by the amendments made as per Act 35/69, effective from 1-1-70. Legislative history may have some relevance in ascertaining the object behind statutory prescriptions defying easy construction; but then one will have to start from the earliest attempts made by the legislatures of Cochin, Travancore and Madras to afford protection to kudikidappukars, if a proper sense of direction is to be obtained. 17. "Kudikidappu" appears to have been an arrangement particularly known to the coastal areas of the former State of Cochin (and probably also some areas nearby). According to Mathew J. (as he then was) in Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (1970 KLT 659) it had had its origin in the grant of permission by a land owner to an agricultural labourer to put up a dwelling house in a part of the former's land, in return for the latter's services as a watchman of garden land (mostly cocoa nut groves). The arrangement was beneficial to both. The poor landless agricultural labourer get some place on earth to fix a roof over his head. Besides the usual agricultural work which must have been at best seasonal, he could also do sundry work for his land owner as also others, and thus augment his earnings, however pitiable the extent of the augmentation was. For the land owner, the kudikidappukaran and the members of his family were all more or less full time watchmen, looking after his cultivation and the crops. The "permission" created no interest in the land over which the but or homestead was allowed to be erected; there was at best only a licence. For the land owner, the kudikidappukaran and the members of his family were all more or less full time watchmen, looking after his cultivation and the crops. The "permission" created no interest in the land over which the but or homestead was allowed to be erected; there was at best only a licence. The first legislative attempt to define "kudikidappukaran" is to be seen in the sub-section (a) of S.2 of the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act, 1118 (1943), reading as follows: (a) "Kudikidappukaran" means a person who has been permitted to have the use and occupation of a portion of a property for the purpose of executing a homestead with or without an obligation to pay rent for the use and occupation of the site so given:" Sub-section (b) defined "Kudiyiruppu": "(b) "Kudiyirppu" means the site of any residential building, the site or sites of other buildings appurtenant thereto, such other lands as are necessary for the convenient enjoyment of such residential building and the easements attached thereto." The Verumpattamdars' Act was designed to confer fixity of tenure on verumpattom tenants, but under S.2(d), a kudikidappukaran was not such a tenant. The definition in S.2(a) was apparently intended to distinguish a licensee from a lessee who alone was marked out for the benevolence of the legislature; but S.8(1)(f) which provided for eviction of verumpattom tenants at the end of the agricultural year where the landlord bona fide required some space for building residential quarters, took care to specify that a kudiyiruppu would stand exempted from this provision. 18. It may be of interest to notice here itself that the kudikidappukaran of S.2(a) of the 1118 Act of Cochin is more or less similar in nature to the one you find in clause (a) of S.2(25) of Act 1/64, with the difference that it was not necessary for him, in 1118 M E, to be a person without a homestead or 10 cents of land (in Panchayat areas) of his own. This qualification was perhaps unnecessary at the time because the Act was not generally intended to protect kudikidappukars. 19. Cochin Proclamation 16 of 1122 (February, 1947) was issued for staying eviction proceedings against verumpattomdars of holdings situated within Municipal limits, If they were having residential buildings of their own, within such holdings. Such a measure was possibly found necessary in view of the exemption in S.3(f) of the 1118 Act. 20. 19. Cochin Proclamation 16 of 1122 (February, 1947) was issued for staying eviction proceedings against verumpattomdars of holdings situated within Municipal limits, If they were having residential buildings of their own, within such holdings. Such a measure was possibly found necessary in view of the exemption in S.3(f) of the 1118 Act. 20. Within a matter of months thereafter (in June, 1947), Cochin Proclamation 18 of 1122 was issued staying all legal proceedings for eviction of kudikidappukars in general: the term "kudikidappukaran" was to be here understood in the same sense as in the 1118 Act. 21. Cochin Proclamation 6 of 1124 (January, 1949) was in the nature of a holding up operation, pending consolidation and amendment of the relating to landlord and tenant. The preamble referred to the need for further protection to tenants and kudikidappukars; and the operative portion in S.5 prohibited eviction of building tenants paying a monthly rent of less than Rs.3/-. If conjectures are permissible, the origin of the present provision in clause (b) of S.2(25) of Act 1/64, roping in huts with limited rent-potential also into the definition of kudikidappukaran, can be traced to this, provision. Kudikidappukars permitted to occupy another's land for putting up their own homesteads had already been protected by Proclamation 18/1122. Proclamation VI/1122 applied only to Municipal areas, and that too to buildings put by the tenants themselves. In contrast, S.5 of the 1124 Proclamation was wide enough to afford protection to all persons occupying buildings (or huts) on nominal or very low rent, irrespective of whether they were situate in Municipal areas or had been put up by the occupants themselves. Here again, it may be possible to surmise that such a legislative measure was felt necessary when it was found that in order to get over the situation created by Proclamation 18/1122, land owners were obtaining rent-chits from persons occupying homesteads put up by themselves. 22. It is said that what was being known as "adakudi" in some parts of Travancore was a concept akin to "kudikidappu"; but the first Travancore legislation dealing with the subject appears to have been the Travancore Prevention of Eviction Act, 1124 (Act 22/1124) brought into force from March, 1949. "Eviction" was defined in S.2(a) of the Act to mean recovery of possession of a kudiyiruppu from a kudikidappukaran; and S.2(c) was in the following terms: "(c). "Eviction" was defined in S.2(a) of the Act to mean recovery of possession of a kudiyiruppu from a kudikidappukaran; and S.2(c) was in the following terms: "(c). 'Kudikidappukaran' means a person who has no homestead or land of his own to erect a homestead and has been permitted by an owner of land to have the use and occupation of a portion of the land for the purpose of erecting a homestead with or without an obligation to pay rent for the use and occupation of the site so given; and 'Kudiyiruppu' means the site so given together with the home, but or shed thereon which is used as a place of residence by the kudikidappukaran with the permission of the owner." S. 4 of the Act conferred the right of permanent occupancy on kudikidappukaran, subject to the provision of S.7 which allowed eviction on extremely limited grounds. The "interest" of a kudikidappukaran in his kudiyiruppu was made heritable, but not alienable, under S.6. S.11 also provided for "shifting" of the kudiyiruppu under certain circumstances. Ignoring the other provisions as not material for the present, the most striking feature of this Travancore enactment was that it recognised for the first time a permanent right of occupancy in favour of kudikidappukars a right which was also heritable, though not alienable. The earlier enactments and Proclamations of Cochin were only stop-gap arrangements, staying eviction of kudikidappukars pending further legislation on the subject. Two or three other aspects also deserve to be noted. The first is that "kudiyiruppu" as defined in the Travancore Act more or less corresponds to "kudikidappu" in S.2(25) of Act 1/64, though the concept appears to be different from the "kudiyiruppu" of the Cochin Act of 1118, the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929 and of S.2(26) of Act 1/64 itself. The second is that the Travancore legislation did not, like Cochin Proclamation 6/1124, apply to buildings erected and let out by the land owners at nominal rates of rent; that is, the "hut" now covered by clause (b) of S.2(25) of Act 1/64, was not within the scope of "kudiyiruppu" under the Travancore Act. The second is that the Travancore legislation did not, like Cochin Proclamation 6/1124, apply to buildings erected and let out by the land owners at nominal rates of rent; that is, the "hut" now covered by clause (b) of S.2(25) of Act 1/64, was not within the scope of "kudiyiruppu" under the Travancore Act. It may also be pertinent to point out in this context that "kudiyiruppu" under the Cochin Act of 1118 and the Malabar Tenancy Act included not only the site of a dwelling house, but also some extra land where that was necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the house. 23. After the integration of the Travancore and Cochin States, Cochin Proclamation 18/1122 and Travancore Act 22/1124 were replaced by the T.C. Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act, 1955; and its effect was virtually to make applicable to the whole of Travancore-Cochin, the provisions of the Travancore Act of 1124. That is, kudikidappukars permitted by the land owners to use portions of their lands for erecting homestead were given permanent occupancy rights, which were heritable but not alienable. The provision for shifting was also there. 24. As for the Malabar area which became part of the Kerala State on States' Reorganisation, kudikidappukars seem to have received legislative attention for the first time when the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929 was amended in 1951. There were further amendments in 1954; and broadly stated, the effect of these amendments was to add definitions of "ulkudi" and "kudikidappu" to the definition clauses of the Act, to provide for their shifting under specified conditions, and also to declare that the rights were heritable, but not alienable. Kudikidappu was defined to mean "a but in any portion of a land in Fort Cochin in the occupation of a person who has been permitted by the person entitled to possession of such land to occupy the but and who otherwise has no interest in land." And "ulkudi" was similarly a but, occupied under similar conditions or circumstances, in a portion of land outside Fort Cochin. As for shifting, the provision was that the land owner could seek the shifting of the kudikidappu (or ulkudi) to another portion of the same land or to some other suitable land at his disposal in the same village, provided the altercate site offered was of equal area and the expenses reasonably required for shifting were also met by the land owner. 25. The Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960 f Act 4/61) was the first major attempt by the Kerala legislature to "enact a comprehensive legislation relating to agrarian reforms" for the whole State. Leaving cut details not relevant for the present discussion, S.2(20) of the Act bad defined kudikidappukaran and kudikidappu, in the following terms: "20. "Kudikidappukaran" means a person who has do homestead or land, either as owner or as tenant in possession, to erect a homestead, and: (i) who has been permitted with or without an obligation to pay rent by a person in lawful possession of any land to have the use and occupation of a portion of such land for the purpose of erecting a homestead, or (ii) who has been permitted by a person in lawful possession of any land to occupy, with or without an obligation to pay rent, a but belonging to such person and situate in the said land, but otherwise has no interest in the land; and "Kudikidappu" means the land and the homestead or the but so permitted to be erected or occupied together with the easements attached thereto:" S.37 of the Act recognised fixity in favour of kudikidappukars, though provisions were also included for eviction under exceptional circumstances, and for shifting under specified conditions. As usual, kudikidappu rights were declared to be heritable, but not alienable. 26. Subject to minor variations, the definitions of kudikidappu and kudikidappukaran in Act 1/64, when it was first enacted, were more or less the same; and the concepts remained unchanged, at least in, substance, even after amendment of S.2 (25) under Act 35/69. As usual, kudikidappu rights were declared to be heritable, but not alienable. 26. Subject to minor variations, the definitions of kudikidappu and kudikidappukaran in Act 1/64, when it was first enacted, were more or less the same; and the concepts remained unchanged, at least in, substance, even after amendment of S.2 (25) under Act 35/69. As has been mentioned, one of the major changes brought about by Act 35/69 was to recognise a right in the kudikidappukaran to purchase his site and some adjoining land also; and we have been tracing the legislative history to find out whether it could help to resolve the question as to the nature and extent of such extra lands he could purchase, in view of the proviso to Sub-s. (3) of S.80A, and also Sub-s.(6). 27. And surveying the history, the picture that roughly emerges seems to be this. At the initial stages, the idea was that land owners should not be allowed to disturb the kudikidappukars, as far as possible. They could be shifted, through the intervention of an impartial agency like a court, where. proper reasons could be shown: otherwise, they were entitled just to continue where they were. A more positive approach was made later, when it was declared that the kudikidappukaran could have the right of permanent occupancy and that his right could be passed on to his legal heirs, though it could not be alienated in favour of ethers. The next stage was perhaps to rope in building tenants (as distinct from licensees of a portion of land allowed to put up homesteads) paying nominal rents, also into the class of kudikidappukaran. Thus certain types of hutment-dwellers became kudikidapppukars. Act 4 of 1961 recognised the kudikidappukaran's right to "rebuild the homestead erected by him" without exceeding the dimensions of the original homestead, at his own cost, S 79 of Act 1/64, as it was originally enacted, clarified the position further that such reconstruction could be done with the same or different materials. Under Act 35/69, S.79 was amended to allow reconstruction, also by increasing the plinth area, but by cot more than 50 per cent And the right to "purchase" as per S.80A was the last stage in this progressive march. Under Act 35/69, S.79 was amended to allow reconstruction, also by increasing the plinth area, but by cot more than 50 per cent And the right to "purchase" as per S.80A was the last stage in this progressive march. The legislative attempt, in stages, has been to elevate the kudikidappukaran from the position of some one to be just tolerated on his land by the land owner, to the status of a person entitled to have his own residential home (which may be a but, or a shed or something more) together with its site, and in appropriate cases, some more land around, necessary for the convenient enjoyment of that home and site. It is not easy to assume. that the idea of the legislature was to allow him to acquire 10 cents of land with a building thereon in all cases, at the nominal cost prescribed by the statute, irrespective of all questions as to the type of kudikidappu he was having, the nature of the adjoining land, the extent of its availability, and what could be necessary lot the convenient enjoyment of the portion he was to get, and of the portion which was to remain with the land owner. As in the Cochin Act of 1118, "kudiyiruppu" was defined in the Malabar Tenancy. Act also as the site of a residential building plus such ether land as was necessary for the convenient enjoyment of such building. As the provisions of the Act originally stood, in any suit by the land owner for evicting a 10-year old kudiyiruppu, its occupant was entitled to seek its purchase at the current market value. After the amendments of 1951 and 1954, S.35 of the Act continued to have more or less the same provision, while S.36 dealt with the shifting of kudikidappu/ulkudi. In my opinion, it is possible to think that when the Kerala legislature took up in 1969, the question of conferring on the kudikidappukaran the right to purchase his kudikidappu, it had before it the example of the kudiyiruppu holder of Malabar, who could purchase the kudiyiruppu ie., the site, the dwelling house, and such other land as was necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the same. The germs of the extra or adjoining land in Sub-s.(1) of S.80A, the restrictions in Sub-s. (3), and the limits in Sub-s. (6) could thus be found in the scheme of the Malabar Tenancy Act in its application to holders of kudiyiruppu: what is allowed to be purchased besides the site, is the land necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the kudikidappu. 28. Even in Kuni Arippandi v. Ummar (1976 KLT 50) the Division Bench had observed: "In the scheme of the Act we think it permissible to hold that the object of the legislature was not to confine the kudikidappukaran to the kudikidappu and the easements attached to it or to give him an extra piece of adjacent land suitable only for building upon if be chose; rather we think that the intention was to give him some extra land, whether garden or paddy, field, for the more convenient enjoyment of Ms dwelling house-" The difficulty in treating the whole conclusion reached in the above manner as binding precedent for all cases has already been considered, with reference to the subsequent decisions in Madhavan Kutty Nair (1976 KLT 629) and Sadananda Kamath-1987 (1) KLT 329; but "convenient enjoyment" appears to be the corner-stone of R.77(1) of the Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules also. The sub-rule reads: (1) The Land Tribunal shall, as far as possible, make available to the kudikidappukaran for his purchase, such portion of the land adjoining the kudikidappu which is necessary or useful for the convenient enjoyment of the kudikidappu: Provided that the Land Tribunal shall, as far as practicable, make available the portion which when purchased will cause the least inconvenience to the person in possession of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate." If the Rule understands the scope of S.80A correctly, what the Land Tribunal has to find out is whether some extra land is required for the kudikidappu for its convenient enjoyment. If not, the kudikidappukaran will have to be satisfied with what he already has, as laid down in the latter part of the proviso to S.80A(3). On the other hand, if some additional extent is necessary, the Tribunal can allow him to purchase up to 10 cents, subject of course to the limit of availability as laid down in the first part of the proviso. On the other hand, if some additional extent is necessary, the Tribunal can allow him to purchase up to 10 cents, subject of course to the limit of availability as laid down in the first part of the proviso. There could be no hard and fast rule: the convenience and need of the kudikidappukaran and the land owner are both relevant, and the ultimate decision has to rest with the specialist tribunal which is not expected to be swayed either by the inhuman attitude of the land owner who may want to save every inch of his land, or by the illegitimate desire of the other side to get for a song, as much land as possible. All I venture to state is that the above is a prudent way of understanding the scope of the relevant provisions of S.80A which otherwise seem to be a little intractable. 29. Turning now to the facts of the case on hand, the finding of the Land Tribunal (despite its "legalistic" doubt) was to the effect that OA 149/77 related to the kudikidappu which had come into existence in 1971 when the petitioner-applicant shifted to the southern corner of the seven cents. This kudikidappu has been occupying about 11/2 to 2 cents of land from that time; and there was absolutely no material before the Tribunal to show that for its more convenient enjoyment, the applicant was in need of some more extent of land. He could have adduced evidence to show that the but was in need of expansion requiring some more land, or that the source of water for the family was on the other side of the fence, or that some more space was needed for a bathroom or lavatory. Neither the petitioner (PW1) nor the two witnesses examined on his side made mention of any such need; and no suggestion on those lines was made to the witnesses examined on the other side also. On the other hand, the Authorised Officer's report showed, as noticed earlier, that the "adjoining" four cents was separately fenced up and was being cultivated by the land owner. On the other hand, the Authorised Officer's report showed, as noticed earlier, that the "adjoining" four cents was separately fenced up and was being cultivated by the land owner. If this was the position from 1971, it cannot seriously be suggested that any portion of the adjoining land in question "is necessary or useful for the convenient enjoyment of the kudikidappu", particularly when it is remembered that such land lies at a higher level, with physical features of its own. The revision is accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs.